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AUTHOR: 


MUNSTERBERG,  HUGO 


TITLE: 


ETERNAL  VALUES 


PLACE: 


BOSTON 


DA  TE : 


1909 


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•'193M92 
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New  York,  Houghton  Mifflin  company,  1909. 

XV,  436  p.,  1  I.    23'-. 
Physical  values.  ^*'"<=s— P*-  ^-  The  ethical  values.-pt  V.  The  raeta- 

Copy  in  The  Butler  Library  of  Philosophy.  1909. 

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PSYCHOLOGY  AND   LIFE.     Boston,  1899. 

GRUNDZUGE  DER  PSYCHOLOGIE.     Leipzig,  1900. 

AMERICAN  TRAITS.     Boston,  1902. 

DIE  AMERIKANER.     Berlin,  1904. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  ART  EDUCATION.     New  York,  1905. 

THE  ETERNAL  LIFE.     Boston,  1905. 

SCIENCE  AND  IDEALISM.     Boston,  1906. 

PHILOSOPHIE  DER  WERTE.     Leipzig,  1907. 

ON  THE  WITNESS  STAND.     New  York,  1908. 

AUS  DEUTSCH-AMERIKA.     Berlin,  1908. 

PSYCHOTHERAPY.     New  York,  1909. 

THE  ETERNAL  VALUES.     Boston,  1909. 


THE   ETERNAL  VALUES 


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THE  ETERNAL 
VALUES 


BY 


HUGO  MUNSTERBERG 


BOSTON    AND    NEW   YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(Cbe  Cliterj^ibe  prcf  jtf  Cambridge 

1909 


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PREFACE 


This  is  the  first  time  that  I  have  ventured  to  write  a  book 
in  both  English  and  German.  So  far  the  author  in  me  has 
presented  a  case  of  double  personality.  For  many  years  the 
one  person  has  written  English,  but  has  published  only  light 
books  and  essays ;  all  that  time  the  other  person  has  written 
in  German,  but  has  insisted  on  writing  scholarly  papers  and 
systematic  works.  The  one  tried  to  address  a  wider  public ; 
the  other  sought  only  the  ear  of  the  scholar.  Neither  knew 
what  the  other  was  doing. 

In  this  way  my  publications  of  the  last  year  were  again 
divided.  When  I  wanted  to  discuss  popularly  the  relations  of 
psychology  to  law  and  to  medicine,  the  American  in  me  came 
to  the  front  and  wrote  In  light  vein  "On  the  Witness  Stand'' 
and  ^'Psychotherapy.'*  But  when  the  philosophical  striving 
of  my  whole  life  had  led  me  to  a  new  idealistic  standpoint 
from  which  I  saw  the  ultimate  problems  of  the  world  in  a 
new  light,  it  seemed  only  natural  that  the  German  in  me 
should  say  it  in  his  mother  tongue  and  with  the  seriousness 
of  scholarly  formulation.  The  product  was  my  "Philosophie 
der  Werte." 

Yet  the  hardly  expected  warmth  of  welcome  which  the 
volume  found  in  wide  spheres  soon  suggested  to  me  that  after 
all  the  task  of  the  book  was  not  only  to  address  scholars  who 
do  not  care  in  what  language  a  book  is  written.  Far  beyond 
the  circle  of  philosophers  it  was  greeted  as  an  expression  of  the 
new  desires  of  our  time,  which  seeks  its  own  understanding 
of  life  and  world,  and  is  tired  of  the  mere  naturalism  and  posi- 
tivism and  skepticism  and  pragmatism  of  the  past  decades. 
The  ethical  idealism  of  the  book  seemed  to  touch  the  most 
widely  different  layers  of  the  community.    That  suggested 


■^^ 


Vlll 


PREFACE 


the  hope  that  the  book  might  fulfil  a  similar  mission  in  the 
world  of  American  thought  and  here  too  might  help  to  liberate 
from  the  ghosts  of  the  past.  Therefore  I  undertook  for  the 
first  time  the  translation  of  a  book  of  mine. 

Yet  this  volume  can  hardly  be  called  a  translation.  Much 
in  this  English  version  is  newly  added  and  much  is  omitted 
from  the  previous  text.  Many  side  issues,  especially  such  as 
connected  the  work  with  particular  German  movements,  are 
entirely  left  out,  and  not  a  few  additions  refer  to  recent 
American  discussions.    Other  parts  are  greatly  condensed. 

While  in  this  way  the  book  has  become  almost  a  new  one, 
I  have  not  altered  its  external  shape :  the  form  of  a  philo- 
sophical system.  It  would  not  have  been  difl^icult  to  re- 
move  these  sharp  boundary-lines  and  to  resolve  systematic 
separations  into  looser  forms,  more  attractive  to  the  casual 
reader.  I  have  not  yielded  to  this  temptation  because  I  sin- 
cerely  believe  that  too  much  in  the  American  method  of 
philosophizing  has  become  antagonistic  to  the  real  character 
of  philosophy.  More  and  more  the  aim  seems  to  be  the 
writing  of  philosophy  in  brilliant  epigrams  and  clever  discus- 
sions. Especially  our  younger  philosophers  dash  down  their 
thoughts  in  an  impressionistic  style  which  captivates  and 
does  not  need  the  slightest  effort  to  follow.  Who  will  doubt 
that  such  picturesqueness  is  stimulating  and  attractive?  Yet 
after  all  it  is  serving  the  ultimate  purpose  of  knowledge  no 
better  than  a  picturesque  and  epigrammatic  mathematics 
or  chemistry.  Philosophy  is  a  movement  of  thought  which 
demands  the  thoroughness  of  the  expert,  and  which  can  be 
followed  only  with  concentrated  attention.  Everything  de- 
pends upon  inner  consistency,  and  only  a  closely  knit  system 
can  secure  it.  In  all  times  only  such  systems  have  marked 
the  great  periods  of  philosophical  insight. 

This  must  not  be  misunderstood.  First  it  does  not  mean 
that  the  philosophical  understanding  of  the  world  should  lead 
us  away  from  the  reality  of  life  and  should  rely  on  meta- 


PREFACE  ix 

physical  speculations.  On  the  contrary,  this  world  of  our 
real  life  is  the  material  of  our  philosophical  effort.  In  the  fol- 
lowing volume  the  last  chapter  alone  faces  metaphysical 
problems.  The  discussion  on  truth  and  beauty,  on  happiness 
and  love,  on  science  and  art,  on  development  and  progress, 
on  industry  and  law,  on  morality  and  religion,  fills  the  bulk 
of  the  book  and  is  not  at  all  metaphysical.  It  aims  to  grasp 
our  real  experience  in  its  original  fulness  and  in  its  true 
significance.  Every  line  of  those  chapters  might  be  accepted 
even  by  those  who  see  other  ways  of  solving  the  metaphysical 
problem. 

Moreover  my  insisting  on  the  difficulty  of  the  philosophical 
task  must  not  be  misunderstood  as  if  it  pleaded  for  a  philo- 
sophical *'art  for  art's  sake."  On  the  contrary,  everybody's 
life  is  controlled  by  some  kind  of  philosophy,  however  hap- 
hazard and  inconsistent  and  fragmentary  it  may  be,  and 
every  true  philosophy  aims  finally  to  reach  the  conviction 
of  the  masses.   But  just  as  the  physicist  must  work  out  his 
formulae,  in  a  way  which  the  average  reader  would  hardly 
understand,  before  his  calculations  can  harness  nature  in  the 
service  of  the  millions,  so  the  philosopher  too  will  build  up 
and  reform  and  serve  human  progress  only  if  he  makes  no 
concession  to  "common  sense."   Common  sense,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  problems  of  world  and  life,  always  means  only  the 
echo  of  the  scholarly  philosophy  of  preceding  centuries.    If 
serious,  thorough  thought  has  distilled  some  truth,  it  will  be 
distributed  quickly  enough  through  thousands  of  popular 
channels. 

Yet  while  the  formulae  of  philosophical  calculation  ought 
not  even  to  tempt  the  reader  who  simply  wants  to  sip  the 
wisdom  of  the  worid,  no  philosophy  will  really  lead  forward 
which  is  not  after  all  the  expression  of  the  deepest  striving 
of  its  time.  The  sincere  conviction  that  this  holds  true  for  the 
idealistic  philosophy  of  "The  Eternal  Values,"  from  the  start 
gave  the  real  aim  and  meaning  to  this  work.  Throughout  our 


«  PREFACE 

life  a  new  wave  is  rising,  a  new  seeking  and  a  new  longing, 
a  new  feeling  and  a  new  certainty :  may  this  book  now  help 
in  the  New  Worid  too  to  bring  these  young  and  yet  so  old 
ideals  to  clear  self-consciousness  and  through  it  to  inner 
strength  and  power!  I  cannot  symbolize  this  hope  better 
than  by  dedicating  this  work,  in  friendship  of  heart  and 
thought,  to  the  same  man  whose  name  it  carried  when  it 
went  forth  on  its  first  voyage. 

„  ,,  Hugo  Munsterberg. 

Harvard  University, 
May,  1909. 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS 

Introduction 

Skepticism  and  Relativism,  1 ;  Idealism,  3 ;  The  Need  of  a 
New  Philosophy,  4. 


PART  I.    THE  MEANING  OF  VALUES 

I.  Physical  Nature 9 

The  World  as  Material  Mechanism,  9 ;  Man  and  the  Uni- 
verse, 12. 

II.  The  Psychical  Nature 15 

The  Aim  of  Psychology,  15;  Voluntaristic  Psychology,  17; 
Content  of  Consciousness,  19;  Pleasure  and  Pain,  20;  The 
One-sidedness  of  Psychology,  22 ;  Immediate  Reality,  23. 

III.  The  Personalities 27 

The  Individual  WUl,  27;  Economic  Values,  29;  Highest 
Values,  31 ;  Modern  Relativism,  34;  Unconditioned  Values, 
37;  Pragmatism  and  Idealism,  41. 

IV.  The  Obligations 46 

The  Validity  of  Absolute  Values,  46 ;  A  Misinterpretation 
of  the  Absolute,  48;  The  Necessity  of  Action,  50;  The 
Social  Norms,  51 ;  The  Values  and  the  Ought,  54 ;  The  Ob- 
ligation of  Knowledge,  58;  The  Obligation  of  Morality,  60; 
Self-consistency,  63 ;  The  Obligations  and  the  Pure  Will,  64. 

V.  The  Satisfaction  of  the  Will 65 

Satisfaction  and  Pleasure,  65;  Satisfaction  and  Fulfilment, 
69;  Pure  Will  Actions,  71;  The  Meaning  of  Realization,  72. 

VI.  The  Eternal  Values 75 

The  Demand  for  a  Worid,  75 ;  The  Self-assertion  of  Experi- 
ence, 77 ;  The  System  of  Values,  78 ;  The  Prejudices  against 
Systematic  Philosophy,  80;  Philosophy  and  Life,  81. 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PART  II.    THE  LOGICAL  VALUES 
VII.  The  Values  op  Existence 37 

The  Identity  of  Experience.  87;  Judgment  and  Reality, 
88;  The  Life  Experience  and  Real  Existence,  90. 

A.  Things g^ 

The  Practical  Test  of  Existence,  94;  The  Postulate  of 
Existence,  96 ;  The  Space-Time  Form,  97;  The  Existence 

of  Mental  Things,  100. 

B.  Persons jqq 

The    Naturalistic    Idea    of    Persons.    102;    The  Real 
Knowledge  of  Others.  104;  The  Practical  Test.  106. 

C.  Valtiations ij2 

The  Over-personal  Will  Acts,  112;  The  Absoluteness  of 
the  Valuation,  114. 

VIII.  The  Values  of  Connection hq 

Identity  as  Principle  of  Connection,  116;  The  Ideal  of 
Science,  119. 

A.  Nature ^21 

The  Totality  of  Things  in  their  Connection,  121 ;  The 
Single  Facts  and  the  General  Laws,  122;  The  Concep- 
tion of  Causality,  126 ;  The  Causal  Laws  and  the  Recog- 
nition of  Identities,  129;  The  Description  and  Explana- 
tion, 130;  The  Natural  Sciences  and  Psychology,  134; 
The  Absolute  Value  of  Science,  136. 

B.  History *  00 

The  Connection  of  Will  Acts,  138;  History  and  the 
Objective  Time,  142;  History  and  Causality,  144;  The 
Understanding  of  Persons,  149;  The  New  Will  Acts!  151; 
History  and  Things,  152. 

C.  Reason ^ee 

The  Connection  of  Evaluations.  155;  The  Connection 
of  Judgments,  159. 

PART  III.    THE  ESTHETIC  VALUES 

IX.  The  Values  op  Unity ^65 

Unity  and   Beauty,  165  ;  The   Psychological   Aspect   of 
^Esthetics.    167;  The  ^Esthetic  Intro jection,  170;   The 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

Esthetic  Unity.  172;  The  Will  of  Nature.  175;  JEsthetic 
Reality,  176;  ^Esthetic  Manifoldness,  177 ;  -^thetic  and 
Logical  Values,  180. 

A.  Harmony 183 

The  Sensuous  Enjoyment,  183 ;  The  Beauty  of  Nature, 
185;  Natural  Beauty  and  Art,  187. 

B.  Love 188 

Harmony  of  Wills,  188;  Love  and  the  Moral  Values, 
190;  Love  and  Pleasure,  193. 

C.  Happiness 195 

Happiness  and  Morality,  195;  Happiness  and  Pleasure, 
197;  The  Unity  of  Will,  198;  The  Will  Character  of 
Happiness,  200 ;  The  Propagation  of  Happiness,  202. 

X.  The  Values  of  Beauty 204 

The  Inner  Agreement  of  the  Manifold,  204 ;  The  Applied 
Arts,  205;  Beauty  and  Reality,  207;  The  Unreality  of 
Art,  208;  Self-deception,  211;  The  Freedom  of  the  Artist, 
212;  The  Artistic  Form,  217. 

A.  Fine  Arts 218 

The  Content  of  the  Picture,  218;  Art  and  Science,  220; 
The  Form  of  the  Picture,  223;  The  Lines  and  Colors, 
224. 

B.  Literature 227 

The  Field  of  Literature,  227 ;  The  Meaning  of  Life.  228 ; 
Historical  Reality,  230 ;  The  Three  Types  of  Literature, 
233;  The  Meaning  of  the  Drama,  234;  The  Form  of 
Literature,  237 ;  Rhythm  and  Sound,  238. 

C.  Music 241 

The  Psychology  and  -Esthetics  of  Music.  241 ;  Rhythms 
and  Sounds,  243 ;  Melody,  246 ;  The  Meaning  of  Musical 
Beauty,  249 ;  Music  and  the  Inner  World,  251. 

PART  IV.    THE  ETHICAL  VALUES 

XI.  The  Values  of  Development 257 

Being  and  Becoming,  257 ;  Purpose  and  Realization,  260. 

A.  Growth 263 

Teleology  in  Natural  Science,  263;  The  Intentions  of 
Nature.  267;  The  Pseudo-intentions  of  Nature,  270;  The 
Material  of  Human  Deed,  273. 


Xll 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PART  II.  THE  LOGICAL  VALUES 

VII.  The  Values  of  Existence 87 

The  Identity  of  Experience,  87;  Judgment  and  Reality. 
88;  The  Life  Experience  and  Real  Existence,  90. 

A.  Things 94 

The  Practical  Test  of  Existence,  94;  The  Postulate  of 
Existence,  96 ;  The  Space-Time  Form,  97 ;  The  Existence 

of  Mental  Things,  100. 

B.  Persons iqq 

The    Naturalistic    Idea    of    Persons,    102;    The  Real 
Knowledge  of  Others,  104;  The  Practical  Test,  106. 

C.  Valtiations 112 

The  Over-personal  Will  Acts,  112;  The  Absoluteness  of 
the  Valuation,  114. 

VIII.  The  Values  of  Connection hq 

Identity  as  Principle  of  Connection,  116;  The  Ideal  of 
Science,  119. 

A.  Nature 2^21 

The  Totality  of  Things  in  their  Connection,  121;  The 
Single  Facts  and  the  General  Laws,  122;  The  Concep- 
tion of  Causality,  126 ;  The  Causal  Laws  and  the  Recog- 
nition of  Identities,  129;  The  Description  and  Explana- 
tion, 130;  The  Natural  Sciences  and  Psychology,  134; 
The  Absolute  Value  of  Science,  136. 

B.  History j^gg 

The  Connection  of  Will  Acts,  138;  History  and  the 
Objective  Time,  142;  History  and  Causality,  144;  The 
Understanding  of  Persons,  149 ;  The  New  Will  Acts,  151 ; 
History  and  Things,  152. 

C.  Reason jkc 

The  Connection  of  Evaluations,  155;  The  Connection 
of  Judgments,  159. 

PART  III.    THE   ESTHETIC  VALUES 
IX.  The  Values  of  Unity 155 

Unity  and   Beauty,  165  ;  The   Psychological   Aspect   of 
-Esthetics,    167;   The   ^Esthetic   Introjection,   170;   The 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

^Esthetic  Unity,  172 ;  The  Will  of  Nature,  175 ;  Esthetic 
Reality,  176;  -Esthetic  Manifoldness,  177 ;  .^thetic  and 
Logical  Values,  180. 

A.  Harmony 183 

The  Sensuous  Enjoyment,  183 ;  The  Beauty  of  Nature, 
185;  Natural  Beauty  and  Art,  187. 

B.  Love 188 

Harmony  of  Wills,  188;  Love  and  the  Moral  Values, 
190;  Love  and  Pleasure,  193. 

C.  Happiness 195 

Happiness  and  Morality,  195;  Happiness  and  Pleasure, 
197;  The  Unity  of  Will,  198;  The  Will  Character  of 
Happiness,  200;  The  Propagation  of  Happiness,  202. 

X.  The  Values  of  Beauty 204 

The  Inner  Agreement  of  the  Manifold,  204;  The  Applied 
Arts,  205;  Beauty  and  Reality,  207;  The  Unreality  of 
Art,  208;  Self-deception,  211;  The  Freedom  of  the  Artist, 
212;  The  Artistic  Form,  217. 

A.  Fine  Arts 218 

The  Content  of  the  Picture,  218;  Art  and  Science,  220; 
The  Form  of  the  Picture,  223;  The  Lines  and  Colors, 
224. 

B.  Literature 227 

The  Field  of  Literature,  227;  The  Meaning  of  Life,  228; 
Historical  Reality,  230;  The  Three  Types  of  Literature, 
233 ;  The  Meaning  of  the  Drama,  234 ;  The  Form  of 
Literature,  237;  Rhythm  and  Sound,  238. 

C.  Music 241 

The  Psychology  and  Esthetics  of  Music,  241 ;  Rhythms 
and  Sounds,  243 ;  Melody,  246 ;  The  Meaning  of  Musical 
Beauty,  249;  Music  and  the  Inner  World,  251. 

PART  IV.    THE   ETHICAL  VALUES 

XL  The  Values  of  Development 257 

Being  and  Becoming,  257;  Purpose  and  Realization,  260. 

A.  Growth 263 

Teleology  in  Natural  Science,  263;  The  Intentions  of 
Nature,  267;  The  Pseudo-intentions  of  Nature,  270;  The 
Material  of  Human  Deed,  273. 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

B.  Progress 277 

History  and  Progress,  277;  The  Naturalistic  View  of 
Society.  281 ;  The  Will  of  the  Community,  285 ;  The  Indi- 
vidual Standpoint  and  the  Group  Standpoint,  286 ;  The 
Stages  of  Civilization,  289;  Progress  and  Regress,  293. 

C.  Self-Development 294 

The  Unfolding  of  the  Will,  294;  The  Fundamental  Will, 
298. 

XII.  The  Values  of  Achievement 301 

The  Intentional  Securing  of  the  Development,  301. 

A.  Industry 3Q4 

Economy,  304 ;  The  Spirit  of  the  Economic  Life,  306 ; 
Nature  and  the  Purposes  of  Man,  310;  The  Technical 
Development,  314. 

B.  Law gj^y 

The  Historic  Relativity  of  Law,  317;  Law  and  Morality, 
321 ;  The  Coercive  Measures  of  Law,  323 ;  Law  and  the 
Economic  Life,  325;  The  Absolute  Value  of  Law,  328. 

C.  Morality 329 

Morality  and  Law.  329 ;  The  Content  of  the  Moral  Action, 
331;  Morality  and  Development,  333;  The  Self  as  Value, 
337;  The  Immoral  Action.  340;  The  Moral  Obligation. 
342. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xv 

XIV.  The  Values  of  Absoluteness 385 

The  Presupposition  of  the  Values,  385;  The  Unification 
of  the  Values,  387 ;  Knowledge  and  Conviction,  392 ;  The 
Over-experience,  395 ;  The  Over-will,  398. 

A.  World 402 

The  World  and  the  WUl,  402 ;  The  Material  of  the  World, 
405;  Time  and  Space,  407;  The  World  and  the  Deed 
of  the  Over-self,  410. 

B.  Mankind 412 

The  Individual  and  the  Over-self,  412;  The  Individual 
and  the  Body.  415;  The  Metaphysical  Meaning  of  Man- 
kind, 416;  The  Upbuilding  of  Values,  418. 

C.  Over-self 420 

The  Contradictions  in  the  Self.  420;  The  Meaning  of  the 
World,  422 ;  The  Meaning  of  Life,  426. 


PART   V.    THE  METAPHYSICAL  VALUES 
XIII.  The  Values  of  Holiness 347 

The  Manifoldness  of  Values,  347 ;  The  Conflict  of  Values, 
350 ;  The  Identification  of  Values,  352 ;  Religion  and  Philo- 
sophy, 354 ;  Development  and  Religion,  357. 

A.  Creation 059 

God  and  Natural  Science,  359;  The  Oriental  Religions, 
363 ;  Christianity,  367. 

B.  Revelation oyQ 

Revelation  and  History,  370 ;  The   Divine  Order,  372 ; 
Revelation  in  the  Historical  Religions,  373. 

C.  Salvation o»g 

The  Life  after  Death,  376;  Buddhism,  378;  Christianity 
and  Salvation,  380;  Immortality  and  Time,  382. 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


INTRODUCTION 

Is  there  anything  in  the  world  valuable  in  itself?  That  is  our 
question.  Of  course  there  are  many  things  which  we  value 
because  you  or  I  like  them,  or  because  they  are  useful  for 
a  certain  purpose;  they  are  helpful  to  us.   But  such  values 
depend  upon  our  special  standpoint.   A  thing  may  be  use- 
ful to  me  and  useless  to  my  neighbor.  It  may  be  agreeable 
to  our  social  group,  but  disagreeable  to  other  nations  or  to 
other  ages.  Even  the  truths  of  to-day  were  not  the  truths 
of  yesterday  and  may  not  be  valued  as  truths  to-morrow. 
The  beauties  of  one  school  may  mean  ugliness  to  another.  The 
moral  laws  of  one  tribe  may  demand  what  is  forbidden  in  the 
next.  Religious  values  have  always  been  objects  of  dispute. 
Everything  seems  dependent  upon  individual  standpoints,  de- 
pendent upon  individual  desires.   Truth  is  nothing  but  that 
which  helps  us  to  fulfil  our  purposes ;  beauty  is  nothing  but 
that  which  appeals  agreeably  to  our  senses;  morality  is  no- 
thing but  useful  prescriptions  which  secure  comfort  for  our  par- 
ticular social  group ;  religion  is  nothing  but  suggestions  which 
give  us  hope.  In  short,  our  so-called  values  seem  to  be  merely 
means  of  personal  gratification,  changing  from  age  to  age, 
from  people  to  people,  from  group  to  group,  from  man  to  man. 
/  Outspoken  or  not,  that  is  the  philosophical  creed  of  the 
Overwhelming  majority  of  thinking  persons  to-day.    The 
faithful  believer,  to  be  sure,  feels  that  his  religion  really 
brings  him  in  contact  with  something  which  is  absolutely 
valuable.   The  moral  man  who  sacrifices  his  life  to  follow 
the  call  of  duty  believes  in  his  deepest  heart  that  the  moral 
deed  is  of  absolute  value.  The  artist  who  creates  a  thing  of 


IH 


2  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

beauty  imagines  that  his  inspiration,  too,  opens  to  him  a 
world  of  absolute  value.  The  social  reformer  and  the  states- 
man, the  pioneer  and  the  captain  of  industry,  when  they 
work  and  fight  for  the  progress  of  mankind,  feel  that  the 
human  advance  is  something  absolutely  valuable.  The  judge 
when  he  serves  on  the  bench  is  filled  with  the  belief  that  it  is 
absolutely  valuable  to  have  justice  prevail  among  men.  And 
in  the  midst  of  his  scholarly  research  the  seeker  for  truth  is 
indeed  uplifted  by  the  conviction  that  the  full  truth  is  some- 
thing eternally  valuable.  But  all  these  convictions  and  be- 
liefs, these  faiths  and  inspirations,  must  fade  away,  it  seems, 
as  soon  as  the  philosopher  begins  to  examine  them.  He  shows 
that  they  are  nothing  but  illusions  which  pleasantly  deceive 
the  striving  men,  and  that  in  reality  no  absolute  values  can 
exist.  Everything  is  relative,  everything  is  good  only  for  a 
certain  purpose,  for  a  certain  time,  for  a  certain  social  group, 
for  a  certain  individual.  Goodness  and  beauty  and  progress 
and  peace  and  religion  and  truth  merely  have  pragmatic  value. 
They  help  us  to  our  personal  ends.  Our  ideals  and  our  lives 
are  of  no  value  in  themselves.  What  we  dream  of  eternal  values 
should  simply  be  explained  psychologically  like  the  fancies 
of  a  fairy-tale.  Philosophical  skepticism  and  relativism  are 
thus  the  last  word,  and  their  answer  harmonizes  with  a  thou- 
sand disorganizing  tendencies  of  our  time. 

To  examine  whether  their  answer  is  really  true  and  the 
whole  truth,  is  the  purpose  of  this  philosophical  volume.  It 
will  show  that  it  is  the  relativism  and  the  skepticism  which 
move  from  misunderstanding  to  misunderstanding;  it  will 
show  that  idealism  is  justified,  nay,  is  demanded,  by  true  sci- 
ence and  true  philosophy,  that  the  believers  are  right  and  the 
pragmatists  wrong,  and  that  we  may  stand  firmly  with  both 
feet  on  the  rock  of  facts,  and  may  yet  hold  to  the  absolute 
values  as  eternally  belonging  to  the  structure  of  the  world. 
Such  an  end  can  never  be  reached  by  simply  affirming  once 
more  a  faithful  belief  and  an  enthusiastic  conviction.    To 


INTRODUCTION 


8 


profess  idealism  never  means  to  prove  its  right.  The  popular 
way  of  the  sentimental  appeal,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  min- 
ister or  of  the  reformer,  of  the  scholar  or  of  the  artist,  of 
the  pioneer  or  of  the  moralist,  cannot  defend  our  cause.    We 
have  to  take  the  way  of  dispassionate  logical  argument ;  it 
is  the  way  of  sober  philosophy.  But  this  way  may  divide 
itself  and  reach  its  end  by  two  different  methods.  We  may 
simply  enter  into  a  critical  discussion  of  the  positivism  and 
pragmatism  and  skepticism  of  our  time.    We  may  show 
where  their  error  begins  and  why  they  must  lead  to  failure. 
This  has  often  been  done,  and  successfully  done ;  and  yet  it 
never  has  led  and  never  can  lead  to  a  new  view  of  the  world. 
It  is  negative ;  it  destroys  the  opposing  argument,  but  has 
nothing  better  to  offer;  and  while  we  may  become  convinced 
that  this  or  that  relativistic  philosophy  is  wrong  and  hollow, 
we  listen  willingly  again  to  every  new  effort  in  the  same  spirit. 
But  there  is  another  way  open.    The  philosopher  might 
try,  not  only  to  destroy,  but  to  build  up ;  not  only  to  criticise, 
but  to  open  new  perspectives.   Our  time  needs  a  new  philo- 
sophy.  The  mere  heaping  up  of  facts  no  longer  satisfies  us; 
the  world  is  tired  of  the  pose  of  a  mere  triumphal  niarch 
from  discovery  to  discovery  without  ever  asking  what  it  all 
means.  We  have  come  to  feel  that  life  is  not  more  worth 
living  by  the  mere  accumulation  of  collected  facts.   But  our 
time  is  tired,  too,  of  the  skeptical  and  relativistic  philosophy 
which  always  follows  the  periods  of  technical  progress  and 
the  advance  of  naturalistic  knowledge.  The  world  longs  for 
a  new  expression  of  the  meaning  of  life  and  reality.  Our 
age  begins  to  feel  anew  that  the  true  riddles  of  the  universe 
are  after  all  not  those  which  the  naturalist  declared  to  be  such, 
and  that  we  do  not  understand  the  world  we  live  in  by  simply 
decomposing  it  into  its  physical  and  psychical  elements.  Our 
time  again  feels  instinctively  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  re- 
new the  old  system  of  the  sophists;  they  taught,  indeed,  like 
the  sophists  of  to-day,  that  there  is  no  value  in  any  ideals, 


I: 


kf ' 


4  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

and  that  the  individual  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things. 
Our  time  certainly  welcomes  every  achievement  of  the  sci- 
ences, —  the  physical  and  the  mental  ones,  —  and  does  not 
want  to  lose  any  of  their  conquests,  but  it  begins  to  reject 
the  superficiality  with  which  such  physical  and  psychological 
knowledge  is  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  philosophy.   The  sci- 
ences themselves  begin  to  urge  a  critical  examination  of 
their  foundations,  and  that  means  that  they  ask  about  the 
real  value  of  truth.  And  in  practical  life,  also,  everywhere  an 
uncanny  feeling  prevails  that  our  hasty,  busy  life  has  lost  its 
aim,  that  our  efficiency  has  grown,  but  that  the  meaning  of 
our  life  is  in  danger,  that  everything  is  scattered,  and  that 
we  need  a  new  unity.    Clearer  and  clearer  shine  the  values 
through  the  world  of  facts. 

We  need  a  philosophy  which  will  do  justice  to  all  the  know- 
ledge  and  all  the  aspirations  of  the  twentieth  century,  and 
yet  avoid  the  shallowness  of  modem  skepticism.   The  time 
may  not  be  ripe  for  such  a  new  unity  of  its  self-expression, 
but  the  time  for  it  will  never  come  if  the  effort  is  not  made 
again  and  again,  seriously  and  consistently.  Mere  preaching 
and  mere  enthusiasm  are  utterly  insufficient.    Hard,  thor- 
ough, patient  labor  is  needed,  and  no  one  ought  to  believe  that 
easy-going  epigrammatic  philosophy  can  relieve  us  from  the 
burden  of  such  difficult  work.    Nor  is  it  sufficient  simply 
to  renew  the  historic  systems  of  classical  idealists  from  the 
days  of  Plato  to  those  of  Kant,  Fichte,  and  Hegel.  The  know- 
ledge of  science  has  become  new  since  those  days,  especially 
through  psychology,  which  has  opened  the  widest  vistas.  New 
fields  of  practical  tasks  have  been  secured  for  us.  We  have 
become  new  types  of  human  beings.   All  that  must  be  in- 
cluded and  developed  by  a  laborious  thought,  abstract  and 
apparently  removed  from  practical  life;  it  must  be  anchored 
in  the  depths  of  conviction.  And  it  is  certain,  if  our  time  is  to 
have  a  new  philosophy  which  may  give  meaning  to  life  and 
reality,  and  liberate  us  from  the  pseudo-philosophic  doubt 


INTRODUCTION  5 

of  our  ideals,  that  the  problem  of  values  must  stand  in  the 
centre  of  the  inquiry.  The  meaning  of  what  is  valuable  must 
decide  our  view  of  the  world.   Of  course  others  may  have 
their  full  share  in  the  study  of  what  mankind  accredits  as 
value.   Sociologists  and  psychologists,  historians  and  biolo- 
gists, economists  and  theologians,  may  and  must  approach 
the  problem  of  values  from  new  and  ever  new  sides.  They 
have  to  describe  and  classify,  and  especially  to  explam,  the 
whole  manifoldness  of  that  which  men  value  in  the  world. 
They  have  to  make  us  understand  how  this  endless  variety 
of  valuations  has  grown  and  how  it  originated.   They  may 
enter  into  the  fight  and  favor  some  groups  of  values  and 
disclaim  other  groups ;  they  may  try  to  make  a  change  m  the 
valuations  of  our  time  and  stamp  new  values  for  mankind ; 
and  yet  the  fundamental  problem  remains  untouched  by  all 
of  them.  The  philosopher  alone  is  called  to  answer  it. 

The  philosophical  inquiry  into  values  is  not  planned  to 
give  or  to  deny  value  to  anything  in  heaven  or  earth,  or  to 
create  new  values,  or  to  reshape  or  to  transvaluate  the  ac- 
knowledged values.  Still  less  can  its  goal  be  to  explam  the 
mental  process  of  preference  by  means  of  natural  science  or 
psychology.  Philosophy  has  rather  to  seek  an  answer  to  the 
one  question,  how  far  we  have  a  right  to  give  to  our  values 
an  objective  character.  Philosophy  needs  to  understand  what 
the  fundamental  meaning  of  any  valuation  is,  and  to  exam- 
ine whether  and  in  what  sense  absolute  valuation  is  pos- 
sible at  all.  Philosophy  never  has  to  do  with  the  problems 
of  special  experiences,  but  always  has  to  ask  how  and  m  what 
sense  such  experience  is  possible.  The  philosopher  leaves  it 
to  the  naturalists  and  to  the  historians  to  discover  the  special 
facts  of  reality,  and  to  bring  them  into  systematic  connection. 
He  keeps  for  his  own  inquiry  only  the  deeper  problem  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  what  the  real  meaning  of  such  facts  can 
be  and  what  it  means  to  have  such  knowledge  of  the  worid 
at'all    It  is  the  same  in  the  domain  of  values.  The  special 


«  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

sciences  have  to  study  what  has  been  valued  or  has  been  re- 
jected, here  or  there,  or  now  or  then,  and  specialists  have  to 
consider  whether  it  would  be  right  or  wrong,  useful  or  dan- 
gerous, to  accept  or  reject  certain  valuations.  But  the  phi- 
losophic theory  of  values  seeks  only  what  it  means  to  have 
values.  In  what  sense  can  they  be  really  valuable  ?  In  what 
sense  are  they  dependent  upon  our  personal  standpoint?    Is 
there  anything  in  the  world  valuable  except  our  personal 
likings  and  pleasures,  anything  worthless  but  the  sources  of 
our  personal  discomfort?  Is  there  any  value  which  we  ought 
to  acknowledge  without  reference  to  our  personality  ?    Is 
there  any  moral  or  logical  or  aesthetic  or  religious  sin  which 
we  ought  to  reject  without  reference  to  our  personal  disliking  ? 


PART  I 

THE  MEANING  OF  VALUES 


i< 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  PHYSICAL  NATURE 

Our  question  is,  whether  we  have  to  acknowledge  anything 
in  our  world  as  absolutely  valuable.  Yet  if  we  formulate  our 
problem  in  this  way,  we  should  at  once  make  clear  who  the 
"we"  are  who  are  to  value  the  world,  and  still  more  which 
"world"  is  meant  of  which  the  worth  or  worthlessness  is  to 
be  weighed.  The  world  can  be  defined  in  so  many  ways.  The 
theologian  means  something  different  by  the  "  world  "  from 
the  physicist,  and  with  every  interpretation  of  the  world  of 
course  the  question  concerning  its  values  changes.  The  same 
holds  true  of  ourselves.  We  too  are  something  entirely  dif- 
ferent for  the  historian  and  for  the  biologist,  for  the  chemist 
and  for  the  moralist,  and  our  attitude  must  always  get  a 
new  meaning.  A  special  way  of  looking  on  us  as  individuals, 
moreover,  belongs  together  with  a  special  way  of  looking  on 
the  world.  The  world  in  which  we  live  our  lives  as  historical 
personalities  is  not  the  same  world  in  which  we  react  as  bio- 
logical organisms.   That  first  world  in  which  we  fight  the 
struggles  of  our  practical  life,  the  world  which  we  experience 
in  every  pulse-beat  of  our  real  aiming  and  working,  mdeed, 
lies  far  from  the  world  of  the  scientist  with  its  atoms  and  its 
causal  laws.    We  must  therefore  discriminate  carefully  of 
which  world  we  are  to  speak.  It  would  seem  most  natural  to 
begin  with  that  world  of  immediate  subjective  experience, 
which  has  not  been  revised  by  scientific  conceptions,  but 
which  we  find  naively  in  us  and  with  us.  Yet  the  modern 
man  is  hardly  prepared  to  begin  his  outlook  with  a  view  of 
such  immediate  reality.  We  all  stand  so  fully  in  the  grasp 
of  our  school  knowledge,  and  we  have  been  so  completely 


10  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

trained  to  see  things  with  the  eyes  of  natural  science,  that  it 
appears  much  more  in  harmony  with  our  habits  of  thought 
if  instead  we  start  with  a  picture  of  the  world  which  physics 
draws  for  us.  That  may  be  our  first  step.  It  is  indeed  quite 
unimportant  with  which  view  of  the  world  we  begin,  so  long 
as  we  take  care  to  be  consistent  and  not  to  mix  the  various 
aspects  of  reality.  Thus  we  ask  as  our  first  preparatory 
question:  What  is  valuable  in  the  world  which  the  scientist 
explores  and  explains,  in  the  world  of  the  causal  laws? 

Then  we  deliberately  take  at  first  the  standpoint  of  the 
naturalist,  and  look  on  the  world  as  if  reality  itself  were 
nothing  but  this  system  of  objects  in  space  and  time  and 
in  causal  connection.   The  scientist  does  not  ask,  and  has 
no  right  to  ask,  whether  space  and  time  and  causality  exist 
without  exception.  He  simply  presupposes  them.  If  he  is  an 
astronomer,  he  knows  that  he  would  not  deepen  his  astro- 
nomy but  distort  it,  if  he  were  to  look  out  with  his  telescope 
to  ascertain  whether  there  is  somewhere  no  space,  or  if  he 
were  to  make  calculations  whether  there  is  somewhere  an 
effect  without  cause.  The  scientist  studies  only  the  details  of 
this  world,  but  the  fundamental  forms  and  the  fundamental 
scheme  of  that  world  he  accepts  beforehand.  There  can- 
not be  anything  in  his  world  which  is  not  included  in  the 
forms  of  time  and  space  and  causality.   Such  a  ground  plan 
of  a  causal  world,  however  vague,  is  somehow  m  the  mind  of 
even  the  most  naive  person  as  soon  as  he  seeks  a  cause  for  any 
happening,  or  tries  to  foresee  an  effect  which  is  to  be  expected. 
The  progress  of  science  means  only  the  further  elaboration 
and  detailed  discovery  of  this  causal  world.   And  now  we 
ask  what  there  is  valuable  in  this  world  of  the  scientist. 

The  ideal  of  such  a  world  is  a  material  mechanism.  If  we 
pad  it  out  into  a  philosophy,  it  gives  us  a  logically  impossible 
materialism;  but  if  we  take  it  simply  as  the  foundation  of 
physical  sciences,  it  is  invulnerable.  Even  the  demand  to 
substitute  energies  for  the  material  substances  only  appar- 


THE  PHYSICAL  NATURE 


11 


ently  changes  such  a  view  of  the  world,  and  is  without  con- 
Squences  for  our  problem.  In  the  language  of  three  thousand 
ZwTshould  therefore  have  to  say  that  every  occur- 
re^  e  ilthe  universe  is  ultimately  only  a  change  of  position 
of  smlst  indivisible  bodily  particles,  of  which  each  is  com- 
netely  determined  in  its  movement  by  preceding  movements 
fnle  whole  system.    Even  all  the  life-processes  are  only 
phyLrand  chemical  occurrences,  and  every  chemical  and 
ES  change  resolves  itself  finally  into  mechanical  move- 
Sslftl  It  is  ciuite  indifferent  for  us  how  farnat^l 
science  is  still  removed  to-day  from  the  solution  of  this  task^ 
IrZiTnt  only  forus  is  the  fact  that  natural  scienceis  bound 
lyite  presuppositions  never  to  acknowledge  any  unmecham- 
Sl  UfLneJSes,  any  over-natural  -Auences  -^.-^^^^ 
a  Mncies    These  demands  would  remam  even  if  the  history  oi 
2  s^esses  had  not  so  completely  affirmed  the  nght  of  its 

^^Zn^..^-Or.>dinsucha,t^^^^^^ 
There  W^^^inations  of  particles  which  are  fugitive  ana 
Ih  h  '  mmble,  or  which  are  lasting  in  their  connec  lons^ 
Some  a^rTrnple  and  others  are  complex,  some  are  similar  to 
.rinXr^nd  some  are  dissimilar,  but  nothing  gives  us  the 
1  h^St;  the  claim  that  the  complex  is  bet^r  an 
,      •      1    4-v,of  fViP  ln<5tins  is  more  valuable  than  tne  lugi 

L'^M  if^SVks  of  prope.  and  o<;i-'°^-f  ,^ 
h.  Mows  up  the  transition  from  the  infnsor  to  the  ym 
brate  «  from  the  acom  to  the  tree;  bnt  such  co'^P"""^' 
orate,  oi  n"  r^mare^  involvc  a  certain  evalu- 

which  like  development  and  progress  injo^^^  „  -. 

ation,  are  after  all  disloyal  to  his  real  intention.    J  ^eisr^Y  ^ 

r  consi  tent  with  his  mechanical  view  of  the  world,  he  has  to 
arnolTedge  that  there  would  be  nothing  worse  and  nothng 

\  l^r  if  th^e  transition  should  l^d  ^^^^^^^^Z'itrZ 
rS^^eS^rrormrto^t^-s.  Cownpo- 


12 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


sition  in  the  universe  cannot  change  this,  as  we  ourselves  are, 
in  such  a  system  of  nature,  nothing  but  organisms.  As  little 
as  the  astronomer  has  the  right  to  think  of  our  earth  as  the 
centre  of  the  imiverse,  has  the  biologist  a  right  to  make  any 
concessions  in  favor  of  the  human  organism.  In  the  consistent 
system  of  nature,  the  existence  of  man  is  in  itself  not  more 
desirable  than  that  of  pebbles  on  the  beach.  Whether  the 
earth  with  all  the  teeming  organisms  on  its  surface  will  sink 
into  the  sun,  or  whether  the  human  organism  will  develop 
itself  into  a  much  more  complex  being  with  a  still  more  com- 
plicated brain,  are  two  hypotheses  concerning  the  future 
which  the  naturalist  has  to  consider  with  equal  neutrality. 
Whether  one  will  occur  or  the  other,  whether  man  will  be 
destroyed  or  will  climb  on,  is  from  such  a  point  of  view  equally 
without  any  value.  Either  would  be  simply  a  fact  and  no- 
thing but  a  fact. 

Of  course  that  would  at  once  be  completely  changed  if 
the  one  product  of  nature,  man,  should  stand  as  something 
absolutely  valuable  in  the  mechanical  universe.  From  this 
point  of  view,  then,  everything  would  become  illuminated, 
and  the  rays  would  be  reflected  on  other  things,  and  finally 
everything  in  the  universe  would  be  shaded  in  accordance 
with  its  relation  to  man.  In  that  case,  evidently,  the  growth 
of  the  race  from  the  simplest  animal  to  the  most  complex 
would  indeed  deserve  to  be  called  a  development,  that  is, 
a  change  from  the  worse  to  the  better,  from  the  Jess  valuable 
to  the  more  valuable.  In  the  same  way,  the  cooling  of  the 
earth's  surface  would  have  represented  a  real  progress.  But 
we  undermine  the  whole  system  of  nature,  if  we  destroy  its 
equilibrium  at  any  one  place  by  such  an  arbitrary  valua- 
tion. Just  as  it  would  be  indifferent  for  the  system  of  nature 
whether  the  law  of  causality  should  be  broken  at  a  few  or 
at  many  points,  in  the  same  way  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  we  give  value  to  a  few  or  to  many  molecular  bodies. 
Nature  is  no  longer  nature  when  the  chain  of  causality  is 


THE  PHYSICAL  NATURE 


13 


I 


broken  at  any  point,  and  nature  is  no  longer  nature  when 
any  causal  process  in  it  is  acknowledged  as  more  valuable 
than  any  other.  Man's  life  cannot  make  an  exception  there. 
Every  evaluation  and  every  preference  evidently  presup- 
poses a  will  which  takes  an  attitude  and  which  finds  its  sat- 
isfaction. But  in  the  conception  of  the  causal  system  of  na- 
ture lies  included  the  complete  independence  of  any  attitude 
and  any  will.  The  things  of  the  world  enter  into  the  mechani- 
cal system  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  conceived  in  relation  to 
one  another,  and  without  relation  to  the  will  of  the  spec- 
tator. Surely  that  is  a  one-sidedness  of  the  naturalistic  view ; 
it  is  an  aspect  which  is  foreign  to  our  immediate  reality  of 
life.   In  our  practical  experience  things  have  their  meaning 
just  through  our  attitude ;  their  existence  is  bound  up  with 
our  interest  in  them.   But  the  whole  significance  of  the  nat- 
uralistic view  of  the  world  lies  in  this  one-sidedness  by  prin- 
ciple; the  naturalist  cannot  know  anything,  and  does  not 
want  to  know  anything,  but  the  objects  in  their  causal  rela- 
tions among  themselves.  To  look  on  things  as  parts  of  nature 
means  to  reconstruct  and  to  remodel  them  in  our  conceptions, 
until  they  come  in  question  only  as  causes  and  effects.  The 
consciousness  which  knows  the  mechanical  universe  is  thus 
no  longer  the  individual  with  his  will  and  his  purposes,  but 
merely  a  passive  spectator,  a  consciousness  which  without 
any  interest  simply  becomes  aware  of  the  interplay  of  ener- 
gies in  this  world.  Such  a  personality  of  course  is  not  a  real 
man.  The  standpoint  of  the  naturalist  is  an  artificial  one;  it 
involves  certain  abstractions.  The  world  is  in  a  way  cut  off 
from  our  real  life-attitudes,  and  has  been  made  a  mere  object 
•    of  awareness ;  but  in  this  abstraction  lies  at  the  same  time  its 
incomparable  strength.  It  allows  us  to  understand  the  pro- 
cesses in  the  world  as  results  of  laws,  and  thus  to  bring  them 
into  mathematical  relations  and  finally  to  master  them  and 
to  put  nature  in  harness.    We  can  go  even  further.    The 
standpoint  of  the  naturalist  differs  from  that  of  real  man 


14 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


with  his  life-interests,  not  only  by  abstracting  from  his  will 
and  preference,  but  by  extinguishing  his  individuality.  Na- 
ture as  such  does  not  exist  for  this  spectator  or  that  spectator, 
for  you  or  for  me.  It  is  conceived  as  being  the  same  for  every 
one.  The  knower  of  nature  is  ultimately  an  impersonal  con- 
sciousness, which  has  not  only  no  influence  on  the  processes 
of  nature,  but  which  has  not  even  any  individual  place  in  its 
system.  In  short,  nature  is  conceived  as  if  it  exists  in  itself, 
independent  of  the  subjects  who  know  it.  Nature  is  simply 
another  name  for  the  totality  of  things  which  are  by  principle 
independent  of  any  subject,  and  therefore  without  relation 
to  any  will,  and  therefore  without  any  value. 

To  be  sure,  that  does  not  at  all  exclude  the  fact  that  the 
relation  to  man  may  play  an  important  role  also  in  natural 
science ;  but  in  that  case  man  is  himself  considered  as  such  a 
part  of  nature.  For  instance,  the  chemist  may  consider  cer- 
tain chemical  substances  in  their  effect  on  the  human  organ- 
ism, and  classify  them  as  food,  or  as  drugs,  or  as  poisons;  and 
from  that  point  of  view  he  is  justified  in  calling  the  foods 
valuable  and  the  poisons  harmful.  But  if  we  take  it  rigor- 
ously, we  must  say  that  in  the  chemical  system  as  such  the 
substances  which  feed  man  and  the  substances  which  kill 
man  are  equally  neutral,  inasmuch  as  man  himself  is  in  that 
system  only  a  chemical  substance,  and  the  assimilation  or 
destruction  of  that  chemical  complex  offers  from  the  chemical 
standpoint  no  reason  to  leave  the  neutral  position  of  mere 
description.  Of  course,  nothing  is  changed  if,  instead  of  the 
single  human  being,  perhaps  the  whole  human  race  is  eval- 
uated. As  part  of  nature  even  all  mankind  is  nothing  but  an 
object  of  explanation. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


We  have  so  far  spoken  of  only  one  half  of  nature.  We  have 
narrowed  the  conception  in  such  a  way  that  it  contained  only 
the  system  of  physical  objects  and  excluded  the  mental  ob- 
jects. Such  a  simplification  makes  it  easier  to  grasp  the  idea 
of  a  system  which  is  free  from  values.  As  soon  as  the  contents 
of  the  psychical  experience  are  added  to  that  physical  expe- 
rience, new  and  unaccustomed  diflSculties  arise.  And  yet  it 
is  evident  that  a  description  of  all  the  objects  of  experience 
which  we  find  in  the  world  must  include  also  the  mental  con- 
tents, the  ideas  and  thoughts,  the  feelings  and  emotions. 
The  naturalist  may  interpret  them  as  products  of  the  organ- 
ism, and  the  psycho-physicist  may  consider  then-  occurrence 
as  determined  by  processes  in  the  brain,  but  in  every  case 
they  remain,  after  all,  something  different  from  the  space- 
filling material  objects.  A  sensation  is  never  a  nerve-cell  and 
is  never  mechanical  energy,  and  yet  no  one  denies  that  such 
sensations  have  just  as  much  real  existence  in  the  world  as 
the  nerves,  and  that  psychology  has  therefore  the  right  to 
exist  as  well  as  physics.  Of  course,  if  we  are  really  to  consider 
the  mental  world  as  part  of  the  causal  system  of  nature,  we 
must  treat  it  also  as  a  series  of  objects  which  we  find,  and 
which  are  to  be  described,  to  be  classified,  and  to  be  explained. 
The  analysis  of  the  elements,  and  the  causal  explanation  of 
the  processes,  is  then  the  true  aim  of  psychology. 

This  aim  of  psychology  is  nowadays  under  a  discussion 
which  has  often  confused  the  issues.  The  popular  literature 
is  always  inclined  to  think  of  psychological  study  as  going  on 
where  inner  life  is  interpreted  in  its  meaning,  or  analyzed  in 


16 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


17 


its  intentions,  or  understood  in  its  internal  relations  of  pur- 
pose. In  the  popular  use  of  the  word,  perhaps,  we  call  the 
poet,  or  the  skilful  lawyer,  or  the  clever  politician  a  great 
psychologist.  But  we  must  be  clear  from  the  start  that  there 
we  give  to  psychology  a  meaning  which  is  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  it  has  in  the  realm  of  science.  The  sit- 
uation is  this.  In  our  immediate  life-reality,  which  the  poet  ex- 
presses, which  the  historian  interprets,  and  in  which  our  legal 
or  political  or  moral  or  social  interests  lie,  we  feel  ourselves 
as  personalities,  and  as  such  characterized  by  our  unity,  by 
our  freedom,  and  by  our  purposiveness.  In  every  act  of  oxirs, 
in  every  feeling  and  every  volition  and  every  thought,  we 
are  conscious  as  a  self  which  expresses  its  aims  and  meanings. 
Every  idea  of  ours  points  beyond  itself,  every  volition  binds 
us  in  our  decisions,  and  every  experience  gets  meaning  by 
our  attitudes.  The  most  immediate  task  which  life  demands 
from  us  in  the  understanding  of  ourselves  and  of  others  is 
therefore  to  interpret  our  ideas,  to  draw  the  consequences  of 
our  will,  to  appreciate  the  attitudes,  to  measure  them  by 
higher  standards.  We  do  that  in  our  practical  life  all  the 
time,  and  there  are  many  scholarly  pursuits  which  carry  out 
just  this  aim  in  a  most  systematic  fashion.  The  jurist,  for 
instance,  systematically  interprets  in  such  a  way  certain  will- 
acts,  or  the  mathematician  develops  consistently  the  conse- 
quences of  certain  ideas  in  our  minds.  The  historian  speaks 
of  man  in  the  full  reality  of  his  purposive  self.  As  a  matter 
of  course,  all  that  is  most  important  and  most  necessary,  if 
we  want  to  understand  man  and  his  inner  life,  and  yet  it  is 
absolutely  no  psychology  in  the  technical  sense  of  the  word. 
Psychology  has  no  other  aim  but,  like  any  natural  science, 
to  describe  and  to  explain  its  material,  while  every  interpre- 
tation and  appreciation  of  mental  life  belongs  to  entirely 
different  spheres  of  human  interest.  It  is  true,  psychology 
has  not  had  the  good  fortune  to  reach,  even  in  scientific  quar- 
ters, that  complete  clearness  about  its  own  task  which,  for 


instance,  astronomy  or  chemistry  has.  Silently  those  two 
different  ways  of  looking  on  mental  life  are  mixed  together. 
While  no  astronomer  nowadays  would  any  longer  confuse  the 
appreciation  of  the  stars  with  the  description  and  explana- 
tion of  their  movements,  as  they  still  did  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  in  psychology  the  descriptive  and  the  explanatory 
account  of  mental  life  are  still  too  often  intertwined  with  an 
effort  to  examine  the  ideas  in  their  meaning  and  the  inner 
purposive  relations  of  the  will. 

Whoever  insists  that  both  groups  of  endeavors  belong  to 
psychology  ought  to  feel  obliged  to  recognize  two  funda- 
mentally different  kinds  of  psychology.  We  have  first  the 
causal  psychology,  which  considers  all  inner  experiences  as 
material  for  description  and  explanation.  That  means  that 
it  treats  the  inner  experience  like  objects.  They  are  then 
simply  contents  of  consciousness,  which  must  be  analyzed 
into  their  elements  in  the  same  way  in  which  the  anato- 
mist dissects  the  body  into  its  tissues  and  the  tissues  into 
their  cells.  And,  finally,  those  contents  of  consciousness  are 
to  be  explained  as  the  physicist  explains  the  changes  in  the 
contents  of  space.  But  we  should  have  in  the  second  place 
another  kind  of  psychology,  which  some  like  to  call  volun- 
taristic  psychology,  which  interprets  the  meaning  of  the  self 
and  follows  up  the  inner  will-relations.  There  is  no  harm  in 
the  double  use  of  the  word  so  long  as  in  this  way  the  two 
methods  are  cleanly  and  clearly  separated.  A  danger  for 
intellectual  straightforwardness  sets  in  only  when  both  are 
carelessly  mixed,  as  too  often  happens.  The  result  is  a  multi- 
colored pseudo-psychology,  which  tries  to  suit  every  one 
and  therefore  does  not  really  suit  any  one.  The  truth,  how- 
ever, is,  that  if  we  look  deeper  into  those  two  tasks,  we  can 
easily  recognize  that  voluntaristic  psychology  has  essentially 
to  answer  questions  which  find  their  natural  place  in  the  field 
of  logic,  ethics,  aesthetics,  philosophy  of  history  and  religion, 
and  that  the  name  of  psychology  ought  to  be  left  simply  to 


18 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


that  other  group  which  deals  in  a  descriptive  and  explanatory 
way  with  the  inner  experience. 

To  us  here  only  the  one  fact  is  essential,  namely,  that 
such  a  scientific  causal  objective  treatment  of  mental  life  is  a 
possible  view  of  inner  experience.  We  can  abstract  from  the 
question  whether  other  aspects  are  also  rightly  or  wrongly 
called  psychology.  We  certainly  have  to  consider  at  the  pre- 
sent stage  of  our  discussion  only  that  descriptive  psychology, 
if  we  really  want  to  answer  the  question  whether  there  is 
anything  valuable  in  the  world  which  the  naturalist  can  find. 
The  naturalist  is  for  us  any  one  who  looks  on  the  world  as 
material  of  description  and  explanation  only.  Mental  life  is 
a  part  of  his  world  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  also  as 
a  system  of  describable  and  explainable  objects,  and  not  as 
expression  of  a  will  and  of  a  self. 

Hence,  the  true  psychologist  sees  the  whole  manif  oldness  of 
perceptions  and  thoughts,  of  feelings  and  emotions,  of  judg- 
ments and  volitions,  lying  before  him  as  the  physicist  sees 
the  manif  oldness  of  bodily  things.  There  in  the  outer  world 
it  rains  and  it  snows,  here  in  the  inner  world  joy  arises  or 
anger,  a  volition  appears,  a  judgment  comes  in,  ideas  enter 
and  depart;  it  is  a  piece  of  unbodily  nature  controlled  by 
laws,  and  the  spectator  is  the  mere  consciousness.  It  does  not 
influence  them  and  does  not  interfere  with  them ;  it  simply 
becomes  aware  of  them.  The  idea  of  the  own  "I"  is  then 
only  one  special  content  among  other  contents  of  conscious- 
ness, and  every  inner  activity  and  act  of  attention  and  every 
decision  must  be  understood  as  a  mere  change  in  the  elements. 
The  atoms  of  the  physical  universe  alter  their  positions,  and 
produce  in  this  way  the  unlimited  manif  oldness  of  forms  in 
the  outer  world.  The  psychical  elements  alter  their  strength 
and  their  vividness,  and  the  resulting  play  produces  the 
vmlimited  manifoldness  of  those  psychical  contents.  Such  a 
psychological  view  is  again  entirely  unfit  to  be  proclaimed 
a  philosophy.   It  would  be  a  superficial  positivism,  which 


THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


19 


I 


indeed  has  too  often  been  honored  as  a  philosophical  view  of 
the  world,  and  yet  is  not  more  fit  for  it  than  the  materialism 
of  the  physicist.  But  while  both  positivism  and  materialism 
are  entirely  insufficient  to  give  us  an  ultimate  view  of  reality, 
both  are  necessary  means  for  the  concrete  scientific  task. 
The  materialistic  view  is  essential  as  presupposition  of  nat- 
ural science,  and  the  positivistic  view  is  essential  as  founda- 
tion of  scientific  psychology.  Psychologists  and  physicists 
are  not  responsible  for  the  fact  that  their  special  scientific 
aspects  are  misunderstood  as  complete  views  of  the  world. 
They  know  that  they  have  to  deal  with  abstractions,  but  that 
those  abstractions  are  essential  for  the  solution  of  their  par- 
ticular problems,  which  serve  the  tasks  of  life. 

We  now  return  to  our  starting-point.  If  we  consider  the 
inner  life  from  a  psychological  point  of  view,  that  is,  as  part 
of  nature,  is  there  in  our  contents  of  consciousness  anything 
which  has  value?  The  temptation  to  answer  that  question 
affirmatively  lies  near.  For  instance,  we  find  feelings  of  plea- 
sure which  we  like  to  keep.  Does  not  that  mean  that  we  treat 
them  as  valuable,  as  against,  for  instance,  feelings  of  pain 
which  we  dislike?  But  now  we  must  look  more  carefully  into 
this  fact.  Our  presupposition  was  that  we  consider  our  inner 
life  as  mere  content  of  consciousness.  We  experience  it  only 
as  passive  spectators.  The  "we''  which  tries  to  keep  the 
pleasure  and  tries  to  reject  the  pain  is  therefore  not  really  the 
same  "we''  which  experiences  that  whole  process.  The  "we" 
which  experiences  is  simply  the  consciousness.  But  this  con- 
sciousness does  not  reject  or  attract  anything,  this  conscious- 
ness only  becomes  aware  of  what  is  going  on.  Now,  in  the 
midst  of  the  contents  which  consciousness  finds,  there  occurs 
the  idea  of  our  self,  and  there  also  occurs  the  pain  or  the  plea- 
sure, and  we  become  aware  that  this  self  reenforces  the  plea- 
sure and  suppresses  the  pain;  but  all  that  goes  on  in  the 
midst  of  the  content.  The  pleasure  is  therefore  in  harmony 
with  another  content  of  our  consciousness,  namely,  with  the 


20  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

idea  of  ourselves,  and  the  pain  is  in  disharmony  with  that 
idea  which  we  find  in  our  consciousness.  But  pain  and  plea- 
sure are  neither  in  harmony  nor  in  disharmony  with  us,  the 
spectators.   For  us  as  spectators,  the  idea  of  ourselves,  and 
that  other  content  which  we  call  pleasure  or  pain,  are  equally 
nothing  but  objects  of  awareness.   Like  spectators,  we  note 
how  this  idea  of  our  "  I,"  which  is  crystallized  about  the  sen- 
sations of  our  body,  contains  those  efforts  to  reject  the  pain 
and  to  continue  the  pleasure.   For  us  as  spectators,  pain  and 
pleasure  stand  only  in  line  with  the  rank  and  file  of  the  other 
contents  of  consciousness.    They  have  an  effect  on  certain 
other  contehtsTIBul  they  are  neither  pleasurable  nor  displea- 
surable,  neither  valuable  nor  worthless,  for  the  spectator. 
That  is,  from  a  strictly  psychological  point  of  view,  pleasure 
and  pain  are  as  indifferent  as  the  molecules  of  the  universe 
are  indifferent  in  the  system  of  physics.   No  atom  is  more 
valuable  than  another  atom  for  the  physicist,  no  feeling  is 
more  valuable  than  another  feeling  for  the  psychologist.    In 
the  procession  of  the  passing  contents  of  consciousness,  a 
state  of  rejection  follows  the  feeling  of  pain  and  a  state  of 
desire  follows  the  feeling  of  pleasure,  but  that  is  interest- 
ing only  for  the  description  of  the  psychical  connections,  it 
has  no  significance  for  the  value  of  pleasure  and  pain.  It  is 
never  the  consciousness  itself  which  desires  or  which  rejects. 
The  desire  and  the  rejection  are  only  parts  of  that  idea  of  the 
self  which  is  itself  nothing  but  one  of  the  neutral  contents  of 
consciousness. 

Of  course  it  is  evident  that  all  that  would  be  entirely 
changed,  if  we  acknowledged  that  pleasure  is  in  itself  a  valu- 
able content  of  consciousness.  The  whole  mental  content, 
and  through  it  the  whole  human  life,  and  through  it  the 
whole  process  of  the  universe,  could  then  easily  be  shaded  in 
accordance  with  its  worth  and  worthlessness.  Everything 
would  become  valuable  in  accordance  with  the  degree  with 
which  it  caused  psychical  pleasures  in  consciousness.  We 


THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


21 


I 


might  then  only  quietly  agree  that  the  pleasure  of  two  per- 
sons is  a  still  more  valuable  content  of  consciousness  than  the 
pleasure-feeling  of  only  one,  and  at  once  we  should  be  pre- 
pared to  pass  judgment  upon  history  and  the  whole  cosmos. 
Indeed,  that  is  the  method  with  which  superficial  thought 
proceeds  every  day,  and  the  biological  and  "monistic''  ethics 
takes  its  life  from  such  thoughtlessness.  All  that  would  be 
very  simple  indeed,  if  in  the  framework  of  such  biological- 
sociological-monistic  view  of  the  world  there  existed  any  rea- 
son to  give  more  value  to  one  content  of  consciousness  than 
to  another,  to  consider  pleasure  and  joy  and  ecstasy  more 
valuable  than  hunger  or  toothache.  Whoever  has  once  seri- 
ously said,  "  Nature !''  must  know  that  he  has  entered  a  world 
of  physical  and  psychical  objects  in  which  everything  is 
equally  neutral.  All  exhaust  their  whole  existence  by  the 
mere  fact  that  they  are  parts  of  the  causal  system.  In  their 
relations  of  cause  and  effect  are  expressed  all  the  relations 
which  are  thinkable  for  them.  As  parts  of  physical  or  psychi- 
cal nature  they  cannot  also  enter  into  relation  with  the  will 
of  the  spectator,  and  thus  get  value  by  his  like  and  dislike. 
But  that  certainly  does  not  mean  simply  that  the  physicist 
or  psychologist  as  such  has  to  ignore  the  values  of  nature,  and 
that  therefore  some  one  else  from  another  point  of  view  may 
still  recognize  values  in  the  natural  system.  No ;  wherever  an 
evaluation  begins,  the  object  is  no  longer  conceived  as  part 
of  the  physical-psychological  universe.  If  we  say  good  or~| 
bad,  the  physical  or  mental  objects  which  are  meant  to  be  \ 
causes  and  effects  only  are  transformed  into  something  new  i 
which  has  no  place  in  the  system  of  nature.  As  soon  as  we 
acknowledge  that  the  living  man  is  more  valuable  than  the 
grain  of  sand,  and  that  the  feeling  of  pleasure  is  more  valu- 
able than  a  foul-smell  sensation,  everything  is  sacrificed. 
The  equilibrium  is  then  destroyed,  the  Archimedic  point  is 
found  from  which  nature  can  be  thrown  off  its  balance.  But 
we  do  know  only  that  man  is  more  complex  than  a  grain  of 


V? 


►io,  \'-> 


ruvi 


foviji^^^ 


22 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


sand,  and  that  the  joy-feeling  connects  itself  with  one  kind  of 
effort-feelings  and  the  foul-smell  sensation  with  another  kind. 
We  do  not  know  that  one  is  better  than  the  other.  If  the 
crank  of  the  world-machine  were  turned  backward,  and  every 
change  were  to  go  on  in  such  a  way  that  the  complex  would 
become  simpler  and  simpler  and  that  pain  would  become  per- 
manent, we  should  have  no  right  to  consider  that  worse  than 
the  accustomed  series  of  natural  events,  which  only  inconsist- 
ent naturalists  call  a  development,  and  which  only  inconsist- 
ent psychologists  call  a  progress.  In  the  world  of  physics  and 
psychology  this  is  the  last  word. 

But  is  it  possible  that  physics  and  psychology  are  ever  the 
last  word  for  the  thinking  spirit?  Can  we  ever  acknowledge 
the  world  which  is  conceived  as  mere  nature,  as  the  totality 
in  which  our  real  life  is  moving?  Yes,  would  it  even  be  pos- 
sible to  have  the  science  of  physics  and  the  science  of  psy- 
chology as  such,  if  the  physical  universe  and  the  psychical 
content  of  consciousness  were  the  totality  of  the  real,  that 
1^  is,  if  there  were  only  objects  for  a  passive  spectator?  Are  not 
these  judgments  of  the  physicist  and  psychologist  themselves 
demonstration  of  the  one-sidedness  of  such  an  aspect  ?  Of 
course,  it  might  be  replied  that  the  thoughts  of  the  naturalist 
and  of  the  psychologist  are  then  themselves  to  be  considered 
as  psychical  objects,  which  as  such  would  be  neutral  contents 
of  consciousness.  But  that  is  impossible.  The  mere  existence 
of  psychical  contents  is  not  a  psychological  description  and 
explanation  any  more  than  the  existence  of  the  stars  is  as- 
tronomy. The  thoughts  of  the  physicist  and  psychologist  can 
be  considered  as  psychical  objects,  and  thus  can  be  made 
material  of  psychology,  only  in  case  a  psychologist  of  a  higher 
order  stands  behind  them  and  compares,  analyzes,  describes, 
connects,  explains  them  like  all  other  contents  of  conscious- 
ness. The  science  of  causal  processes  which  are  given  to  a 
passive  spectator  is  itself  possible  only  because  the  scientist 
as  such  is  no  passive  spectator.   He  takes  his  attitude,  se- 


I 


c- 


THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


23 


'% 


K 


r 


«V 


c-\ 


lects  and  connects  his  material,  and  his  very  act  of  abstrac- 
tion is  such  a  purposive  activity.  The  scientist  has  to  think 
the  world  as  content  of  an  inactive  consciousness,  for  the 
purpose  of  grasping  it  as  a  causal  system,  but  his  thinking 
itself  is  activity.  J 

Correspondingly  we  can  say,  in  general,  that  the  mass  of 
physical  and  psychological  contents  must  be  thought  as  free 
from  every  value,  as  we  have  seen,  but  this  thought  itself  has 
the  character  of  an  evaluation.  The  objects  of  the  scientific 
judgments  are  without  value,  but  the  scientific  judgments 
themselves  are  affirmations  of  value.  Thus  the  simple  fact  /  YL^ 
j  of  a  scientific  statement  proves  that  reality  is  more  than  a  *  f  .,<  .vt 
\  system  of  natural  objects.*'The  question  whether  there  exist  ^^^^*  ^^  "* 
real  values  is  therefore  in  no  way  denied  so  long  as  we  have 
only  found  that  there  are  no  values  in  the  system  of  physi- 
cal and  psychical  objects.  Those  systems  have  resulted 
from  the  reconstructing  thought  of  the  scientist  who  thinks 
the  world  without  value  for  the  purpose  of  thinking  it  in 
causal  connection;  but  this  work  itself  moves  in  a  reality 
which  logically  precedes  the  reconstructing  system,  and  in 
which  the  thinking  itself  demonstrates  the  relation  to  values 
as  it  aims  towards  the  value  of  truth. 

From  the  system  of  nature  which  the  abstracting  thought 
of  the  thinker  reconstructs,  we  find  in  such  a  way  the  bridge 
to  the  immediate  reality  in  which  his  scholarly  thought  pro- 
ceeds. But  as  soon  as  we  have  reached  that  reality,  we  easily 
recognize  that  it  is  not  only  the  sphere  in  which  our  scientific 
thought  goes  on,  but  that  it  is  the  sphere  of  our  whole  prac- 
tical life.  Whenever  in  the  changing  days  I  follow  my  desires 
and  am  obedient  to  my  duties,  when  I  use  things  and  under- 
stand men,  when  I  am  in  joy  or  in  grief,  when  I  praise  or 
blame,  at  first  I  do  not  know  an3rthing  of  things  or  men  or 
aims  in  the  way  in  which  the  scientist  or  the  psychologist 
knows  them  and  treats  them.  My  feeling  and  willing,  my 
hope  and  my  regret,  are  for  me  not  a  content  ofconsciousness 


24 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


which  is  simply  found  like  an  object.  They  have  lost  their  ori- 
ginal meaning  when  they  are  confronted  with  consciousness 
like  objects.  In  reality  we  are  to  ourselves  not  created  nature, 
but  free  creators;  our  self  is  not  found,  but  with  immediate 
certainty  it  is  felt  and  asserted  in  the  act  of  our  attitude. 

Together  with  the  "I,"  we  know  the  "thou."  There,  too, 
an  immediate  experience  is  transformed  into  a  result  of  arti- 
ficial thought,  if  a  piece  of  psychological  nature  is  substituted 
for  the  other  man.  Such  naturalistic  transformation  may  be 
necessary  for  certain  purposes,  but  surely  it  is  no  longer  the 
fresh  pulsating  life  which  speaks  to  us  in  the  "thou "-expe- 
rience of  immediate  reality.  The  psychologist  may  explain  to 
us  that  we  perceive  in  nature  only  physical  organisms,  and 
that  the  similarity  of  their  movements  to  our  own  leads  us 
to  the  conclusion  that  those  other  bodies  have  consciousness 
like  ourselves.  That  is  perfectly  true  in  the  system  of  natural 
science,  but  the  life-experience  of  every  hour  tells  us  that  our 
immediate  relation  to  friend  and  foe  has  after  all  an  entirely 
different  meaning.  When  we  meet  in  conversation,  we  do 
not  come  in  question  for  each  other  as  objects.  The  other 
person  with  whose  plans  I  agree  or  disagree  is  to  me  primarily 
no  object  of  perception,  but  a  subject  which  I  acknowledge. 
He  is  no  thing  which  I  find,  but  a  will  which  I  support  or 
fight ;  in  short,  he  is  a  piece  of  reality  which  as  such  does  not 
belong  in  the  system  of  nature.  As  I  feel  myself  as  the  sub- 
ject of  attitude  and  will,  my  friends,  too,  are  to  me  first  per- 
sonalities which  take  attitudes,  and  which  as  such  want  to 
be  understood  and  interpreted  and  appreciated. 

Finally,  the  things.  They,  too,  are  in  the  immediate  reality 
not  physical  and  psychical  objects  without  values,  seen  be- 
hind the  conception-gate  of  the  causal  sciences.  The  physicist 
tells  me  that  those  blossoming  trees  before  my  window  stand 
there  independent  of  me  as  physical  things ;  the  psychologist 
adds  that  all  that  I  know  of  those  trees  are  my  perceptions, 
and  that  those  trees  as  such  perceptive  ideas  are  my  content 


, 


THE  PSYCHICAL  NATURE 


25 


of  consciousness.  Thus  they  show  me  two  groups  of  objects, 
the  psychical  and  the  physical ;  the  psychical  with  its  rich- 
ness of  color  included  within  my  consciousness,  the  physical 
composed  of  uniform  atoms.  But  when  I  turn  my  eyes  to  the 
trees  and  their  glorious  beauty,  I  do  not  know  an5^hing  of 
that  doubleness  of  which  the  sciences  speak.  In  reality,  I  do 
not  find  there  any  perceptive  idea  in  me;  but  there  without 
the  window  I  have  the  branches  and  the  blossoms,  there 
without  is  the  perceived  thing,  and  no  reality  puts  any  spe- 
cial image  of  it  into  my  own  person.  Again,  the  demand  for 
causality  may  lead  me  to  that  separation.  I  may  for  certain 
purposes  feel  obliged  to  split  the  real  object  into  that  which 
is  common  to  all  and  which  I  call  physical,  and  into  that  which 
is  related  to  me  alone  and  which  I  call  psychical.  But  no  im- 
mediate reality  suggests  to  me  that  these  two  separated  sys-  ;  P^^ 
tems  of  objects  exist  from  the  beginning. 

There  is  no  limit.  If  the  perceived  world  is  undivided,  the 
same  must  be  true  for  all  which  memory  brings  to  us  or  which 
imagination  creates.  The  artificial  doubleness  is  nowhere 
content  of  reality.  In  my  memory,  for  instance,  I  really  grasp 
the  past  object,  and  at  first  do  not  know  anjrthing  of  the 
doubleness  which  separates  the  physical  external  thing  of 
past  days  from  my  present  memory-idea.  Finally,  in  that 
immediate  reality  in  which  the  things  are  neither  atoms  with- 
out nor  psychical  contents  within  me,  but  are  still  unbroken, 
really  experienced  things,  in  that  reality  I  myself  am  never 
merely  a  passive  spectator  of  the  things.  I  am  always  a  self 
for  which  the  things  are  means  and  ends,  objects  of  fear  and 
hope,  of  desire  and  dislike. 

Here  we  do  not  have  to  ask  whether  it  is  our  duty  to  recon- 
struct the  subjectively  experienced  world  for  certain  pur- 
poses as  a  physical-psychical  system  of  nature.  This  ques- 
tion will  come  to  us  as  soon  as  we  examine  the  value  of  science. 
But  it  is  evident,  indeed,  that  we  have  left  the  immediate  life 
behind  us,  when  we  look  around  in  the  system  of  nature.  In 


26 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


life  we  and  the  others  with  us  are  subjects  of  will  and  of  atti- 
tude, and  the  things  are  not  objects  of  a  passive  spectator,  but 
aims  and  means  of  a  purposive  will.  We  have  seen  fully  that 
the  causally  conceived  nature  must  be  thought  as  without 
any  values,  but  that  cannot  lead  us  to  any  materialistic  or 
positivistic  denial  of  values.  It  only  leads  us  to  the  more 
important  question,  in  what  sense  we  can  acknowledge  val- 
ues in  the  world  of  immediate  life,  in  that  world  in  which 
the  thought  of  a  nature  without  value  itself  arises  only  as  a 
mental  deed  in  the  service  of  a  valuable  purpose. 


*  } 


CHAPTER  m 

THE  PERSONALITIES 

/  In  the  realm  of  nature,  the  bodily  and  the  mental  nature, 
we  could  not  find  any  values  because  nature  as  such  has  no 
relation  to  will.  Now  we  enter  the  realm  of  immediate  life- 
experience.  Here  we  are  subjects  of  will.  Here  our  decision  is 
no  longer  the  effect  of  foregoing  causes,  but  comes  in  question 
with  reference  to  our  purposes  and  to  our  aims.  Have  we  now 
a  firm  anchorage  for  the  values  of  the  world?  Can  we  under- 
stand the  value  in  its  pure  validity  from  the  will  of  individ- 
uals? But  this  question  evidently  has  no  meaning  so  long  as 
we  simply  identify  value  with  that  which  is  the  goal  of  our 
will.  In  that  case  we  could  not  desire  anything  which  would 
not  by  this  mere  fact  of  our  desire  be  raised  to  the  dignity  of 
a  value.  For  certain  human  interests  we  are  accustomed  to 
such  terms.  The  political  economist,  for  instance,  is  in  the 
habit  of  calling  the  things  which  are  desired,  values.  If  the 
philosopher  follows  in  this  path,  he  needs  of  course,  every 
time,  qualifying  additions,  if  his  inquiry  into  values  is  to  have 
any  meaning.  If  he  studies  the  character  of  values,  he  does 
not  intend  to  discuss  the  value  of  butter  and  eggs.  The  phi- 
losopher in  his  sphere  of  thought  might  even  hesitate  to  call 
food  valuable  at  all,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  hungry  man 
longs  for  it,  that  the  consumer  enjoys  it,  and  that  the  grocer 
in  buying  and  selling  measures  it  by  the  standard  of  other 
desired  things.  If  the  philosopher  is  ready  to  use  the  word 
''value  "  in  such  a  colorless  way,  and  to  concede  to  the  econo- 
mist that  everything  is  valuable  which  is  object  of  desire, 
he  has  simply  to  divide  the  values  at  once  into  two  large 
groups.  He  must  make  from  the  start  a  sharp  demarcation 


28 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


,nV* 


Vi 


A^'^H   * 


line  between  relative  values  and  absolute  values.  Whether 
in  reality  two  such  kinds  of  values  exist  has  to  be  examined. 
It  would  be  thinkable  that  only  the  relative  values  have 
existence,  that  is,  that  everything  would  be  valuable  only  for 
this  or  that  individual,  in  this  or  that  position,  under  this  or 
that  condition.  But  even  if  the  reality  of  absolute  values  is 
denied,  this  separation  remains  necessary.  In  the  spirit  of  crit- 
'  ical  philosophy,  value  always  means  an  absolute  value.  But 
if  we  use  the  word  in  its  wider  sense,  our  question  is  now 
clear.  That  there  exist  relative  values  in  the  world  of  imme- 
diate life  is  then  a  matter  of  course  to  us.rAs  it  is  a  world  in 
which  the  personalities  are  subjects  of  will,  everything  which 
is  object  of  their  will  must  have  such  conditional  value.  Our 
real  question  remains^  It  is  the  question  whether,  in  this 
^sphere  of  individual  desires,  there  exist  also  unconditional  ab- 
\>i  \  solute  values,  values  which  are  valuable  in  themselves  with- 
out reference  to  this  or  that  individual  and  his  wishes.  So 
long  as  we  were  speaking  of  nature,  the  separation  into  rela- 
tive and  absolute  values  was  superfluous,  as  a  world  in  which 
there  is  no  will  can  have  no  values  whatever. 

If  all  values  in  the  world  are  based  on  the  fact  that  indi- 
viduals as  individuals  desire  and  prefer  for  themselves  certain 
things,  evidently  we  have  only  the  one  class  of  values,  the 
relative  ones.  Every  one  who  wants  to  acknowledge  only  the 
absolute  values  as  true  values  would  have  to  claim  in  this 
case  that  the  world  has  merely  pseudo-values.  Indeed,  it  is 
impossible  ever  to  deduce  an  absolute  value  from  the  world 
of  individual  personal  desires.  There  exists  no  bridge  from 
the  individual  pleasure  and  displeasure  to  the  absolute  value. 
So  long  as  we  start  from  the  selfish  desire  of  individuals,  — 
and  there  may  be  imlimited  millions  of  them,  —  we  shall 
always  come  only  to  social  and  economic  values  which  have 
relative  validity.  A  value  which  without  reference  to  indi- 
vidual pleasures  and  displeasures  belongs  to  the  world  of 
reality  itself,  and  which  thus  stands  above  all  individual  de- 


29 


sires,  remains  out  of  the  question  there.  Nature  did  not  know 
any  unconditional  values,  because  nature  had  no  relation  at 
all  to  will ;  but  the  world  of  personal  desires  has  no  uncondi- 
tional values,  because  in  it  every  relation  to  will  lacks  the 
general  necessary  unconditional  character.  Whoever  is  con- 
vinced that  all  values  in  the  world  can  be,  and  ultimately 
must  be,  based  on  the  desire  for  pleasure  in  individuals,  is 
certainly  more  consistent  if  he  denies  every  absolute  value 
than  if,  as  frequently  happens,  he  bolsters  up  the  conditional 
values  into  eternal  ones. 

Indeed,  there  never  has  been  a  lack  of  efforts  to  proclaim 
unconditional  values  in  the  sphere  of  personal  desires.   The 
speculations  about  value  in  political  economy  have  shown 
the  way.  Everybody  agreed  that  the  value  of  things  referred 
to  the  needs  of  personalities,  but  the  mutual  relations  of  such 
individual  desires  allow  the  building  up  of  certain  systems 
of  goods.  In  these  systems  everything  may  have  its  defi- 
nite position,  which  thus  becomes  independent  of  the  chance 
desires  of  a  particular  individual.  For  instance,  we  may  de- 
termine the  value  by  the  relation  of  the  human  needs  to  the 
.  available  amount.  That  which  exists  in  an  unlimited  quan- 
tity, then,  has  no  economic  value  in  spite  of  its  use,  and  that 
which  does  not  satisfy  any  need  has  no  economic  value  either. 
Or  we  may  determine  the  value  by  its  relation  to  the  mutual 
exchange  of  things.   But  whatever  our  principle  may  be,  in 
every  case  we  aim  towards  a  scale  of  things  which  has  social 
and  thus  individual  character.  That  alone  allows  us  to  speak 
of  the  economic  value  of  certain  goods  without  asking  whether 
they  merely  please  Tom,  Dick,  and  Harry.  Diamonds  are  ob- 
jectively more  valuable  than  pebbles,  and  this  value  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  caprice  of  any  individual.   If,  nevertheless, 
the  economist  sometimes  says  that  such  an  evaluation  refers 
to  subjective  and  not  to  objective  conditions,  he  takes  the 
word  ''objective  "  in  the  sense  of  physical  as  against  psychi- 
cal. He  only  wants  to  say  by  that,  that  it  is  not  the  physical 


1 1, 


i 


30 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


31 


i 


quality  of  the  mineral  which  makes  diamonds  more  desirable 
than  pebbles,  but  that  it  is  the  mental  desire  of  human  beings 
in  their  vanity  and  their  longing  for  self -adornment  which 
makes  the  value.  Yet  if  we  mean  by  objective  that  which  is 
independent  of  subjective  arbitrariness,  we  have  to  acknow- 
ledge that  the  pebbles  are  objectively  less  valuable.   In  the 
Tmoney-system  these  objective  values  are  brought  to  their 
1  simplest  expression,  and  the  individual  has  to  accept  the  fact 
\  that  in  the  world  in  which  he  moves  the  one  thing  is  cheap, 
^  the  other  expensive. 

Nevertheless,  there  ought  not  to  be  any  lack  of  clearness 
about  the  fact  that  such  economic  evaluations  represent 
merely  relative  goods.  Their  economic  value  remains,  after 
all,  determined  by  their  power  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  indi- 
viduals as  such.  Under  definite  social  conditions,  where  defi- 
nite needs  and  desires  are  prevalent,  we  can  build  up  such  an 
economic  pyramid  of  values,  in  which  a  few  things  are  at  the 
top  and  many  things  at  the  bottom.  But  as  soon  as  the  needs 
of  the  groups  change,  and  the  conditions  of  production  and 
distribution  and  consumption  are  altered,  this  whole  pyramid 
falls  to  pieces.  It  certainly  does  not  belong  to  the  meaning 
of  the  universe,  nor  to  the  foundation  of  reality,  that  the  one 
thing  stands  high  and  the  other  low  in  the  scale  of  market- 
N^alues.  If  nature  were  to  regulate  our  needs  in  such  a  way 
that  the  means  for  their  satisfaction  were  at  the  disposal  of 
every  one  in  an  unlimited  supply,  the  economic  values  would 
disappear  altogether;  and  yet  nothing  would  be  changed  in 
the  meaning  of  reality.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  that  kind  of 
objectivity  of  values  which  is  expressed  by  the  market  price 
still  lies  entirely  in  the  circle  of  relative  values  which  are 
determined  by  the  needs  of  individuals. 

Ultimately  we  are  not  led  to  any  higher  point  by  those 
theoretical  speculations  which  try  to  determine  the  values 
by  the  character  of  the  desires.  Here  it  is  no  longer  the  ques- 
tion of  mere  objects  of  exchange  and  thus  of  marketable 


things.  Every  possible  content  of  our  interests,  every  mate- 
rial of  our  impressions  and  thoughts,  can  be  considered  from 
the  point  of  view  of  its  desirability.  If  we  take  such  an  atti- 
tude of  appreciation  as  a  standard,  we  can  say  that  every- 
thing is  valuable  in  accordance  with  its  desirability,  or,  in 
the  language  of  other  theories,  in  accordance  with  its  pleasant- 
ness.  Of  course  such  systems  demand  from  the  start  many 
supplementary  restrictions.  Not  every  value,  for  instance, 
presupposes  an  actual  desire.  Often  it  must  be  sufficient  that 
we  should  have  the  desire,  if  the  object  were  not  already  in 
our  possession.  That  which  we  own  remains  valuable  to  us 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  no  longer  an  object  of  an  actual 
desire.  We  can  also  easily  enter  into  many  subdivisions. 
These  theories  separate,  for  instance,  those  values  which  are 
in  themselves  pleasant  and  those  which  are  only  causes  of 
pleasant  effects.  And  from  there  we  can  go  further  on  to  the 
subtlest  classification  of  the  agreeable  and  of  the  useful.  Such 
theories  can  now  again  easily  advance  to  so-called  objective 
values,  which  are  superior  to  and  independent  of  the  chance 
desires  and  the  haphazard  pleasures.  We  can  take  as  stand- 
ard the  intensity  of  the  feeling  or  the  expansion  of  the  feeling, 
and  so  on.  For  instance,  the  desire  for  a  fugitive  stimulus  is 
less  intense  than  that  for  a  source  of  lasting  happiness.  The 
drama  and  the  symphony  furnish  a  deeper  satisfaction  than 
the  nursery-rhyme  and  the  street-song;  the  noble  deed  of 
one's  friend  wakens  a  more  vivid  pleasure  than  the  conven- 
tional politeness;  the  scholarly  work  secures  a  richer  enjoy- 
ment than  a  superficial  talk. 

In  this  way  I  may  be  able  ultimately  to  find  the  climax- 
values,  perhaps  even  one  which  is  highest  of  all  and  which,x 
therefore,  I  prefer  to  all  others.  It  may  be  the  mild  peace  of  a  ; 
soul  without  desires,  or  it  may  be  the  completeness  of  a  har- 1 
monious  active  life.  As  soon  as  I  have  acknowledged  such  | 
highest  value,  it  becomes  necessarily  the  objective  point  of 
comparisons  for  all  the  other  special  values.  And  yet  it  can- 


t 


^i 


32 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


33 


not  be  denied  that  even  such  supreme  value  gets  its  excep- 
tional position,  after  all,  only  through  comparison  with  the 
others.  In  itself  it  is  in  no  way  different  from  the  remainder 
"^  of  the  sources  of  pleasure.  From  the  most  fleeting  pleasure 
of  my  tongue  to  the  highest  satisfaction  in  life  leads  a  con- 
tinuous path  of  small  steps,  and  there  is  nowhere  a  decisive 
turn  in  the  road  from  the  personal  to  the  over-personal.  That 
apparently  definite  point  of  comparison  has  its  own  position 
only  in  the  midst  of  a  system  which  itself  has  no  definite 
absolute  position. 

We  do  not  reach  any  other  result  if  we  take  as  a  standard 
the  expansion  of  the  field.  The  higher  value  then  belongs 
to  that  which  gives  pleasure  to  many  and  not  only  to  one. 
The  greatest  pleasure  of  the  greatest  possible  number  be- 
comes the  apparently  independent  background  of  every 
valuation.  But  even  if  a  miracle  occurred  which  satisfied 
every  desire  on  earth  and  filled  every  heart  with  pleasure, 
would  there  exist  any  reason  to  acknowledge  by  principle  a 
difference  between  such  a  pleasure  and  the  pleasure  of  those 
who  enjoy  a  feast  ?  The  illusion  of  absoluteness  may  arise 
still  more  vividly,  if  we  abstract  entirely  from  concrete  indi- 
viduals, and  refer  our  evaluation  to  a  not-existing  ideal  per- 
sonality. Such  an  ideal  person  is  indeed  introduced  into  the 
world  of  conceptions  as  soon  as  the  theories  speak  of  a  being 
whose  feelings  are  determined  by  a  complete  knowledge  of 
all  the  qualities  and  effects  of  things.  Of  course,  no  real  man 
can  boast  such  a  perfect  acquaintance,  and  every  practical 
evaluation  among  men  must  accordingly  have  its  sources  of 
error.  We  may  deceive  ourselves  as  to  the  effects  of  a  thing. 
The  pleasure  which  we  expected  may  not  come  up,  or  may 
be  overshadowed  by  accompanjring  displeasures  from  the 
same  source.  Thus  a  real  evaluation  ought  to  be  determined 
by  an  ideal  man,  who  foresees  exactly  whether  or  not  things 
really  will  give  us  pleasure. 
But  have  we  really  gained  anything  new  by  principle  in 


such  a  way  ?  Such  an  ideal  being  cannot  accomplish  any- 
thing except  a  certain  supplementation  and  correction  of 
that  which  the  erring  individual  might  have  desired.  But  in 
its  character  and  significance,  its  activity  is  not  different 
from  that  of  the  average  individual.  The  average  physical 
man  of  the  statistical  tables  may  walk  nowhere  on  the  earth, 
and  nevertheless  his  energies  are  in  no  way  superhuman.  In 
the  same  way  the  judgments  of  value  at  which  the  completely 
informed  ideal  men  would  arrive  would  be  more  reliable  than 
those  of  the  chance  individual,  but  they  would  not  show  in- 
dividual type  any  the  less.  There  is  no  limit  to  such  auxiliary 
constructions.  We  may  abstract  from  any  special  sides  of  the 
personalities,  and  construct  accordingly  systems  of  goods  with 
reference  to  any  kind  of  abstract  men.  We  may  thus  gain  neat 
classifications  of  the  sources  of  pleasure,  perhaps  for  a  certain 
group,  or  a  certain  nation,  or  a  certain  historical  period.  Yet 
it  is  clear  that  such  a  classification,  with  all  its  superordi- 
nations  and  subordinations,  refers  only  to  the  desires  of  indi- 
vidual beings. 

In  still  another  direction  the  evaluation  has  sometimes 
been  detached  from  the  desires  of  individuals.  It  has  been 
said  that  the  significance  of  a  real  value  lies  in  the  steadiness 
of  the  desire.  Only  that  can  be  acknowledged  as  value  for 
which  a  lasting  disposition  of  desire  exists.  The  forming  of 
values  would  then  show  a  certain  analogy  to  the  forming 
of  conceptions.  The  idea  of  a  value  would  bring  unity  into 
the  chaos  of  possible  demands,  just  as  our  conceptions  unify 
our  ideas.  All  that  has  its  truth.  We  may  even  acknowledge 
that  a  repeated  desire  may  bring  about  a  mental  disposition 
by  which  the  object  appears  as  a  value  when  no  pleasure  can 
be  expected  from  it  in  the  concrete  situation,  as  is  perhaps 
the  case  with  the  value  of  money  for  the  miser.  Our  desire  for 
pleasure  may  find  its  unified  organization  in  values,  or  may 
be  projected  into  them  even  when  it  has  disappeared  as  desire. 
But  none  of  these  ways  opens  to  us  the  view  of  a  value  which 


iiv.. 


34 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


is  superior  to  individual  desire.  However  we  may  try  to 
escape  the  conclusion,  we  cannot  come  beyond  the  ultimate 
result  that  from  personal  pleasure  and  displeasure  there  is  no 
path  to  values  which  mean  more  than  that  they  are  enjoy- 
able to  this  or  that  man,  or  to  many  or  to  most  people,  now 
or  then  or  usually.  From  individual  desires  we  always  can 
come  merely  to  conditional  values. 

At  all  times  the  effort  has  been  made  to  suit  the  demand 
for  a  general  philosophy  with  such  individualistic  conceptions 
of  value.  Yes,  modern  relativism  in  all  its  forms,  the  Ameri- 
can Pragmatism  like  the  German  Empirio-Criticism,  glories 
in  its  nakedness.  What  these  theories  of  knowledge  try  to 
argue  with  philosophical  endeavor  is  reached  without  any 
toil  by  the  naivet6  of  monistic  and  positivistic  philosophy. 
These  are  satisfied  in  their  poverty  of  thought  as  soon  as  it 
is  demonstrated  that  the  tastes  and  norms  are  different  at 
various  times  and  among  various  peoples,  and  that  even  the 
most  important  evaluations  are  frequently  changing.  They 
triumphantly  show  that  even  in  the  highest  spheres  of  human 
valuation  everything  changes  and  fluctuates.  In  the  sphere 
of  art  we  see  how  often  at  the  same  time,  in  the  same  nation, 
sometimes  the  same  works  are  adored  and  detested.  The  same 
grotesque  contradictions  appear  in  the  values  of  wisdom; 
that  which  is  true  to  one  generation  may  be  error  to  the  next. 
What  alarming  contrasts  appear  in  the  religious  values  which 
are  so  often  praised  as  over-personal,  while  science  shows  that 
in  every  part  they  have  the  stamp  of  passing  civilizations. 
What  chaos  is  found  in  the  moral  evaluation  of  the  peoples; 
the  one  places  as  the  highest  of  values  what  another  tribe 
may  condemn  as  heinous. 

The  sociologists  have  indeed  accumulated  such  over-rich 
material  of  this  kind,  that  the  philosophic  philistines  of  our 
time  must  look  down  only  with  condescension  to  those  un- 
scientific minds  which  still  dare  to  doubt  the  relativity  of  all 
valuation.  It  may  even  be  said  that  no  anthropological  voy- 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


35 


ages  to  the  Pacific  islands  are  necessary  for  the  discovery  of 
such  contrasts.  Every  one  of  us  can  find  such  flat  contradic- 
tions in  his  narrowest  circle  only  a  little  below  the  surface. 
And  here  comes  the  great  chance  for  the  Pragmatist  and  the 
Humanist  and  all  their  intellectual  kin.  They  show  us  that 
all  which  we  call  truth  is  indeed  only  an  organization  of 
our  experiences  in  the  service  of  our  changing  purposes,  and 
that  the  value  of  truth  must  thus  by  its  own  meaning  be 
understood  as  a  relative  value  only.  Finally,  that  agrees 
splendidly  with  the  favorite  thought  of  evolutionistic  philo- 
sophers. They  have  demonstrated  long  ago  that  only  those 
brains  could  find  the  conditions  for  development,  the  ideas  of 
which  are  useful  for  the  survival  of  man,  and  that  therefore 
everything  which  we  call  truth  is  only  a  product  of  selection 
in  the  phylogenetic  development. 

Such  contributions  to  ethnology,  to  sociology,  to  biology, 
and  to  psychology  are  without  doubt  of  high  importance 
for  the  anthropological  aspect  of  the  process  of  evaluation. 
But  that  cannot  possibly  determine  their  significance  for  the 
ultimate  problems  of  philosophy.  In  the  circle  of  biologi- 
cal studies,  of  course  we  have  to  inquire  how  the  processes 
of  thinking  came  to  their  natural  development  in  evolution. 
We  ought  not  to  overlook,  however,  that  the  meaning  and  the 
whole  value  of  such  an  inquiry  are  entirely  dependent  upon 
the  more  fundamental  question  of  whether  or  not  we  accredit 
to  such  biological  arguments  the  value  of  truth.  The  value  of 
truth  thus  ultimately  depends,  not  upon  the  biological  devel- 
opment, but  our  right  to  follow  up  a  biological  development 
depends  upon  the  acknowledgment  of  the  value  of  truth. 

Those  beginnings  of  the  race  from  which  the  biologist 
starts  are  certainly  not  known  to  us  as  an  immediate  experi- 
ence. In  the  service  of  causal  explanation  we  have  reached 
the  idea  of  those  beginnings  by  h5rpothetical  speculations 
deduced  from  our  really  perceived  world.  To  accept  them 
means,  therefore,  to  consider  those  thoughts  and  their  search 


] 


^ 

^ 


36 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


V>An%^     c^  V* 


J 


or  causes  as  true;  and  that  means  as  valuable.  Only  if  the 
value  of  truth  is  valid  can  we  have  a  right  to  include  those 
constructed  beginnings  in  our  view  of  reality ;  and  only  if  we 
do  that  can  we  become  able  to  deduce  ultimately  the  life 
which  surrounds  us  as  the  late  product  of  those  early  begin- 
nings. The  idea  that  our  thinking  of  truth  is  to  be  conceived 
as  an  evolutionary  product  of  the  past  generations  thus  can- 
not itself  derive  its  value  of  truth  from  its  evolutionary  ori- 
gin. Its  significance  must  be  understood  entirely  out  of  our 
present  logical  purposes.  Our  thinking  creates  the  thought  of 
biological  development  with  its  selection  and  adjustment. 
How,  after  that,  the  thinking  itself  can  be  conceived  as  part 
of  such  a  development  remains  a  purely  biological  question. 
Any  answer  to  this  question,  therefore,  does  not  belong  in 
the  circle  of  philosophy,  if  philosophy  is  to  inquire  into  the 
ultimate  problems  of  thought. 

This  holds  by  principle  for  all  the  pragmatic  relativistic 
theories.  The  value  of  truth  is  demonstrated  as  a  relative 
value  which  is  adjusted  to  changing  experiences;  its  whole 
significance  lies  in  its  function  of  suiting  individual  needs. 
But  all  that  becomes  demonstrated  with  logical  arguments 
and  conclusions,  and  yet  these  conclusions  and  proofs  have 
no  power,  and  even  no  meaning,  unless  we  have  acknowledged 
^^-v  beforehand  the,  independent  value  of  truth.  If  such  a  proof 
of  the  merely  individual  significance  of  truth  has  itself  only 
individual  importance,  it  cannot  claim  any  general  mean- 
ing ;  the  possibility  of  its  validity  must  therefore  be  acknow- 
ledged from  the  very  start.  On  the  other  hand,  if  this  rela- 
tivistic proof  demands  for  itself  the  right  to  be  taken  as 
generally  valid,  the  possibility  of  a  general  truth  is  then 
acknowledged  from  the  start,  at  least  for  this  one  assertion. 
As  soon  as  this  one  exception  is  granted,  it  offers  the  firm 
point  from  which  the  whole  illusory  universe  of  relativism 
may  be  overthrown. 
But  at  this  moment  we  are  not  engaged  in  the  proof  that 


87 


t 


there  exist  absolute  values.   All  that  we  want  to  bring  out 
here  is  that  we  really  seek  values;  for  instance,  in  the  inquiry 
for  truth,  which  cannot  possibly  be  thought  as  mere  relative 
ones.  It  may  be  an  illusion  that  we  presuppose  the  existence 
of  unconditioned  values.  In  our  individual  seeking  and  striv- 
ing for  the  over-individual  lies  no  proof  of  its  validity.  Here 
we  have  only  to  stop  and  to  make  sure  that  all  that  which  we 
can  deduce  from  the  individual  desires  is  not  identical  with 
that  which  we  are  really  seeking  and  acknowledging.    The 
truth  which  I  seek  in  my  search  for  knowledge  is  an  uncon- 
ditional one,  as  such  truth  has  lost  its  meaning  as  goal  for  my 
inquiry  as  soon  as  I  presuppose  that  the  contrary  may  pos- 
sibly have  the  same  truth-value.  That  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  changing  standpoint  of  individuals.    There  maybe  at  my 
left  what  there  is  at  the  right  of  others ;  there  may  be  past 
for  me  that  which  was  future  for  others;  I  may  put  things  into 
my  picture  of  the  world  which  were  unknown  in  the  previous 
periods ;  these  are  not  contradictions  in  the  truth  itself  which 
I  am  seeking.  The  question  is  not,  anyhow,  how  far  I  can  par- 
ticipate in  the  truth.  The  question  is  only  whether  I  can  refer 
my  search  for  truth  to  any  truth  which  is  conceived  as  one  of 
merely  individual  character.  Do  I  really  seek  in  truth  simply  \    ^ 
something  which  is  agreeable  and  helpful  to  me  or  my  neigh-  J  ^ 
bors  or  millions  of  contemporaries?  Do  I  not  demand  frxunl  .\ 
any  truth  that  its  value  be  independent  of  the  feelings  of  any  f    ^ 
majorities  and  temporal  currents,  and  that  we  have  to  subor-    ^^''^''"^  ^  ^ 
dinate  ourselves  to  the  truth  in  a  way  which  excludes  every    ^'"^[^^    ^^f 
relation  to  individuals,  however  much  they  may  agree  in  ^  *   ^il^^*v>  ^ 
their  needs?  We  may  be  satisfied  with  provisional  formula- 
tions, but  their  purpose  is  after  all  determined  by  the  demand 
that  they  approach  a  truth  whose  unconditional  reality  is 
presupposed.  To  deny  every  truth  which  is  more  than  rel- 
ative means  to  deprive  every  thought,  including  skeptical 
thought  itself,  of  its  own  presuppositions. 
Whoever  believes  that  every  thinking  about  the  world  is 


n 


fiK  ?<!/«i^^  /V'  U  f  *'  H . 


^ 


38 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


39 


'i| 


only  a  personal  grouping  and  shaping  of  the  individual  ex- 
periences, must  become  aware  of  his  error  as  soon  as  he  starts 
to  communicate  his  views.  The  effort  to  convince  others  must 
be  meaningless,  if  it  is  not  acknowledged  beforehand  that  we 
agree  in  the  fundamental  thought-forms.  The  world  to  which 
all  our  thoughts  refer  must  thus  be  acknowledged  beforehand 
as  thought  alike  by  every  one.  The  view  of  the  world  which 
our  exchange  of  thoughts  aims  at  must  therefore  be  presup- 
posed as  a  truth  of  general  value.  Whoever  denies  that,  ought 
to  give  up  the  effort  to  refer  his  thought  to  a  world  which 
he  wants  to  share  with  others.  He  knows  practically  only  a 
world  of  his  dreams,  with  reference  to  which  there  cannot  be 
any  real  thinking  or  any  seeking  of  truth. 

The  possibility  of  knowledge  would  be  the  more  excluded, 
as  a  skepticism  which  is  directed  against  the  other  beings 
would  be  turned  with  the  same  right  against  the  own  mental 
acts  which  lie  outside  of  the  present  moment.  My  present 
thought  aims  to  make  use  of  my  earlier  experiences,  and  yet 
that,  too,  has  a  meaning  only  if  I  presuppose  that  my  previous 
acts  and  the  present  ones  refer  to  the  same  objective  world. 
Such  transcending  of  the  present  moment  to  gain  the  unity 
of  my  personal  experiences  represents,  indeed,  at  least  the 
first  germ  of  the  thought  of  a  real  world  and  an  objective 
truth.  But  the  act  by  which  I  acknowledge  my  past  act  as 
connected  with  my  present  transcends  my  immediate  real- 
ity not  less  than  the  further  act  by  which  I  acknowledge 
the  other  subjects  as  logically  coordinated.  If  I  am  afraid  of 
the  one  act,  I  have  no  right  to  recklessly  perform  the  other. 
In  short,  if  I  want  to  be  a  logical  skeptic,  even  my  own  "I" 
crumbles,  and  all  that  remains  is  a  flashing  life-instant  which, 
as  such,  cannot,  indeed,  admit  any  over-individual  truth- 
value. 

Self -destructive  in  the  same  way  as  the  logical  relativism 
is  that  skepticism  which  denies  the  over-individual  value 
of  the  moral  actions.   The  skeptic  denies  that  there  is  any 


^ 


duty  which  has  absolute  binding  power.  Every  motive  for 
action  has  then  only  a  personal  individual  character.  But 
whoever  speaks  so,  wants  to  perform  by  such  assertion  a 
definite  action  and  to  reach  a  definite  goal,  namely,  the 
acknowledgment  of  ethical  denial  on  the  part  of  his  hear- 
ers. Yet  the  hearers  who  were  inclined  to  trust  the  skeptic 
would  have  to  doubt  from  the  beginning  whether  the  speaker 
really  brings  his  true  conviction  to  outer  expression.  Who- 
ever is  not  bound  by  any  duty  may  lie,  may  therefore  deny 
his  true  view,  and  in  spite  of  his  words  may  be  fully  convinced 
that  there  exist  over-individual  duties.  The  skeptic,  there- 
fore, cannot  expect  any  belief  for  his  claim,  and  he  thus 
undertakes  an  action  by  which,  through  his  own  efforts,  he 
makes  it  impossible  to  reach  his  goal. 

Here,  too,  it  is  not  necessary  to  sharpen  the  contrasts  in 
such  an  artificial  way.  The  question  is,  at  first,  not  whether 
our  will  frustrates  itself,  but  what  the  will  intends.  Our  moral 
consciousness  affirms  immediately  that  when  we  are  carried 
by  moral  will,  we  do  not  aim  at  goals  whose  value  is  de- 
termined by  our  personal  like  or  dislike.  When  we  will 
the  morally  good,  we  do  indeed  wish  that  the  good  also  give 
us  joy,  but  we  know  that  it  is  not  the  good  simply  because 
it  gives  us  pleasure.  Even  if  we  acknowledge  the  pleasure 
in  the  minds  of  other  beings  as  goal  for  our  moral  action,  the 
moral  itself  is  not  therefore  based  on  pleasure.  The  essential 
fact  lies  in  our  feeling  of  obligation.  We  feel  it  our  duty 
to  serve  the  pleasure  of  others,  but  this  duty  cannot  itself 
come  in  question  as  a  pleasure.  We  may  submit  to  it  with 
pleasure,  but  we  do  not  submit  to  it  because  it  gives  us  plea- 
I  sure.   Otherwise  it  would  not  be  acknowledged  as  a  duty. 

"Such  a  view  cannot  be  changed  by  the  discussions  of  explan- 
atory science.  The  biologist  may  explain  that  the  welfare 
of  the  whole  to  which  the  individual  belongs  has  become 
the  psychological  motive  for  the  impulse  of  the  individuals. 
What  we  feel  in  our  immediate  experience  is  not  changed  in 


^i 


40 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


41 


ii 


I*' 


its  meaning  and  significance  by  such  explanations.  The  expe- 
rience is  complete  in  itself  and  in  its  life-reality ;  it  does  not 
at  all  refer  to  preceding  causes,  but  is  to  be  interpreted  and 
appreciated  for  itself.  We  will  the  right  and  the  good  and 
the  just,  and  in  this  will  lies  a  reference  to  a  goal  which  in 
this  act  itself  remains  entirely  independent  of  any  conscious 
relation  to  our  own  welfare.  The  meaning  of  this  purposive 
will  is  therefore  not  in  the  least  changed  when  we  consider 
it  from  another  point  of  view  as  a  process  which  can  be 
causally  connected  with  our  personal  pleasure.  In  the  pur- 
posive will-connection  itself  the  over-personal  relation  of 
the  will  remains  valid.  The  action  may  refer  to  this  or  that 
neighbor,  or  to  the  nation,  or  to  the  totality  of  individuals ; 
but  in  our  moral  aim  we  point  towards  a  duty  which  as  such 
stands  above  all  merely  personal  interests.  It  has  for  us  the 
validity  of  something  which  we  acknowledge  absolutely.  The 
man  who  really  thinks  in  the  spirit  of  morality  knows  that  his 
deepest  longing  is  falsified  if  it  becomes  deprived  of  a  rela- 
tion to  something  which  is  independent  of  merely  individual 
desires.  Whoever  says  ''duty''  means  a  value  which  is  not 
founded  on  individual  pleasures. 

Such  an  aspect  reaches  out  far  beyond  truth  and  morality. 
The  beautiful,  too,  may  awake  in  us  personal  pleasure,  the 
progress  of  mankind  may  yield  us  personal  joy,  even  the  re- 
ligious fulfilment  may  awake  in  us  agreeable  expectations;  and 
yet  all  that  does  not  decide  anything  in  our  belief  in  the  value  of 
art  and  progress  and  eternity.  Whatever  biology  and  psycho- 
logy may  explain  as  to  the  pleasantness  of  aesthetic  objects,       ,      \^ 
everybody  who  has  experienced  the  true  meaning  of  high  art  t^^^*** 
knows  there  a  relation  to  something  absoTutelbr  which  all 
explanatory  questions  remain  insignificant.  Our  submission 
under  the  eternal  laws  of  pure  beauty  must  be  grasped  in  its 
meaning  and  not  in  its  causal  effects.    There  is  no  life  so 
poor  that  the  thought  of  the  progress  of  civilization  has  not 
brought  light  and  warmth  into  it,  and  yet  who  has  the  right 


V 


to  claim  that  the  individual  has  gained  from  such  progress, 
and  that  he  would  have  suffered  if  history  had  moved  back- 
ward ?    No  one  can  assert  that  the  advance  of  culture  has 
j  j  added  to  the  total  amoimt  of  pleasure  in  the  individuals,  and 

ihas  made  them  freer  from  displeasure.  The  real  value  of  cul- 
tural development  is  acknowledged  by  us  as  valid,  without 
our  connecting  its  goal  with  the  personal  will  of  any  individ- 
uals. The  meaning  of  our  life  is  broken,  the  world  to  which  all 
our  purposes  refer  must  crumble,  if  our  will  cannot  orientate 
itself  with  reference  to  ideals  which  are  conceived  as  ulti- 
mately independent  of  all  desires  of  special  individuals,  even  if 
those  individuals  are  billionf  old.  Those  who  consider  the  over- 
individual  values  as  products  of  mere  individual  demands,  — 
and  that  means  who  consider  the  eternal  ideals  as  illusions, 
—  stand  indeed  where  the  Sophists  stood  at  all  times.  How- 
ever much  the  modern  relativists  may  try  to  convince  us  that 
there  exists  no  conviction,  it  remains  that  old  sophistry  which 
Socrates  has  overpowered  once  for  all. 

Such  criticism  must  not  be  misinterpreted  as  if  it  meant  to 
say  that  this  new  movement  of  German  Empirio-Criticism, 
or  of  American  Pragmatism,  is  without  any  element  of  truth 
and  without  helpful  suggestions  for  the  philosophy  which  our 
time  needs.  Like  the  old  Sophists  they  fight  against  the  gods 
of  the  past,  a  fight  in  which  Socrates  was  entirely  in  agree- 
ment with  the  Sophists.  The  new  idealism,  which  has  come 
to  stay,  is  in  the  same  way  in  full  agreement  with  the  rela- 
tivists when  they  aim  to  subdue  the  pseudo-gods  of  our  recent 
naturalistic  past.  They  are  welcome  fellow-combatants  in 
the  battle  against  that  clumsy  naturalism  which  accepts  the 
constructions  of  physics  and  psychology  as  ultimate  fact, 
and  which  thus  acknowledges  atoms  or  sensations  as  a  last 
reality.  A  phildsophy  which  turns  from  such  naturalism  back 
to  the  immediate  life-experience  of  the  individual  is  certainly 
in  the  right  there.  Such  a  philosophy,  then,  recognizes  easily 
that  all  physical  and  psychological  things,  the  movements 


42 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


43 


of  the  molecules  and  the  tissues  of  the  associations,  are 
reconstructions  of  immediate  experience  and  have  left  life- 
reality  behind.  At  last  we  reach  again  the  true  life  with  the 
pulse-beat  of  individuality.  History  again  comes  into  its 
right,  man's  will  and  purpose  become  the  decisive  starting- 
point,  and  the  psycho-physical  mechanism  disappears  from 
metaphysics ;  positivism  is  succeeded  by  voluntarism. 

No  step  should  be  retraced  there,  but  whoever  goes  no 
farther  has  after  all  not  gained  anything  decisive  for  a  new 
view  of  the  world.  It  is  certainly  necessary  to  return  to  the 
life-experience  as  a  starting-point.  The  philosophers  had  to 
recognize  that  the  way  from  such  a  starting-point  towards 
naturalism  is  a  blind  alley.  An  ultimate  lasting  and  funda- 
mental reality  can  never  be  gained  from  immediate  experi- 
ence, if  the  thought  moves  in  the  direction  of  naturalism. 
But  nothing  better  is  secured,  if  the  thinker  simply  returns  to 
the  immediate  life-experience,  and  does  not  dare  to  leave  the 
starting-point  at  all.   What  we  found  there  is  surely  given 
with  immediate  vividness,  but  it  is  after  all  nothing  more 
than  life-impression,  and  not  a  real  world.   We  have  found 
the  will  in  its  immediacy,  but  we  nowhere  discover  a  goal 
towards  which  the  will  can  be  directed.  Instead  of  withered 
conceptions  we  have  again  found  the  warm  life,  but  no 
content  which  overcomes  the  life-instant,  no  content  which 
makes  the  life  worth  living. 

It  is  not  easy  to  maintain  the  standpoint  of  immediate 
experience.  Such  a  philosophy  of  immediacy  too  readily 
slips  back  into  the  berth  of  ordinary  psychology.  Yet  the 
superficial  arguments  against  it  ought  not  to  count.  We  often 
hear  that  in  the  immediate  experience  we  do  not  know  any 
other  subjects ;  but  it  may  readily  be  answered  that  we  find  the 
questions  and  replies,  the  suggestions  and  objections,  of  the 
other  persons  in  our  own  experience  with  exactly  the  same 
immediacy  with  which  we  find  the  help  and  the  resistance  of 
things.   Others  claim  that  we  perceive  in  immediate  experi- 


'     L 


t*v 


i 


/    UH.-'fTS 


ence  only  the  physical  things,  and  that  we  ourselves  clothe 
them  with  our  thoughts,  which  themselves  are  no  experi- 
ence. But  that  again  is  certainly  a  misunderstanding.  In  our  j 
true  life-experience  we  find  thought  and  thing  at  first  as  a  j-^  ^^'^^^^  ^ 
unity,  and  as  equally  immediate,  and  we  separate  the  two  only/ 
through  secondary  considerations.  Out  of  this  unity  we  elab- 
orate the  thing  and  deduce  from  it  the  remainder  as  thought, 
but  we  never  experience  the  thing  alone  and  cover  it  with 
thought  afterwards.  Finally,  still  others  object  by  saying 
that  we  have  an  immediate  experience  only  of  our  psychical 
sensations,  and  that  we  make  conclusions  as  to  the  physical 
things  merely  from  those  psychical  sensations.  But  those 
who  argue  in  such  a  way  are  still  deep  in  the  confusion  of 
naturalism,  which  naively  puts  our  whole  external  experi- 
ence into  the  capsule  of  an  individual  consciousness.  In  outi 
real  life  we  know  nothing  of  this  artificial  doubleness,  we  do 
not  separate  the  perceived  thing  without  and  the  perceptional 
idea  within.  Our  ideas,  and  their  elements  the  sensations,  are 
felt  there  without,  where  we  see  and  hear  and  touch  them, 
and  only  by  abstractions  we  reach  a  new  view  in  which  we 
refer  some  aspect  of  the  things  to  ourselves  and  thus  project 
their  image  into  ourselves. 

No  such  arguments  can  disturb  the  philosophy  of  immedi- 
acy and  its  relativism.  And  yet  it  remains  true  that  such  a 
philosophy  of  immediate  experience  is  a  view  of  the  world 
which  lacks  nothing  but  a  world.  Such  a  philosophy  deals 
with  a  haphazard  dream  in  which  the  chance  desire  is  deci- 
sive. No  will  subordinates  itself  there  before  an  absolute  and 
eternally  valuable  will  which  must  hold  unconditionally  for 
every  possible  subject.  Therefore  there  can  be  no  room  for 
morality  and  beauty  and  truth  in  the  ultimate  meaning  of 
these  ideals.  After  all  the  errors  and  vagaries  of  the  natural- 
istic period,  which  had  no  philosophy  at  all,  it  looks  like 
the  beginning  of  a  better  time  to  return  to  the  will  of  the 
individual  as  a  starting-point;  but  simply  to  stand  still  at 


r  ^  ^  -c- 


44 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  PERSONALITIES 


45 


that  which  is  meant  ultimately  as  merely  individual,  even  if 
millions  of  such  individuals  are  in  question,  would  mean 
nothing  but  to  substitute  nihilism  for  dogmatism.  Hence  in 
every  relativistic  philosophy,  in  all  its  many  modem  denom- 
inations, including  Pragmatism  and  its  kin,  we  have  to  sepa- 
rate two  elements.  We  have  on  the  one  side  the  return  to 
the  immediate  life-experience  with  man's  will  in  its  centre, 
as  against  a  naturalistic  pseudo-philosophy.  And  secondly, 
there  is  the  claim  that  this  will  has  merely  individual  charac- 
ter, and  therefore  no  absolute  value.  The  anti-naturalistic 
element  and  the  anti-absolute  element  are  most  intimately 
intertwined.  Moreover,  that  doubleness  allows  a  conven- 
ient method  of  defence.  Whenever  the  naturalists  attack  the 
anti-naturalism  of  such  a  philosophy,  suddenly  the  emphasis 
is  laid  on  the  common  fight  against  absolutism.  But  when 
the  idealists  attack  its  anti-idealism,  they  are  set  at  rest  by 
the  common  antipathy  to  naturalism.  Now  the  return  to  the 
immediate  life-experience  is  the  thoroughly  sound  action  of 
the  relativists,  but  they  can  hardly  claim  that  they  deserve 
any  credit  there  for  a  new  movement.  The  idealists  have 
never  ceased  to  fight  this  battle,  and  have  with  much  deeper 
arguments  demonstrated  that  all  physicism  and  pyscholo-  '. 
gism,  all  atomism  and  all  sensationalism,  in  short,  all  natural- 
ism,  is  an  artificial  construction  of  experience  necessary  for/ 
certain  purposes.  That  is  the  real  life-element  of  idealism, 
and  while  it  is  true  that  in  periods  of  shallow  unphilosophy, 
even  this  philosophic  commonplace  was  forgotten,  the  philo- 
sophers at  least  cannot  forget  that  the  great  idealists,  like 
Kant  and  Fichte,  who  preceded  the  recent  naturalistic  period, 
have  made  that  a  lasting  part  of  philosophical  insight.  There 
is  nothing  whatever  new  in  such  an  aspect. 

Contrary  to  the  spirit  of  such  classical  idealism  is  only  that 
other  claim,  that  our  will,  in  aiming  towards  truth  or  moral- 
ity or  the  other  ideals,  cannot  transcend  the  individual  desire 
and  cannot  reach  anything  absolute.    It  is  this  relativistic 


\^ 


and  not  the  anti-naturalistic  element  of  Pragmatism  which 
demands  stubborn  resistance,  and  such  a  resistance  has  to  be 
the  more  serious  as  those  two  elements  form  an  almost  un- 
recognizable mixture.  The  opposition  to  this  anti-truth  and 
anti-morality  character  is  too  easily  charmed  and  brought 
to  silence  by  the  many  strong  points  which  such  a  philosophy 
makes  against  the  naturalistic  superficiality.  We  must  insist 
that  these  two  factors  have  nothing  to  do  with  each  other. 
We  must  leave  naturalism  behind  us,  we  must  come  back  to 
immediate  experience  as  a  starting-point,  we  must  recognize 
the  human  will  as  the  centre  of  every  search  for  reality,  and 
yet  we  must  acknowledge  that  this  will  is  bound  by  absolute 
and  necessary  eternal  values. 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


47 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  OBLIGATIONS 

We  have  now  gained  a  twofold  insight.  First,  the  causal 
system  of  nature  contains  no  absolute  values,  because  nature 
itself  must  by  principle  be  conceived  as  without  any  relation 
to  will  and  therefore  without  any  value.  Secondly,  the  system 
of  the  purposes  of  individuals  contains  no  absolute  values, 
because  the  reference  to  individual  personalities  can  always 
lead  only  to  relative  values.  That  means  that  any  uncondi- 
tional general  values  of  the  world  can  be  neither  contents  of 
the  causal  nature  nor  demands  of  historical  origin.  If  they 
have  existence  at  all,  they  must  belong  to  an  over-causal  and 
over-individual  reality  of  the  world.  But  we  have  seen  that 
we  cannot  doubt  their  validity.  We  recognized  that  there 
exist  only  two  possibilities :  we  have  a  world  with  over-per- 
sonal unconditional  values,  or  we  have  no  real  world  at  all, 
but  merely  a  worthless  chance  dream,  in  which  to  strive 
for  truth  and  morality  can  have  no  meaning  whatever.  We 
recognized  that  we  have  not  even  a  choice  whether  we  want 
to  refer  our  striving  really  to  a  world  or  to  a  meaningless  hap- 
hazard chaos,  without  truth  and  morality,  as  our  whole  com- 
mon task  is  here  to  seek  the  truth  logically  and  to  stand  up 
for  the  truth  morally.  Whatever  psychologists  and  biologists 
and  historians  may  tell  us  of  how  all  this  thinking  and  aim- 
ing can  be  explained,  does  not  matter.  We  know  well  that 
our  particular  idea  of  truth  can  be  construed  as  the  product 
of  our  brains ;  that  our  individual  ideas  are  the  effects  of  the 
social  influences  among  which  we  have  grown  up ;  that  our 
theories  are  the  results  of  a  historical  development ;  and  that 
our  convictions  are  shaped  by  the  traditions  of  our  time.  Yet 
in  our  effort  to  reach  the  truth  and  to  defend  the  truth,  we 


^ 


IJL^-* 


\ 


do  not  refer  our  will  to  causes,  but  to  ideals ;  we  seek  a  truth 
which  is  meant  as  something  which  is  absolutely  valuable, 
and  that  means  as  something  of  which  the  opposite  is  impos- 
sible. In  the  same  way,  in  upholding  the  truth  we  do  not  ask 
how  our  desire  for  truth-speaking  originated.  We  believe  in 
the  absolute  value  of  our  duty,  and  in  this  our  belief  lies  a 
reference  for  which  no  mere  social  request  can  be  substituted. 
We  seek  a  truth  which  we  conceive  in  our  search  as  inde- 
pendent of  its  possible  useful  consequences ;  and  we  submit  to 
a  duty  which  in  our  submission  we  conceive  as  independent  of 
any  practical  effects.  We  saw  that  every  doubt  of  absolute 
values  ultimately  destroys  itself.  As  thought  it  contradicts  it- 
self, as  doubt  it  denies  itself,  as  belief  it  despairs  of  itself.  No 
way  leads  from  it  to  the  reality  of  the  own  self  beyond  the 
immediate  instant.  All  strife  and  effort  has  lost  its  goal.  But 
we  are  striving  here,  we  are  in  the  midst  of  an  effort,  as  we 
want  to  convince  others ;  that  means  we  have  already  chosen, 
and  we  are  resolved  to  maintain  the  conviction  that  there  is 
a  world  independent  of  chance  individuals.  Absolute  values 
must  therefore  be  presupposed  by  us  as  real,  must  have  valid- 
ity for  us  superior  to  the  relativistic  values  which  historical 
individuals  create.  We  have  therefore  to  ask  what  the  real 
meaning  and  real  significance  of  such  unconditioned  abso- 
lute values  is.  Natural  science  and  history  cannot  find  them. 
Where,  after  all,  can  they  be  found?  What  are  they  made  of  ? 
How  do  they  hang  together  ?  How  do  we  individuals  reach 
them  ?  What  do  they  contribute  to  the  meaning  of  our  per- 
sonal life,  and  what  is  their  own  ultimate  purpose? 

But  before  we  turn  to  these  fundamental  questions,  we 
ought  to  eliminate  at  least  one  complete  misunderstanding 
which  is  responsible  for  much  in  the  relativistic  vagaries.  The 
values  which  we  are  seeking  are  to  find  their  foundation  in 
the  unconditional  character  of  the  world,  and  are  to  maintain 
their  absolute  validity,  however  much  or  little  we  historical 
Individuals  may  grasp  them.  Such  a  postulate  is  at  once  dis- 


48 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


torted  into  pre-Kantean  metaphysics  as  soon  as  it  is  misin- 
terpreted, as  if  we  assert  the  eternal  existence  of  a  world 
which  is  independent  of  the  experiencing  consciousness.  The 
rationalistic  philosophy  and  the  empirical  philosophy  of  a 
precritical  age  agreed  in  just  such  a  metaphysical  presupposi- 
tion. Both  the  rationalists,  like  Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  Leib- 
nitz, and  the  empiricists  from  Bacon  to  the  encyclopaedists, 
claimed  that  there  exists  a  reality  which  is  independent  of  the 
mental  conditions  of  knowledge.  Their  disagreement  referred 
only  to  the  question  whether  the  thinking  of  reason  or  the 
experience  of  the  senses  would  be  the  right  method  to  gain 
access  to  that  independent  world  and  thus  to  win  the  truth. 
But  the  idea  of  such  super-reality  has  beeen  definitely  re- 
moved from  critical  philosophy  by  Kant.  The  world  of  ex- 
perience is  the  only  world  to  which  our  knowledge  can  have 
reference,  and  the  reality  which  we  want  to  grasp  in  our  truth 
is  therefore  completely  bound  up  with  the  conditions  of  our 
mental  experience.  The  true  world  is  independent  of  the 
single  individual  as  such,  and  therefore  absolute  with  refer- 
ence to  the  individual ;  but  it  is  a  world  of  which  we  can  have 
knowledge  at  all  only  if  its  forms  are  determined  by  the  con- 
ditions of  consciousness.  A  world  which  is  possible  material 
for  knowledge  must  be  thought  beforehand  as  a  world  which 
stands  under  the  conditions  of  possible  conscious  experience. 
A  reality  of  which  the  kind  and  form  is  not  conceived  as  in 
relation  to  consciousness  can  never  be  understood  as  a  pos- 
sible object  of  knowledge.  The  absolute  values  must  therefore 
completely  lie  in  a  world  whose  totality  stands  under  the 
condition  of  being  a  possible  object  of  experience.  Even 
where  the  conviction  transcends  the  world  of  experience  and 
seeks  an  over-experience,  such  a  last  reality  must  still  remain 
dependent  upon  the  conditions  of  consciousness. 

The  absolute  world  with  its  eternal  values,  if  it  exists,  is 
thus  certainly  not  something  which  hangs  in  an  own  atmos- 
phere, eternally  separated  from  our  consciousness.    The 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


49 


values  which  we  seek  in  reality  do  not  point  from  an  experi- 
enced world  to  a  sphere  beyond  experience.  On  the  contrary, 
everything  which  can  be  acknowledged  as  unconditional 
must  be  conceived  beforehand  as  belonging  to  the  sphere  of 
possible  material  of  consciousness,  and  it  is  absolute  only  for 
the  world  in  which  every  subject  can  participate,  ijhe  values 
are  absolute  for  the  only  world  which  we  can  know  at  all. 
This  mutual  relation  goes  so  far  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
can  acknowledge  as  subjects  only  those  who  can  experience 
such  a  world.  If  there  were  a  spirit  directed  towards  a  higher 
world  than  that  of  our  possible  experience,  the  exchange  of 
thought  with  such  a  subject  would  lose  all  meaning  for 
us,  and  nothing  absolute  could  be  brought  over  from  there 
out  of  his  incomprehensible  special  world  into  our  world  of 
experience.  The  absolute  values  have  unexceptional  validity 
because  they  are  valid  for  every  possible  subject  who  shares 
the  world  with  us,  and  who  relates  his  thinking  and  striving 
to  our  world.  In  such  thinking  and  striving  the  values  remain 
independent  of  any  particular  individual  will,  and  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  such  individuals  take  their  attitude 
individually  or  in  the  cooperation  of  millions.  The  values 
stand  above  the  individual.!  But  they  would  become  mean- 
ingless if  they  were  conceived  as  independent  of  the  conditions 
of  consciousness.  Xn  that  ought  to  be  common  property  since 
the  days  of  Kant  and  Fichte,  and  every  new  time  only  de- 
mands a  new  adjustment  of  these  fundamental  insights  to  the 
changing  knowledge  of  the  period.  But  it  ought  no  longer  to 
be  necessary  to  defend  idealism  against  attacks  which  really 
are  meant  only  against  the  caricatures  of  idealism.  There  is 
no  true  philosophical  idealist  who  means  by  an  absolute  a 
'>  gigantic  monster  which  swims  behind  the  clouds  without  rela- 
tion to  the  subjects  of  experience.  Only  on  this  basis  we  ask 
once  more  for  the  meaning  of  such  real  absolute  values. 

^We  find  our  will  bound  by  values.)  We  cannot  affirm  a 
judgment  in  accordance  with  our  caprice ;  we  are  bound  by 


50  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

the  truth.  We  cannot  act  in  accordance  with  every  desire ;  we 
are  bound  by  duties.  What  binds  our  will?   The  two  repli^ 
which  are  most  usual  are  either  afnecessity  or  an  obligatioij. 
It  almost  sounds  as  if  that  is  the  antithesis  of  a  solution  be- 
side which  no  third  solution  is  possible.  But  it  is  clear  from  the 
start  that  the  binding  by  a  necessity  in  the  sense  of  a  natural 
law  cannot  be  the  solution  for  us  at  all.  It  would  lead  us  back 
from  the  sphere  of  free  personalities  to  the  sphere  of  psycho- 
logical processes.  It  ought  to  be  a  matter  of  course  that  in  the 
sphere  of  causal  connections,  the  psychical  phenomena  of  will 
and  value  cannot  represent  an  exception.  The  subordination 
of  the  will  as  a  psychical  process  under  the  psychological  idea 
of  value  must  be  explained  by  psychical  and  physiological 
causes.  But  such  an  explanation  stands  on  the  same  level  on 
which  we  explain  that  perhaps  a  pain  sensation  awakes  an 
impulse  of  rejection.  The  fact  that  the  idea  of  a  value  has  a 
controlling  effect  on  the  will  is  simply  a  chapter  of  the  psy- 
chology of  suggestion,  and  as  such  stands  in  near  neighbor- 
hood to  the  problems  of  attention,  inhibition,  and  hypnosis. 
Such  a  psycho-physical  necessity  has  in  no  way  the  charac- 
ter of  absoluteness.   Like  any  other  inherited  or  acquired  reac- 
tion, it  can  be  remodelled  by  new  training  and  can  be  entirely 
suppressed  by  new  conditions.  Moreover,  we  saw  beforehand 
that  such  a  psychological  explanation  of  our  submission  to 
the  value  cannot  have  any  philosophical  bearing  at  all.   Its 
philosophical  significance  is  eliminated  by  the  fact  that  the 
truth  of  such  a  causal  connection  of  psychological  facts  is 
itself  a  value.  We  must  already  have  accepted  this  value  if 
we  want  to  explain  the  psychological  phenomena  of  valuation 
by  psychological  laws.  But  we  may  add  that  the  connection 
between  the  value  and  the  will  is  not  even  one  of  causal 
necessity.   We  may  have  the  idea  of  the  moral  value,  for 
instance,  in  our  mind,  and  yet  our  action  may  remain  unin- 
fluenced :  we  turn  towards  sin  and  crime.    It  is  not  true  that 
we  must  act  by  necessity  in  accordance  with  a  value. 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


51 


Just  here  starts  the  much  deeper  reply  which  says  that  our 
will  is  bound  not  by  necessity,  but  by  obligation.  We  are  not 
forced  to  act  in  accordance  with  a  value,  but  we  ought  to  act 
in  accordance  with  it.  The  value  is  thus  an  obligation.  To  be 
sure,  any  "ought''  can  also  be  easily  translated  into  the  terms 
of  natural  science.  The  biological  treatment  of  obligation 
appears  almost  as  a  necessary  part  of  naturalistic  sociology. 
Experience  teaches  us  that  the  real  effects  may  not  always 
bring  the  expected  pleasure.  We  connect  the  valuation,  there- 
fore, in  our  mind  with  those  effects  which  are  most  frequent 
or  most  typical.  That  gives  us  certain  rules  for  action  which 
are  crystallized  in  norms.  The  individual  finally  acts  in  his 
own  well-understood  interest  in  accordance  with  the  pre- 
scriptions and  norms,  even  when  the  special  circumstances 
suggest  the  desire  to  escape  the  norms.  The  consciousness  of 
obligation  is  from  such  a  sociological  point  of  view  a  kind  of 
apparatus  for  the  inhibition  of  desires  which  may  be  ulti- 
mately harmful.  It  is  an  impulse  to  do  what  has  shown  itself 
to  be  useful  in  the  great  average,  and  a  warning  not  to  do 
what  may  appear  tempting  for  the  moment,  but  has  usually 
shown  itself  to  be  dangerous.  The  feeling  of  obligation  is  thus 
psychologically  what  the  smell-sensation  is  for  our  appetite. 
If  we  had  a  full  knowledge  of  the  chemical  constitution  of  a 
substance  and  of  its  physiological  effects  on  the  organism,  it 
would  be  unnecessary  to  take  any  notice  in  eating  of  the 
feeling  which  connects  itself  with  the  preceding  smell.  But 
nature  substitutes  for  this  complete  knowledge  the  feeling 
of  smell.  We  rely  on  the  general  rule  that  that  will  agree 
with  us  which  smells  well,  and  that  will  not  agree  with  us 
which  smells  badly,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  the  particular 
case  the  sweetly-smelling  substance  may  be  a  poison. 

It  is  evident  that  such  a  conception  of  obligation  cannot 
bring  us  nearer  to  our  goal.  That  which  we  ought  to  do  is 
here  again  ultimately  only  that  which  we  wish  to  do  in  the 
interests  of  our  pleasure.   The  only  difference  is  that  the 


52 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


expectation  of  pleasure  is  attached  not  to  the  immediate 
impression,  but  to  a  calculation  of  averages  condensed  in  a 
prescriptive  formula.  The  personal  welfare  again  stands  at 
the  central  point.  Not  to  be  obedient  to  the  obligation  means 
only  to  play  a  risky  game.  The  possible  gain  may  be  tempt- 
ing, but  the  probability  is  that  one  loses  the  game.  The  value 
which  ought  to  be  aimed  at  is,  then,  in  no  way  uncondi- 
tional. On  the  contrary,  it  differs  from  the  opposite  which  we 
ought  not  to  do,  only  through  the  greater  probability  of  the 
resulting  pleasure. 

In  the  same  circle  of  thought  move  the  usual  deductions  of 
social  norms.  When  the  stronger  forces  the  weaker  to  subor- 
dinate himself,  and  demands  from  him  that  he  act  against  his 
own  desire,  the  obeying  actor  does  not  do  anything  but  sim- 
ply weigh  his  personal  pleasure  and  displeasure.  He  performs 
what  is  demanded  from  him,  and  what  he  "ought''  to  do, 
because  the  threatened  punishment  in  case  of  his  not  doing 
it  is  anticipated  with  still  greater  displeasure  than  the  unde- 
sirable action.  There  the  will  of  the  stronger  has  on  the 
weaker  exactly  the  same  effect  as  a  situation  in  nature  which 
forces  on  us  an  uncomfortable  effort  for  the  purpose  of  escap- 
ing an  injury.  This  subordination  under  the  power  has  no- 
thing to  do  with  the  acknowledgment  of  eternal  norms.  The 
one  who  threatens  and  the  one  who  obeys  are  equally  com- 
pelled by  motives  of  pleasure  and  displeasure. 

All  social  norms  in  the  sense  of  social  psychology  can  be 
reduced  to  this  fundamental  scheme,  however  manifold  the 
forms  of  development  and  the  abbreviations  of  the  mental 
process  may  be.  Thousandfold  are  the  sources  of  power  and 
authority,  thousandfold  the  means  of  the  stronger  or  of  the 
majority  to  force  their  desires  on  the  weaker  and  the  fewer, 
and  thousandfold  the  ideas  of  customs,  morality,  law,  and 
religion  in  which  the  demands  of  the  social  majority  are 
brought  to  expression.  Ultimately,  it  always  means  that  the 
members  of  an  association,  from  the  family  to  the  nation  and 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


53 


civilized  mankind,  create  values  as  a  result  of  their  own  social 
desire  for  self -conservation  which  the  individual  is  forced  to 
acknowledge.  In  the  mind  of  the  individual  the  consciousness 
of  this  real  connection  disappears ;  the  feeling  of  fear  is  trans- 
posed through  a  mental  abbreviation  from  the  threatened 
punishment  over  to  the  forbidden  action  itself.  It  is  just  as  a 
child  soon  refers  the  dislike  which  belongs  to  the  chastisement 
to  the  forbidden  action,  and  expands  the  pleasure  to  every- 
thing which  at  first  was  artificially  connected  with  reward. 
Even  the  highest  social  psychological  norms  thus  remain  by 
principle  on  the  level  of  social  hygiene.  The  hygienic  pre- 
scriptions of  the  police,  even  if  they  were  useful  for  all  man- 
kind, would  yet  remain  in  principle  different  from  everything 
which  in  a  philosophical  sense  has  to  be  acknowledged  as  a 
valid  obligation. 

The  right  of  such  sociological  constructions  is  not  at  all  to 
be  denied.  If  we  are  to  study  evaluation  as  a  phenomenon  of 
social  psychology,  the  inquiry  cannot  move  in  any  other  lines. 
General  and  valid,  then,  indeed  is  every  evaluation  which 
serves  the  development  of  the  psycho-physical  society,  and 
this  utilitarian  goal  necessarily  remains  ultimate.  The  psy- 
chologist has  no  right  to  acknowledge  any  metaphysical  ends. 
Even  the  thought  of  a  metaphysical  evaluation  could  mean 
nothing  for  the  social  psychologist,  unless  the  thought  itself 
is  taken  as  the  means  to  a  utilitarian  end.  He  might  acknow- 
ledge that  it  is  useful  for  the  welfare  of  society  that  its  mem- 
bers live  in  the  illusion  of  the  belief  that  there  exist  values 
which  are  independent  of  pleasure  and  welfare.  And  if  the 
psychologist  discovers  that  such  an  idealistic  belief  is  after  all 
not  useful  for  society,  he  will  simply  relegate  such  meta- 
physics to  the  accidental,  or  perhaps  even  to  the  pathological, 
phenomena  of  the  social  psyche.  From  his  utilitarian  point  of 
view  such  a  belief  then  means  for  society  what  dreams  mean 
for  the  individual  consciousness. 

But  the  "ought''  can  be  found  also  on  a  much  purer 


54 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


55 


height,  where  all  relativism  and  all  sophisticism  are  left  far 
behind,  and  the  critical  philosophy  is  ready  to  reach  out  to 
its  last  consequences.    Especially  in  the  modem  German 
philosophy  the  conviction  is  growing  that  the  conception  of 
being  itself  is  founded  on  the  conception  of  obligation.  The 
existence  of  reality  is  given  to  us  in  judgments,  and  their 
affirmation  ultimately  has  no  other  reason  than  the  fact  that 
our  thought  faces  a  rule,  an  "  ought,''  which  obliges  our  will  to 
judge.   There  is  no  positive  judgment  of  existence  in  which 
the  will  is  not  affirming,  no  negative  judgment  in  which  the 
will  is  not  denying.  Yet  the  will  which  affirms  in  the  judg- 
ment the  existence  of  a  certain  thing  does  not  follow  an  in- 
dividual caprice.   The  individual  yields  there  to  the  pressure 
of  facts.    But  is  this  pressure  perhaps  the  effect  of  an  inde- 
pendently existing  reality  which  our  judgment  simply  tries  to 
copy?  That  would  throw  us  back  into  the  crudest  metaphy- 
sics, the  more  as  the  existence  of  such  an  independent  world 
would  have  the  value  of  truth  again  only  for  the  one  who 
judges,  and  thus  it  would  still  leave  open  the  question :  What 
external  power  forces  this  metaphysical  judgment?  No,  the 
will  which  affirms  the  existence  of  anything  real  is  not  de- 
termined by  something  which  has  an  independent  existence, 
but  is  determined  by  an  "ought"  which  decides  upon  the 
value  of  the  judgment.    The  judgment  which  ought  to  be 
affirmed  is  a  valuable  judgment,  and  that  means  a  true  judg- 
ment.   Such  an  "ought''  does  not  belong  to  the  existing 
object,  but  belongs  to  the  will  of  the  subject  as  its  deepest 
significance,  by  which  alone  experience  becomes  possible.  To 
think  the  truth  would  then  mean  to  subordinate  the  affirm- 
ing will  to  an  obligation. 

In  this  way  the  difference  between  knowledge  and  moral- 
ity disappears.  He  who  seeks  the  truth  and  he  who  will  per- 
form his  deed  subordinates  himself  equally  to  an  "ought" 
which  is  independent  of  his  individual  desires.  It  is  the  ab- 
solute validity  of  this  "ought"  which  gives  meaning  to  the 


ideals  of  truth  and  morality.  In  the  same  way  we  should  have 
to  interpret  the  manifoldness  of  the  aesthetic  values.  They 
tell  us  how  we  ought  to  interpret  the  world.  The  artist  obeys 
his  aesthetic  conscience,  an  "ought"  which  appeals  to  his  will 
to  seek  beauty.  We  think  and  feel  and  will  in  accordance  with 
absolute  values.  We  are  loyal  to  the  way  in  which  we  ought 
to  think  and  ought  to  feel  and  ought  to  will.  If  we  become 
disloyal  to  our  obligations,  we  enter  into  error,  into  the  ugly, 
into  the  immoral,  into  the  sin.  Here  at  least  we  have  a  view 
of  the  world  which,  endlessly  superior  to  all  naturalism  and 
realism  and  pragmatism,  really  acknowledges  the  absolute 
values.  The  evaluation  precedes  the  existence.  All  values 
are  founded  on  the  relations  of  will,  and  are  super-ordinated 
to  every  possible  individual  will.  The  logical,  ethical,  aesthetic, 
and  religious  values  are  based  on  the  same  fundamental 
principle,  and  do  not  refer  to  a  transcending  existence,  but  to 
a  fundamental  determination  of  will.  All  this  is  never  again 
to  be  lost.  And  yet  we  must  raise  the  question  whether  the 
doctrine  of  the  value  as  an  "ought"  can  be  really  accepted 
as  an  ultimate  goal.  Is  the  conception  of  the  obligation  really 
fit  to  lead  us  into  the  ultimate  depths  of  absolute  validity? 
Certainly  all  philosophical  right  is  on  the  side  of  the  "ought," 
when  this  conception  is  brought  into  contrast  with  the  real- 
istic conception  of  the  "must,"  or  with  the  relativistic  con- 
ception of  the  desire.  But  are  the  possibilities  of  will  really 
exhausted  in  such  a  way  ? 

One  limitation  is  evident  at  once.  The  "ought"  which  is 
sought  in  the  value  contributes  nothing  to  bring  together  the 
scattered  values  of  our  life.  Truth  is  valuable  and  also  beauty, 
justice  is  valuable  and  also  morality,  progress  and  develop- 
ment are  valuable  and  also  religious  fulfilment,  but  no  tie 
connects  the  diverging  ideals.  If  knowledge  and  art  and  his- 
tory and  morality  and  religion  each  demands  an  obligation 
of  a  special  kind,  they  remain  separated  grounds  of  reality. 
The  philosophers  of  the  "ought"  point  to  history  to  show 


7  ^ 


.vn.vi'i- 


•L. 


56  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

how  the  consciousness  of  one  obligation  after  another  was 
developed,  but  that  only  suggests  that  we  gather  the  historical 
elaboration  of  the  values  in  an  external  way.  For  instance, 
we  could  not  foresee  whether  or  not  entirely  new  values  might 
arise  to-morrow,  and  we  could  not  understand  why  others 
have  not  come  up  before.  The  logical  "ought"  which  binds 
the  mathematician,  the  aesthetic  "ought''  which  binds  the 
sculptor,  the  ethical  "ought"  for  which  the  martyr  suffers, 
have  nothing  in  common.  We  do  not  find  a  connected  system 
of  values,  but  a  chaos  of  diverging  valuations.  Whoever  really 
seeks  a  united  view  of  the  world  must  ultimately  demand 
that  the  values  can  be  understood  as  interrelated  and  as 
connected  parts  of  a  whole ;  we  must  be  able  to  deduce  them 
^  from  one  and  the  same  principle. 

Moreover,  can  we  overlook  that  the  conception  of  the 
"ought"  does  not  really  contribute  anything  to  the  deeper 
understanding  of  the  validity  of  the  values?  Valuable  is  that 
which  we  ought  to  accept,  and  that  which  we  ought  to  accept 
is  valuable.  Thus  we  do  not  add  anything  new  to  the  concep- 
tion of  value  if  we  reduce  it  to  an  obligation,  or  rather  we 
do  not  reduce  it,  as  we  do  not  move  forward  at  all.  That  does 
not  mean  that  the  treatment  of  values  as  forms  of  obligation 
is  entirely  superfluous.  It  is  not  only  a  new  name  for  it.  If 
we  say  "ought"  instead  of  "value,"  if  we  say  "  obligation  to 
think  "  instead  of  "  value  of  truth,"  we  do  much  more  than  to 
call  the  same  thing  by  a  different  name.  The  characteristic 
features  of  the  new  conception  indeed  contribute  something 
very  significant  to  the  understanding  of  the  problem.    Our 
only  objection  would  be  that  the  thing  which  is  expressed  by 
the  idea  of  obligation  is  essentially  something  negative.   To 
say,  for  instance,  that  the  value  of  truth  is  based  on  obliga- 
tion means  in  the  first  place  that  it  does  not  result  from  a 
metaphysical  existence.  The  old  dogmatism  said  that  a  true 
judgment  is  valuable  because  it  agreed  with  an  existing  reality 
which  is  independent  of  thinking.    Such  an  unphilosophical 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


57 


view  is  energetically  rejected  by  the  doctrine  of  the  "ought." 
The  doctrine  emphasizes  that  there  exists  no  other  basis  for 
our  truth  than  the  necessity  of  our  judgment.  And  just  as  the 
"ought"  rejects  such  dogmatic  empiricism,  it  also  turns  with 
full  clearness  against  any  relativism  which  denies  the  absolute 
character  of  the  truth.  In  both  directions  the  conception  of 
value  would  be  at  first  powerless  to  suppress  the  wrong  the- 
ories, but  as  soon  as  the  conception  of  value  is  surrounded 
by  the  conception  of  obligation  this  negative  task  becomes 
completed.  Every  mixture  of  the  philosophy  of  value  with 
mere  empiricism  or  with  mere  relativism  then  becomes  ex- 
cluded. The  same  holds  for  the  ethical  and  aesthetic  values. 
The  conception  of  obligation  brings  to  sharpest  distinction 
the  fact  that  the  value  of  the  moral  deed  is  not  based  on  its 
objective  effect  in  the  existing  world,  as  utilitarianism  would 
like  to  teach  us.  The  value  of  the  duty  lies  in  the  obligation 
itself  and  not  in  its  usefulness.  As  far  as  we  are  anxious  to 
fight  against  the  usual  falsification  of  the  absolute  values, 
there  indeed  exists  no  more  effective  means  than  to  point  to 
the  difference  between  the  "is"  and  the  "ought."  For  such 
negative  purposes  in  the  service  of  idealism  the  conception 
of  obligation  is  excellent. 

But  in  contrast  to  this  negative  achievement,  we  must 
insist  that  the  positive  character  of  the  conception  of  obliga- 
tion is  directly  misleading.  It  brings  into  the  conception  of 
value  certain  characteristics  which  do  not  belong  to  it,  and 
which  hinder  the  grasping  of  its  deepest  meaning.  As  long  as 
it  is  a  question  of  fighting  realism  and  utilitarianism  and 
empiricism,  the  conception  of  "ought"  may  be  unavoidable. 
As  soon  as  we  come  to  an  ultimate  theory,  we  must  try 
to  get  rid  of  the  conception  of  obligation,  because  we  must 
recognize  that  in  its  ultimate  meaning  the  value  does  not 
represent  an  "  ought."  The  idea  of  an  "  ought"  evidently  lies 
before  us  most  clearly,  and  comes  first  to  the  mind  of  every 
one  in  the  field  of  moral  obligation.  What  does  it  mean  there? 


I 


58  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

We  have  before  us  a  manifoldness  of  possibilities  of  action. 
Some  are  tempting.  They  promise  pleasure,  but  only  one 
action  may  be  demanded  by  our  duty.  The  obligation  faces 
us  here  in  our  choice  of  action.  We  feel  that  we  can  do  that 
which  our  duty  forbids.  We  alone  have  to  decide.  This  is 
evidently  the  commonplace  meaning  of  obligation.  We  should 
not  speak  of  obligation  at  all  in  such  a  case,  if  there  were  no 
opportunity  for  a  choice,  no  decision,  not  at  least  the  possi- 
bility to  will  that  which  we  ought  not  to  will. 

Let  us  accept  for  the  first  moment  this  every-day  idea  of 
duty.  Have  we  any  right  to  say  that  it  really  holds  for  the 
value  of  truth  or  beauty  or  justice?  When  I  want  to  judge, 
do  I  really  stand  before  a  decision  whether  I  want  the  true 
judgment  or  its  opposite?  Is  it  not  rather  the  case  that,  if 
I  will  to  judge  at  all,  I  never  desire  to  choose  anything  but 
the  true  valuable  judgment?  Of  course,  it  may  be  that  I  am 
not  especially  interested  in  judging  at  all ;  I  do  not  care  for 
knowledge  and  for  the  seeking  of  the  truth.  Society  may 
then  remind  me  that  it  is  my  duty  to  seek  the  truth,  but  that 
^,    is  evidently  an  ethical  duty,  not  a  logical  one.  Society  wants 
Us  ^*«^^^^''^fme  to  think  in  a  way  which  makes  me  an  agent  of  truth.  But 
.  .^H  \^^>"  H*^-^  •  as  soon  as  I  want  to  think  at  all,  I  certainly  do  not  feel  any 
"   .   \A^'   '  choice  between  my  will  for  the  truth  and  my  will  for  the 
'  ,    ^  '^    error ;  I  always  will  only  the  true  judgment  and  never  the  error. 
I  \il   '^^^  ^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^  ^^  ^^  obligation  which  warns 
""     UJU,    ^^  against  my  opposite  desire.  Whenever  I  want  to  judge,  I 
^  stand  before  a  question  which  I  am  anxious  to  solve.  I  seek  a 

solution  which  is  valuable  to  me  because  it  gratifies  my  desire 
for  the  removal  of  the  difficulty.  In  this  point  the  relativistic 
philosophers  are  perfectly  right.   The  relativists  put  them- 
selves in  the  wrong  when  they  add  that  this  gratification  is  , 
dependent  only  upon  the  personal  conditions  and  has  no  \\  *^  ^^^[ 
general  necessity.  There  is  necessity.  We  feel  it.  But  here  \^^''^]^^^ 
begins  the  mistake  of  the  other  side  when  the  idealists  claim  ^j^      ^ 
that  this  necessity  is  an  obligation.    Not  everything  which        V 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


59 


i„         •   ^\     •v     r    - 


i.%>^» 


is  necessary  for  every  will  —  that  is,  which  suits  the  will 
without  reference  to  the  individual  desires —  must  be  an  obli- 
gation. If  I  seek  truth,  I  seek  a  connection  by  which  a 
particular  difficulty  is  removed,  a  particular  problem  is  solved. 
If  I  feel  that  the  problem  does  not  lie  before  me  as  an  indi- 
vidual only,  but  must  be  common  to  all  who  share  the  world 
with  me,  I  feel  the  complete  solution  as  a  satisfaction  which 
refers  to  no  merely  personal  need,  but  which  has  absolute 
validity.  But  no  obligation  enters  into  it.  It  is  an  over-per- 
sonal satisfaction  of  the  will. 

Often  an  error  may  tempt  me,  but  it  can  tempt  me  only 
so  long  as  I  take  it  for  truth ;  that  is,  for  a  real  solution  of 
my  problem.  I  never  want  the  error  as  such.  I  never  prefer 
a  judgment  unless  it  bears  the  value  of  truth  for  myself,  and 
thus  makes  me  believe  that  every  other  possible  subject 
would  feel  it  in  the  same  way  as  gratification  of  his  will.  Of 
course  that  loses  its  meaning  if  I  give  it  a  psychological  inter- 
pretation. It  does  not  mean  that  my  psycho-physical  mechan- 
ism stands  under  the  necessity  of  choosing  the  true  judgments 
and  of  inhibiting  the  untrue  ones.  Most  of  the  judgments 
which  the  brain  produces  are  errors.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
a  causal  process  any  more  than  it  is  a  question  of  obligation. 
To  will  the  action  is  neither  the  result  of  a  natural  law  nor 
of  a  rationalistic  obligation.  I  will  the  truth  because  that 
which  it  offers  is  really  a  complete  satisfaction  of  my  will; 
and  yet  this  value  is  unconditional  because  my  will  is  ul- 
timately not  related  to  me  or  to  an5rthing  individual,  but 
to  something  absolute  and  over-personal.  Here  lies  the  real 
problem :  How  is  it  possible  that  I  will  something,  and  yet  that 
I  will  it  without  any  reference  to  myself  and  merely  with 
reference  to  something  which  by  principle  is  independent  of 
me  as  an  individual  ? 

In  the  same  way,  we  do  not  find  any  obligation  in  the  field 
of  aesthetics.  There,  too,  society  may  suggest  the  practical 
request  that  he  who  has  a  talent  ought  to  create  beauty,  but 


60 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


c*> 


a 


v»    Vvf 


that  is  a  moral  obligation.   Such  an  ethical  duty  demands 
that  you  realize  that  which  has  aesthetic  value,  but  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  aesthetic  value  is  already  presupposed. 
Beauty  is  a  completeness  which  our  will  wants,  and  if  we 
/    grasp  it  at  all,  we  can  never  will  it  otherwise.  We  never  will 
o*:'a.'Sf    •vt|5^^«^  the  ugly.   The  obligation  of  an  "ought''  against  which  an 
cil*  W      opposite  will  is  fighting  does  not  exist  there.  We  will  the 
'^  T^*'*^  I.  beautiful.  Yet  here, too,  it  is  notonly  an  individual  desire  like 
the  will  for  the  charming  and  pleasing.  The  individual  in  his 
devotion  to  beauty  is  not  bound  by  an  obligation,  he  wills 
it  with  his  own  longing;  but  his  will  raises  him  over  the  merely 
individual  desires.  It  is  again  an  over-personal  and  pure  will. 
Always  again  the  same  problem :  How  can  we  will  without 
reference  to  our  own  pleasure?  But  this  alone  is  indeed  the 
question  which  experience  puts  before  us.  If  instead  we  sim- 
ply say  that  we  will  because  we  ought,  we  cut  off  the  signifi- 
cant question  instead  of  answering  it. 

But  there  now  remains  at  least  the  "ought"  of  the  moral 
value.  There  we  certainly  have  a  real  choice  between  the 
action  which  we  ought  to  do  in  accordance  with  our  duty 
and  the  action  which  we  want  to  do  because  it  promises  us 
pleasure.  Thus  in  the  moral  sphere  the  equation  of  value  and 
obligation  appears  entirely  justified.  Yet  as  soon  as  we  look 
somewhat  carefully  into  the  situation,  we  find  here  the  same 
thing  which  we  find  in  truth  and  beauty.  The  moral  value, 
too,  is  in  reality  a  value  which  we  always  will,  and  which 
is  never  fought  by  any  not-willing.  The  moral  value  never 
stands  in  real  contradiction  to  our  own  true  will,  and  thus 
has  no  reference  to  an  "ought."  We  have  to  consider  care- 
fully here  the  whole  situation,  which  is  very  easily  misinter- 
preted. It  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  the  usual  interpretation 
misplaces  the  accent. 

Whoever  does  harm  to  his  neighbor  acts  against  the  moral 
value,  and  whoever  gives  his  own  to  his  neighbor  acts  in 
accordance  with  the  moral  value.    We  have  the  free  choice 


'i  :'! 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


61 


whether  we  want  to  follow  the  norm,  or  whether  we  want  to 
transgress  it  in  an  immoral  spirit.  Yet  even  on  the  surface  it 
is  clear  that  the  external  effects  of  our  actions  do  not  charac- 
terize them  as  morally  good  or  bad.  The  one  who  injures  a 
neighbor  is  not  acting  immorally,  if  he  as  a  physician  causes 
the  wound  in  the  service  of  a  surgical  operation;  and  he 
who  gives  presents  to  his  neighbor  does  not  act  morally,  if  he 
wants  to  bribe  him  to  misuse  his  influence.  The  activity  itself 
ris  therefore  indifferent,  the  motive  alone  decides  about  tfee 
[  moral  value  of  the  action.  Thus'  the  moralist  usually  pre- 
sents his  doctrine  of  obligation  in  the  nobler  form  that  there 
is  ultimately  only  one  obligation.  We  ought  to  fulfil  our  duty, 
that  is,  we  ought  to  perform  that  action  which  we  ourselves 
conceive  as  the  action  which  ought  to  be  done.  Which  action 
we  consider  the  right  one  in  the  particular  case  depends  upon 
a  thousand  circumstances,  and  belongs  to  our  traditions  and 
education  and  our  social  surroundings.  It  has  in  itself  nothing 
to  do  with  the  moral  value.  The  moral  value  demands  only"^. 
that  we  remain  loyal  to  our  conviction,  and  that  in  spite  of  i 
tempting  pleasure  and  advantage  we  do  what  we  with  our 
[best  knowledge  believe  to  be  the  right  deed.  ' 

This  is  perfectly  true.  We  have  indeed  no  right  to  claim 
that  any  moral  value  is  involved  in  considering  one  action 
rather  than  another  as  the  action  which  we  ought  to  do.  If  a 
man  has  not  learned  which  actions  ought  to  be  done,  he  is  not 
immoral  but  amoral.  If  he  is  practically  unable  to  attach 
value  to  certain  actions,  we  speak  of  moral  insanity.  We  do 
not  call  a  man  a  thief  because  he  prefers  the  action  of  stealing 
to  the  honest  action.  On  the  contrary,  if  he  had  a  view  of  life 
according  to  which  stealing  is  the  action  which  as  action  has 
a  special  value,  and  he  lived  up  to  his  principles,  we  should  try 
to  protect  society  against  such  a  dangerous  individual  and 
would  put  him  in  an  asylum,  but  we  should  avoid  any  moral 
attitude.  We  call  him  a  thief  only  if  he  feels  that  the  honest 
action  is  the  valuable  action,  and  if  he  feels  it  as  valuable, 


«J.    c>bh»f 


VtyTf 


\-nX«' 


62  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

it  is  the  action  which  he  himself  really  wants,  while  the  steal- 
ing as  action  he  does  not  want.  If  there  were  only  the  choice 
between  the  two  actions  as  such,  stealing  and  not  stealing,  he 
would  never  hesitate,  he  would  always  prefer  the  valuable 
honest  action.  His  difficulty  is  only  that,  while  he  wills  of  the 
two  actions  only  the  one,  the  honest  one,  he  wills  and  desires 
at  the  same  time  the  booty,  and  to  get  it  he  has  to  steal. 
"  Stealing  itself  does  not  become  desirable  by  it.   And  so  the 
situation  of  the  criminal  is  that  he  wavers  between  what  as 
action  he  really  wills,  namely  the  honest  one,  and  another 
(action  which  he  must  perform  if  he  is  to  reach  a  desired 
^pleasurable  result.  On  the  one  side,  he  has  an  action  which  is 
willed  without  reference  to  its  result,  and  on  the  other,  he  has 
an  action  which  he  does  not  will  at  all  as  action,  but  which 
he  does  want  in  the  service  of  the  agreeable  effect.  Where  this 
contrast  does  not  exist,  there  we  never  have  a  moral  situation. 
Now  it  is  clear  that  in  this  part  of  the  process  there  exists 
no  obligation.  That  we  have  learned  not  to  will  this  feeling 
and  to  will  the  honest  action  belongs  to  our  past  develop- 
ment, and  to  social  traditions,  and  to  the  influences  of  our  sur- 
roundings. It  may  be  different  in  every  nation  and  in  every 
social  group.  No  one  is  responsible  as  an  individual  for  the  pre- 
ference for  certain  actions.  We  begin  with  any  moral  demand 
only  as  soon  as  these  preferences  have  really  taken  hold  of 
us.  The  child  and  the  insane  person,  like  the  beast,  have  no 
moral  obligation  because  they  have  not  learned  to  give  pre- 
ference to  certain  special  types  of  actions,  and  thus  consider 
the  possibilities  of  action  only  with  reference  to  the  effects. 
The  social  pressure  which  society  exerts  to  impress  the  indi- 
vidual with  the  desirability  of  certain  types  of  action,  there- 
fore, still  lies  outside  of  the  ethical  obligation. 

But  here  begins  the  real  "ought."  The  moral  man  ought 
under  any  circumstances  to  perform  that  action  which  he 
really  prefers  as  action.  No  hope  of  pleasure  and  no  fear  of 
pain  ought  to  tempt  him  to  perform  instead  the  opposite 


THE  OBLIGATIONS 


63 


action  which  he  really  does  not  want  as  action.  The  desire 
for  the  booty  ought  not  to  lead  to  stealing,  if  the  individual 
feels  that  the  opposite  action  is  the  action  which  he  prefers 
as  action.  The  starting-point  for  a  moral  decision  is  therefore 
always  that  there  are  in  view  two  possible  actions,  of  which 
the  one  is  desired  only  as  means  to  an  effect,  while  the  other 
is  desired  as  action  itself  and  for  itself,  and  therefore  without 
reference  to  any  pleasurable  effect.  Such  action  is  willed, 
then,  only  as  an  expression  of  the  will,  as  a  realization  of  the 
personality.  He  alone  thinks  morally  who  performs  the  action 
which  he  wants  to  perform,  not  for  any  result,  but  only  as  an 
expression  of  his  whole  real  will.  Moral  merit  belongs  only  to 
the  one  who  brings  to  realization  that  particular  action  which 
he  himself  really  wants  as  action.  Hence  moral  value  comes 
in  question  only  where  a  man  chooses  what  he  really  wants 
himself,  and  what  expresses  his  own  deepest  will ;  in  short, 
when  he  is  loyal  to  himself.  The  moral  value  is  therefore  not 
attached  to  the  resulting  action,  and  not  to  the  preceding 
will  for  an  action,  but  is  attached  to  the  agreement  between 
the  two.  Moral  is  the  self-realization  of  the  mind  by  which 
the  kind  of  action  which  we  really  want  is  performed. 

This  self -consistency  is  the  only  thing  in  the  world  which  is 
morally  valuable.  But  in  the  face  of  that,  have  we  still  a  right 
to  speak  of  an  obligation?  Is  this  value  not  just  like  truth 
and  beauty,  a  satisfaction  of  the  will  which  is  never  opposed 
by  an  opposite  will?  As  little  as  the  thinking  mind  ever  wants 
to  think  the  error,  does  a  thinking  mind  ever  want  to  prosti- 
tute itself,  ever  want  to  become  disloyal  to  itself,  ever  want 
to  give  up  itself.  Even  the  criminal  prefers  the  carrying 
through  of  the  honest  action  which  he  really  values  as  action. 
His  dishonest  performance  does  not  at  all  indicate  that  the 
disloyalty  against  his  own  will  tempts  him  more  than  loyalty. 
On  the  contrary,  if  he  is  a  criminal  and  not  an  insane  person, 
the  value  of  self -consistency  remains  steadily  before  his  mind. 
Just  because  he  values  this  loyalty,  he  feels  sharply  that  he 


64 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


111 


himself  lost  in  worth  when,  under  the  temptation  of  a  pleas- 
ure, he  realized  that  action  which  as  action  he  did  not  will 
at  all.  He  has  never  wavered  between  the  will  to  moral  self- 
consistency  and  the  will  to  inconsistency ;  he  never  did  not 
will  the  consistency ;  in  other  words,  he  never  did  not  will  the 
moral.  He  did  fluctuate  between  his  will  for  the  moral  and 
his  will  for  a  pleasure,  and  he  chose  the  pleasure,  but  by  that 
the  moral  never  became  something  which  he  did  not  will.  The 
only  thing  which  is  valuable  in  actions,  namely,  the  self-, 
consistency,  needs  no  outside  obligation,  but  is  thoroughly 
based  on  the  own  will.  No  one  cannot  will  it.  But  here,  too,  it 
must  be  acknowledged  that  it  is  a  will  which  is  ultimately 
over-personal,  necessary,  and  general.  I  want  to  be  consistent 
with  myself  in  my  actions,  and  thus  want  to  be  myself,  not 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  a  personal  pleasure  from  this  con- 
sistency, but  to  satisfy  a  will  in  me  which  has  no  reference 
to  my  individual  advantage.  It  is  a  will  which,  however 
much  it  concerns  my  personality,  is  ultimately  not  referring 
to  my  self  but  serving  an  eternal  cause.  It  is  a  will  which 
uses  the  consistency  of  my  self  as  means  for  building  up  an 
absolutely  valuable  world. 

Ultimately  the  real  value  of  morality  is  then  as  little  an 
obligation  as  the  value  of  truth  and  of  beauty.  They  are  all 
objects  of  will  only.  The  will  never  can  prefer  the  untrue,  the 
unbeautiful,  the  immoral,  and  the  "ought''  loses  all  meaning 
if  a  decision  between  different  desires  is  excluded.    But  in 
every  case  the  will  which  prefers  a  value  is  independent  from 
the  individual  personality,  that  is,  it  is  a  pure  will  which  is  not 
touched  by  personal  pleasure  and  displeasure.  The  problem 
which  the  conception  of  obligation  has  simply  pushed  aside 
instead  of  solving  is  now  at  last  clearly  before  us.  To  under- 
stand the  absolute  values  means  to  understand  how  our  will 
can  become  an  over-personal  demand  which,  without  refer- 
ence to  any  one's  personal  pleasure  or  displeasure,  finds  its 
satisfaction  in  truth  and  beauty  and  morality  and  religion. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  SATISFACTION  OF  THE  WILL 

Now  at  last  we  see  our  whole  field  before  us.  The  path  which 
we  have  travelled  necessarily  led  us  to  this  vista.   We  saw 
that  it  is  meaningless  to  deny  the  reality  of  absolute  values. 
It  is  necessary  to  seek  and  to  understand  them.  Nature,  the 
physical  and  the  psychical,  is  without  values  because  it  can- 
not have  any  reference  to  the  will,  and  every  value  must  in- 
volve a  satisfaction  of  the  willing  personality.  On  the  other 
hand,  every  individual  will  is  determined  by  pleasure  and  dis- 
pleasure ;  it  serves  personal  desires  and  can  therefore  never  be 
general  and  absolute.    Even  if  millions  demand  the  same 
thing,  it  lies  in  the  meaning  of  personal  will  that  it  cannot  be 
necessary,  and  therefore  that  it  cannot  posit  any  absolute 
values.   To  explain  the  absoluteness  of  the  value  by  a  ne- 
cessity is  impossible,  as  the  will  would  then  become  a  part  of 
causal  nature.  It  seemed  tempting  to  deduce  this  dependence 
of  the  individual  will  from  an  ought,  but  we  saw  that  this 
solution  also  is  unsatisfactory.  The  value  is  not  an  obligation, 
because  there  exists  no  not-willing  of  the  value  and  therefore 
no  choice  and  decision  which  would  give  meaning  to  an  obli- 
gation. Thus  we  stand  before  the  fundamental  fact  that  there 
exists  a  will  the  fulfilment  of  which  satisfies  us,  and  that 
means  is  valuable  for  us,  and  which  yet  is  without  reference 
to  any  individual  pleasure  or  displeasure,  necessary  for  every 
possible  subject,  and  therefore  absolutely  valid. 

This  brings  us  to  two  separate  questions :  Why  do  we  feel 
satisfaction  from  something  which  has  no  reference  to  our 
pleasure  or  displeasure?  And,  secondly,  Why  does  our  will  de- 
mand something  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  our  pleasure 


66 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  SATISFACTION  OF  THE  WILL 


67 


or  displeasure?  We  turn  first  to  the  former  question,  which 
is  after  all  only  a  preparatory  one.  Can  we  feel  satisfaction 
without  awakening  pleasure  or  the  relief  from  displeasure,  that 
is,  without  reference  to  our  own  personal  states  ?  Of  course  the 
popular  psychological  view  is  that  our  will  is  always  directed 
by  the  pleasure  or  the  displeasure  which  we  expect.  The  will 
is  satisfied  when  the  expected  pleasure  arises,  inasmuch  as  the 
pleasure  is  just  the  satisfaction  which  we  seek.  Whatever  we 
strive  for,  it  must  contain  some  glimmer  of  pleasure,  and  as 
soon  as  we  have  reached  the  goal,  the  desired  pleasure  enters 
our  consciousness  and  no  further  explanation  of  our  satisfac- 
tion is  needed.  But  the  situation  is  not  quite  so  simple.  Its 
complexity  begins  with  the  fact  that  the  word  ^^  feeling ''  has 
many  meanings.  If,  for  instance,  we  speak  of  a  pain  as  a  feel- 
ing, we  do  not  say  whether  we  mean  the  disagreeable  pain 
content  or  the  dislike  with  which  we  experience  the  content. 
Headache  and  toothache  are  two  different  contents  of  feeling, 
but  the  dislike  in  both  cases  is  the  same.  In  a  corresponding 
way  the  tickling  and  the  sexual  excitements  are  agreeable  con- 
tents of  feeling,  both  of  which  may  be  separated  from  our 
attitude  of  liking  towards  them    These  contents,  however, 
are  evidently  nothing  but  sensations,  just  like  blue  and  green ; 
in  a  stricter  sense,  the  psychologist  ought  not  to  call  them 
feelings  at  all.    The  toothache  or  the  sexual  experience  are 
sensations,  and  the  displeasure  of  the  ache,  that  is  the  real  feel- 
ing, lies  entirely  in  our  attitude  of  disliking.  We  may  dislike  a 
foul  smell  more  strongly  than  a  slight  pain.  Wherever  we 
speak  of  a  feeling  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word,  we  mean 
our  liking  and  disliking,  and  not  the  content  to  which  they 
refer.  These  contents,  which  are  merely  bodily  sensations,  are 
usually  called  feelings  only  because  they  are  accompanied  by 
especially  vivid  attitudes  of  liking  and  disliking. 

As  soon  as  we  turn  to  the  more  complex  objects  of  feeling, 
to  our  memory-ideas  and  so  on,  no  bodily  sensations  are  any 
longer  involved.    The  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  which 


results  from  the  fulfilling  or  not  fulfilling  of  the  will  thus  cer- 
tainly has  nothing  to  do  with  the  pleasure-sensations  or  the 
pain-sensations.  But  what  is  our  liking  and  disliking,  our 
pleasure  in  the  sweet  and  our  displeasure  in  the  bitter?  We 
point  to  the  only  essential  factor.  Our  feeling  of  pleasure  in 
the  stimulus  is  our  striving  for  its  continuation  which  fuses 
with  our  perception.  Our  displeasure  in  the  stimulus  is  our 
striving  for  the  removal  of  the  stimulus  which  also  blends 
with  our  perception.  Such  striving  is  not  consciously  chosen. 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  biologist,  we  should  say  the  re- 
moval of  the  disagreeable,  for  instance  of  the  pain-sensation, 
is  the  general  rebellion  of  the  organism  against  the  injury. 
Consciousness  has  not  chosen  it,  consciousness  simply  expe- 
riences both  the  pain-sensation  and  the  activity  of  defence  as 
completed  facts.  And  now  sets  in  the  process  which  is  decis- 
ive for  the  experience  of  feeling.  The  sensation  of  rebellion 
fuses  with  the  sensation  of  the  stimulus  into  a  unity.  The 
defence  becomes  apparently  an  element  of  the  impression 
itself,  and  the  pain-sensation  thus  gains  a  new  quality,  its 
disagreeableness.  Our  own  defence  thus  becomes  somewhat 
a  part  of  the  impression  itself,  and  that  characterizes  the  dis- 
like element. 

Exactly  the  same  process  distinguishes  all  the  other  feeling- 
tones  of  external  stimuli,  only  with  the  difference  that  the 
pain-sensation  alone  produces  the  reaction  with  such  com- 
plete regularity.  In  the  case  of  other  stimuli,  much  depends 
upon  the  special  preparedness  or  unpreparedness  of  the  indi- 
vidual. But  in  every  case  where  there  is  a  feeling,  the  in- 
truding stimulus  produces  reactions  which  work  towards  the 
continuation  or  towards  the  removal.  The  reaction  results  in 
every  case  without  intellectual  meddling,  and  is  not  felt  as 
a  special  action.  With  the  higher  senses  the  process  is  more 
complex.  The  effort  to  continue  or  to  discontinue  the  stimu- 
lus then  becomes  dependent  upon  a  larger  and  larger  num- 
ber of  conditions  and  is  itself  more  ramified.  The  inhibitions 


h  5 


68  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

and  resettings  of  the  higher  motor  nervous  system  control 
the  situation,  but  here,  too,  the  reaction  remains  the  basis  of 
the  feeling.   It  is  always  dependent  upon  the  whole  situation 
of  the  individual  system.  If  we  come  to  the  world  of  our  ideas 
and  thoughts,  the  reacting  apparatus  is  no  longer  the  mere 
organism,  but  the  whole  personality  with  all  its  memories 
and  expectations;  and  yet  again  the  reaction  is  produced 
without  conscious  interference.   Out  of  the  whole  composite 
of  mental  states  there  results  in  every  particular  case  either 
a  movement  towards  the  continuity  or  a  movement  towards 
the  removal  of  the  content  of  consciousness.    Pleasure  or 
displeasure  is  thus  the  same  in  the  highest  as  in  the  lowest 
case.   Whether  we  like  a  life  position  or  a  smell  sensation, 
our  liking  is  nothing  but  a  reaction  of  the  whole  personality. 
Our  reaction  becomes  in  a  way  the  psychical  over-tone  for  the 
fundamental  tone  of  our  perception.  The  reaction  does  not 
set  in  because  the  feeling  precedes,  but  the  feeling  is  given 
because  the  reaction  has  set  in.   The  pleasure-experience  is 
thus  in  itself  not  at  all  an  especially  agreeable  content  of 
consciousness.  As  content  it  is  entirely  indifferent ;  it  is  only 
a  sum  of  sensations  of  activity,  sensations  of  approach,  shad- 
ings of  attention,  associations,  and  similar  processes,  which 
are  held  together  only  by  the  common  purpose  of  reenforc- 
ing  the  stimulus.    In  the  same  way  the  displeasure-feeling 
as  a  content  is  not  disagreeable,  but  neutral ;  it  is  a  sum  of 
tension-sensations,  inhibitions,  organic  sensations,  associa- 
tions, and  similar  states  serving  as  defence  against  the  in- 
trusion.  In  both  cases  everything  becomes  significant  only 
as  addition  to  the  idea  with  which  the  various  feeling-ele- 
ments are  now  fusing.  The  pleasure  is  not  agreeable  and  the 
displeasure  is  not  disagreeable,  but  their  existence  indicates 
to  us  that  the  stimulus  or  the  idea  with  which  they  are  fusing 
is  welcome  or  unwelcome  to  the  psycho-physical  system.  It 
is  thus  the  stimulus  which  is  agreeable  or  disagreeable, 
and  not  the  feeling.   Of  course  we  must  not  forget  that  we 


THE  SATISFACTION  OF  THE  WILL 


69 


recognized  the  pain  or  tickling  as  mere  sensations ;  they  are 
no  feelings  at  all. 

If  that  is  the  case,  then  it  is  evidently  absurd  to  assert  that 
our  will  works  towards  the  creation  of  pleasure  or  towards 
the  removal  of  displeasure.  I  will  a  stimulus,  perhaps  the  taste 
of  a  fruit,  or  the  view  of  a  landscape ;  I  bite  into  the  fruit  or  I 
wander  to  the  landscape,  and  my  will  is  satisfied.  We  asked 
for  the  source  of  this  satisfaction,  and  received  the  reply  that 
we  got  it  from  the  pleasure  which  we  gain  and  which  itself  is 
the  satisfaction.   Now  it  is  clear  that  cause  and  effect  have 
been  exchanged  here.  It  is  true  the  taste  of  the  fruit  is  plea- 
surable, but  it  is  not  the  pleasure  which  I  was  seeking ;  the 
pleasure  is  only  expression  of  the  fact  that  I  desire  the 
continuation  of  the  taste  of  the  fruit.  The  feeling  connected 
itself  with  that  taste-sensation  before  the  juice  reached  my 
tongue,  when  it  was  only  an  anticipated  idea  in  me.   That 
means  my  psycho-physical  system  worked  towards  the  re- 
enforcement  of  that  taste-sensation  by  giving  me  the  im- 
pulse to  bite  into  the  fruit.  My  will  desires  not  the  pleasure 
which  the  fruit  brings  with  it,  and  which  as  such  has  no 
agreeableness,  but  my  will  wants  the  fruit-taste  which  I  wish 
to  continue,  and  which  therefore  seems  pleasurable.(  The  goal 
of  the  will  is  thus  not  the  pleasure  but  the  realization  of  the 
stimulus  which  is  welcome  to  my  individual  system,  and 
which  is  therefore  agreeable.  ;The  pleasure  only  brought  it 
about  that  the  will  turned  to  this  goal.   Wherever  there  is 
pleasure  we  must  will  its  object,  inasmuch  as  pleasure  cor- 
responds to  the  inner  movement  towards  the  reenforcement 
of  the  object.  What  the  will-activity  desires  and  reaches  is 
thus  the  realization  of  the  anticipated  stimulus.  And  if  the 
fulfilment  of  the  will  brings  satisfaction,  it  is  evidently  this 
realization  which  is  satisfactory.  That  the  realized  stimulus 
is  accompanied  by  pleasure  does  not  contribute  anything  to 
the  satisfaction,  then.    It  only  indicates  that  the  stimulus 
harmonizes  with  the  whole  situation  of  the  personality,  and 


70  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

that  the  individual  thus  favors  its  continuation.  The  satis- 
faction may  exist  no  less  when  the  anticipated  excitement 
which  becomes  realized  by  the  will  is  not  accompanied  by  any 
pleasure.  The  absence  of  such  a  feeling-tone  means  only  that 
the  stimulus  anticipated  and  realized  stands  in  no  definite 
relation  to  the  particular  personality.  It  neither  threatens 
with  a  disturbance  of  the  inner  equilibrium  nor  does  it  pro- 
mise  to  remove  an  existing  disturbance. 

Our  unavoidable  preliminary  question  is  now  answered. 
Satisfaction  of  the  will  is  independent  of  pleasure  and  dis- 
pleasure; satisfaction  of  the  will  results  from  the  realization 
of  the  anticipated  stimulus.    Pleasure  and  displeasure  ex- 
press only  the  relation  of  the  stimulus  to  the  personality 
without  being  themselves  sources  of  satisfaction  or  dissatis- 
faction.   If  the  anticipated  stimulus  has  a  feeling-tone  of 
pleasure  or  displeasure,  it  stimulates  the  will  towards  the 
particular  action.  But  if  the  will  arises  without  a  particular 
relation  of  the  stimulus  to  the  equilibrium  of  the  personality, 
the  fulfilment  of  the  will  involves  no  less  satisfaction.   It 
must  therefore  be  perfectly  possible  to  get  deepest  satisfac- 
tion in  a  sphere  in  which  no  pleasure  and  displeasure  exist. 
If  we  can  show  that  the  will,  and  that  means  the  striving  for 
realization,  can  exist  without  being  stirred  up  by  pleasure 
or  displeasure,  we  understand  that  the  fulfilment  of  such 
striving  can  satisfy.  And  the  consequence  is  that  values  may 
be  entirely  over-personal,  without  any  reference  to  the  in- 
dividual equilibrium,  and  that  means  without  reference  to 
pleasure  or  displeasure,  and  may  yet  be  true  values,  sources 
of  complete  satisfaction. 

We  called  all  this  a  preliminary  question  because  it  does 
not  answer  our  general  question  how  values  are  possible.  We 
have  shown  that  experiences  without  any  relation  to  personal 
pleasure  and  displeasure  may  give  satisfaction,  if  they  real- 
ize the  end  of  a  will.  But  we  have  not  touched  the  deeper 
question :  How  can  there  be  will-movements  which  are  not 


THE  SATISFACTION  OF  THE  WILL 


71 


directed  by  reference  to  the  own  interest,  that  is,  by  pleas- 
ure and  displeasure?  If  we  call  the  will  which  is  not  con- 
trolled by  pleasure  or  displeasure  a  pure  will,  we  must  ask : 
Can  there  exist  at  all  pure  will-actions  ?  If  such  pure  will- 
actions  exist,  we  now  understand  at  last  that  the  pure  will 
may  bring  us  no  less  satisfaction  than  the  will  which  creates 
pleasure  and  relieves  displeasure.  Even  this  may  now  be 
clear  from  the  start,  that  if  there  exists  a  pure  will  at  all, 
both  kinds  of  will  and  therefore  both  kinds  of  satisfaction 
may  be  mixed  in  a  single  action.  The  pure  will  may  drive 
towards  a  goal  from  its  own  motives,  and  yet  that  goal  may 
have  at  the  same  time  relation  to  the  personal  equilibrium. 
The  realization  may  thus  satisfy  the  pure  will  and  represent 
a  pure  absolute  value,  and  yet  may  at  the  same  time  remove 
a  personal  disturbance  and  may  satisfy  by  it  a  selfish  side- 
will.  In  this  way  the  beautiful  may  perhaps  at  the  same  time 
cause  pleasure  by  its  agreeableness,  the  true  may  at  the  same 
time  bring  pleasure  by  its  usefulness,  the  moral  may  secure 
in  the  world  somewhere  a  happiness  which  reflects  on  us  with 
enjoyment,  and  even  the  religious  may  at  the  same  time  give 
a  pleasurable  comfort.  But  all  that  remains,  indeed,  a  double 
play,  which  at  any  time  may  also  turn  into  counter-play ;  the 
pure  will  may  and  must  often  turn  against  the  pleasure- will. 
As  yet,  however,  we  do  not  have  to  examine  these  complica- 
tions ;  we  do  not  yet  know  whether  we  have  a  right  to  acknow- 
ledge at  all  the  beautiful,  the  true,  the  moral,  as  cases  of  pure 
will,  inasmuch  as  we  have  not  found  out  whether  a  pure  will 
can  exist  at  all.  So  far  we  only  know  that  all  those  ideals  can 
fulfil  their  meaning  only  if  they  are  conceived  without  rela- 
tion to  personal  pleasure  and  displeasure,  and  we  now  know 
further  that  the  will  which  lacks  such  a  relation  can  bring 
us  complete  satisfaction. 

That  which  fulfils  our  will  brings  us  satisfaction  and  is 
thus  valuable  for  us.  But  what  does  it  mean  to  fulfil  our 
will  ?  We  say  our  will  is  fulfilled  when  the  idea  which  we  try 


72  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

to  maintain  becomes  realized.  We  must  elaborate  that  state- 
ment further.   What  does  this  realization  mean?  We  may 
say  in  the  first  place,  it  means  the  identity  of  content  be- 
tween the  preceding  and  the  resulting  experience.    In  the 
language  of  psychology,  we  should  say  that  in  every  com- 
plete will-action  the  idea  of  the  end  must  precede  the  per- 
ception of  the  end.  If  I  long  for  the  taste  of  the  fruit  and  the 
result  is  that  I  taste  chocolate,  the  sweet  taste  of  chocolate 
may  give  me  pleasure,  but  it  does  not  give  me  satisfaction 
of  my  will.  It  is  not  a  fulfilment  of  that  which  I  long  for. 
The  satisfaction  is  left  out  because  the  taste  of  chocolate  is 
not  a  realization  of  my  anticipated  idea  of  the  taste  of  fruit. 
The  one  is  not  identical  in  its  content  with  the  other.   It  is 
evidently  just  this  identical  anticipation  of  the  end  which 
makes  the  will  a  function  for  which  the  personality  is  respon- 
sible. If  we  did  not  know  the  end  beforehand,  we  should  not 
be  able  to  inhibit  the  action  by  associated  ideas  of  undesir- 
able consequences.  The  anticipated  idea  of  the  effect  makes 
it  possible  to  stir  up  associations  which  represent  our  whole 
life-experiences  and  our  principles.    Through  them  we  can 
reenforce  or  suppress  the  action  which  is  to  realize  the  idea. 
If  there  were  no  identity  between  the  anticipated  and  the  real- 
ized experience,  we  should  never  feel  responsible,  and  instead 
of  a  will-action,  we  should  have  merely  a  chance  activity. 

This  identity  does  not  involve  that  I  must  think  the  con- 
tent from  the  stari;  in  the  same  material  of  sensations  in  which 
it  is  later  to  be  realized.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  be  that  I  do 
not  know  at  all  what  I  want  to  reach.  It  is  then  for  my  will 
at  first  an  unknown  X,  which  is  defined  only  by  its  relations. 
I  feel  the  satisfaction  of  the  fulfilment  of  will  as  soon  as  the 
equation  is  solved  and  the  unknown  unveiled.    If,  for  in- 
stance, I  try  to  remember  a  name,  my  desire  is  fulfilled,  if 
under  the  pressure  of  this  will  the  name  enters  my  conscious- 
ness. The  sound  of  this  name  itself  is  evidently  not  in  me 
beforehand.  If  the  name  itself  had  been  there,  I  should  not 


THE  SATISFACTION  OF  THE  WILL 


73 


have  sought  it,  and  yet  that  which  I  grasped  beforehand, 
that  idea  of  the  forgotten  name,  was  in  its  content  identical 
with  the  name  which  I  finally  found.  If  this  idea  of  the  un- 
known name  had  not  preceded  my  desire,  the  final  appear- 
ance of  the  name  would  not  have  been  felt  at  all  as  the  result 
of  my  effort,  and  therefore  not  as  the  product  of  will.  In  this 
way  the  working  of  our  imagination  or  our  reason  may  lead 
us  to  results  which  certainly  were  not  beforehand  in  conscious- 
ness. But  the  artistic  creation  or  the  scientific  thought  does 
not  strike  us  as  a  chance  result ;  it  comes  to  us  as  a  deed  of  our 
will  because  the  goal  which  we  reach  is  identical  in  content 
with  that  which  we  aimed  at.  The  artist  or  the  scholar  had 
this  end  in  his  mind  only  in  an  indistinct  way.  The  realization 
was  given  by  his  elaboration.  The  forms  in  which  such  a 
transmutation  into  a  new  but  identical  content  goes  on  are 
of  course  numberless.  We  must  not  confuse  this  transition 
by  thinking  of  the  difference  between  psychical  and  physical  ; 
we  do  not  have  a  will-action  only  if  the  first  content  is  a 
psychical  idea  and  its  realization  a  physical  process.  Even  in 
that  case  the  final  factor  is  not  the  physical  process  as  such, 
but  the  psychical  perception  of  it.  It  is  always  the  transition 
from  one  content  of  consciousness  to  another  content,  from 
the  idea  to  the  perception.  The  reference  to  a  reality  outside 
of  consciousness  does  not  contribute  anything  essential.  If 
I  have  a  hazy  and  sketchy  idea  and  disentangle  it  and  de- 
velop it  by  logical  thinking,  and  finally  reach  a  clear  con- 
sistent thought,  this  end  is  reached  by  my  will,  while  the  whole 
transmutation  went  on  in  my  consciousness.  The  only  essen- 
tial thing  always  remains  the  identity  between  the  starting- 
point  and  the  end. 

But  finally,  what  is  the  difference  between  the  starting- 
point  and  the  end?  .  They  are  identical  in  content.  Why  do 
we  go  over  from  one  to  the  other  ?  Why  do  we  aim  from  the 
idea  to  its  realization,  and  what  do  we  mean  by  the  realiza- 
tion? To  point  again  at  once  to  the  centre,  we  seek  the  new 


74  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

form  because  it  allows  us  a  new  action.  Every  realization  is 
the  starting-point  for  a  new  possibility  of  action,  which  is  im- 
possible as  long  as  the  content  exists  only  in  the  preceding 
form.  Whether  I  take  a  tool  in  my  hand,  or  brmg  the  fruit 
to  my  lips,  or  recall  a  name,  or  think  a  thought  consistently 
to  its  end,  each  time  a  certain  action  becomes  possible  by 
which  the  particular  content  expresses  its  meanmg.   I  can 
make  use  of  the  tool,  I  can  swallow  the  juice  of  the  fruit,  l 
can  pronounce  the  name.  I  can  carry  out  the  development 
of  thought.  To  realize  always  means  to  remodel  a  given  ex- 
perience in  such  a  way  that  the  content  remains  the  same, 
except  that  it  takes  a  form  in  which  a  special  action  becomes 
possible.  The  transition  from  the  idea  of  the  end  to  its  real- 
ization is  a  transition  from  a  vague,  indefinite,  misatisfactory 
starting-point  to  a  definite,  satisfactory  basis  of  action.  Prac- 
tical life  leads  us  to  will-actions  because  it  constantly  leads 
us  into  situations  in  which  we  can  satisfy  our  desires  only 
by  transforming  our  ideas  into  realities,  that  is,  by  transform- 
ing our  contents  of  consciousness  in  such  a  way  that  they 
allow  us  definite  application  while  their  content  remains  the 
same.  We  cannow  say  in  general  that  we  have  the  satisfaction 
of  fulfilment  whenever  we  maintain  the  content-experience 
and  secure  the  identical  content  in  a  new  form  as  part  of  a 
new  situation  which  allows  a  new  activity.   It  is  the  identity 
in  the  transition  which  satisfies  us,  and  whatever  provides 
this  identity  is  therefore  valuable.  And  from  here  we  can 
take  our  last  step. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


Every  instant  of  our  experience  is  in  itself  without  any  value ; 
it  is  just  a  flash  of  life,  a  momentary  thrill  of  consciousness. 
If  life  were  nothing  but  such  a  momentary  flash,  if  no  instant 
referred  beyond  itself,  if  no  content  remained  beyond  the 
flying  experience,  life  would  have  no  meaning  and  we  should 
have  nothing  which  we  might  call  a  world.  To  hold  this  ex- 
perience when  a  new  pulse-beat  of  life  comes  with  its  new  sit- 
uation and  its  new  needs,  and  to  find  in  it  once  more  the  iden- 
tical content,  is  the  one  fundamental  demand  which  liberates 
us  from  the  mere  flashlike  character  of  life.  We  seek  the  iden- 
tical content  once  more,  and  if  we  find  it.  we  have  a  bit  of  a 
world.  And  because  to  have  a  world  means  thus  to  secure  in 
the  new  experience  identical  content  with  the  old.  such  a 
world  gives  us  exactly  that  which  we  have  recognized  as  the 
condition  for  every  satisfaction;  that  means,  it  is  valuable. 
In  short,  whatever  secures  us  a  world,  that  is,  whatever  al- 
lows us  to  transcend  the  isolated  flashlike  experience,  must 
be  valuable  to  us.  Here  we  have  the  deciding  fact  from  which 
everything  else  will  follow. 

We  seek  the  identity  of  experience.  That  is  the  one  funda- 
mental act  which  secures  for  us  a  world.  It  is  the  one  act 
which  we  cannot  give  up,  and  yet  which  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  personal  pleasure  and  pain.  We  demand  that 
there  be  a  world ;  that  means  that  our  experience  be  more 
than  just  the  passing  experience,  that  it  assert  itself  in  its 
identity  in  new  experiences.  Here  is  the  one  original  deed 
which  gives  eternal  meaning  to  our  reality,  and  without  which 
our  life  would  be  an  empty  dream,  a  chaos,  a  nothing.  We 


76  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

will  that  our  experience  is  a  worid.  We  do  not  say  that  our 
Sperience  points  toward  a  world,  or  that  our  experience  is  an 
Se  of  a  world,  as  if  there  is  still  something  beyond  expen- 
e^e  in  an  immutable  transcendence.    If  we  were  to  grasp 
uch  an  over-world,  it  would  again  become  an  expenence  f o 
us  and  would  lead  to  the  same  problems    No,  the  ^xperi 
enced  content  itself  becomes  such  a  world  for  us  by  that  one 
rdamental  deed  of  s^king  identities.   Whoever  d^s  not 
want  to  perform  this  deed  cannot  have  anything  but  mere 
flying  experiences.  Moon  and  stars  are  merely  Persond  sen- 
sations to  him;  friends  and  foes,  norms  and  ^-^^^^  ^'^^^ 
Dersonal  impressions.  Nothing  has  validity  beyond  its  mere 
beS^xpeTenced,  nothing  ha.  independent  content,  no  hmg 
t  of  iSendent  significance,  nothing  of  independe'itlife_ 
No  one  can  be  forced  to  perform  that  deciding  deed.   It 
hafto  b    Tone  in  full  freedom,  and  yet  only  for  those  who 
have  performed  it  has  it  a  meaning  at  all  to  speak  about  he 
world  and  its  values.  We  did  not  start  to  P^ove  ^^^^^^^^^^^ 
values  exist,  and  still  less  did  we  intend  to  preach  that  those 
who  do  not  believe  in  them  ought  to  submit  to  such  a  creed; 
we  asked  only  what  such  values  mean  for  those  who  know 
Them    He  who  does  not  know  them,  and  who  therefore  mu.t 
deny  even  the  value  of  reality  for  anything  which  transcends 
hrimmediate  experience,  must,  of  course,  deny  also  the 
^lity^f  any  other  subject.   He  stands,  therefore,  entirely 
^te  de  the  circle  of  those  who  combine  for  the  common  n- 
S;nto  values.  Whoever  wants  to  discuss  and  to  examine 
S  us  must  have  acknowledged  already  the  reality  of  other 
^SeSs  and  must  have  affirmed  the  independent  reality  of 
th^experiences.  Only  we  who  have  taken  this  fir.t  dmsive 
IT  and  who  have  thus  aSirmed  the  independent  existence 
of TheTlents  of  our  experience,  that  is,  their  identity  in  new 
and   ver  new  experiences  -  we  alone  can  exammea,^  test 
anything  together.   If  there  are  beings  who  do  not  ^^  to 
perform  this  first  act,  they  must  be  eliminated  as  possible 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


77 


subjects  of  such  a  discussion.  They  do  not  want  to  have  a 
world;  they  are  satisfied  with  having  merely  instantaneous 
experiences  of  which  no  one  is  thought  as  the  same  in  con- 
tent with  another.  They  may  not  be  aware  that  they  then  lose 
even  the  possibility  of  their  self-identity,  and  that  their  life 
cannot  be  anything  but  a  meaningless  chaotic  dream.  But 
certainly  they  are  not  bound  together  with  us  by  a  common 
interest,  as  our  interest  is  to  understand  the  world,  and  thus 
to  presuppose  the  self-assertion  of  our  experiences  in  their 
identities.  But  we  who  have  taken  the  step  and  aflBrmed 
this  self-assertion  of  our  experience,  and  thus  gained  a  world, 
now  want  carefully  to  examine  throughout  this  book  whether 
or  not  this  one  act  of  affirmation  of  an  independent  world 
necessarily  determines  all  its  pure  values  and  gives  to  them 
an  eternal  absolute  significance.  ^ 

If  every  inner  occurrence  remained  isolated  and  appeared 
only  to  disappear  forever  without  trace,  we  should  not  have 
a  world.  The  self-assertion  of  the  occurrence,  and  that  means 
the  world-character  of  the  experience,  consists  in  the  identical 
recurrence,  and  this  recurrence  constitutes  the  ground  for  our 
satisfaction,  as  we  recognized  that  all  satisfaction  results  from 
the  finding  of  identities.  If  we  approach  the  event  with  the 
will  that  it  is  not  a  dream  but  a  self -asserting  independent 
world,  every  recurrence,  every  self-identity  in  the  experiences 
must  be  for  us  a  fulfilment.  But  as  this  will  to  have  a  world 
has  no  relation  to  personal  pleasure  and  pain,  and  must  hold 
for  every  possible  subject  with  whom  we  can  discuss  the 
world,  this  satisfaction  must  have  validity  for  every  con- 
sciousness which  wills  with  us  the  reality  of  a  world.  A  sat- 
isfaction which  must  hold  for  every  one  who  wants  to  have 
a  world  at  all  is  a  pure  value  independent  of  personal  pleasure. 
The  assertion  of  identity  among  the  changing  experiences  is 
thus  the  fundamental  absolute  valuation.  On  the  other  hand, 
only  in  so  far  as  such  identity  offers  itself  is  the  experience 
at  all  a  self-dependent  real  world.  Hence  the  world  of  values 


78  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

is  the  only  true  world,  and  for  every  one  who  wants  to  have  a 
world  at  all,  all  the  relations  which  result  from  the  self-asser- 
tion of  the  ;xperiences  must  be  acknowledged  as  absolutely 
valid  for  the  true  world.  The  system  of  values  must  then  be 
riognizedas  soon  as  we  ask  what  has  been  really  posited  by 
this  act  of  world-assertion.  It  wUl  be  the  topic  of  all  the  fol- 

^  the  Sfm'ntal  directions  of  evaluation  can  now  be  re- 
coSz^  at  once.  If  the  experiences  are  to  assert  them^l  ves 
as^  self-dependent  world,  and  are  to  realize  themselves  in 
ne^  and  ever  new  experiences,  and  are  to  remam  .dentijl 
^tti  themselves,  we  must  demand  a  fourfold  relation^  First, 
"^y  part  must  remain  identical  with  itself  in  the  changmg 
evSs!  secondly,  the  various  parts  must  show  ma  cei^m 
Inse  identity  among  themselves,  and  ^^-^J^^'^^^l^l 
agree  with  one  another  and  that  no  one  part  of  the  worid  is 
entirely  isolated;  thirdly,  that  which  changes  itself  in  the  ex- 
;Se  must  still  present  an  identity  in  its  change  by  show- 
tag  that  the  change  belongs  to  its  own  meaning  and  is  only  ts 
^realization.  This  threefold  identity  in  the  chaos  «flije- 
e^nts  gives  a  threefold  self-assertion,  a  threefold  fulfilment 
of  our  demand  for  an  independent  world  of  our  e^n^nce^' J 
thSold  over-personal  satisfaction  of  the  subject,  a  threefold 
outvalue   We  may  call  them  the  value  of  conservation,  the 
va^e  d  agr  Jment,  the  value  of  realization.  But  if  the  world 
Ts  Xletrfy  to  assert  itself,  that  is,  to  hold  its  own  identity, 
theSree  values  must  ultimately  be  identical  with  one  an- 
other o^rmust  realize  itself  in  the  other.  Then  only  the  pure 
^U  gains  its  absolute  satisfaction;  and  then  we  gam  the 
fourth  value  of  completion. 

Hence  we  have  four  postulates  which  supplement  each 
other  and  which  cooperate  to  make  a  world  PO^^^^at  a^ 
and  thus  to  overcome  the  mere  chance  events.   Whoever 
affirms  a  world  must  demand  this  ^on^^^ti^^^^^^ 
ment  and  realization  and  completion  of  the  world  as  guarantee 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


79 


for  the  self-assertion  of  the  experience.  In  each  of  these  four 
forms  life  demonstrates  itself  as  a  piece  of  reality.  Each  single 
occurrence  as  such,  each  instantaneous  experience  as  such,  is 
without  value.  But  it  is  of  absolute  value  that  it  asserts  itself 
and  thus  builds  up  a  world.  Wherever  our  will  reaches  the 
contact  with  this  world-fulfilment,  and  finds  an  experience 
identical  with  itself  in  a  new  event,  there  the  pure  will  is 
satisfied  and  a  pure  value  is  gained.  The  true  world  is  there- 
fore the  world  of  our  experiences  in  so  far  as  they  assert  them- 
selves. In  their  own  independent  self-assertion  they  become 
realized  while  they  are  for  us  only  experiences.  Our  question 
as  to  the  validity  of  pure  values  can  have  no  other  meaning 
except  in  reference  to  this  true  world,  and  it  is  now  evident 
that  it  would  be  meaningless  to  deny  the  question.  The  true 
world  must  be  filled  with  these  pure  values,  inasmuch  as  it 
is  just  the  world  which  we  build  up  in  affirming  the  inde- 
pendence of  our  experiences.  The  true  world  has  validity 
only  in  so  far  as  it  does  fulfil  this  demand,  and  thus  satisfies 
the  pure  will,  that  is,  in  so  far  as  it  has  absolute  value.  We 
single  individuals  may  not  be  able  to  grasp  the  true  world ; 
but  the  world  which  we  are  seeking  and  the  values  which  we 
want  to  recognize  are  a  world  for  which  the  validity  of  these 
values  is  presupposed.  We  can  say  with  a  technical  term : 
the  satisfaction  of  our  pure  will  for  identities  is  the  only 
"  a-priori  "  for  the  true  world  which  we  are  upbuilding.  Our 
experience  is  nothing  but  just  our  experience,  or  else  it  be- 
longs to  a  world  which  is  absolutely  valuable.  There  cannot 
be  a  third  possibility.  If  it  is  a  world  at  all,  it  must  be  abso- 
lutely valuable,  that  is,  it  must  satisfy  the  pure  will,  because 
it  becomes  a  world  only  by  its  self-assertion,  that  is,  by  its 
identical  recurrence,  and  this  identity  means  fulfilment, 
means  satisfaction,  means  value. 

This  deed,  which  raises  the  experience  to  its  independent 
selfhood,  is  performed  by  us  naively.  We  have  posited  such 
an  evaluation  already  whenever  we  give  to  things  or  to  per- 


80  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

sons  an  own  value  of  existence.  But  out  of  these  naive  evalu- 
ations of  life  arise  the  purposive  efforts  which  serve  the  sys- 
tematic upbuilding  of  such  a  self-asserting  and  therefore  abso- 
lutely valuable  world.  Such  purposive  efforts  in  the  service 
of  the  absolute  values,  we  call  the  labor  of  civilization.  Hence 
we  must  separate  the  values  which  naive  life  posits  from  the 
values  which  civilization  posits  intentionally.    In  each  of 
these  two  large  groups,  the  life-values  and  the  culture-va  ues, 
we  then  have  the  four  heads  of  the  values  of  conservation, 
agreement,  realization,  and  completion.  Thus  we  have  eight 
classes  of  values,  but  each  must  be  divided  three  times,  inas- 
much as  experiences  which  are  to  assert  themselves  can  be- 
long to  three  different  fields,  either  to  the  experience  of  the 
outer  world,  or  to  the  experience  of  our  fellow-world,  or  to 
the  experience  of  our  inner  world.   Hence  we  have  a  system 
of  eight  times  three  groups  of  values,  and  yet  all  these  twenty- 
four  values  are  only  ramifications  of  the  one  value  which 
fulfils  our  will  that  our  experience  is  to  belong  to  a  self- 
dependent,  self-asserting  world. 

We  have  not  avoided  the  word  "  system,"  and  yet  we  know 
well  that  it  awakens  in  many  minds  a  deep-rooted  aversion. 
They  have  the  vision  of  dry,  secluded  pedants,  who  "cut  up 
thought  and  knowledge  into  a  scheme  of  neatly  formulated 
and  mutually  exclusive  departments."    They  see  m  such 
system-makers  perhaps  the  successors  of  the  medieval  scho- 
lastics who  carried  their  Aristotelianism  to  a  point  where  they 
lost  contact  with  the  concrete  experience,  and  they  would  hke 
to  remind  such  modem  scholastics  that  they  ought  rather  to 
drink  deeper  from  the  well  of  Platonic  philosophy.  What  is 
the  use  of  the  demarcation  lines  which  such  systems,  far  from 
the  real  world,  demand,  if  the  world  itself  comes  to  us  in  an 
inexhaustible  manifoldness  of  transitions  and  intermediate 
regions  of  half-lights  and  mysteries  ?  To  build  systems  means 
to  leave  out  the  best  that  really  exists.  But  those  who  speak 
in  such  a  mood  still  stand  outside  of  the  temple  of  philosophy. 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES- 


SI 


They  still  think  with  the  man  on  the  street,  that  the  world  of 
existence,  which  is  object  of  our  real  knowledge,  can  be  found 
as  an  immediate  life-experience,  and  that  all  our  inquiry  into 
its  traits  and  values  is  simply  a  discovering  and  exploring 
of  that  which  really  exists  ready-made  beforehand.  As  soon 
as  he  has  left  the  street  and  has  entered  the  temple,  he  be- 
comes aware  that  the  thought-form  of  existence  itself  pre- 
supposes a  definite  act  and  attitude  of  the  will.  We  do  not 
find  an  existing  world,  but  we  make  it  out  of  the  raw  mate- 
rial of  immediate  life.  Existence  is  a  goal,  not  a  starting- 
point.  Existence  is  a  value  which  we  assign  to  the  things 
of  life  in  the  service  of  the  aim  of  following  up  their  iden- 
tity. The  whole  world  to  which  our  knowledge  refers  is  a 
world  determined  and  shaped  by  such  attitude  of  our  will. 

We  make  the  world.  That  does  not  mean  that  we  construct 
it  arbitrarily  like  the  game  of  chess.  Our  constructions  do  not 
speak  of  a  world  which  we  shape  in  order  that  we  may  have 
new  problems  about  which  to  think  while  the  true  world 
goes  on  not  caring  for  our  constructions.  No,  we  make  the 
world,  but  the  world  which  we  make  is  the  only  one  with  re- 
gard to  which  any  knowledge  has  meaning.  It  is  the  world  of 
nature  and  of  history  and  of  norms,  a  world  which  we  build 
up,  but  in  which  alone  every  possible  truth  lies.  Mere  life  does 
not  contain  it;  life  is  only  the  clay  from  which  we  have  to 
mould  the  world  which  has  the  value  of  truth.  And  if  we  un- 
derstand that,  we  see  that  the  act  of  affirming  the  true  world 
belongs  together  with  the  act  of  affirming  the  beautiful  world 
and  the  moral  world ;  and  we  have  no  rightyto  give  any  more 
emphasis  to  the  one  act  than  to  the  other./ The  world  which 
maintains  itself  in  existence,  and  is  therefore  true,  has  no 
more  reality  than  the  world  which  realizes  itself  in  morality 
and  the  world  which  agrees  with  itself  in  beauty.  In  short, 
to  speak  of  the  values  of  life  means  not  to  speak  of  that  which 
is  given,  but  of  that  which  is  to  be  performed.  In  that  case,  what 
remains  of  the  blame  against  the  system-maker?  If  the  world 


82  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

were  really  something  completed,  which  we  simply  have  to 
explore,  then  indeed  he  would  be  petty  and  narrow,  if  he 
believed  that  he  could  make  out  beforehand  what  may  be 
found  in  the  world.  The  next  day  might  overrun  his  Irttle 
system,  and  the  big  meshes  of  his  conceptional  net  might 
prove  themselves  unfit  to  hold  all  which  gayly  swims  m  the 
ocean  of  reality.  But  if  it  is  a  world  of  tasks  which  we  are  to 
perform,  and  if  the  world  of  existence  and  of  progress  and  of 
harmonyand  of  completeness  is  tobeaworld  by  our  own  work 
then  nothing  has  reality  which  is  not  determined  by  the  char 
acter  of  our  task.  We  reach  reality  only  m  so  far  as  we 
are  loyal  to  our  purpose,  and  we  understand  reality  only  in  so 
far  as  we  are  clear  about  these,  our  purposes.  And  as  to  these 
purposes,  we  surely  need  not  wait  until  we  h^^e  brought  in 
all  the  knowledge  which  a  future  may  seci^e  by  its  discover- 
ies. All  that  future  knowledge  must  itself  stand  in  the  ser- 
vice of  our  particular  purposes.  To  divide  the  field  of  thought 
into  a  scheme  of  departments  is  thus  not  the  presumptuous- 
ness  of  one  who  believes  that  he  knows  everything  in  the 
world,  and  that  he  can  tell  beforehand  exactly  how  the  sepa- 
rate sub-departments  in  the  world  really  look,  instead  of  mod- 
estfy  waiting  until  our  knowledge  is  richer.  To  understand 
he  taTw4h  we  are  to  fulfil,  to  understand  the  duties  to 
which  we  must  live  up  if  our  life  is  to  give  us  the  meamng 
If  a  world,  demands  only  a  full  expression  of  that  which  lives 
in  us  and  a  full  clearness  as  to  our  own  actual  purposes. 

Of  course  there  remains  a  personal  difference  in  man  which 
is  ultimately  one  of  temperament.  Not  every  one  seeks  an 
ultimate  understanding  of  reality;  many  a  n«nd  may  be 
rather  fascinated  by  the  one  or  the  other  aspect  of  the  ex- 
isting world.  No  one  is  obliged  to  take  the  niathematician  s 
r61e,  and  we  can  deal  with  the  things  without  counting  them 
and  measuring  them.  But  no  one  has  the  ngh  to  b  ame  the 
mathematician  if  he  refers  the  manifoldness  of  our  things  to 
the  system  of  numbers,  and  the  manifoldness  of  our  space 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


83 


to  the  system  of  three  dimensions.  He  does  not  have  to  wait 
until  it  is  found  out  that  three  dimensions  exist,  because 
these  three  dimensions  are  forms  of  his  truth-positing  activ- 
ity. He  does  not  deny  by  it  that  you  can  move  in  any  num- 
ber of  directions ;  his  system  has  room  for  every  possible  di- 
rection. And  still  less  the  man  on  the  street  ought  to  accuse 
the  philosopher  of  living  removed  from  the  worid,  from 
the  reality  of  life,  from  the  pulse-beat  of  immediate  experi- 
ence. On  the  contrary,  common-sense  which  deals  with  the 
worid  of  knowledge,  that  is,  with  the  true  constructions  of 
science,  as  if  it  were  the  world  of  our  immediate  experience, 
is  really  far  from  the  truth  of  life.  The  philosopher  who  re- 
cognizes that  the  world  of  existence  is  a  world  which  the  log- 
ical thought  has  shaped,  and  who  therefore  understands 
reality  out  of  the  manifoldness  of  our  tasks  and  purposes, 
brings  us  back  to  the  apprehension  of  the  life  which  we  really 
live.  It  has  always  been  the  true  grandeur  of  philosophy  that 
it  has  brought  mankind  nearer  to  life  again,  and  has  secured 
by  it  new  life-energies.  The  more  abstract  its  language,  and 
the  more  technical  its  system,  the  more  fully  has  it  always 
performed  its  upbuilding  work  and  fulfilled  its  duty.   The 
history  of  mankind  has  shown  that  the  more  abstractly  and 
consistently  and  systematically  philosophy  carried  out  her 
labor,  the  more  influential  her  work  has  been  for  the  true 
progress  of  striving  mankind.  Next  to  religions,  rigid  philo- 
sophical systems  which  the  man  on  the  street  hardly  under- 
stood in  their  original  form  have  been  the  most  powerful 
factors  in  the  history  of  the  last  two  thousand  years;  they 
have  made  revolutions  and  they  have  brought  reforms.  All 
popular  compromises  of  thought  have  been  historical  seda- 
tives. Only  the  laborious  self -consistent  systematic  thought 
can  give  us  the  full  truth,  and  only  the  full  truth  can  make 
us  free. 


M 


PART    II 


THE  LOGICAL  VALUES 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


In  out  first  part  we  have  reached  a  theory  of  pure  values. 
The  work  which  lies  before  us  is  to  elaborate  the  system  of 
values.  We  have  recognized  in  what  sense  values  are  possible 
at  all  and  how  they  must  be  apprehended.  Now  we  must  ex- 
plore the  whole  universe  of  values  and  separate  carefully  its 
various  parts.  We  recognized  as  absolutely  valuable  that 
which  constitutes  a  world.  On  the  other  hand,  that  which  is 
necessary  for  the  constitution  of  a  world  must  be  acknow- 
ledged beforehand  as  belonging  eternally  to  the  only  world 
which  we  seek  and  which  we  can  know.  The  only  thing  which 
is  fundamentally  necessary  for  it  and  which  gives  to  us  the 
absolute  satisfaction  is  the  self-assertion  of  the  world.  It  trans- 
forms our  mere  chance  experience  from  a  chaotic  dream  into 
a  world.  We  find  this  self-assertion  by  the  recognition  of 
identities  in  the  experience.  The  first  demand  is  then  natural, 
that  any  part  of  the  experience  can  be  found  identical  with 
itself  in  new  experiences.  Naive  life  finds  this  identity  and 
correspondingly  values  it.  The  resulting  value  is  that  of  ex- 
istence. But  the  history  of  knowledge  is  the  great  effort  to 
elaborate  this  value  and  to  assert  the  identities  of  the  parts 
of  experience  where  naive  life  would  not  recognize  them.  This 
systematic  effort  leads  us  to  a  new  group  of  values,  the  values 
of  connection.  Both  the  naive  values  of  existence  and  the 
cultural  values  of  connection  serve  the  same  need,  to  re- 
cognize every  element  of  experience  as  identical  with  itself 
in  new  experiences.  This  effort  of  civilization  is  called  sci- 
ence. Both  the  naive  and  the  elaborate  efforts,  those  simple 
acknowledgments  of  existence  and  those  scientific  recogni- 


88  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

tions  of  connections,  represent  together  the  logical  values 
and  we  may  turn  first  to  them,  beginning  with  the  values  of 

And  so  we  are  to  speak  of  existence,  of  that  real  absolutely 
valid  being  which  stands  in  contradiction  to  not-bemg.  No 
other  attitude  is  demanded  from  us  there  but  the  mere 
acknowledgment  which  expresses  itself  in  the  affirmative 
judgment.  The  being  of  a  thing  or  of  a  person  demands 
no  appreciation  such  as  we  might  give  to  an  achievement, 
demands  no  joy  such  as  we  might  have  in  the  beautiful, 
demands  no  conviction  such  as  we  might  have  for  the  meta- 
physical  values.  The  being  simply  wants  to  be  accepted,  to 
be  recognized,  to  be  affirmed,  and  demands  that  submission 
which  calculates  with  the  fact  that  this  or  that  is  given. 

The  value  of  existence  becomes  material  of  communica- 
tion in  the  form  of  a  judgment ;  for  instance,  "  It  rams.     The 
first  impression  may  be  that  we  put  the  accent  m  the  wrong 
place    It  might  be  said  that  what  is  valuable  is  not  the  ex- 
istence of  the  rain,  but  the  judgment  about  its  existence. 
The  valuable  is  not  that  which  is  expressed  by  the  judgment, 
but  the  valuable  is  the  truth  of  the  judgment.  That  means 
that  the  judgment  which  agrees  with  the  real  existence  is 
valuable.  Knowledge  is  valuable,  but  not  the  known.  Yet  let 
us  discriminate  carefully  there.   The  popular  confusion  re- 
suits  from  the  dogmatic  idea  that  our  judgments  refer  to  a 
world  which  is  independent  of  our  experience  and  which  is  to 
be  deciphered  in  our  judgments.  Whoever  wants  to  overcome 
such  dogmatism  and  wants  to  carry  through  the  cntical  at- 
titude must  not  only  demand  that  all  knowledge  have  refer- 
ence to  the  world  of  our  experience,  but  that  the  world  of  ex- 
perience build  itself  up  only  in  our  knowledge.  We  do  not 
have  a  world  of  experience  which  is  only  object  of  awareness. 
Our  only  world  is  an  acknowledged,  an  asserted,  a  judged,  a 
logically  formulated  world.   The  objects  of  knowledge  and 
the  knowing  judgments  are  not  two,  but  are  one.  And  only 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


89 


the  conceptional  formulation  in  the  interests  of  communica- 
tion is  something  additional.  At  first  the  only  logically  sig- 
nificant thing  is  the  acknowledgment  of  that  which  is  given, 
and  in  itself  this  acknowledgment  demands  no  conceptions 
and  no  formulations,  but  only  the  act  of  will  which  exists  in 
the  affirming  an  experience  as  being.  The  system  of  our  ac- 
knowledgments as  they  find  their  expression  in  our  judgments 
is  at  the  same  time  the  system  of  our  real  experiences.  An 
experience  which  is  not  object  of  judgment  exists  for  us  as 
little  as  a  reality  which  is  hidden  behind  the  experience.  It 
is  therefore  impossible  to  seek  the  logical  value  in  the  fact 
that  the  judgment  renders  correctly  the  experience,  inasmuch 
as  experience  comes  in  question  only  as  object  of  judgment. 
The  value  of  a  judgment  as  act  of  acknowledgment  coincides 
with  the  value  of  existence  of  that  which  is  asserted  in  the 
judgment.  The  value  of  the  judgment  of  existence  means  the 
same  as  the  value  of  the  existence  of  the  world.  We  do  not 
know  as  object  of  knowledge  any  other  reality  than  the  one 
which  is  shaped  and  acknowledged  in  our  judgments.  Con- 
sequently it  is  misleading  to  speak  of  an  agreement  between 
the  two  and  of  a  value  which  belongs  to  this  agreement. 

Of  course  we  all  find  difficulties  in  overcoming  dogmatism. 
We  are  inclined  to  believe  that  the  earth  stands  firm  while 
the  sun  is  moving.  In  the  same  way  we  always  refer  the  value 
of  our  knowledge  to  the  agreement  between  our  judgments 
and  a  world  which  is  independent  of  our  judgments.  We  eman- 
cipate ourselves  with  the  more  difficulty  from  such  habits  of 
thought  as  we  have  all  gone  through  the  school  of  psychology. 
Certainly  the  psychologist  treats  the  experiences  as  contents 
of  our  individual  consciousness  entirely  separated  from  the 
physical  things.  For  the  psychologist  the  judgment  is  a  com- 
bination of  ideas  in  our  consciousness,  and  its  value  consists 
in  the  harmony  between  those  ideas  in  the  capsule  of  our 
consciousness  with  the  outer  physical  world.  All  that  is  per- 
fectly true  in  the  midst  of  psychology,  but  the  true  results 


90  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

of  scientific  psychology  are  misinterpreted  if  they  are  taken 
as  expressions  of  the  pure  reality  of  life.  If  o^^.f^'^'^^^^ 
to  be  interpreted  in  its  real  willing  and  acting,  it  must  not  be 
brought  under  the  point  of  view  of  a  science  which  works  by 
principle  with  far-reaching  artificial  abstractions.  Such  psy- 
chologizing philosophy  is  ultimately  the  same  niisuse  as  that 
which  in  past  daysdistorted  the  true  teachings  of  phy-s  -  « 
a  wrong  philosophy.  At  that  time  there  arose  a  hastily  budt 
materialism,  which  met  its  downfall  as  soon  as  serious  phi- 
losophy approached  it.  On  its  crumbling  rums  psychologism 

has  settled  itself.  ,  „^=tAncP 

If  we  really  want  to  find  what  the  assertion  of  existence 

expresses,  we  must  return  to  the  ^-^-^^^f^^^^^Z^^er 
it  is  transformed  and  reshaped  by  psychology  or  any  other 
special  science.  What  does  it  mean  in  the  pure  jeahtyof  Ufe 
that  we  acknowledge  anything  as  really  ^J^^^^^^^^^^^^^f  ^^ 
must  start,  of  course,  from  his  own  self.  Now  I  Jj^  my  f  f 
view  of  a  manifoldness  of  contents  as  a  self  ^^ich  ^kes^"^ 
tude  towards  them.  This  difference  of  content  and  self  I  find 
in  every  experience  of  which  I  can  give  an  account.  But  this 
con3  between  content  and  self  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
"pISSon  of  physical  and  psychical.  The  content  of -y  rea 

experience  is  neither  psychical  nor  P^y^^f  ^^ec^^^^V .  h  JI 
bo?h  together;  it  is  the  still  undifferentiated  real  thmg  ttiere 
without  which  I  grasp.   On  the  other  hand,  the  seU  m  i 
attitude  is  neither  psychical  nor  physical  content  be^!f^^* 
cannot  be  content  in  any  case.  The  rea  self  as  \^^l^'^\ 
true  life-experiences  is  never  a  content  -hich  I  Pe  erne 
know  myself  in  my  attitude  by  becommg  certain  of  my  sen 
through  my  activity  and  my  effort.  Whoever  makes  the  con- 
eZf  that  he  finds  his  own  ^If  as  a  content  of  con-«- 
is  lost  in  the  artificiality  of  psychologism  and  cannot  find  his 
wav  back  to  true  life-experience. 

T  contest  to  this,  my  real  self  and  its  attitudes  I  find  t^^ 
contents.  They  are  not  packed  together  m  my  self,  but  they 


THE  VALUES  QF  EXISTENCE 


91 


are  scattered  over  the  universe ;  they  are  not  yet  pulverized 
by  the  physicist  into  atoms  and  not  yet  transformed  by  the 
psychologist  into  sensations.  There  without  in  the  sky  I  ex- 
perience  the  stars,  and  I  do  not  know  anything  of  my  con- 
sciousness which  reflects  them  and  still  less  of  my  brain  which 
is  to  produce  them  as  sensations.  That  true  thing  is  every- 
where, but  never  in  me,  the  self,  which  takes  attitudes.  Fur- 
ther, just  as  my  true  objects  are  never  spatially  in  me,  but  are 
there  and  there,  in  the  same  way  the  true  objects  are  not 
pressed  together  into  the  present  moment  of  experience.  If  I 
psychologize  them,  my  ideas  are  all  present  in  me  now;  the 
perceptions  which  refer  to  the  present,  the  memory  ideas 
which  refer  to  the  past,  the  expectation  ideas  which  refer  to 
the  future,  are  all  present  in  me  in  this  instant.  But  in  the 
true  life-experience  this  double  relation  does  not  exist  at  all. 
My  remembering  does  not  involve  a  content  which  is  present 
now;  my  self  turns  directly  towards  the  past  objects,  and 
in  my  expectation  my  self  turns  directly  towards  the  future 
content.  To  treat  those  contents  as  experiences  which  are 
experiences  of  the  present  moment  involves  the  whole  trans- 
formation which  psychology  introduces. 

The  contents  which  I  know  in  my  real  life  are  further  never 
given  to  a  passive  spectator,  like  those  which  natural  science 
deals  with.  The  physicist  may  and  must  abstract  from  every 
self  which  takes  attitudes.  The  true  things  thus  become 
merely  perceivable  objects.  But  in  reality  I  know  the  things 
only  as  starting-points  of  my  attitude,  of  my  interest,  of  my 
acceptance,  or  of  my  rejection.  The  things  are  means  and 
ends  for  me,  tools  of  my  will  and  of  my  attention,  never  merely 
content  of  an  indifferent  awareness.  The  true  experience  is 
thus  a  will  directed  towards  goals,  and  only  afterwards  does 
the  will  separate  itself  as  a  felt  attitude  of  the  self  from  its 
goal  as  an  experienced  content.  If  I  ask  myself  how  in  my 
real  experience  the  will  and  the  goal,  that  is,  the  self  and  the 
content,  can  be  discriminated  at  all,  I  feel  ultimately  one  last 


92  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

simple  fact :  in  the  feeling  of  self  I  always  experience  an  inner 
coXst  which  does  not  exist  in  the  content.  In  this  will  o 
he  Sf  is  always  a  certain  inner  relation  to  an  opposite. 
«f  agree  without  excluding  the  disagreement;  I  cannot 
See  without  refusing  the  agr^ment.  In  every  liking  and 
dSSng  loving  and  hating,  desiring  and  resisting,  lies  such 
an  oppo  i^m  only  in  this  contrast  I  know  myself  as 

the  subject  of  attitude,  and  that  means  as  a  real  Personality^ 
Mter  eliminating  that  which  moves  in  ^-'^^J^^^^^l 
call  the  remainder  of  the  experience  content.  The  real  life  can 
Tever  overcome  this  fundamental  relation.  Experience  may 
bTevXed  towards  the  height  of  -^olarly  though^  ^ 
vet  even  the  world  of  the  scientist  remains  content  for  the 
STa  seU  which  takes  attitude.  The  physicist  conceives 
The  univeSe  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  thought  as  an  object 
Zr  TpasL  spectator.   But  in  doing  so  he  gains  a  system 
mide  up  from  the  mechanical  universe  on  the  one  side  and 
that  abstract,  passive  spectator  on  the  other  -de,  andjh^s 
whole  system  is  now  itself  not  at  all  object  for  a  passive 
Ti^ctator,  but  is  content  for  the  will  of  the  purposive  think- 

'"  Yet  the  reality  of  life  is  still  richer.  As  such  a  subject  of 
will,  I  find  myself  not  only  in  relation  to  the  outer  world,  but 
from  the  start  also  in  relation  to  the  fellow-world.   In  the 
mmedL  life-act  I  take  attitude  to  friend  and  foe,  and  work 
sympathizing  or  resisting  in  continuous  reference  to  other 
suSects  of  ^11.  The  individual  will  thus  finds  i^elf  alway 
in  relation  to  objective  things  and  to  subjective  bemgs    But 
finSytthird  aitithesis:  the  individual  will  finds  its  imita- 
tion not  only  in  the  outer  world,  and  in  the  fellow-world,  but 
also  in  its  ovm  inner  world.  The  self  finds  itself  bomid  by  he 
S^  "u^^of^ertain  own  will-acts.  I  find  will-attitud^  ahve 
T^e  which  I  cannot  change  arbitrarily,  -"-acts  which  s^rn 
to  be  valid  in  me  with  an  over-personal  T>o^'l'^f±^°^'f^ 
ethical,  ^thetic  valuation.  The  outer  world,  the  fellow-world. 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


93 


and  the  inner  world  have  importance  for  my  individual  will. 
In  each  of  the  three  realms,  I  must  make  my  decision  whether 
that  which  my  will  finds  there  is  merely  my  individual  expe- 
rience which  has  exhausted  its  energy  by  its  being  experi- 
enced, or  whether  it  has  an  independent  reality.  If  the  im- 
pression of  the  outer  world,  the  suggestion  of  the  fellow-world, 
the  demand  of  the  inner  world,  are  merely  that  which  they  ap- 
pear as  experience,  namely,  just  an  impression,  a  suggestion, 
a  demand,  then  they  have  no  real  independent  existence,  no 
right  to  the  claim  of  absolute  acknowledgment,  in  short,  no 
absolute  value.  If  impression,  suggestion,  and  demand  are 
merely  our  personal  experience,  our  will  may  take  attitude 
towards  them  entirely  with  reference  to  the  personal  desires 
and  liking.  The  decision  will  not  have  any  bearing  beyond 
the  particular  act.  On  the  other  hand,  if  our  will  holds  them 
with  the  postulate  that  they  are  real  beyond  the  particu- 
lar experience,  and  if  they  can  be  found  identical  again,  they 
become  parts  of  a  real  world,  which  as  such  satisfies  our  fun- 
damental demand  for  a  self-asserting  reality.  That  which  ful- 
fils this  absolute  demand  for  a  world,  we  recognized  as  a  value. 
The  particular  value  which  must  be  acknowledged  here  is  the 
value  of  existence. 

Hence  we  must  examine  whether  our  will  that  the  impres- 
sions, suggestions,  and  demands  remain  identical  can  really  be 
fulfilled,  that  is,  whether  the  value  of  existence  has  validity. 
From  this  standpoint  ever3rthing  is  without  value  which  does 
not  belong  to  the  world  of  really  existing  things,  beings,  and 
demands,  and  which  is  thus  nothing  but  our  personal  expe- 
rience. The  question  is  therefore  ultimately:  What  in  the 
immediate  experience  is  experience  of  the  real?  We  separate 
the  examination,  as  we  shall  always  do,  into  the  three  realms 
of  the  outer  world,  the  fellow-world,  and  the  inner  world,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  just  in  this  group  of  values  the  three 
groups  hang  most  closely  together.  We  know  existence  of 
the  things  because  we  acknowledge  other  subjects,  and  the 


94  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

acknowledgment  of  other  subjects  would  not  be  valid  if  we 
did  not  know  the  things. 

A.  —  TfflNGS 

How  does  practical  life  proceed?  The  most  trivial  thing 
may  teach  us.  I  believe  I  remember  that  at  the  end  of  this 
forest  path  there  stands  a  wooden  bench.  Do  I  deceive  my- 
self, or  has  the  bench  which  I  remember  reality  ?  If  I  walk  on, 
I  shall  find  out  whether  the  thing  had  meaning  only  for  my 
remembering,  or  whether  it  has  an  independent  existence. 
If  I  can  find  again  that  which  I  seek,  it  is  demonstrated  that 
this  remembered  object  had  the  value  of  existence.  The  case 
is  the  same  with  the  perceived  as  with  the  remembered. 
There  on  the  moss  I  believe  I  see  a  curious  bird.  Am  I  de- 
ceiving myself  ?    Is  it  not  perhaps  a  shadow  or  a  stone  ?   I 
go  nearer  to  it  to  find  out  whether  the  thing  which  attracts 
my  attention  will  offer  itself  also  in  the  further  experience 
as  a  bird,  and  will  thus  remain  identical  with  that  which  I 
believe  I  perceive.  In  short,  the  recurrence  in  a  new  experi- 
ence raises  the  perceived  or  remembered  impression  above 
the  level  of  unreality.   In  a  similar  way  we  know  another 
method  which  helps  us  in  practical  life  perhaps  still  more  fre- 
quently. I  try  to  grasp  and  to  touch  the  thing  which  at  first 
I  only  saw,  or  I  try  to  see  that  which  at  first  I  only  heard.  In 
short,  that  which  I  perceived  at  first  in  one  form  is  sought 
in  a  new  form  and  yet  has  an  identical  content.   Every  dis- 
appointment teaches  me  about  the  existence  of  the  thing. 

Such  methods  are  thoroughly  useful,  and  within  certain 
limits  reliable.  Experience  warns  us  constantly  to  respect 
those  limits,  and  trains  us  in  applying  each  method  only  where 
it  is  usually  helpful.  If  I  believe  I  hear  a  cry  and  I  want  to 
prove  that  it  was  no  deception,  that  the  cry  had  a  real  exist- 
ence, it  would  be  absurd  to  examine  whether  the  cry  still  lasts 
in  the  way  in  which  the  bench  still  stands  by  the  road.  No 
other  sense  can  teach  me  whether  the  moon  which  I  see  really 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


95 


exists  in  the  sky  or  is  merely  my  hallucination.  Even  the 
bench  in  the  forest  may  have  been  there  at  my  last  walk  and 
may  have  been  removed  now.  Certainly  no  principle  of  fun- 
damental character  is  involved  in  this  way  of  testing  real  ex- 
istence. No  one  can  claim  by  principle  that  the  impressions 
represent  a  real  existence  only  if  they  return  unchanged  in 
our  later  experience,  or  if  they  admit  of  perception  by  other 
senses,  too.  Yet  even  this  scheme  emphasizes  the  decisive 
point.  The  experience  is  sought  as  identical  in  a  new  experi- 
ence ;  the  recurrence  in  a  new  effect  fulfils  the  desire  of  the 
subject  and  brings  him  satisfaction.  The  source  of  this  satis- 
faction is  the  identity.  Neither  the  original  experience  nor 
the  finding  by  other  senses  or  in  a  later  occurrence  is  in  itself 
valuable,  but  the  fact  that  both  are  identical  and  the  one 
fulfils  the  demand  of  the  other  for  continuity  is  satisfactory ; 
it  is  the  value  of  existence. 

As  soon  as  we  speak  in  a  fundamental  way  about  the 
existence  of  things,  we  postulate  a  much  more  extensive 
recurrence.  Even  in  the  circle  of  practical  life,  we  rely  pre- 
ferably on  a  more  systematic  method  of  testing,  namely, 
the  affirmation  by  other  observers.  I  can  soon  ascertain 
whether  the  cry  which  I  believe  I  heard  was  a  real  sound.  I 
ask  my  neighbors  whether  they  heard  the  same  cry,  and  if  no 
one  of  them  perceived  anything,  it  was  an  illusion  or  a  halluci- 
nation ;  the  sound  had  no  real  existence.  The  external  world 
is  real  to  us  when  it  can  stand  the  social  test  and  is  a  common 
object.  But  here,  too,  the  principle  is  the  same.  The  experi- 
ence is  found  identical  in  a  new  realization,  this  time  in  the 
acknowledged  experience  of  the  neighbors,  and  this  time,  too, 
it  is  a  recurrence  of  the  identical  which  constitutes  the  true 
value  of  the  existence.  But  even  this  social  agreement  has 
narrow  limits.  The  other  observers  may  err  as  well  as  I  my- 
self. They  may  stand  under  the  same  prejudices  and  sugges- 
tions under  which  I  stand.  Moreover,  every  one  must  per- 
ceive things  from  his  own  particular  aspect,  and  that  does 


ii 


it 


96  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

not  refer  only  to  space  and  time,  but  to  the  mental  relations 
as  well.  Many  things,  probably,  no  one  at  all  can  share 
with  me.  The  ultimate  decision  whether  we  recognize  the 
real  existence  cannot  remain  dependent  upon  such  external 
chances.  The  fundamental  meaning  of  the  value  of  existence 
is  characterized  by  the  practical  agreement  upon  the  part 
of  some  neighbors  as  little  as  by  the  aflarmation  of  our  own 

senses  at  a  later  time. 

But  we  need  progress  only  one  step  further  in  the  same  di- 
rection. It  is  not  sufficient  that  other  persons  find  by  chance 
that  identity  in  their  experiences,  if  we  want  to  elaborate  the 
value  of  existence  fundamentally.  But  everything  is  done  if, 
instead  of  this,  we  say  that  the  content  of  our  experience  is 
demanded  as  experience  for  every  other  being  under  the  same 
circumstances.   The  mere  experience  is  hereby  transcended 
and  a  postulate  is  put  in  its  place.  We  demand  that  our  con- 
tent of  the  outer  world  is  possible  object  for  every  possible 
subject.  Only  now  we  have  separated  it  from  our  personal 
situation  and  have  made  it  independent.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  independence  of  the  content  does  not  indicate,  of  course, 
that  it  has  stopped  being  an  object.    If  it  ceased  to  have  the 
character  of  an  object,  it  would  be  annihilated.  Our  things 
become  independent  not  by  ceasing  to  be  objects  for  the  sub- 
jects of  will,  but  by  ceasing  to  be  objects  for  one  subject  only. 
It  has  absolute  existence  as  soon  as  it  can  be  conceived  as 
being  by  principle  a  possible  object  for  every  subject.  Again 
we  must  say,  the  fact  that  the  other  subjects  have  the  object 
is  not  more  valuable  than  the  fact  that  I  have  it  myself.  The 
value  lies  exclusively  in  the  fact  that  it  is  identically  the  same 
object  which  the  others  and  I  demand.    As  now  the  recur- 
rence is  referred  to  every  possible  subject,  the  satisfaction 
transcends  every  personal  wish  and  constitutes  an  abso- 
lutely valid  valuation. 

It  is  evident  that  such  a  valuation  is  really  a  deed  of  the 
postulating  will,  inasmuch  as  the  experience  of  every  possible 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


97 


subject,  of  course,  lies  outside  of  any  possible  concrete  life. 
Nevertheless,  such  a  postulate  is  not  independent  of  experi- 
ence. Every  contradiction  of  any  other  being  interferes  with 
the  postulate.  If,  perhaps,  I  tried  to  conceive  the  playthings 
of  my  imagination  or  my  dreams  as  real  objects,  I  should  find 
at  once  the  opposition  of  my  fellows,  and  I  should  be  as  power- 
less as  if  I  wanted  to  settle  in  castles  in  the  air.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  I  tried  to  annihilate  my  reminiscences  as  unreal,  and 
tried  to  make  them  merely  personal  ideas,  and  thus  denied 
the  real  existence  of  the  remembered  things,  the  social  con- 
tradiction would  set  in.  The  value  of  existence  is  accordingly 
no  fact  of  mere  experience,  nor  is  it  a  postulate  which  can 
be  settled  independently  of  experience.  The  existence-value 
of  the  things  is  indeed  no  physical  discovery.  Where  there  is 
no  postulate  of  a  will  which  seeks  a  world,  no  experience  can 
force  it  on  the  subject.  Whoever  believes  that  the  flame  is 
unreal  because  he  does  not  acknowledge  real  existence  cannot 
be  taught  more  by  burning  his  fingers  in  it.  The  seeing  of  the 
flame  and  the  pain  in  the  hand  are  equally  personal  experi- 
ences. In  the  same  way  the  heavy,  the  hard,  the  big,  do  not 
stand  nearer  to  the  consciousness  of  existence  than  the  lumi- 
nous and  odorous  and  sounding.  The  plastic  has  no  higher 
value  of  existence  than  the  flat.  It  is  absurd  to  think,  as  is 
often  done,  that  the  personal  experience  is  a  kind  of  surface 
view  and  the  valuation  of  a  real  existence  is  in  a  way  to  add 
the  third  dimension.  The  imagined  landscape  which  we  con- 
ceive as  not  really  existing  has  yet  its  full  dimensions  of  depth. 
In  a  quite  different  way,  space  and  also  time  are  indeed 
connected  with  the  objective  existence  of  the  things.  The 
value  of  existence  presupposes  that  our  experience  of  things 
can  be  found  again  identical  in  everybody's  existence.  The 
individual  space-time  perspective  must  on  this  account  be 
replaced  by  an  over-personal  unalterable  space-time  system 
which  makes  it  possible  to  eliminate  the  individual  differences. 
What  is  at  my  right  and  yet  at  your  left  could  not  be  con- 


i 


98  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

ceived  as  an  identical  object,  if  the  leftness  and  Tightness  be- 
longed  to  the  character  of  the  object.  That  which  is  past  for 
one  and  present  for  the  other  and  future  again  for  still  others 
could  not  be  the  same,  if  this  personal  time-aspect  remained 
an  element  of  the  thing.  In  my  immediate  personal  experi- 
ence  these  space-values  and  these  time-values  are  at  first  only 
subjective  attitudes.  The  things  are  before  me  or  behind  me, 
right  or  left,  above  or  below,  near  or  far,  and  each  direction 
and  distance  demands  its  particular  way  of  action  and  atti- 
tude. In  the  same  way  past  and  present  and  future  are  re- 
lated to  my  will.  Present  is  that  towards  which  my  action  is 
directed,  future  is  that  for  which  I  prepare  my  action,  past  is 
that  which  is  beyond  my  action.  All  these  attitudes  are  effec- 
tive in  my  personal  system  of  experience  without  involving 
any  objective  space  or  objective  time. 

Still  in  quite  a  different  way  I  find  space-time  determina- 
tion in  my  real  world  of  things.  Every  particular  object  may 
have  its  particular  space-form,  may  be  round  or  angular,  star- 
shaped  or  tree-shaped  or  house-shaped.  Everything  may 
have  its  particular  time-form,  may  be  iambic  or  dactylic,  may 
sound  in  waltz  rhythm  or  in  the  rhythm  of  a  funeral  march, 
may  flash  regularly  or  irregularly,  may  touch  me  quickly 
or  slowly.  Here,  too,  the  temporal  and  spatial  forms  remain 
qualities  of  the  thing,  just  like  tone  or  color.  They  do  not  con- 
tain any  reference  to  a  general  space-time  form.  The  things 
have  their  space  shape,  but  they  are  not  parts  of  one  space; 
they  have  their  time  shape,  but  they  do  not  lie  in  time.  If 
a  manifoldness  of  things  comes  together  opposite  each  other 
or  after  each  other,  then  new,  more  complex  shapes  are  formed ; 
but  as  long  as  I  consider  it  all  merely  as  my  experience  I 
have  no  reason  to  transcend  this  primary  shape. 

This  whole  situation  is  changed  at  once,  if  I  try  to  conceive 
the  object  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  be  thought  as  identical 
with  itself  in  everybody's  experience.  Now  we  have  to  re- 
think all  spatial  and  temporal  differences  of  direction  and  of 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


99 


form  in  such  a  way  that  they  become  entirely  independent 
of  the  personal  standpoint  and  yet  do  not  become  eliminated. 
Various  ways  might  be  permissible.  The  simplest  one,  which 
has  proved  entirely  satisfactory,  is  to  detach  these  differences 
of  directions  which  originally  belong  to  our  own  attitude  with 
reference  to  the  things,  and  instead  to  refer  them  to  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  things  themselves.  If  I  acknowledge 
the  same  right  to  the  standpoint  of  every  subject,  I  must 
acknowledge  that  everything  may  be  right  and  left,  may  be 
above  and  below,  may  be  near  and  far,  may  be  past  and  pre- 
sent and  future.  In  other  words,  those  rays  of  direction  which 
at  first  irradiate  from  me  must  be  conceived  as  starting  from 
every  possible  object.  Things  are  now  past  and  future,  right 
and  left,  no  longer  with  reference  to  subjects,  but  with  refer- 
ence to  other  things.  Consequently  we  gain  a  system  of  rela- 
tions between  the  objects  themselves  without  reference  to 
subjects  of  will.  A  thing  is  now  past  or  future  in  relation  to 
another  thing;  one  object  is  near  or  far  from  other  objects. 
Thus  we  gain  a  net  of  space-time  relations,  and  with  its  help 
every  space-time  shape  also  can  be  translated  into  a  series  of 
distances  and  directions.  As  soon  as  that  is  carried  through, 
the  things  are  independent  of  the  chance  personal  standpoints. 
What  is  round  for  one  can  no  longer  be  elliptical  for  another, 
inasmuch  as  the  form  is  now  expressible  in  space  measure- 
ments. Hence  the  thing  can  remain  the  same  spatially  and 
temporally  for  everybody's  experience,  even  if  every  one 
looks  into  the  street  from  a  different  window  and  the  one 
comes  later  and  the  other  earlier  to  his  outlook.  The  inde- 
pendent existence  of  things  demands  in  this  way  an  inde- 
pendent form  of  space  and  time.  But  for  this  absolute  space 
and  this  absolute  time  the  same  is  true  which  showed  itself 
for  existence.  It  is  a  free  postulate,  which  far  transcends 
every  possible  actual  experience,  and  yet  it  is  everyivhere 
controlled  by  experience  and  develops  itself  only  where  the 
experience  suggests  it. 


I 


100  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

The  value  of  existence  thus  belongs  to  the  objects  dis- 
tributed over  space  and  time  as  soon  as  we  perceive  or  remem- 
ber or  expect  them  with  the  conviction  that  these  identical 
things  can  be  objects  of  experience  for  every  possible  sub- 
ject. Whatever  we  cannot  hold  with  this  conviction  possesses 
for  us  no  real  value  of  existence  and  does  not  belong  to  the 
existing  things  in  our  world.  At  the  first  glance  this  seems 
to  be  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  we  are  accustomed  to 
attribute  real  existence  also  to  ideas;  for  instance,  to  our 
imaginative  ideas.   They  have  their  existence  in  a  particular 
consciousness,  but  certainly  the  psychologist  presupposes 
their  full  existence  for  his  analytical  studies.   But  such  an 
argument  is  deceitful.   From  the  standpoint  of  real  experi- 
ence in  which  we  wanted  to  remain  at  first,  the  imaginative 
idea  indeed  has  no  reality;  as  a  psychical  content  of  con- 
sciousness enclosed  within  the  personality,  the  imaginative 
ideas  do  not  come  in  question  here.  We  have  to  ask  at  first 
what  such  imagination  means  in  real  life.  If  my  imagination 
erects  beautiful  castles  in  the  fairy  forest,  they  are  in  my  real 
experience  not  ideas  of  castles  with  ideas  of  forests  both  en- 
closed in  my  brain,  but  they  are  for  me  the  walls  and  towers 
at  the  place  where  I  believe  them  to  be,  exactly  as  the  land- 
scape which  I  see  here  from  my  piazza  is  perceived  there 
without  and  not  in  my  brain.   From  this  standpoint  of  real 
experience  the  landscape  which  I  see  has  real  existence  and 
that  fairy  castle  has  not.  That  which  by  principle  is  found  as 
an  object  of  experience  for  me  alone  has  as  such  not  a  kind 
of  diminished  or  faded  or  transparent  existence,  but  it  has 
absolutely  no  part  in  the  world  which  is  maintained  by  the 
absolute  value  of  real  existence. 

If  the  value  of  existence  meant  simply  that  an  object  is 
given  to  many  subjects,  we  might  perhaps  think  that  the 
object  which  is  given  to  one  subject  only  has  at  least  a  small 
fraction  of  true  existence.  Such  an  imagined  object  then 
might  have  a  kind  of  diluted  value  of  existence  which  we 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


101 


mean  by  psychical  existence.  But  that  is  not  the  case  at  all. 
The  value  of  existence  did  not  result  from  the  mere  appear- 
ance in  many  subjects,  but  the  fundamental  point  was  always 
the  consciousness  of  the  identity  among  those  various  appear- 
ances. Wherever  this  recurrence  of  the  original,  this  fulfilment 
of  the  thought,  in  short,  this  realization  fails,  no  over-personal 
satisfaction  can  result,  and  therefore  no  value  of  existence.  My 
castle  in  the  fairy  forest  has  no  value  of  existence  whatever. 
The  meaning  in  which,  later,  the  dreamed,  the  desired,  the 
hoped,  the  expected,  the  imagined,  may  enter  after  all  into  the 
world  of  the  really  existing  as  a  psychical  fact  is  entirely  dif- 
ferent. We  shall  follow  up  this  process  as  soon  as  we  discuss 
the  world  of  subjects.  The  subject  as  centre  of  will  is  as  such 
never  an  existing  object,  but  we  shall  see  that  it  has  never- 
theless its  existence.  The  subject  is  characterized  and  is  to 
be  understood  by  its  activities,  its  acts  of  attitude,  and  these 
activities  are  related  to  objects,  and  these  objects  of  activity 
of  course  may  be  now  either  the  really  existing  objects  or  the 
merely  individual  experienced  objects.  To  understand  the  real 
subjects  it  will  thus  become  necessary  to  consider  also  those 
things  which  have  only  a  personal  relation.  And  in  this  way 
the  mere  illusions  and  imaginations  become  connected  with 
the  world  of  the  real.  We  shall  see  later  that  the  systematic 
science  which  connects  the  facts  from  this  starting-point  can 
develop  a  whole  system,  the  system  of  psychology.  But  as 
long  as  we  deal  merely  with  the  problem  of  existence  and  do 
not  enter  into  the  question  of  connection,  the  imaginative  idea 
is  no  real  process  in  us  nor  a  real  psychical  object  in  our  con- 
sciousness, but  is  merely  and  only  that  which  has  no  reality. 
Whether  the  valuation  of  existence  in  the  particular  case 
is  justified  or  not,  that  is,  whether  the  existential  judgment  is 
right  or  wrong,  has  of  course  nothing  to  do  with  our  exam- 
ination of  the  principle  of  existence.  Philosophy  does  not 
have  to  discriminate  which  things  are  real  and  which  are  not. 
That  is  a  problem  of  social  importance,  and  society  examines 


i 


102  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

it  with  all  the  means  of  its  specialized  sciences.  If  I  say  that 
I  see  there  in  the  field  a  raven,  my  assertion  of  existence  is 
not  changed  if  the  zoologist  can  prove  it  to  be  a  crow,  or  if 
I  myself  find  upon  nearer  inspection  that  it  was  a  piece  of 
coal,  or  if  the  physician  finds  that  I  suffer  from  hallucina- 
tions. The  only  decisive  factor  was  that  it  had  for  me  and 
for  every  one  a  reasonable  and  necessary  meaning  when  I 
claimed  for  the  thing  which  I  experienced  an  absolute  value  of 
existence.  We  had  to  examine  what  is  meant  by  this  ab- 
solute value,  but  whether  my  raven  by  chance  possesses  this 
value  is  without  any  fundamental  significance.    We  know 
now  that  the  affirmation  which  gives  meaning  to  such  ex- 
istence-judgments demands  that  the  experienced  object  can 
be  maintained  as  identical  in  the  experience  of  everybody. 
In  the  negative  existential  judgment,  just  this  is  denied  m 
saying  this  thing  does  not  exist.  Whoever  affirms  or  demes 
may  be  in  error  or  may  find  contradiction ;  but  what  affirma- 
tion and  denial  mean  must  stand  firm  not  only  for  himself, 
but  must  be  beyond  every  possible  contradiction,  if  his  judg- 
ment is  to  have  a  meaning  at  all. 

B.  —  PERSONS 

When  we  discussed  the  existence  of  things,  we  were  always 
turned  to  the  experience  of  other  beings.  My  experience  of 
objects  meant  a  real  piece  of  the  world  because  other  subjects 
experienced  it  too.  How  do  I  know  those  other  subjects,  and 
in  what  sense  do  I  acknowledge  their  absolute  existence  also? 
The  natural  sciences  and  the  naturalistic  psychology  have 
a  simple  and  convenient  solution  for  the  whole  problem. 
The  other  living  beings,  we  are  assured,  are  for  us  at  first  only 
objects  of  external  perception.  But  their  characteristic  series 
of  movements  remind  us  of  our  own  movements  and  their 
form  reminds  us  of  our  own  form.   On  the  other  hand,  we 
know  from  our  inner  experience  that  we  ourselves  represent 
not  only  a  physical  but  also  a  psychical  manifoldness.  We 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


103 


find  in  ourselves  contents  of  consciousness.  Thus  it  seems  a 
justified  conclusion  of  analogy  that  those  other  organisms 
are  also  supplied  with  such  inner  attachment,  and  that  they 
also  carry  ideas  and  similar  contents  packed  into  their  brains. 

It  is  evident  that  our  deduction  of  the  existence  of  things 
would  become  impossible  by  such  conclusions.  We  deduce 
the  existence  of  things  from  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  the 
experience  of  other  subjects.  That  would  become  a  vicious 
circle  if  we  really  knew  the  other  subjects  at  first  as  existing 
things.  But  does  such  a  view  correspond  in  the  least  to  the 
true  life-experience  from  which  we  have  to  start  ?  Is  not  the 
whole  meaning  of  our  relation  to  our  fellows,  with  its  warmth 
and  immediacy,  destroyed  by  every  effort  to  express  the  life- 
relation  from  man  to  man  by  the  clumsy  forms  of  the  percep- 
tion of  things  ?  Whoever  acknowledges  no  other  experience 
but  the  sensations  of  contents  is  surely  obliged  to  confine  the 
totality  of  experience  to  physical  and  psychical  things,  and 
thus  to  reduce  all  life-relations  ultimately  to  relations  of  things. 
Inasmuch  as  this  special  way  of  treatment  is  the  particular 
task  of  natural  science  and  psychology,  such  views  would 
demand  that  psychological  and  biological  researches  alone 
have  to  interpret  what  our  fellow-man  is.  Certainly  it  is  sur- 
prising what  an  overwhelming  power  belongs  to  the  habit  of 
naturalistic  thought,  and  how  difficult  it  is  for  all  of  us  to  re- 
turn to  the  immediate  experience  of  life.  We  all  have  learned 
too  much  from  those  smooth  explanations  in  the  sphere  of 
the  world  of  things.  The  effort  to  explain  us  and  other  men 
from  foregoing  causes  pushes  itself  into  the  foreground  even 
when  we  really  start  not  to  explain  but  to  interpret  and  to 
understand  ourselves  and  our  relation  to  other  men.  Every 
effort  to  explain  refers  of  course  to  the  things,  and  reenf orces 
the  suggestions  of  the  natural  sciences  that  everything  can  be 
understood  completely  when  it  is  conceived  as  an  object. 

Nevertheless,  our  view  of  the  world  must  remain  distorted 
if  we  cannot  liberate  ourselves  from  such  suggestions.   We 


104  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

must  be  emancipated  from  them,  if  we  are  not  to  lose  ourselves, 
wfn^us  mphasize  here  most  strongly  what  we  touched  on 
Tee  before,  that  we  do  not  find  ourselves  in  the  present  expe- 
rience  as  objects.  Of  course  I  can  at  any  time  consider  myself 
i  such  experienceable  object  after  the  pattern  of  descnb.ng 
Tnd    xplaLg  psychology.  In  that  case  my  bodUy  ra- 
tions stand  in  the  centre ;  my  actions  are  then  ^xpre^d  by  the 
sensations  which  come  from  my  musc^s  and  ^-^fj-^'^ 
dons  andskin,  together  with  associated  ^^eas, and  rny  I  is  the 
system  of  my  psycho-physical  processes  of  ^^f^stTw^ 
tions  and  inhibitions.  But  when  I  move  in  the  midst  of  life, 
I  taow  my  self  in  a  way  which  has  nothing  in  common  with 
uch  objTctification  of  my  personality.  lUen  I  do  not  perceiy 
r^Jself,  but  I  feel  my  self.  My  action  is  "0*  ^^^^.^^^^.^e 
find  as  a  content  in  my  consciousness,  but  I  myself  am  the 
Attitude  and  the  decision  and  the  will.  I  !»!>-- jfj^'^^™^ 
will-event  most  immediately  in  a  way  which  ^^f'^^damen^ly 
different  from  every  knowledge  of  objects.  If  J  t"f  t°J;^ 
Se  it,  I  should  already  deviate  into  the  world  of  objecte. 
Sut  whoever  would  deny  this  uniqueness  of  the  wil  has  only 
S  his  own  denying  to  become  aware  that  his  intention  in 
urln  act  of  denying  is  not  something  which  can  be  found 
as  an  object,  but  is  valid  in  its  Jeed-character.  As  s^^^^^^^^ 
we  fixate  our  attitude  and  deed  by  conceptions  for  the  pur- 
;L  of  communication  and  discussion,  the  conceptions  b^^^ 
which  we  think  them  are  of  course  objects  for  us,  but  that 
which  is  to  be  thought  by  those  conceptions  is  not  remodelled 
L  it  into  an  object  itself.  Such  an  act  of  attitude  as  we  ex 
perience  it  in  every  pulse-beat  of  our  self-certainty  is  funda- 
mentally different  from  every  possible  e^^^^^^/^jf^^' 
and  exactly  of  this  kind  is  every  «ther  subject  of  wiUto^^^ 
As  we  become  conscious  of  ourselves  m  our  wJl,  our^ellows^ 
too,  meet  us  in  every  act  by  their  attitudes,  and  only  by  the  r 
attitudes  does  their  will  immediately  reach  us.  T^^se  who  ^^^ 
inextricably  entangled  in  the  nets  of  naturalistic  conceptions 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


105 


fancy  that  such  a  relation  of  wills  must  be  something  mystical 
or ''  metaphysical."  Perhaps  they  think  of  telepathy,  in  which 
the  psychical  in  one  organism  has  an  unexplainable  influence 
on  the  psychical  in  another  body.  But  all  this  represents 
exactly  the  opposite.  Telepathy  is  an  unexplainable  process 
in  the  system  of  bodily  nature  in  which  everything  ought  to 
be  explained,  and  in  which  everything  must  be  explainable  by 
principle.  But  when  my  will  meets  your  will,  agrees  with  it 
or  disagrees  with  it,  there  is  nothing  at  all  unexplainable,  be- 
cause it  has  no  reference  at  all  to  a  system  which  demands 
explanation.  It  belongs  to  a  manifoldness  for  which  the  ques- 
tion of  explanation,  the  question  of  cause  and  effect,  would  be 
just  as  absurd  as  the  question  whether  the  will  is  triangular 
or  has  the  color  of  violet.  The  will  in  its  life-reality  is  not  to 
be  explained,  but  is  to  be  interpreted  in  its  meaning,  is  to  be 
understood  in  its  bearing,  is  to  be  developed  in  its  purposes 
and  consequences.  I  do  not  experience  the  fellow-will  as 
something  which  I  think  into  the  perceived  body  by  a  kind 
of  analogy  on  the  basis  of  external  similarities.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  will  of  the  other  man  approaches  me  as  the  very 
first  experience,  and  I  know  it  in  sympathizing  with  its  inten- 
tions, in  understanding  its  attitude,  in  imitating  or  rejecting 
its  decision. 

Whoever  asks  how  I  can  experience  the  fellow-will  other- 
wise than  by  starting  from  the  perception  of  bodily  move- 
ments is  already  on  the  track  of  naturalistic  explanation.  If 
my  knowledge  of  the  other  will  is  to  be  explained  causally, 
the  whole  system  of  relations  must  of  course  be  expressed  in 
the  form  of  perceivable  objects.  But  in  reality  the  under- 
standing of  the  foreign  will  is  in  every  case  the  only  true 
starting-point  from  which  nothing  refers  at  all  to  preceding 
causes.  This  life-event  begins  there,  and  the  whole  situation 
is  completely  elucidated  as  soon  as  it  is  completely  interpreted 
in  its  meaning.  That  we  can  acknowledge  another  will  is  the 
first  step ;  that  we  conceive  this  other  will  in  its  relation  to 


106 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


that  object  which  is  central  for  it,  namely  in  relation  to  the 
other  man's  body,  is  the  second  step.  This  reference  to  the 
body  has  for  us  interest  only  because  it  gives  to  the  will 
of  the  other  man  the  characteristic  space-time  order  of  his 
objects  and  thus  interprets  his  individual  perspective  of  the 
world.  But  it  is  the  will  alone  which  binds  together  this  world 
of  the  fellow-man,  and  which  demands  our  interest  in  his  indi- 
viduality. All  this  ought  not  to  be  misinterpreted  as  if  it  were 
an  artificial  construction.  On  the  contrary,  the  experience  of 
every  life-instant  contains  the  whole  truth  here,  and  we  have 
only  to  remove  the  artificial  elaborations  of  the  causal  sci- 
ences to  reach  again  the  pure  immediate  experience.  But  this 
we  must  do  because  just  at  the  starting-point  ever5rthing  must 
be  perfectly  cleared  from  reminiscences  of  scientific  trans- 
formations. As  soon  as  we  have  broken  those  chains  which 
have  become  by  far  too  convenient  to  most  of  us,  as  soon  as 
we  have  reached  once  more  the  immediate  certainty  of  our- 
selves and  of  our  fellow-men  in  their  original  community  of 
will,  then  alone  we  have  the  possibility  of  really  reaching  a 
consistent  view  of  reality.  Then  the  pseudo-necessity  of  the 
causal  laws  disappears  for  our  will  and  we  are  free ;  the  bound- 
aries of  time  disappear  and  we  are  eternal ;  the  relativity  of 
our  purpose  is  annihilated  and  our  values  grow  to  the  height 
of  absolute  validity. 

But  at  first  we  should  not  discuss  here  the  last  fulfilling  of 
purposes.  We  start  at  the  starting-point  where  everything 
essential  must  be  given,  not  in  ideal  situations,  but  in  the  most 
trivial  life-experiences.  When  I  converse  with  friends  and 
quarrel  with  opponents,  when  I  help  my  neighbor  and  under- 
stand what  he  proposes,  when  I  sympathize  with  his  pain  or 
try  to  convince  him,  when  I  praise  or  blame,  in  short,  in  the 
trivialities  of  every  hour  of  life,  the  fellow-man  is  a  subject  of 
attitude  and  will  to  me.  What  he  brings  to  me  is  a  suggestion, 
a  proposition,  a  decision,  a  question,  a  contradiction,  long 
before  it  becomes  a  process.  A  meaning  is  understood  before 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE  107 

a  content  is  perceived.  On  this  basis  arises  the  question 
of  what  It  means  that  I  acknowledge  the  existence  of  such 
acts.  In  my  personal  experience  it  is  only  an  excitement 
which  I  feel,  a  suggestion  or  a  proposition,  and  thus  it  may 
be  nothmg  but  just  this  particular  excitement  of  my  will 
Whether  it  is  more  than  such  a  personal  experience  of  mine 
I  do  not  know  at  first,  and  as  I  may  skeptically  contend  that 
the  things  are  more  than  my  impressions,  I  may  also  deny 
that  the  fellow-beings  are  more  than  suggestions  which  my 
will  feels  in  itself  as  starting-points  of  attitudes. 

In  reality,  however,  we  do  not  doubt  that  as  there  is  ex- 
istence in  the  things,  certainly  the  other  beings  have  an  in- 
dependent existence,  too.   We  give  the  same  reality  to  them 
which  we  give  to  ourselves.  The  importance  of  the  problem 
is  too  easily  overlooked.  In  the  history  of  the  theory  of  know- 
ledge no  question  has  been  answered  in  such  an  unsatisfac- 
tory way  as  the  question  of  the  reality  of  other  subjects. 
The  poorest  means  of  help  borrowed  from  naturalistic  think- 
ing have  been  carelessly  taken  over  into  philosophies  which 
by  their  principles  directly  contradict  such  pseudo-thoughts. 
Thus  we  ask,  on  the  basis  of  the  real  immediate  experience, 
what  is  meant  when  we  give  to  the  suggestion  which  arises  for 
our  will  the  value  of  a  really  existing  subject.   As  in  the  case 
of  the  objects,  here,  too,  practical  experience  may  show  us 
a  way.   In  the  case  of  the  things,  we  found  that  I  ascribe 
existence  to  the  house  which  I  perceive,  but  not  to  the  fairy 
palace  of  my  imagination,  because  only  that  house  can  be 
found  by  my  neighbors,  while  my  palace  does  not  return  in 
the  experience  of  any  one  else.  Now  we  have  to  deal  with  sub- 
jects instead  of  objects,  and  as  subjective  we  acknowledged 
that  act  of  attitude  which  we  understand.  But  attitude  is 
always  attitude  to  an  object.  As  there  could  not  be  a  thing 
which  is  not  an  object  for  a  subject,  there  cannot  be  an  atti- 
tude which  is  not  directed  towards  an  object.  If  I  agree  with 
an  attitude,  it  means  that  I  take  the  same  subjective  will- 


108 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


109 


relation  to  a  thing  as  that  which  has  been  proposed  to  me. 
The  object  had  its  real  existence  when  it  was  experienceable 
also  for  other  subjects.  The  subject  has  its  real  existence  when 
it  takes  attitude  also  to  other  objects. 

This  is  indeed  the  method  by  which  we  judge  in  our  daily 
life.  Suggestions  approach  our  will  continually,  and  at  every 
moment  we  have  to  discriminate  between  those  which  we 
imderstand  as  expressions  of  real  existing  beings  and  those 
which  are  nothing  but  just  suggestions  behind  which  no  ex- 
isting subject  stands.  The  neighbor  who  talks  with  me  sug- 
gests to  me  in  every  sentence  acts  of  attitude  which  I  imitate 
or  reject.  In  the  same  way  the  child  who  laughs  or  cries  at 
my  side  wants  my  sympathy,  the  dog  wants  to  be  stroked, 
the  flower  wants  to  be  picked,  the  fruit  wants  to  be  tasted, 
the  beautiful  curve  of  the  line  tempts  me  to  follow  its  move- 
ment, the  rhythmic  sound  suggests  to  me  impulses  in  accord- 
ance with  it.  It  is  true  the  psychologist  tells  us  at  once  that 
in  the  last  cases  we  have  to  do  only  with  objects ;  their  per- 
ception realizes  certain  impulses  to  action  only  through  asso- 
ciations. But  that  does  not  help  us  at  all.  Such  explanatory 
comment  might  be  applied  with  exactly  the  same  right  in  the 
cases  of  the  first  kind,  to  the  dog  and  to  the  child  and  to  the 
neighbor.  We  do  not  stand  here  before  a  problem  which  can 
be  solved  by  explanation  of  causes.  The  suggestion  which 
comes  from  the  rhythmic  sound  or  from  the  swinging  curve 
is  just  as  original  and  unique  an  experience  of  will  as  the 
suggestion  which  approaches  us  from  the  sentences  of  the 
speaker  or  from  a  smiling  face.  If  we  refer  only  some  sugges- 
tions to  existing  beings  and  others  not,  if  we  give  the  value 
of  real  existence  to  the  neighbor,  the  child,  the  dog,  perhaps 
also  to  the  earthworm,  but  not  to  the  flower,  the  melody,  the 
curved  line,  a  new  principle  of  selection  must  have  entered. 

The  soft  waving  of  the  flowering  branch  before  me  wakens 
my  inner  harmony  with  its  mild  rhythmical  movement ;  what 
the  branch  wills  and  suggests  finds  a  welcome  in  me  just  like 


that  which  the  laughing,  playing  child  at  my  side  wakens  in 
me.  I  laugh  with  the  child,  and  I  surrender  myself  to  the  play 
of  the  rising  and  falling  motion.   What  the  child  wills  and 
what  the  branch  wills  are  to  me  equalfy  suggestions  to  will 
the  same.  But  now  I  show  the  child  a  piece  of  candy  and  he 
grasps  for  it  with  vivid  will ;  I  take  away  his  toy  and  his  tears 
show  his  regret.   The  same  will  takes  attitude  toward  new 
and  ever  new  situations.  The  waving  branch,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  moving  curve,  even  the  flower,  all  will  something, 
but  their  will  never  turns  to  a  new  goal.  The  one  suggestion 
which  we  experience  from  them  expresses  their  whole  will. 
An  attitude  which  transcends  that  first  experience  and  re- 
lates to  other  objects  is  denied  to  them.  Their  will  cannot  ad- 
just itself  to  any  new  purpose.  On  this,  indeed,  is  based  the 
decision  with  which  our  daily  life  is  satisfied.   We  separate 
the  suggestions  in  which  the  will  turns  towards  other  objects 
from  those  in  which  the  will  plays  itself  out  in  the  one  de- 
mand.   The  situation  thus  corresponds  completely  to  the 
separation  of  objects.  With  the  experienced  impressions,  we 
have  to  ask  whether  they  are  also  objects  for  other  subjects  ; 
with  the  experienced  suggestions,  we  have  to  ask  whether 
this  will  also  takes  attitude  towards  other  objects.    Where 
the  latter  is  the  case,  where  the  will  can  be  found  again  in  a 
new  attitude  as  the  identical  will,  there  we  have  again  the 
condition  for  a  true  value  of  existence.   Only  the  will  which 
takes  other  attitudes  towards  other  things  means  to  us  the 
will  of  really  existing  subjects.  On  the  other  hand,  those  sug- 
gestions which  exhaust  themselves  in  the  one  experience  are 
as  little  real  existing  subjects  as  the  objects  of  imagination 
are  real  existing  things. 

The  demarcation  line  between  real  subjects  and  things 
which  lack  subjectivity  has  consequently  no  longer  anything 
to  do  with  an  external  similarity  between  the  things  and  our- 
selves. If  the  naturalist  really  believes  that  we  ascribe  con- 
sciousness to  the  monkey  or  the  earthworm  or  the  jelly-fish 


i 


mmmtitmmritiiKmtit^ 


110 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


because  they  are  so  similar  to  us,  his  argument  is  as  good  and 
as  bad  as  all  the  other  biological  demonstrations  for  the  ex- 
istence of  consciousness  in  animals.  Some  biologists  put  the 
emphasis  on  the  power  to  learn,  others  on  the  existence  of 
memory,  others  on  the  ability  to  adjust  the  behavior.  Who- 
ever looks  into  the  depths  of  the  problem  must  see  clearly 
that  an  investigation  which  comes  from  without  can  never 
bring  any  proofs  for  the  existence  of  psychical  processes 
either  with  the  jelly-fish,  or  with  the  monkey,  or  with  our 
neighbor.  He  who  wants  to  explain  must  explain  all  the 
actions,  including  the  actions  apparently  produced  by  mem- 
ory, from  strictly  physical  causes,  and  the  exigencies  of  ex- 
planation never  can  determine  whether  psychical  factors  are 
accompanying  the  physical  ones.  The  biologist  finds  a  modi- 
fiability  of  behavior  and  not  a  psychical  learning,  he  finds 
an  after  effect  of  earlier  stimuli,  but  not  a  psychical  memory. 
That  there  is  consciousness  must  be  presupposed  and  cannot 
be  proved  by  demonstration.  With  animal  as  with  man  we 
simply  have  to  acknowledge  the  other  will  before  we  can  find 
the  particular  image  of  the  world  which  belongs  as  object  to 
that  particular  will.  Where  the  demarcation  line  lies  de- 
pends thus  entirely  upon  our  actual  acknowledgment,  which 
cannot  be  found  out  by  a  biological  experiment.  Whoever  in 
sentimental  mood  feels  in  the  expression  of  the  flower  not 
only  the  present  suggestion  of  the  flower's  lovely  desire,  but 
goes  so  far  as  to  believe  that  the  same  will  may  take  attitude 
towards  new  situations,  that  it  is  the  same  will  which  re- 
sists the  breaking  of  its  stem  or  which  longs  to  refresh  itself 
on  sweet  dew  —  he  indeed  gives  the  value  of  real  existence 
to  the  will  of  the  flower. 

If  we  observe  in  this  way  that  a  will  takes  attitude  also 
towards  other  objects,  it  will  be  sufficient  for  our  practical 
purposes.  Yet  such  an  empirical  motive  does  not  reach  fur- 
ther than  the  corresponding  one  in  the  realm  of  things.  We 
saw  there,  too,  that  we  gave  existence  to  the  things  when 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


111 


one  or  the  other  neighbor  divided  the  experience  with  us,  or 
when  we  ourselves  foimd  the  identical  experience  again.  In 
the  same  way,  we  now  give  existence  to  the  subject  when  the 
will  turns  towards  this  or  that  other  object,  or  takes  a  changed 
attitude  towards  the  same  object.  But  to  gain  a  firm  ground, 
independent  of  chance  experiences,  we  had  to  go  further  and 
to  demand  that  a  really  existing  thing  must  be  experience- 
able  for  every  possible  subject.  The  subject  reaches  the  same 
detachment  from  the  chance  experiences  when  it  is  conceived 
in  its  relation  not  to  the  one  or  the  other  object,  but  to  every 
possible  object.  Only  if  a  being  is  acknowledged  as  the  possible 
subject  for  the  total  world  of  things  is  its  selfhood  completely 
detached  from  that  chance  attitude  which  it  takes  towards 
us ;  then  alone  it  has  an  absolute  real  existence.  This  postu- 
late can  be  fulfilled  only  if  we  posit  in  the  place  of  the  things 
a  world  of  words,  of  conceptions ;  only  by  language  does  it  be- 
come possible  to  bring  the  whole  world  of  possible  objects  into 
the  sphere  of  will  for  every  being.  Only  by  the  conceptions 
does  the  subject  complete  its  independence  from  the  chance 
object.  This  corresponds  exactly  to  the  independence  which 
the  object  found  by  our  gaining  the  forms  of  absolute  space 
and  time.  The  objective  system  of  conceptions  becomes  the 
place  of  absolute  relation  for  the  subject,  as  space  and  time 
are  the  place  of  absolute  relation  for  the  object.  Again  we 
have  transcended  the  mere  experience.  It  is  a  postulate  with 
which  we  approach  our  fellow-men,  if  we  demand  from  every 
being  that  he  be  able  to  take  attitude  towards  everything 
which  can  be  determined  by  conceptions;  but  again  it  is 
experience  which  has  to  guide  our  postulate.  If,  without 
motive  of  experience,  we  tried  to  give  real  existence  to  every 
suggestion  which  comes  to  our  will,  we  should  stand  in  a 
romantic  world  of  dreams,  just  as  if  we  were  to  give  exist- 
ence to  the  things  of  our  imagination.  And  such  a  single 
suggestion  has  now  gained  not  a  kind  of  faint  value  of  exist- 
ence, but  it  has  none  at  all,  inasmuch  as  we  saw  that  it  is 


112 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


just  this  recurrence  of  the  identical  which  is  the  only  condi- 
tion of  fulfilment,  and  that  means  of  value. 

Now  we  also  understand  what  constitutes  the  existence 
of  the  subject  for  himself.  We  give  value  of  existence  to  a 
subject  as  soon  as  we  find  his  will  in  a  new  attitude  towards 
new  goals  as  the  identical  will.  Consequently  a  really  exist- 
ing person  must  have  the  possibility  of  maintaining  himself  in 
every  new  act  of  will.  This  conservation  of  the  same  will 
cannot  mean  the  temporal  lasting  of  it,  because  such  mere 
lasting  in  time  we  recognized  as  a  trait  of  objects.  We  saw 
that  objects  alone  are  conceived  in  the  absolute  time.  If  a 
subject  of  will  is  to  remain  identical  with  itself,  it  cannot  mean 
its  temporal  continuity,  but  it  must  mean  a  continual  self- 
assertion  by  which  the  will  knows  itself  as  identical  in  every 
new  act.  It  is  a  subjective  self-continuity,  which  as  such  is 
untemporal,  and  which  eternally  binds  all  particular  acts  of 
the  individual.  This  inner  self -relation  of  the  will  is  that 
which  we  have  to  call  the  soul. 

C.  —  VALUATIONS 

Our  individual  will  is  not  only  bound  by  the  fellow-world 
and  the  outer  world.  We  acknowledge  not  only  the  other 
persons  and  things  as  limitations  to  our  individual  willing  and 
desiring.  In  the  inner  world,  too,  the  will  finds  its  boundaries 
which  no  individual  desire  has  created.  There  is  no  need  of 
returning  to  our  fundamental  argument  that  this  inner  world 
does  not  mean  the  psychical  in  the  sense  of  psychology.  We 
started  from  the  immediate  experience.  In  it  everything 
which  is  object  of  our  will,  that  which  the  psychologist  would 
call  our  ideas,  perceptions,  or  memories,  belongs  entirely  to 
the  outer  world ;  only  our  acts  of  attitude,  our  personality, 
our  soul  as  deed,  is  our  original  inner  world.  If  this  soul- 
world  is  to  find  in  itself  something  binding,  it  must  be  again 
a  will.  Every  part  of  experience  which  does  not  represent  a 
will  would  have  to  be  experienced  as  object ;  it  would  thus 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


113 


belong  to  the  world  of  impressions,  but  not  to  the  self.  In 
our  inner  world,  any  objective  value  like  that  of  the  things 
in  the  outer  world  or  of  the  persons  in  the  fellow-world  can 
belong  only  to  a  will  which  is  our  will  and  yet  which  we  do 
not  will  as  individuals.  In  our  experience  the  impressions  and 
suggestions  had  real  existence  when  they  showed  themselves 
as  independent  and  self -asserting  beyond  the  first  occurrence. 
Their  existence  was  absolute  if  they  remained  identical  in 
every  possible  experience.  In  the  same  way  our  will  must  be 
acknowledged  as  having  an  independent  absolute  existence 
as  soon  as  this  will  is  thought  as  recurring  identical  every 
time  in  such  a  situation.  Thus  our  will  can  be  a  part  of  the 
existing  world,  which  is  by  principle  independent  of  our  in- 
dividual personality.  It  is  a  world  of  the  over-personal  will, 
which  gives  the  firm  background  to  the  wavering  individual- 
ity in  the  same  way  that  the  world  of  the  real  things  gives 
background  to  the  play  of  our  personal  ideas. 

Such  over-personal  will-acts  are  the  absolute  valuations. 
Compared  with  them,  the  will-acts  from  personal  needs  and 
from  personal  desires  have  only  chance  character.  In  the 
system  of  the  absolute  valuations  these  merely  personal  acts 
are  as  unreal  and  as  non-existent  as  the  things  of  imagination 
are  in  the  realm  of  existing  nature.  But  that  which  gives 
to  the  over-personal  will-acts  the  absolute  value  of  existence 
is  again  only  the  one  fact  that  we  will  them  with  the  con- 
sciousness that  they  are  not  willed  only  in  this  particular  ex- 
perience. Here,  too,  of  course  we  have  at  first  simply  the  mo- 
tives of  experience.  We  may  have  to-day  a  will  with  a  vague 
feeling  that  we  probably  shall  will  that  always.  Yet  this  re- 
mains still  in  the  limits  of  conditional  value,  however  much 
it  may  become  the  starting-point  for  a  complete  development. 
Oiu-  will  is  anchored  in  the  depths,  and  has  become  a  valua- 
tion with  absolute  existence  as  soon  as  we  will  with  the  con- 
sciousness that  we  cannot  possibly  will  otherwise  as  long  as 
we  will  a  world  at  all ;  that  we  would  give  away  ourselves  and 


114 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


that  our  world  would  lose  its  meaning,  if  we  were  not  to  will 
this  will. 

The  progress  is  evidently  the  same  as  with  things  and  per- 
sons. Here,  too,  the  original  experience,  the  single  volition, 
is  maintained  to  be  found  identical  in  new  experience  and  by 
postulate  in  every  possible  experience.  As  with  things  and 
persons,  here  again  the  value  of  existence  is  not  based  simply 
on  the  fact  that  the  same  event  really  occurs  again,  but  that 
it  is  held  in  our  experience  with  the  demand  that  it  remain 
identical  and  thus  assert  itself.  The  value  of  objective  exist- 
ence for  the  valuations  differs  from  that  for  the  things  and 
persons  only  by  the  one  important  fact,  that  the  latter  point 
beyond  themselves.  The  things  demand  the  acknowledgment 
of  other  persons,  the  persons  demand  reference  to  other 
things,  but  the  existence  of  the  valuations  always  leads  back 
to  the  self,  to  the  inner  world.  The  valuations  for  which  we 
must  thus  acknowledge  absolute  existence  have  of  course 
objects  just  like  any  other  will.  The  objects  of  these  over- 
personal  attitudes  are  the  values.  It  is  practically  the  same 
thing,  whether  we  speak  of  the  absolute  existence  of  the 
valuations  or  of  the  absolute  validity  of  the  values.  It  is 
merely  a  difference  of  standpoint.  The  values  belong  to  the 
world  which  we  will,  the  valuation  belongs  to  the  will  which 
forms  a  world.  That  the  values  are  absolute  cannot  express 
anything  else  than  that  the  valuation  of  the  values  is  a  will-act 
which  is  independent  of  any  individual  volition.  Our  will  has 
absolute  existence  as  soon  as  we  will  it  with  the  consciousness 
that  there  exists  no  world  at  all,  and  thus  no  reality,  if  we  do 
not  maintain  this  will  in  every  possible  experience.  On  this 
foundation  the  whole  absoluteness  of  the  values  is  based. 
Accordingly  it  must  be  possible  to  deduce  the  totality  of  the 
absolute  valuations,  and  that  means  the  totality  of  the  abso- 
lutely valid  values,  from  this  one  fundamental  principle. 
Those  volitions  posit  absolute  values  which  result  from  the 
demand  that  there  exists  at  all  a  real  world.  The  question 


THE  VALUES  OF  EXISTENCE 


115 


which  values  have  to  be  acknowledged  as  really  existing  is  of 
course  not  a  new  question  for  us,  inasmuch  as  it  is  exactly 
and  exclusively  the  problem  of  this  whole  book.  The  philo- 
sophy of  the  eternal  values  cannot  be  anything  else  but  the 
systematic  deduction  of  all  possible  absolutely  valid  values 
from  one  principle,  and  for  us  this  one  principle  is  now  founded 
on  the  deepest  rock  of  our  inner  world  —  on  the  will  to  have 
a  world  which  is  self-asserting. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


We  submit  to  the  things,  we  acknowledge  the  persons,  and 
we  believe  in  the  valuations  without  any  efforts  of  thought. 
We  feel  that  these  values  of  mere  existence  are  immediately 
given  with  the  postulate  of  a  real  world.  It  is  different  with 
the  connections  which  hold  together  the  experiences.  More- 
over, our  world  of  the  connected  things,  persons,  and  valua- 
tions is  endlessly  larger  than  the  mere  circle  of  impressions, 
suggestions,  and  decisions  which  we  find  in  our  immediate 
experience.  We  transcend  this  circle  by  reflection  and  re- 
search, by  explanation  and  exploration  and  reasoning,  and 
thus  by  our  own  activity  we  reach  new  experiences.  One 
thing  leads  to  another,  the  present  to  the  past  and  the  future, 
the  given  to  the  calculated.  From  the  single  experience,  we 
thus  reach  a  connected  independent  reality  which  we  acknow- 
ledge in  the  same  way  as  the  mere  existence.  But  indeed,  it 
is  not  given  any  more  immediately;  it  must  be  discovered. 
The  exploration  of  the  connections  is  thus  a  purposive  con- 
scious effort,  which  is  slowly  performed  in  the  historical  life 
and  is  never  completed ;  it  is  the  task  of  science. 

When  I  say :  "  It  rains,''  I  want  to  express  that  I  affirm  the 
independent  existence  of  the  present  rain.  But  when  I  say : 
"It  has  rained,  because  the  street  is  wet,''  I  transcend  the 
affirmation  of  the  perceived  wetness.  I  assert  on  the  basis  of 
reflection  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  wetness  and 
the  not-perceived  rain.  This  connection  has  for  me  as  much 
existence  as  the  perceived  object  itself.  As  soon  as  I  have 
discriminated  what  there  is  really  existing  in  my  experience 
and  what  there  is  not,  and  as  soon  as  I  have  found  all  the  real 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


117 


connections  in  which  the  experience  stands,  I  have  found 
everything  which  can  be  possible  material  of  my  knowledge. 
We  have  only  to  convince  ourselves  now  that  such  connec- 
tions also  are  not  merely  personal  acts  of  thought,  but  have 
the  over-personal  reality  value.  We  must  ascribe  such  abso- 
lute value  to  the  connections,  if  we  can  show  that  in  the  con- 
nections too  the  experience  is  maintained  as  self -identical. 
Indeed,  this  will  be  the  goal  of  our  demonstration.  We  shall 
recognize  that  to  find  connections  always  ultimately  means 
to  follow  out  the  postulate  of  self-assertion  of  the  things,  of 
the  persons,  and  of  the  valuations.  Effort  is  needed  to  dis- 
cover such  further  identities.  The  will  to  maintain  the  given 
must  overcome  hindrances  here,  and  cannot  be  simply  satis- 
fied with  the  postulate  only,  as  is  the  case  of  mere  existence  ; 
but  here,  too,  it  is  the  fulfilment  of  this  will  for  identity  which 
gives  the  complete  satisfaction,  and  which  thus  gives  to  the 
relation  between  the  given  and  the  recurrent  that  independ- 
ent value  which  we  call  the  value  of  connection. 

If  all  connection  is  based  on  identity,  things  can  hang  to- 
gether only  with  things,  persons  with  persons,  valuations  with 
valuations.  In  this  way  we  find  the  three  large  fields  in  which 
independent  values  of  connection  demand  our  acknowledg- 
ment. The  connection  of  things  is  expressed  in  the  relations 
of  cause  and  effect.  Their  system  is  the  system  of  nature, 
their  ideal  is  the  conception  of  natural  processes  as  a  complete 
identity  of  all  given  things  in  every  possible  new  experience. 
This  ideal  is  aimed  at  by  the  natural  sciences.  The  natural 
scientist  thus  seeks  fundamentally  the  same  thing  which  the 
simple  assertion  of  existence  tries  to  reach,  namely,  the  de- 
tachment and  declaration  of  independence  of  the  thing.  But 
for  the  mere  assertion  of  existence,  it  was  sufficient  to  show 
that  our  thing  occurs  also  in  the  experience  of  other  subjects ; 
for  the  connections  which  natural  science  seeks,  it  must  fur- 
ther be  demanded  that  the  thing  never  ceases  to  be  real  object. 
The  totality  of  the  present  things  must  then  be  identical  with 


118 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


the  totality  of  the  past  and  with  the  totality  of  the  future. 
To  make  it  possible  to  conceive  the  world  accordingly,  every 
single  object  must  be  transformed  in  our  conceptions.  Na- 
ture is  accordingly  the  world  of  things  conceived  in  such  away 
that  it  can  be  thought  as  identical  with  itself  through  all  time. 
Nature  is  the  world  of  things  with  reference  to  their  identity. 

The  connection  of  persons  stands  under  entirely  different 
conditions.  With  nature  everything  results  from  the  char- 
acter  of  the  object ;  the  persons  enter  into  the  connection  as 
subjects.  The  naive  assertion  of  mere  existence  demands 
from  the  person  only  that  the  will  which  he  experienced  as 
an  attitude  towards  one  thing  must  be  able  to  direct  itself 
also  to  other  things.  If  the  idea  is  to  be  carried  further,  we 
must  here  also  maintain  the  given  will  with  the  demand  that 
it  may  be  found  identical  in  other  subjects.  Only  as  far  as 
the  old  will  can  be  found  again  in  a  new  will  can  we  find 
real  connection  between  the  persons.  The  assertion  of  this 
connection  of  the  subjects  is  the  science  of  history.  The 
world  of  history  is  the  world  of  the  subjects  of  will  under 
the  point  of  view  of  identity.  The  ideal  is  that  every  ex- 
perience of  will  is  conceived  in  its  identity  with  the  will  of 
other  subjects.  Again  only  in  this  identity  lies  the  reality  of 
the  historical  connection. 

The  valuations,  too,  hang  together.  Historical  acts  are  the 
acts  of  individuals  which  as  such  are  free,  and  consequently 
one  act  of  the  historical  personality  does  not  bind  any  other 
act.  If  they  were  to  bind  each  other,  they  would  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  free  decision  of  the  personality  and  therefore 
over-personal.  Such  over-personal  relations  we  find  in  the 
valuations.  The  relations  of  identity  between  these  valuations 
are  therefore  also  independent  of  the  particular  beings,  and 
the  recurrence  of  the  one  valuation  in  the  other  again  must 
give  an  absolutely  valuable  connection.  It  is  a  connection  of 
teleological  character.  The  system  of  reason  is  this  world  of 
valuations  under  the  aspect  of  identity.   Its  ideal  is  the  de- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


119 


duction  of  all  logical,  aesthetic,  ethical,  and  metaphysical  valu- 
ations as  purposively  identical  with  one  fundamental  will, 
the  absoluteness  of  which  is  not  accessible  to  any  doubt. 

The  judgments  in  which  the  results  of  such  connecting  labor 
are  communicated  are  the  truths.  We  have  therefore  causal, 
historical,  normative  truths.  They  form  the  real  sciences, 
and  presuppose  the  judgments  of  existence  with  reference 
to  the  things,  persons,  and  valuations.  The  scientific  value 
lies  accordingly  in  the  transformation  of  the  given  in  the 
interest  of  a  system  of  identities,  and  that  means  in  the 
interest  of  maintaining  a  self -asserting  world.  As  a  matter 
of  course  the  complete  system  of  nature,  history,  and  reason 
is  an  unattainable  ideal  for  the  individual,  as  the  manifold- 
ness  of  things,  persons,  and  valuations  is  unlimited,  and  as 
the  experiences  into  which  they  may  enter  as  identities  lie 
before  us  unlimited,  too.  The  connection  of  the  total  world, 
therefore,  cannot  be  reached  by  any  thinking  and  investiga- 
tion, but  it  is  constantly  presupposed  because  the  postulate 
of  this  connection  alone  makes  the  world  itself  possible. 
Something  which  is  absolutely  isolated  cannot  enter  into  the 
world  of  our  knowledge  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  the  real  sci- 
ence has  not  at  all  a  vague,  unlimited  task.  There  lie  before  it 
always  new,  but  always  definite  concrete  problems  as  the 
investigation  is  constantly  guided  by  the  real  experience. 
Given  motives  must  induce  us  to  seek  the  identities  just  for  a 
concrete  section  of  the  postulated  world,  a  section  which  is 
determined  by  our  own  definite  experiences.  Every  experi- 
ence which  interests  us  and  which  does  not  completely  hang 
together  with  the  given,  and  which  is  therefore  not  completely 
understood,  is  like  an  equation  in  which  the  unknown  quan- 
tity is  to  be  found,  but  it  is  experience  which  must  propose 
the  equations.  The  situation  for  which  we  seek  the  unknown 
identity  must  be  suggested  by  our  own  next  purposes  and 
ends. 

The  transition  from  the  given  to  the  identical  and  new 


120 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


realization  is  indeed  the  only  factor  which  is  common  to  all 
scientific  inquiries,  however  often  just  this  essential  factor 
may  seem  hidden.  If  we  seek  the  effect  of  a  cause,  at  first  we 
seem  to  connect  two  entirely  unlike  things.  Yet  the  connec- 
tion has  the  value  of  truth  only  because  through  it  cause  and 
effect  can  be  conceived  as  parts  of  two  whole  situations  of  a 
system  of  things  which  is  identical  with  itself.  The  over- 
personal  satisfaction  in  this  transition  is  again  based  upon 
the  fulfilment  of  the  absolute  demand  to  conceive  the  given 
as  independent  of  our  experience  and  as  asserting  itself  and 
lasting.  That  which  gives  these  satisfactions  is  always  the 
connection  itself  between  the  two  phases  of  the  identical  part 
of  the  system ;  it  may  be  the  system  of  nature,  or  of  history, 
or  of  reason. 

The  value  of  existence  had  for  us  absolute  character,  but 
that  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  question  whether 
the  existing  thing  or  person  was  valuable  also  in  any  other 
direction,  perhaps  ethically  or  aesthetically.  In  the  same  way 
the  connections  of  science  are  valuable  in  themselves  with- 
out reference  to  the  further  question  whether  the  relation 
which  we  find  represents,  for  instance,  a  progress  or  a  regress. 
It  is  not  the  connected  parts  that  are  valuable,  but  the  valu- 
able thing  is  that  the  parts  are  connected,  that  every  isola- 
tion is  eliminated,  that  we  have  before  us  a  world  in' which 
everything  is  determinable  by  other  things,  and  in  which, 
therefore,  order  and  connection  control  the  system  in  an  abso- 
lutely valid  way.  That  is  after  all  the  last  word  concerning  all 
knowledge.  These  values  of  connection,  painstakingly  elabo- 
rated and  never  complete,  arise  from  our  desire  for  identity. 
And  everything  which  satisfies  this  desire  has  not  personal 
but  absolute  value,  because  the  striving  for  identity  results 
from  the  absolutely  necessary  postulate  that  our  experience 
stands  for  a  world.   The  absolute  validity  of  everything  which 
satisfies  this,  our  demand  for  the  self-assertion  of  the  world, 
is  consequently  the  necessary  presupposition  for  all  possible 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


121 


knowledge  of  connections  in  the  world  of  nature,  of  history, 
and  of  reason.  Our  task  now  is  to  illuminate  the  characteris- 
tic traits  of  these  three  realms.  We  have  to  study  the  special 
conditions  to  understand  how  in  every  particular  case  the 
given  must  be  transformed  to  solve  the  problems  of  natural 
science,  of  historical  science,  and  of  normative  science.  But 
this  we  know  now:  every  transformation  that  serves  the 
purpose  of  connecting  and  that  means  the  apprehension  of 
identities  is  for  us  scientifically  valuable  and  its  affirmation 
is  truth.  The  world  which  is  transformed  in  our  conceptions 
in  such  a  way  is  therefore  the  only  world  which  from  the 
standpoint  of  scientific  knowledge  can  be  called  real.  In 
this  sense  the  given  world  of  experience,  as  it  is  given,  is 
nothing  but  an  illusion,  and  only  science  grasps  the  absolute 
reality  of  the  things,  of  the  persons,  and  of  the  values. 

A.  —  NATURE 

Nature  is  for  us  the  totality  of  the  existing  things  in  their 
connection,  in  their  order,  in  their  self-assertion.  Only  those 
things  which  have  real  existence  enter  into  nature,  not  those 
to  which  we  deny  the  value  of  existence  because  they  are  ob- 
ject for  one  single  experience  only.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
things  alone  enter  into  nature,  not  the  persons,  the  subjects 
of  will  who  take  their  attitude  towards  the  things.  And  finally, 
the  things  enter  into  nature  only  as  far  as  they  are  connected. 
Nothing  which  is  isolated  can  be  a  part  of  nature.  This  alone 
is  that  nature  the  secrets  of  which  the  natural  sciences  try 

to  explore. 

When  we  examined  the  meaning  of  the  conception  of  value, 
we  began  with  the  statement  that  there  cannot  be  any  values 
in  the  system  of  nature.  It  might  appear  as  if  we  want  to 
withdraw  that  assertion,  inasmuch  as  we  now  ask  for  the 
value  of  nature.  Yet  there  is  no  contradiction.  In  the  sys- 
tem of  natural  objects  as  such  there  can  indeed  be  no  value. 
Every  valuation,  we  asserted,  demands  the  attitude  of  a  sub- 


122 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


ject,  and  subjects  have  no  place  in  nature,  where  everything 
is  conceived  as  object  for  a  passive  spectator.  In  nature  man 
is  conceived  as  an  organic  being,  and  the  processes  in  such 
a  man  are  again  parts  of  nature,  but  not  real  attitudes.    If 
reality  were  nothing  but  the  sum  of  natural  objects,  there 
could  not  be  any  values  at  all.   But  here  our  question  is  an 
entirely  different  one.  We  ask  here  for  the  values  which  can 
be  found  when  the  objects  of  nature  are  conceived  in  relation 
to  the  judging  scientist.  Nature  is  now  only  a  part  of  a  much 
richer  system,  a  system  constituted  from  nature  plus  natu- 
ralist, and  in  this  wider  system  values  surely  can  exist.   The 
naturalist  takes  real  attitudes,  and  we  all  are  such  naturalists 
whenever  we  observe  nature  and  expect  its  processes.   We 
the  observers  and  calculators  then  stand  outside  of  nature. 
The  most  immediate  value  of  such  objects  of  the  naturalist 
was  that  of  existence.  We  now  have  to  study  the  more  com- 
plex value  which  results  from  the  self-assertion  of  things 
through  all  times.   It  is  the  value  of  connection. 

The  ultimate  purpose  of  natural  science  has  often  been 
distorted.  The  scientist  himself  is  too  easily  inclined  to  think 
that  his  real  aim  is  not  the  exploration  of  the  concrete  na- 
ture, but  the  discovery  of  the  general  laws  which  control  it 
and  the  general  conceptions  under  which  we  must  think  it. 
Philosophers  have  recently  supported  this  interest  in  the  law 
by  acknowledging  two  different  kinds  of  knowledge  of  nature. 
They  claim  that  it  is  the  task  of  history  to  report  to  us  what 
happened  once  in  the  development  of  the  universe,  while  to 
overcome  this  manifoldness  of  facts  by  bringing  them  together 
under  laws  and  conceptions  is  indeed  to  be  recognized  as 
the  only  purpose  of  natural  science.   The  leading  thought, 
namely,  that  a  separation  between  natural  science  and  his- 
tory is  necessary,  ought  to  be  maintained.   We  must  indeed 
understand  that  natural  science  cannot  express  the  total 
reality,  and  can  never  do  justice  to  the  real  life.   We  must 
maintain  that  our  true  personality,  with  its  rights  and  duties 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


123 


and  morality  and  truth  and  beauty,  can  never  be  understood 
from  the  view  of  the  natural  scientist.  This  philosophical 
movement  which  emphasizes  the  difference  between  natural 
science  and  history  was  therefore  the  justified  reaction  against 
the  immodesty  of  a  triumphing  natural  science.  Too  long 
an  unphilosophical  age  fancied  that  natural  science  is  the 
only  true  way  to  knowledge.  Psychologists  and  sociologists 
followed  with  eagerness.  The  whole  inner  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  of  society  became  object  of  explanation  and  de- 
scription after  the  naturalistic  methods ;  the  duties  and  ideals 
of  mankind  became  the  necessary  effects  of  psycho-physical 
causes,  and  nothing  seemed  to  remain  in  reality  about  which 
physics  and  psychology  did  not  have  to  speak  the  last  word. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  such  short-sightedness  demanded  a 
counter-movement. 

That  does  not  mean,  however,  that  theonly  way  to  overcome 
the  modem  naturalism  must  be  the  discrimination  between  a 
science  of  general  laws  and  a  science  of  single  facts.  If  we 
start  with  the  presupposition  that  every  experience  must  be 
of  the  object  type,  then  we  must  seek  the  differentiating 
principles  of  the  different  sciences  in  the  method  of  treatment. 
Under  these  conditions  it  is  indeed  convenient  to  say  that  we 
treat  reality  at  one  time  under  the  point  of  view  of  the  general 
occurrences  and  call  it  natural  science,  and  at  another  time 
imder  the  point  of  view  of  the  single  facts  in  their  uniqueness 
and  call  it  history.  But  we  have  declined  from  the  start  such 
a  presupposition ;  we  have  seen  that  our  will  and  the  will  of 
others  are  given  to  us  in  an  entirely  different  way  from  the 
world  of  things.  The  original  material  of  reality  is  of  two 
kinds.  We  have  from  the  beginning  the  material  which  is  of 
the  thing  type  and  the  material  which  is  of  the  will  type.  If 
this  separation  is  acknowledged  and  that  of  the  thing  type 
is  recognized  as  the  material  of  natural  science,  we  at  once 
reserve  for  another  kind  of  science  a  large  special  field ;  then 
we  have  that  which  is  of  the  will  type  as  material  of  history. 


124 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


Thus  we  do  not  need  any  separation  by  method  in  order  to 
gain  a  new  field  of  knowledge  besides  the  natural  science,  in- 
asmuch as  the  twoness  is  given  by  the  contents  themselves. 
History  has  not  to  deal  with  the  things  at  all,  but  with  the 
will.  On  the  other  hand,  the  natural  science  of  the  world  of 
things  has  to  deal  with  the  single  facts  as  well  as  with  the 
general  ones,  has  to  describe  the  unique  development  of  the 
totality  as  well  as  the  general  laws  which  control  it. 

Indeed,  we  are  too  much  accustomed  to  consider  the  gen- 
eral in  the  natural  sciences  as  the  most  important  part  and 
the  law  as  the  ideal  of  scientific  inquiry.  This  habit  has 
practical  social  reasons,  not  logical  significance.  The  real 
goal  of  natural  science  remains  the  one  unique  nature  con- 
ceived in  its  connection.  Thus  the  real  material  is  that  which 
is  unique,  which  has  happened  once,  and  it  is  only  to  be  illumi- 
nated by  the  general  law.  The  totality  of  naturalistic  judg- 
ments represents  nature  in  its  unique  givenness.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  only  world  of  things  to  which  all  our  knowledge 
can  be  referred  must  really  have  all  those  characteristics 
which  the  general  conceptions  and  the  laws  project  into  them. 
The  laws  and  conceptions  are  artificial  abstractions,  but  if 
those  abstractions  are  demanded  by  the  purposes  of  our  search 
for  a  connected  world,  that  is,  if  those  conceptions  and  laws 
are  true,  they  are  the  expression  of  the  only  reality,  beside 
which  no  other  reality  can  be  conceived.  If  chemistry  de- 
mands that  I  conceive  a  certain  substance  as  a  combination  of 
atoms,  this  substance  is  really  composed  of  those  atoms  as 
far  as  it  is  part  of  the  only  nature  which  is  object  of  knowledge. 
The  naturalist  is  entirely  within  his  rights  there.  It  is  wrong 
to  say  in  opposition  that  the  atoms  are  nothing  but  a  product 
of  abstraction,  and  that  they  do  not  really  belong  to  nature, 
as  they  are  only  conceived  by  thought  to  calculate  certain 
regular  occurrences.  Yes,  such  abstract  conceptions  are  pro- 
jected into  nature  by  thought,  but  the  nature  which  is  recon- 
structed through  thought  is  the  only  real  nature,  the  only 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


125 


nature  which  can  be  object  of  knowledge.  The  general  con- 
ception and  the  law  are  not  the  goal  of  the  naturalist,  but 
only  his  tool.  The  goal  is  the  recognition  of  the  one  process 
of  nature  in  its  connection. 

The  general  conception  of  the  naturalist  is  as  secondary 
there  as  the  words  of  language.  It  has  been  claimed  that 
Raphael  would  have  become  a  great  painter,  even  if  he  had 
been  born  without  hands.  In  the  same  way  surely  Newton 
and  Lavoisier  and  Helmholtz  would  have  been  great  scien- 
tists, if  they  had  been  born  without  an  organ  for  general  con- 
ceptions and  for  causal  laws.  The  great  naturalist  has  to 
imagine  the  process  of  nature  in  new  connections,  has  to 
bring  the  temporally  separated  content  of  nature  into  such 
relations  that  the  one  can  be  conceived  by  the  identical  con- 
tinuation of  the  other.  Whether  this  newly  connected  pair 
exists  once,  or  has  shown  similar  connections  a  million  times, 
makes  no  decisive  difference.  The  astronomical  or  the  zoo- 
logical or  the  pathological  discovery  is  completed  and  may 
be  epoch-making  when  the  connection  through  identical 
continuity  can  be  demonstrated  in  a  single  case,  and  it  makes 
no  difference  that  this  cosmical  event  of  the  astronomer  may 
never  again  repeat  itself  in  our  experience,  while  the  biological 
may  come  back  sometimes  and  the  clinical  very  often.  Even 
if  the  physicist  formulates  a  general  theory,  he  only  demands 
that  it  shall  be  demonstrated  on  the  individual  case.  There  is 
the  goal  of  all  theoretical  thought.  We  may  go  further,  and 
may  even  claim  that  the  laws  themselves  mean  more  than 
merely  a  general  statement,  but  that  they,  too,  get  their  true 
meaning  in  silently  reporting  a  piece  of  concrete  reality  in  its 
existence  as  part  of  our  one  unique  world-experience.  Chem- 
ical laws  concerning  the  acids  or  pathological  laws  concerning 
sexual  propagation  would  be  valueless  and  entirely  meaning- 
less, if  they  did  not  intend  to  describe  at  the  same  time  that 
acids  and  sexual  organisms  really  exist  in  this  one  world  of 
our  experience. 


126 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


The  usual  confusion  concerning  the  true  task  of  the  natural- 
ist and  the  central  importance  of  the  general  law  becomes 
worse  through  the  conception  of  causality.  What  is  involved 
in  this  idea?  The  assertion  of  causality  may  on  the  one  side 
posit  only  the  general  fact  that  every  process  in  the  world  has 
a  cause,  but  that  is  evidently  not  a  naturalistic  discovery. 
It  is  a  postulate  which  precedes  all  naturalistic  thinking.  We 
are  to  look  on  nature  in  such  a  way  that  we  consider  every 
process  with  reference  to  the  preceding  ones.    The  general 
character  of  this  postulate  does  not  say  anything  as  to  the 
general  character  of  the  causal  connections  which  we  find. 
The  fact  of  causal  connection  may  hold  absolutely  without 
exception,  and  yet  no  particular  connection  may  be  fit  for 
any  generalization  in  our  given  world.  The  assertion  of  cau- 
saHty  may  mean,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  same  causes 
bring  always  the  same  effects,  and  that  therefore  whenever 
the  same  conditions  are  given,  the  same  connections  must 
arise.  It  seems  as  if  this  second  postulate  secures  to  every 
possible  naturalistic  observation  an  absolute  general  character, 
and  that  accordingly  natural  science  indeed  means  the  know' 
ledge  of  the  general  only  and  not  of  the  particular. 

But  if  we  inquire  somewhat  more  carefully,  we  find  that 
the  situation  is  very  different.  The  only  presupposition  which 
we  have  made  there,  namely  that  the  same  conditions  are 
given  again,  is  evidently  never  to  be  fulfilled  with  theoretical 
perfection.  Who  is  to  decide  where  the  limits  of  the  condi- 
tions  lie?  The  little  ball  which  I  let  fall  to  the  ground  can 
never  again  in  the  world  of  experience  fall  down  under  exactly 
the  same  totality  of  conditions.  The  conditions  in  my  labora- 
tory  room  may  perhaps  be  repeated  once  more,  but  at  first 
I  cannot  know  whether  it  is  not  decisive  that  the  next  time 
the  wind  outside  my  room  blows  somewhat  differently  or  that 
the  moon  has  changed  its  place.  All  the  conditions  of  the 
process  can  never  return.  Even  if  theoretically  all  the  atoms 
of  the  universe  arranged  themselves  once  more  in  exactly  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


127 


same  position,  the  series  of  the  preceding  conditions  would  be 
changed  after  all,  inasmuch  as  the  same  world-process  had 
existed  once  before  in  the  chain  of  preceding  causes.  Every 
assertion  that  an  observed  or  conceived  connection  will  repeat 
itself  presupposes  that  the  important  and  decisive  conditions 
are  selected  from  the  totality  of  the  real  processes  before 
a  generalization  becomes  possible.  The  general  character  is 
then  theoretically  removed.  We  observe  a  certain  connection 
and  demand  that  it  always  repeat  itself,  but  we  can  never 
say  with  certainty  whether  the  conditions  for  its  repetition 
are  given  or  not. 

Of  course,  for  practical  purposes,  we  may  be  able  to  limit 
the  conditions  with  sufficient  probability,  and  thus  may  know 
where  we  can  expect  the  same  effects  from  a  similar  situation. 
Our  daily  life  with  its  practical  use  of  things  is  dependent  on 
that  scheme,  but  in  such  a  case  it  is  indeed  only  a  practical 
generalization  of  that  which  we  might  expect,  not  a  theoreti- 
cal law  without  possible  exception.  The  natural  sciences  cer- 
tainly do  habitually  formulate  the  justified  expectations  on 
the  basis  of  frequent  observations,  and  can  state  in  such  a  way 
the  observed  connections  with  a  certain  degree  of  confidence. 
We  contend  only  that  such  generalizations  give  us  truths  of  a 
special  kind,  laws  which  include  the  absoluteness  of  the  valid- 
ity, and  that  such  absolute  laws  constitute  the  real  content 
of  natural  sciences.  Such  absolute  laws  are  impossible  because 
the  conditions  of  the  observed  processes  are  always  varying. 
What  remain  are  practically  rules  for  expectations  which 
facilitate  our  labor,  and  which  theoretically  point  towards 
the  real  single  connections.  The  understanding  of  these  single 
connections  in  our  given  nature  is  the  true  task  of  science. 
And  the  only  thing  which  leads  towards  it  is  the  finding  of 
identities.  The  mere  law  can  never  guarantee  such  an  under- 
standing. As  soon  as  we  have  acknowledged  a  causal  law  as 
valid  and  have  understood  a  special  case  as  exactly  falling 
under  this  law,  the  particular  case  is  of  course  imderstood 


128 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


by  the  law,  but  only  in  the  sense  of  logical  pertinence.  A  real 
understanding  of  the  particular  case  would  be  given  to  us 
only  if  the  general  law  under  which  it  falls  should  itself  be 
understood  in  its  concrete  connection.  Yet  just  that  is  not  in 
question  at  all,  for  those  laws  are  nothing  but  generalizations 
of  observed  sequences  of  processes. 

For  some  people,  to  be  sure,  the  conception  of  causality 
has  a  kind  of  mystical  power  to  bring  together  the  separated 
facts  in  such  a  way  that  the  connection  itself  becomes  under- 
stood. Some  think  of  the  immediate  effect  which  our  will 
has  on  the  organs  of  our  body,  others  are  satisfied  with  the 
idea  that  the  causality  is  a  thought-form  of  our  understand- 
ing, without  which  we  cannot  apperceive  at  all  the  suc- 
ceeding things,  and  which  is  therefore  fundamental  for  every 
possible  experience.  But  such  theories  are  based  on  illusions. 
The  will  conceived  as  an  object  is  in  its  effects  exactly  as 
little  understood  as  any  other  content  of  nature.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  will  is  meant  in  its  subjective  reality,  its  internal 
influence  can  be  felt  and  understood,  but  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  causal  connection  of  things,  and  accordingly  can 
never  be  a  model  for  the  explanation  of  nature.  Even  the 
reference  to  causality  as  thought-form  of  our  understanding 
cannot  help  us  at  all.  If  such  a  form  were  to  be  more  than  a 
mere  apperception  of  time  succession,  the  form  itself  would 
have  to  choose  which  effect  belongs  with  which  cause.  Just 
that,  however,  is  possible  to  our  understanding  only  in  one 
single  case,  namely,  in  the  case  when  the  second  experience 
can  be  conceived  as  identical  conservation  of  the  first.  The 
imagined  thought-form  of  causality  must  therefore  be  re- 
duced to  the  real  thought-form  of  identity. 

Now  we  stand  before  our  goal.  Causal  laws  which  are 
merely  generalizations  of  observed  regularities  have  not  the 
power  to  give  an  understanding  of  nature,  and  are  in  no  way 
end-points  of  natural  science.  They  have  their  scientific  im- 
portance exclusively  as  preparation  for  the  only  real  know- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


129 


ledge  of  nature,  namely,  the  recognition  of  identities.  Causal 
laws  are  for  the  scientist  what  the  rules  of  application  are  for 
the  layman,  helpful  formulations  which  quickly  and  simply 
point  to  the  essential  factors.  The  real  purpose  is  the  apper- 
ception of  the  world  of  things  as  self-asserting,  as  identical. 
In  the  chaotic  change  of  experiences  we  have  to  connect  the 
given  with  the  identical  in  the  new  experience.  The  nearer 
the  so-called  law  approaches  the  holding  of  the  identical,  the 
nearer  it  will  approach  the  character  of  absoluteness.  Where 
mathematical  physics  formulates  laws  which  are  no  longer 
generalizations  of  observations  at  all,  but  simply  expressions 
of  identities,  there  the  causal  laws  become  real  means  of  ex- 
planation. 

The  ideal  of  natural  science  is  not  a  system  of  laws  but  a 
system  of  things,  the  self-assertion  of  which  throughout  time 
brings  with  it  all  the  perceivable  changes  in  the  outer  world. 
Every  given  status  of  the  world  can  then  be  completely  ex- 
plained, but  is  really  explained  only  if  all  its  differences  from 
the  preceding  status  of  the  world  can  be  understood  through 
the  perseverance  of  all  parts  of  the  world.  Everything  which 
brings  us  nearer  to  this  ideal  is  scientifically  true.  To  reach 
this  ideal  it  is  of  course  necessary  to  substitute  for  the  per- 
ceived things  others  which  are  serviceable  for  the  task.   If 
these  substituted  parts  fulfil  their  purpose,  they  have  scien- 
tific reality.  The  original  perception  in  that  case  has  not  shown 
us  the  scientifically  real  things,  and  in  the  place  of  the  mere 
appearance  we  find  the  true  object,  which  is  perhaps  accessi- 
ble  only  to  conceptions. 

We  easily  see  in  what  direction  this  remodelling  must 
move,  a  remodelling  which  from  another  point  of  view  is 
the  discovery  of  the  naturalistic  reality.  We  recognized  the 
value  of  existence  of  things  in  the  fact  that  the  experienced 
object  can  be  conceived  as  object  for  every  possible  subject, 
and  we  therefore  demanded  that  the  existing  thing  must  be 
detached  from  the  chance  standpoint  of  the  individual.  This 


130 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


intellectual  movement  must  be  carried  through  to  its  ulti- 
mate point  by  the  natural  sciences,  if  the  world  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  identical  with  itself  through  every  possible  experi- 
ence.   Everything  must  be  removed  which  belongs  to  the 
space-time  perspective  of  the  chance  personality,  and  every- 
thing must  be  eliminated  which  presupposes  a  relation  of  the 
thing  to  the  individual  organism  and  its  senses;  that  ulti- 
mately means  nothing  else  but  that  all  sense-features,  all 
qualities,  must  be  excluded.  Therefore  the  things  have  only 
the  quantitative  relations  of  space,  time,  and  masses.  In  this 
quantitative  determination  the  ideal  is  reached  of  absolutely 
detaching  the  thing  from  the  individual.    It  is  thought  en- 
tirely in  over-individual  terms,  as  those  quantities  belong  to 
a  system  the  relations  of  which  can  never  be  perceivable  to 
an  individual ;  it  is  an  abstract  construction  made  with  refer- 
ence to  all  the  other  subjects.  The  objective  space-time  form 
is  the  absolutely  over-personal  field  of  relations  for  the  things 
in  nature.  As  soon  as  things  are  expressed  in  measurable  terms 
in  counting  units  of  space,  of  time,  and,  deduced  from  them, 
of  mass,  they  are  absolutely  free  from  that  individual  deter- 
mination in  which  they  stand  in  experience.    Without  any 
change,  therefore,  they  can  again  enter  into  the  calculation, 
as  they  can  now  remain  identical  with  themselves  through 
a  limitless  past  and  future.  The  history  of  science  is  indeed 
an  unending  endeavor  to  eliminate  all  qualitative  features 
from  nature  and  to  replace  them  by  quantities,  until  every 
luminous,  sounding,  warming,  and  odorous  thing  is  trans- 
formed into  the  movements  of  smallest  particles  which  can 
be  determined  only  conceptionally. 

The  efforts  of  description  and  explanation  cooperate 
towards  this  end.  The  description  gives  us  the  elements  of 
the  thing,  the  explanation  connects  the  thing  with  preceding 
and  following  things.  But  the  only  connection  which  we  seek 
by  principle  is  that  of  identity.  Hence  if  we  want  to  explain, 
we  must  conceive  the  primary  things  in  such  a  way  that  their 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


131 


elements  can  enter  identically  into  the  final  positions.  The 
elements  which  in  this  way  are  put  at  the  service  of  explana- 
tion in  the  place  of  the  things  are  thus  elements  which  the 
description  enumerates.  If  we  describe  water  by  saying  that 
it  consists  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen,  we  mean  by  it  that  under 
certain  conditions  water  produces  effects  which  can  be  un- 
derstood only  if  we  think  those  two  elements  put  in  the  place 
of  the  whole.  Then  alone  we  can  understand  the  facts  as  the 
perseverance  of  those  substances  which  existed  at  the  begin- 
ning. All  progress  in  the  explanation  of  the  world  is  there- 
fore at  the  same  time  a  progress  in  the  description,  and  vice 
versa.  It  is  an  illusion  to  believe  that  there  can  exist  descrip- 
tions which  are  independent  from  the  seeking  of  explanation, 
and  that  means  from  the  understanding  of  the  identities. 

Accordingly  natural  science  tries  to  replace  the  thing  by 
those  elements  which  persevere  in  the  succeeding  experiences, 
and  to  think  these  elements  themselves  ultimately  as  ob- 
jects with  qualities  determinable  strictly  by  over-individual 
relations.  Nevertheless,  there  still  remain  insuperable  diffi- 
culties when  we  try  to  understand  the  natural  process  by 
mere  identical  perseverance  of  the  smallest  particles  and 
their  movements.  Science  therefore  goes  still  further  and 
tries  to  introduce  the  deviations  from  this  conservation  of 
movement  into  the  calculation.  They  are  brought  back  to 
conditions  which  can  be  conceived  as  identically  persevering. 
For  this  purpose  natural  science  introduces  the  conception 
of  force,  a  quality  which  belongs  to  the  thing  only  with 
reference  to  other  things,  and  which  accelerates  or  retards 
its  movements.  As  by  such  forces  everything  can  stand  in 
relation  to  an  unlimited  number  of  other  things,  it  becomes 
possible  to  deduce  every  movement  or  every  rest  from  the 
interplay  of  the  forces,  and  yet  to  conceive  all  the  old  forces 
as  identically  remaining  in  every  change.  The  ideal  task  of 
science  is  hereby  characterized.  It  would  be  perfectly  ful- 
filled, if  the  totality  of  the  processes  of  nature  from  the  given 


132 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


present  status  of  the  world  backward  and  forward  could  be 
followed  up  and  yet  always  conceived  as  an  identical  sys- 
tem of  things  which  persevered  with  their  substances  and 
their  energies.  It  would  be  a  fulfilment  of  the  ideal  task  of 
natural  sciences,  and  yet  all  that  would  not  contain  any 
reference  to  laws. 

The  solution  of  this  task  is  practically,  of  course,  impos- 
sible. The  endless  manifoldness  of  things  makes  it  incon- 
ceivable that  the  scientist  can  pursue  every  ether  atom  of  the 
universe  in  its  identity  through  all  the  cosmical  periods  in 
its  curve.  Probably  all  that  science  can  do  to  come  as  near 
as  possible  to  the  solution  is  to  create  tools  by  which  with 
the  least  effort  every  particular  situation  can  be  subordi- 
nated to  the  point  of  view  of  identity.  Ways  and  means  must 
be  secured  by  which  a  given  group  of  things  can  quickly  and 
simply  be  re-thought  in  such  a  way  that  they  may  be  con- 
ceived as  identical  with  the  preceding  and  succeeding  expe- 
riences. Rules  for  the  abstract  remodelling  must  be  devel- 
oped in  which  the  whole  previous  observations  of  science  are 
condensed  in  order  that  every  one  may  profit  from  the  his- 
torical knowledge.  Here  belong,  first  of  all,  the  classifications 
and  general  conceptions  based  on  the  similarities  and  dif- 
ferences, here  belong  the  descriptions  of  the  elements,  and 
here  also  belong  the  causal  laws. 

The  laws  themselves  usually  do  not  express  any  identity, 
but  they  connect  two  processes  which  are  of  decisive  impor- 
tance for  the  identity  of  two  total  situations.  The  causal  law 
selects  from  two  groups  of  succeeding  processes  the  cause  and 
the  effect.  That  does  not  indicate  that  the  relation  of  this 
effect  with  that  cause  becomes  intelligible.  It  means  rather 
that  the  whole  group  in  which  the  cause  occurs  can  be  trans- 
formed by  identities  into  that  other  group  in  which  the  effect 
occurs.  The  emphasis  on  cause  and  effect  is  therefore  not  in 
itself  an  explanation  of  a  connection,  but  only  a  practical 
indication  of  two  total  situations,  of  which  the  one  includes 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


133 


the  cause  and  the  other  includes  the  effect.  The  identity  con- 
nects the  total  situations.   Just  as  in  the  economic  life  the 
money  in  itself  is  without  value  for  us  and  has  significance 
only  as  the  means  of  exchange  for  market  values,  the  natu- 
ralistic law  has  in  itself  no  connecting  value.  It  is  only  a  con- 
venient means  of  exchange  between  different  succeeding  sit- 
uations, which  find  their  real  connection  not  by  cause  and 
effects,  but  by  the  identities.   But  as  by  a  shifting  of  values 
the  money  finally  appears  valuable  and  to  the  miser  seems 
a  most  glorious  possession,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  cannot 
satisfy  by  it  any  one  of  his  true  needs,  to  the  naturalist,  too, 
the  causal  law  itself  appears  valuable  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
it  does  not  satisfy  any  real  need  of  explanation.  The  law  al- 
ways turns  our  attention  to  that  which  belongs  together,  and 
without  class  conceptions  and  causal  laws  we  should  stand 
hopeless  before  the  overwhelming  abundance  of  things.  Yet 
all  causal  laws  of  the  world  in  themselves  offer  not  the  least 
real  explanation  of  a  necessary  connection.    On  the  other 
hand,  as  soon  as  two  processes  are  connected  in  such  a  way 
that  the  second  is  understood  from  the  identical  continuation 
of  the  first,  everything  is  completely  understood  without  any 
laws  whatever.  All  the  really  great  advances  of  natural  sci- 
ence have  consisted  in  a  new  vision  of  perseverance.    Each 
such  new  insight  into  the  identities  has  then  demanded  a  re- 
modelling of  the  elements  of  the  things. 

However  far  or  near  we  may  be  to  the  ideal  of  such  natu- 
ralistic knowledge,  everywhere  an  absolutely  valid  value  is 
reached  where  science  succeeds  in  apprehending  the  changes 
in  the  universe  by  the  maintenance  of  the  given.  It  cannot 
be  otherwise  if  the  realization  of  a  content  in  a  new  ex- 
perience is  really  the  only  possible  source  of  pure  satisfaction. 
The  experienced  objects  seem  to  disappear  and  to  be  re- 
placed by  new  ones.  In  our  life  the  things  pass  by,  appear 
from  nothing,  disappear  into  nothing.  Natural  science  opens 
our  eyes  and  shows  us  that  if  we  only  look  into  the  depths 


134 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


of  nature,  the  things  which  seem  to  disappear  really  remain 
unchanged,  and  the  things  which  seem  to  originate  from 
nothing  really  always  existed  beforehand.  The  candle  bums 
down,  and  yet  the  chemist  shows  us  that  no  atom  of  it  is  lost. 
That  which  we  sought,  the  self-assertion  of  the  first  thing, 
has  then  been  found  in  the  form  of  the  second.  Our  will  is 
satisfied ;  complete  satisfaction  comes  to  us.  But  the  value 
does  not  then  belong  to  the  first  thing  or  to  the  second,  but 
exclusively  to  the  fact  that  the  first  can  be  refound  in  the 
second,  and  that  accordingly  a  real  connection  exists  between 
the  two. 

We  still  have  before  us  one  theoretically  important  ques- 
tion. If  it  is  the  task  of  all  natural  science  to  transform  the 
world  of  processes  into  identities,  then  where  is  the  place  of 
psychology?  It  is  a  science  which  analyzes  its  objects,  the 
psychical  contents,  into  elements,  describes  them,  classifies 
them,  arranges  them,  and  finally  explains  them,  in  its  method 
proceeding  decidedly  like  the  natural  sciences.  The  presup- 
positions and  rights  of  psychology  as  science  offer  very  diffi- 
cult problems,  which  have  recently  come  into  the  foreground 
of  theoretical  discussion ;  they  had  been  too  long  neglected. 
As  we  have  the  objects  of  psychology  in  our  inner  imme- 
diately accessible  experience,  it  seemed  too  long  permissible 
to  consider  the  psychological  work  as  an  activity  which  needs 
no  presuppositions.  Only  slowly  we  had  to  learn  that  the 
study  of  a  psychological  fact  already  involves  a  complex 
transformation  of  the  real  experience  and  is  full  of  presup- 
positions. For  our  special  circle  of  problems  one  of  these 
questions  is  of  a  special  significance.  The  natural  sciences 
explain  the  connections  by  the  identities.  How  is  it  possible 
that  psychical  connections  can  be  made  explainable,  inas- 
much as  the  psychical  as  such  can  never  retimi  identical  in 
a  second  experience?  Here  indeed  lies  the  nodal  point  of 
the  difficulties.  We  have  seen  that  in  our  real  experience  the 
objects  have  value  of  real  existence  only  in  so  far  as  they  are 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


135 


common  property,  and  that  is  what  we  call  the  physical  ob- 
jects. In  so  far  as  they  belong  to  the  individual  only,  for  in- 
stance, the  objects  of  imagination  have  no  real  existence.  The 
psychical  object  is  nothing  but  that  which  remains  as  residue 
as  soon  as  the  whole  reality  is  subtracted  from  the  totality 
of  the  experience.  Thus  the  psychical  object  can  never  be 
common  object  of  various  experiences  and  can  never  recur 
identical.  My  perception,  my  memory  idea,  my  imaginative 
idea,  my  expectation,  are  my  individual  property;  others 
may  agree  with  me,  but  then  they  have  only  corresponding 
ideas,  they  cannot  have  my  ideas  themselves.  We  all  have 
the  same  physical  moon,  but  each  of  us  has  his  own  psychical 
perception  of  the  moon.  And  even  if  I  returned  to  the  object 
of  my  previous  idea,  I  must  create  a  new  idea.  The  previous 
idea  has  gone  never  to  return.  An  immediate  connection  by 
identity  is  thus  by  principle  impossible  for  the  psychical 
contents. 

How,  then,  is  psychology  possible  at  all?  How  can  it  have 
meaning  to  ask  for  the  connection  of  objects  which  in  an 
absolute  sense  have  no  reality  ?  Those  psychical  objects  are 
given  only  in  their  relation  to  the  will  of  the  subject ;  they 
have  no  place  in  a  naturalistic  system.  They  would  belong 
only  to  a  historical  account  where  the  subject  has  its  real- 
ity just  as  subject,  and  where  the  psychical  objects  represent 
material  to  which  the  will  of  the  subject  refers.  But  it  is 
different  as  soon  as  the  true  subject  of  will  is  replaced  by  the 
perceivable  bodily  individual.  As  soon  as  the  other  man  is 
for  us  an  organism,  his  individual  contents  must  somehow 
be  in  his  body,  and  as  accompaniments  of  such  bodily  pro- 
cesses the  psychical  objects  get  their  own  relative  existence 
in  the  real  physical  world.  The  imaginative  ideas  of  my 
friend,  his  air  castles,  have  as  objects  of  his  personal  attitude 
their  reality  only  in  that  will-world  of  which  history  speaks, 
but  not  natural  science.  As  objects  of  perception  they  cannot 
claim  any  value  of  existence,  as  they  are  only  imaginative 


136 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


objects  and  thus  not  perceivable  for  any  one  else.  But  as 
soon  as  I  consider  my  friend  in  his  bodily  existence,  his  indi- 
vidual objects  must  somehow  be  contained  in  him.  The  psy- 
chologist carries  this  introjection  through  in  a  systematic 
way.  The  subject  of  will,  the  real  personality,  is  replaced  by 
the  individual  organism,  and  this  is  done  just  under  the  pres- 
sure of  the  demand  to  produce  a  connection  between  those 
individual  psychical  objects.  As  soon  as  such  introjection 
into  the  body  is  brought  about,  there  remains  no  difficulty 
when  we  try  to  reduce  the  psychical  series  also  to  necessary 
connections  which  are  ultimately  based  on  identities.  We 
cannot  do  it  directly,  but  can  at  least  indirectly  succeed.  If 
the  ideas  are  in  definite  dependence  upon  certain  bodily  pro- 
cesses in  the  brain,  the  necessary  connection  of  two  brain 
states  at  the  same  time  becomes  the  necessary  connection  of 
the  accompanying  conscious  contents.  Through  this  method 
modern  psychology  with  its  psycho-physical  parallelism  has 
become  a  true  causal  science. 

But  whether  we  explain  psychical  or  physical  stars  or 
dreams,  the  purpose  is  always  to  grasp  the  existing  things 
in  our  one  universe  as  persevering,  as  absolutely  self-asserting. 
That  involves  that  science  must  transform  everything  into 
one  single  connected  system.  But  as  it  anticipates  its  ideal 
goal  as  the  reality  which  ought  to  be  discovered,  science 
treats  its  work  as  if  it  were  merely  the  exploration  of  an  ex- 
isting system.  The  naturalist  who  feels  the  obligation  of  de- 
ciding nothing  by  his  own  caprice,  and  who  modestly  submits 
to  nature  and  its  eternal  laws,  may  possibly  ask  how  it  would 
be,  if  our  postulate  of  perseverance  could  not  be  realized. 
Could  it  not  be  that  nature  act  quite  differently,  that  the 
things  arise  and  disappear,  and  that  a  connection  by  self- 
assertion  really  would  not  offer  itself  ?  Have  we  naturalists  not 
to  subordinate  ourselves  to  it,  then,  and  is  not  natural  science 
endlessly  far  from  such  a  postulated  goal  ?  Whoever  argues 
in  such  a  way  still  overlooks  the  essential  point.  We  as  search- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


137 


ing  individuals  have  to  submit  ourselves,  but  that  to  which 
we  submit  is  our  own  over-individual  deed.  The  demand  of 
perseverance  is  of  that  kind.  It  does  not  originate  from  your 
wishes  or  from  mine,  but  from  a  fundamental  deed  without 
which  a  reality  would  not  be  possible  at  all.  Such  a  will  is  in- 
deed stronger  than  the  universe,  and  the  universe  must  submit 
to  it,  and  the  possibility  of  its  complete  fulfilment  must  be 
presupposed  as  the  ideal  goal.   It  is  of  no  fundamental  im- 
portance that  the  actual  science  which  is  composed  of  the 
thought- work  of  individual  scientists  is  still  endlessly  far  from 
its  goal.  The  only  decisive  factor  is  that  we  count  as  progress 
in  science,  as  discovery,  as  new  knowledge,  only  that  which 
brings  us  nearer  to  this  goal.  The  experienced  manifoldness 
does  not  take  any  regard  of  our  demands.  Certainly  not.  In 
our  real  experience  the  things  continually  disappear  into  no- 
thing and  continually  arise  from  nothing,  but  that  is  not  the 
nature  which  we  try  to  explore  in  our  scientific  knowledge. 
That  nature  which  has  value  of  existence  and  connection 
must  be  sought,  and  in  seeking  must  be  created,  and  this 
seeking  goes  on  everywhere  where  man  tries  to  gain  connec- 
tion and  explanation  even  in  the  most  modest  sense.   The 
soul  of  the  child  and  of  the  savage  seeks  it  tentatively.  But 
if  science  succeeds  in  remodelling  the  world  of  experienced 
things  in  such  a  way  that  they  can  be  detached  from  all  in- 
dividual experience,  and  that  they  can  be  maintained  without 
change  as  atoms  and  energies  without  qualities  through  new 
experiences,  then  nature  no  longer  can  disappoint  the  investi- 
gator. Only  that  which  results  from  the  perseverance  of  such 
absolutely  existing  over-personal  objects  then  belongs  to  the 
real  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  were  impossible  to  trans- 
form the  experienced  things  into  such  persevering  ones,  na- 
ture would  not  disappoint  us,  but  we  should  have  no  nature  at 
all.  The  world  would  be  a  dream  and  a  personal  experience 
of  ourselves  in  which  no  other  subject  would  take  part.   It 
would  thus  be  meaningless  and  without  value  in  the  changing 


138 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


coming  and  going  to  ask  about  a  valuable  connection  of  the 
world. 

B.  —  HISTORY 

If  nature  is  the  connection  of  things,  history  is  the  connec- 
tion of  persons.  The  problems  which  offer  themselves  are 
fundamentally  the  same  here  and  there,  controlled  by  the 
conception  of  connection.  Yet  every  question  must  demand 
new  forms  and  new  solutions  on  account  of  the  difference  of 
the  material.  The  world  of  history  will  have  to  interest  us 
in  many  ways,  as  it  is  a  world  in  which  value  is  joining  value. 
Especially  the  value  which  the  development  and  the  pro- 
gress of  historical  mankind  offers  will  bring  us  back  to  history 
and  its  meaning.  Here,  exactly  as  in  the  system  of  nature, 
we  have  to  deal  only  with  the  one  value  which  makes  his- 
tory the  material  of  knowledge,  the  value  of  the  connection 
between  the  individual  beings.  History,  too,  becomes  his- 
tory only  by  a  logical  transformation;  to  secure  a  connec- 
tion subjects  must  be  remodelled  in  many  ways.  But  here, 
too,  the  system  which  is  finally  reached  has  to  be  considered 
as  the  true  reality,  and  all  the  means  of  presentation  and 
communication  of  this  system  then  appear  only  as  external 
tools.  It  is  valuable  that  no  subject  of  will  stands  alone, 
that  every  personality  works  in  a  connection,  and  that  each 
volition  thus  perseveres  in  the  changing  events  of  history. 
This  self -asserting  continuity  of  the  will  is  the  true  object  of 
the  logical  valuation  in  the  science  of  history.  To  find  this 
identity  of  will  means  to  discover  the  historical  truth  which 
we  value.  We  saw  how  in  the  field  of  natural  science,  in  the 
midst  of  the  research,  the  necessary  means  appeared  to  the 
student  often  more  valuable  than  the  solution  of  the  true 
problem.  The  general  conception  and  laws  seemed  more  im- 
portant than  the  perseverance  of  the  objects.  In  a  similar 
way,  in  the  historical  investigation,  too,  the  means  attract 
the  attention  more  than  the  ultimate  aims  for  which  they 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


139 


exist,  and  the  demand  for  identity  of  will  may  thus  be  sub- 
dued in  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  historian.  And 
yet  that  which  brings  us  nearer  to  this  fimdamental  aim  is 
alone  historically  true.  To  discover  connections  means  to 
elaborate  identities  of  will,  and  our  fundamental  satisfaction 
in  the  seeking  of  the  identities  creates  the  value  of  the  his- 
torical process. 

That  sounds  quite  different  from  the  usual  account.  How- 
ever much  the  views  about  the  meaning  of  history  may  vary, 
they  usually  agree  in  the  one  thought  that  the  material  of 
history  belongs  to  the  same  world  of  causally  connected 
things  of  which  the  natural  sciences  speak.  We  even  some- 
times hear  that  the  historian,  if  he  wants  to  proceed  scien- 
tifically, has  to  accept  the  methods  of  the  natural  scientist, 
and  that  his  particular  task  is  characterized  only  by  the  par- 
ticular object.  He  has  to  select  from  all  the  possible  parts  of 
nature  only  the  human  societies ;  his  task  is  the  microscopical 
and  macroscopical  description  and  explanation  of  this  so- 
ciety process  with  its  political  and  economic  and  intellectual 
products.  If  such  a  science  is  logically  different  from  physics, 
and  if  its  laws  are  less  general,  it  is  claimed  that  that  results 
merely  from  the  particularity  of  the  material. 

We  must  disagree  there  completely.  We  are  not  afraid 
that  the  causally  thinking  science  of  natural  objects  would 
necessarily  be  unable  to  proceed  from  the  chemical  structures 
to  the  political  ones.  Whatever  fills  space  and  time  in  the 
universe  must  be  fit  to  be  ranged  into  the  causal  connections 
of  nature;  otherwise  the  presuppositions  of  natural  science 
would  be  given  up.  If  we  consider  a  nation  as  the  sum  of 
psycho-physical  organisms,  nothing  can  arise  in  its  midst 
for  which  the  postulate  of  complete  natural  explanation 
would  not  remain  applicable  without  exception.  No  hero 
and  no  poet  can  live  his  life  there  for  whom  every  deed  and 
every  word  does  not  necessarily  result  from  the  foregoing 
causes,  and  it  makes  no  difference  that  by  the  unlimited  man- 


140 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


ifoldness  of  conditions  the  effect  can  never  be  predicted  with 
practical  certainty.  The  wave  in  the  midst  of  the  ocean  also 
cannot  be  calculated,  and  yet  we  do  not  doubt  that  it  is  a 
necessary  product  of  the  preceding  conditions.  We  could 
not  take  any  step  in  human  society  without  peril,  if  we  could 
not  rely  on  a  fair  and  practically  satisfactory  foresight  of  the 
actions  of  others.  There  is  also  no  objection  in  the  fact  that 
the  sociological  naturalist  usually  calculates  with  the  whole 
human  being  as  a  unit.  That  does  not  contradict  the  spirit 
of  the  natural  sciences  at  all.  In  the  same  way  the  biologist 
uses  the  cell,  the  astronomer  the  whole  globe  as  a  unit,  and 
yet  they  remain  loyal  to  their  naturalistic  presuppositions 
and  purposes.  It  also  has  no  fundamental  importance  that 
the  sociological  science  is  still  endlessly  far  from  its  goal, 
and  thus  perhaps  still  unable  to  start  any  psycho-physical 
calculation  for  the  historical  events.  It  may  be  easier  to 
calculate  the  next  solar  eclipse  than  the  next  important 
novel,  but  in  so  far  as  the  world  is  a  causal  system  of  objects, 
the  brain  excitement  which  discharges  itself  in  the  writing 
of  a  novel  must  by  principle  be  accessible  to  naturalistic 
science.  The  absolute  value  of  connection  in  nature  would 
be  destroyed,  if  at  any  place  and  at  any  time  something  should 
go  on  in  the  world  of  objects  without  a  cause,  and  unless 
every  growth  and  every  apparently  creative  innovation  could 
be  conceived  as  the  identity  of  the  elements  of  nature.  And 
yet  any  one  whose  mind  is  schooled  by  the  masterpieces  of 
great  historians  will  abhor  the  thought  of  considering  such 
astronomical  causal  calculation  and  deduction  of  human 
events  as  the  true  task  of  history. 

The  fundamental  mistake  lies  in  the  presupposition  that 
all  knowledge  has  to  deal  with  objects.  The  most  essential 
part  of  our  pure  experience  is  eliminated  if  we  are  to  acknow- 
ledge only  things  and  not  subjects  which  we  meet,  by  the 
suggestions  of  their  attitudes.  When  we  spoke  of  the  exist- 
ence of  subjects,  we  fully  discussed  this  fundamental  differ- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


141 


ence.  We  now  have  to  make  use  of  it.  Even  if  such  a  selec- 
tion among  the  causal  objects  could  offer  us  everything  which 
historical  science  needed,  we  would  yet  have  to  demand  most 
seriously  that  there  must  still  exist  some  other  kind  of  know- 
ledge which  deals  with  ourselves  and  with  all  other  men  really 
as  subjects  in  our  will-reality,  and  which  teaches  us  to  un- 
derstand our  will-relations.  But  the  truth  is,  that  this  alone 
is  the  most  productive  way  to  make  historical  science  possi- 
ble at  all.  Only  under  this  aspect  the  historical  valuations 
of  man  come  to  their  true  meaning  and  man  in  his  respon- 
sible and  purposive  character  enters  into  history. 

The  subjects  of  will  affect  us  in  unlimited  manifoldness. 
We  have  seen  that  their  suggestions  are  not  only  our  expe- 
riences, but  that  they  have  as  subjects  a  real  existence.  But 
if  the  manifoldness  of  those  fellow-beings  is  really  to  mean 
to  us  a  world,  then  this  ideal  of  their  self-assertion  and  in- 
dependence must  be  carried  further,  just  as  it  was  with  the 
things  in  the  world  of  nature.  The  subjects  must  not  only 
have  their  real  existence,  but  their  attitude  must  persevere 
in  the  will  of  others.  It  must  remain  identical  with  other  at- 
titudes in  the  true  realm  of  beings,  and  so  must  make  it  possi- 
ble to  create  the  only  true  connection  between  subjects.  Only 
as  far  as  we  have  such  identity  of  will,  we  have  connection 
between  beings,  and  only  as  far  as  we  can  shape  connections 
of  beings,  we  have  history.  The  isolated  existence  of  beings 
never  makes  history,  just  as  the  isolated  existence  of  things 
never  makes  nature.  The  task  of  the  historian  is  to  under- 
stand the  subjects  in  such  a  way  that  a  closer  connection  of 
all  beings  by  identity  of  will  becomes  possible.  Whatever 
serves  this  task  has  historical  truth.  Let  us  recognize  first 
that  no  other  real  connection  between  subjects  of  will  can 
exist  at  all.  Every  application  of  causality  which  connects 
the  things  of  the  outer  world  including  the  psycho-physical 
human  beings  is  excluded  for  the  subjects  in  their  attitude 
character.    Neither  the  subjects  with  the  things  nor  the 


142 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


subjects  themselves  can  be  yoked  together  by  natural  caus- 
ality. If  natural  science  had  reached  its  ideal  goal  and  had 
explained  causally  all  processes  in  the  world,  including  the 
contents  of  consciousness  as  functions  of  the  organism, 
nevertheless  no  subjective  attitude  of  will  as  such  would 
have  been  touched  by  it.  The  impracticability  of  the  con- 
ception  of  causality  for  the  subjects  may  be  recognized  even 
from  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  reality  of  history  does 
not  lie  in  that  time  in  which  the  processes  of  nature  go  on. 

At  first  that  sounds  strange.  The  tables  of  historical  dates 
are  the  familiar  background  of  all  historical  reports  for  us. 
Yet  no  easy-going  concession  must  distort  the  boundary  lines 
here.   We  saw  that  the  conception  of  the  objective  time  to 
which  all  physical  measurements  are  referred  has  been  de- 
veloped from  two  different  qualities  of  our  experience.    On 
the  one  hand,  the  things  have  temporal  qualities  of  form ;  for 
instance,  different  rhythm  or  different  duration.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  lie  for  ourselves,  for  our  will,  in  different  direc- 
tions; they  are  past  or  present  or  future.   Both  are  traits  of 
the  immediate  life-experience.  We  aim  towards  the  connec- 
tion of  the  things  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating  every  per- 
sonal aspect.   We  construct,  therefore,  a  continuous  time,  in 
which  every  possible  point  can  be  taken  as  a  present  with 
reference  to  which  there  is  a  past  and  a  future.  All  temporal 
forms  of  the  experienced  world  can  now  be  represented  ob- 
jectively by  reference  to  this  one  over-individual  time.  But 
there  can  never  be  an  opening  by  which  the  will  itself  can 
find  entrance  into  the  objective  time.  The  will  posits  the 
time,  but  it  does  not  itself  fill  it.  From  the  start,  the  atti- 
tude of  the  will  towards  the  things  gives  to  them  the  per- 
sonal value  of  past,  present,  and  future,  and  in  the  objective 
time  this  relation  is  detached  from  the  individual  and  is 
elaborated  into  a  system  which  is  carried  by  the  will-atti- 
tudes of  all  thinkable  personalities ;  but  the  attitude  itself 
always  remains  outside  of  time.  Every  fellow-being  who  can 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


143 


be  apperceived  in  life  as  a  subject  and  not  as  a  thing  is  for  us 
atemporal,  and  in  such  atemporal  reality  we  experience  also 
our  own  will. 

That  is  in  no  way  in  contradiction  to  the  other  fact  that 
everybody  can  yet  be  put  into  the  temporal  frame.   Every 
attitude  refers  to  objects.  The  material  of  the  will  is  given 
with  the  will,  and  it  must  be  described  in  order  to  understand 
the  will.   If  the  attitude  of  the  will  determines  the  temporal 
character  of  the  objects,  it  seems  natural  and  is  without  ob- 
jection for  the  ordinary  usage,  if  we  conceive  the  will  itself  as 
simultaneous  with  the  present  objects.  Hence  the  will  is  later 
than  the  past  objects.  Accordingly  the  will  is  simultaneous 
with  the  sense-impressions  of  the  body,  and  therefore  lasting 
from  the  birth  to  the  death  of  the  organism.  It  is  the  same 
process  of  thought  by  which  we  give  to  the  will  also  its  place 
in  space  somewhere  in  the  brain.  On  this  general  foundation 
the  naturalistic  psychology  has  to  work,  and  it  is  not  only  the 
right  but  also  the  duty  of  psychology  to  take  this  standpoint, 
and  to  consider  every  mental  experience  as  a  phenomenon 
in  time ;  the  psychologist  may  measure  it  in  his  laboratory  in 
thousandths  of  a  second.  But  history  has  not  the  right  to  do 
the  same,  if  the  subjects  are  really  to  be  maintained  in  their 
subjectivity.  The  historian  must  resist  there  at  the  very  be- 
ginning, and  must  even  refuse  as  logical  transgressions  the 
popular  projection  of  the  real  will  into  physical  time. 

If  we  speak  of  Napoleon,  it  is  justifiable  to  refer  his  will  to 
certain  gyri  of  his  brain.  It  seems  a  matter  of  course  that 
Napoleon's  will  was  enclosed  in  his  skull,  as  it  evidently  was 
nowhere  else  in  space ;  and  yet  we  feel  clearly  that  it  is  absurd 
even  to  ask  whether  his  will  in  the  brain  was  three  centimeters 
long,  or  longer  or  shorter,  or  whether  it  had  a  triangular  form 
or  any  other  space  form.  It  is  as  absurd  as  if  we  were  to  ask 
whether  his  will  was  green  or  red.  We  feel  immediately  that 
all  such  questions  can  refer  only  to  objects,  and  that  the  will 
of  Napoleon,  if  we  want  to  understand  it  in  its  historical 


144 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


meaning,  the  will  which  conquered  Europe,  does  not  come 
to  us  as  an  object.  But  if  that  is  so,  it  has  no  more  meaning 
to  ask  how  many  units  of  time  his  will  was  long.   His  wars 
lasted  for  years,  his  bodily  movements  lasted  for  seconds, 
but  his  attitudes  had  no  part  in  the  physical  time.  The  act 
is  completely  grasped  when  it  is  understood  in  the  meaning 
of  its  attitude.   If  Napoleon's  will  is  completely  understood 
in  its  meaning,  there  remains  nothing  to  be  understood  by 
other  inquiries,  and  no  question  about  its  color,  its  odor,  its 
space-form,  or  its  temporal  duration  would  refer  to  its  reality. 
Its  particular  relation  to  the  world  is  determined  by  the 
particular  selection  of  spatial  temporal  objects  to  which  it 
takes  attitudes.  Their  particular  perspective  in  space  and  time 
gives  to  that  special  will  a  unique  relation  to  the  space-time 
world,  but  the  attitude  itself  works  outside  of  the  space-time 
system.  History  deals  with  realities  which  stand  in  number- 
less relations  to  the  temporal  things,  but  which  themselves 
are  neither  things  nor  temporal. 

All  this  involves  that  the  historical  realities  cannot  also  be 
members  of  a  causal  chain.  The  cause  must  precede  the 
effect.  We  recognized  that  the  last  goal  of  explanation  de- 
mands that  every  causal  connection  shall  ultimately  be  re- 
duced to  temporal  perseverance.  That  which  is  outside  of 
time  therefore  cannot  enter  into  causality,  and  the  causal 
connections  of  the  things  to  which  the  will  of  the  beings  refers 
are  thus  cleanly  separated  from  the  historical  connections  of 
the  beings  themselves.  One  person  may  influence  another, 
but  all  persuading  and  convincing  and  stimulating  signifies  a 
relation  from  will  to  will  which  is  psychologized  as  soon  as  it 
is  mterpreted  in  a  causal  way.  In  the  life  of  experience  the 
influencing  wiU  is  not  cause,  but  is  a  part  of  the  new  will  into 
which  it  enters,  and  incomparable  with  any  relation  of  things. 
In  ourselves,  too,  one  attitude  does  not  hang  together  with 
another  attitude  by  causal  connection.  Perhaps  we  feel  our- 
selves bound  in  one  will-act  by  our  own  resolution,  but  in  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


145 


I 


life  of  experience  such  binding  never  means  that  we  feel  the 
one  act  as  preceding  cause  of  the  other.  The  resolution  itself 
is  still  living  and  enters  into  the  new  will-action.  In  the  same 
way,  the  motive  is  for  the  experiencing  will  not  cause,  but  a 
goal  towards  which  the  will  is  directed. 

From  here  only  we  can  see  in  what  sense  the  willing  being 
who  enters  into  history  is  a  free  being.  We  often  hear  that 
the  historian  and  accordingly  the  practical  life  has  to  do  with 
free  personalities.  What  does  it  mean?  Some  fancy  that  man 
is  a  part  of  causal  nature  and  usually  determined  by  causes, 
but  that  from  time  to  time,  perhaps  when  an  important  de- 
cision is  to  be  made,  he  can  throw  a  few  causes  overboard  and 
annihilate  their  effect.  Such  thoughtlessness  does  not  de- 
serve consideration.  As  soon  as  the  concession  is  made  that 
a  single  atom  of  nature  can  be  diverted  from  its  path  without 
causes,  the  possibility  of  nature  is  sacrificed  by  principle. 
More  careful  thinkers  would  say  that  every  human  will  is  in- 
deed causally  determined,  but  the  determining  conditions  are 
so  complex  that  a  real  predetermination  cannot  be  in  ques- 
tion. In  this  vagueness  and  inaccessibility,  then,  lies  the  free- 
dom. Still  others  argue  that  even  such  indeterminability 
usually  does  not  exist,  inasmuch  as  we  can  foresee  the 
actions  of  most  people  more  easily  than  rain  and  sunshine. 
They  add  that  nevertheless  the  action  which  is  causally  de- 
termined has  to  be  accepted  as  free  when  the  causal  motives 
lie  in  the  man  himself  and  are  not  forced  on  him  from  with- 
out. And  finally  we  have  the  more  correct  argument  that 
after  all  the  motives  of  the  insane,  or  of  the  intoxicated,  or  of 
the  hypnotized  also  lie  in  the  man  himself,  and  yet  that  we 
deny  freedom  to  his  actions.  This  freedom  exists  only  when 
the  causal  process  goes  on  in  an  undisturbed  psycho-physical 
mechanism  in  which  all  previous  excitements  and  trainings 
cooperate  in  a  normal  way.  The  psychological  naturalistic 
problem  of  freedom  is  indeed  sufficiently  answered  in  such  a 
way.  The  causal  chain  is  nowhere  disrupted,  and  neverthe- 


146 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


less  a  clean  and  useful  separation  between  free  and  not  free 
action  is  carried  through.  The  demands  of  the  psychologist 
are  in  this  way  satisfied. 

Yet,  when  the  true  historian  speaks  of  free  beings,  if  he  un- 
derstands himself,  and  if  he  has  the  power  to  remain  inde- 
pendent of  naturalistic  patterns,  he  means  something  funda- 
mentally different.  He  does  not  ask  at  all  whether  the  causes 
for  the  attitude  of  the  will  were  surveyable  in  the  particular 
case  and  whether  the  effect  was  thus  determinable  before- 
hand. Nor  does  he  ask  whether  the  deciding  causes  were  l3ang 
in  the  acting  man  himself  and  whether  they  worked  in  normal 
conjunction.  He  has  no  reason  to  ask  anything  of  this,  be- 
cause the  will  and  the  deed  did  not  point  backward  to  any 
causes,  and  every  possible  question  is  met  by  reference  only 
to  the  meaning,  to  the  significance,  to  the  purpose,  and  to  the 
inner  relations  of  the  will.  As  soon  as  the  question  of  causes 
arises,  the  historical  interest  has  already  been  replaced  by 
the  extra-historical  one,  by  the  naturalistic  psychological 
one.  To  be  free  in  the  sense  of  history  means  to  belong  to  a 
sphere  in  which  there  exist  no  causes,  because  the  question 
of  causes  of  the  will  would  be  meaningless  there.  The  insane 
man,  whose  deed  the  fellow-man  cannot  understand,  just 
because  his  will  does  not  come  to  him  as  a  meaning,  sug- 
gests the  causal  naturalistic  interest.  But  for  that  reason  the 
insane  man  cannot  be  subject  of  history.  His  mental  life  be- 
comes an  object.  Of  course  such  an  object  may  be  important 
for  history  by  the  will  of  others  who  take  attitude  towards  it, 
but  the  paranoiac  himself  does  not  make  history. 

In  this  realm  of  true  freedom,  the  historian  now  seeks  the 
connections  of  the  real  subjects  and  the  system  of  connected 
wills  which  he  finally  affirms  is  the  world  of  history.  In  what 
sense  are  such  connections  between  two  subjects  possible 
at  all?  Two  friends  stand  in  conversation.  From  personal 
successes  and  failures,  experiences  and  hopes,  they  turn  to  an 
exciting  political  discussion.    In  every  pulse-beat  of  their 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


147 


talk  each  of  the  two  is  vividly  touched  by  the  real  personal 
existence  of  the  other,  and  with  full  devotion  he  takes  part 
in  the  pleasure  and  displeasure  of  the  neighbor.  Sometimes 
one  agrees  with  the  other,  sometimes  there  is  contradiction ; 
now  he  gives  a  piece  of  advice,  now  he  expresses  a  doubt. 
Those  two  men  have  not  for  an  instant  considered  each  other 
as  objects.  Neither  of  them  was  conscious  that  a  series  of 
persevering  contents  of  consciousness  was  proceeding  in  the 
brain  of  the  other.  Their  inner  participation  did  not  know 
anything  of  the  thing-like  content  of  man,  and  reached  out 
immediately  to  the  will-like  human  being.  The  understanding 
and  doubting,  the  questioning  and  answering,  the  admiring 
and  despising,  the  loving  and  hating,  the  sympathizing  and  en- 
vying, each  point  in  real  life-experience  directly  from  subject 
to  subject.  Of  course  there  exists  no  relation  which  might 
not  be  explained  in  psychology,  but  those  two  friends  who 
quarrel  about  politics  do  not  take  the  psychologist's  stand- 
point, and  nevertheless  they  know  each  other  completely. 
They  know  each  other  without  a  remainder.  Everything 
which  comes  in  question  in  their  discussion  at  all  has  reality. 
No  psychologist  could  teach  either  of  them  anything  about 
the  other  man  which  could  possibly  deepen  their  mutual 
imderstanding.  The  psychologist  who  would  observe  those 
two  would  take  a  merely  perceiving  attitude,  and  he  would 
dissolve  the  psychical  contents  which  he  associates  with  the 
perceivable  organisms  into  sensations,  that  is,  into  psychical 
elements,  objects  of  awareness.  Each  of  those  two  friends 
during  the  talk  also  resolves  the  internal  life  of  the  other.  The 
pleasure,  the  anger,  the  joy,  resolve  themselves  into  a  mass 
of  partial  feelings ;  the  suggestions,  the  deeds,  the  decisions, 
become  disentangled  into  numberless  partial  will-acts;  but 
every  part  has  again  that  subjective  character  which  must 
be  interpreted,  and  which  the  objectifying  psychologist  can- 
not know  at  all.  Only  the  willing  subject  thus  knows  friends 
and  foes,  leaders  and  imitators,  comrades  and  opponents. 


148 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


Thus  there  is  a  possible  relation  between  willing  beings 
which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  causal  connection  of  things. 
Of  course  that  alone  does  not  prove  that  the  connection  which 
the  historian  seeks  can  be  really  understood.  We  find  there 
the  same  situation  which  existed  in  the  case  of  the  natural 
sciences.  The  naturalist  finds  a  mass  of  relations  of  objective 
things  which  he  does  not  doubt  because  they  appear  with 
great  regularity.  Yet  such  electrical  or  thermal  or  optical 
laws  of  things  were  not  understood,  and  therefore  offered  no 
real  explanation  until  they  could  be  transformed  into  rela- 
tions of  identities.  In  the  same  way  the  historian  is  sure  that 
in  amity  and  enmity,  in  sympathy  and  opposition,  in  agree- 
ment and  disagreement,  a  real  connection  exists,  as  it  is  ac- 
knowledged as  such  in  immediate  life.  Yet  a  real  understand- 
ing of  such  relations  is  not  reached  thereby.  The  satisfaction 
of  ultimate  understanding,  and  therefore  an  absolutely  valid 
value  of  connection,  can  here,  too,  be  gained  only  under  the 
one  condition  which  brings  rest  to  all  striving :  the  re-finding 
of  the  identical  in  the  new  experience.  Just  as  the  manifold- 
ness  of  the  causal  laws  must  be  reduced  to  the  perseverance 
of  the  identical  things,  the  manifoldness  of  will-relations  must 
be  brought  down  to  a  perseverance  of  will,  if  absolutely  valid 
connections  are  to  become  possible  for  the  historical  sciences. 
Only  this  absolutely  valuable  connection  by  identity  is  then 
the  real  history,  just  as  the  mechanical  connection  is  the  real 
nature.  Certainly  that  in  no  way  excludes  the  possibility  that 
the  historian,  for  his  presentation,  may  make  use  of  the  ordi- 
nary relations  of  practical  life,  just  as  the  naturalist  speaks 
of  plants  and  animals  without  ever  replacing  them  by  an 
enumeration  of  their  ultimate  atomistic  elements.  Yet  in  a 
last  theory  we  must  understand  that  those  practical  relations 
must  be  accessible  to  a  transformation  into  identities  if  the 
connections  of  history  are  to  be  acknowledged  as  objectively 
valuable  for  thought,  and  that  means  as  true. 

The  postulate  for  the  identities  of  volitions  leaves  it  un- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


149 


certain  whether  they  can  be  found.  If  the  demand  could  not 
be  fulfilled,  we  should  have  isolated  subjects,  but  no  historical 
connections.  But  immediate  life-experience  shows  the  way 
clearly,  and  no  artificial  force  is  needed  to  interpret  the  his- 
torical facts  by  such  identities.  When  I  agree  with  my  friend 
in  his  affirmation  or  negation,  or  when  I  sympathize  with  his 
inclination,  or  when  I  feel  with  his  suffering  or  his  hopes,  in 
short,  whenever  I  understand  him,  his  will  must  have  really 
become  my  will.  To  the  naturalist  who  cannot  emancipate 
himself  from  the  thing-view,  this  sounds  like  mysticism.  If 
the  will  of  one  being  becomes  the  will  of  another,  it  appears 
to  him  as  if,  by  a  telepathic  mystery,  the  will  which  is  enclosed 
within  one  organism  slips  out  from  it  to  slip  in  at  another 
place  at  another  time.  But  we  know  now  that  the  other  will 
is  not  at  another  place  and  not  at  another  time,  because  as 
will  it  is  outside  of  space  and  of  time,  and  no  wall  is  broken 
down  when  the  will  becomes  also  the  will  of  the  other.  In 
every  act  of  understanding  just  that  is  fulfilled.  The  other 
will,  however,  does  not  simply  become  my  own  will.  That 
would  mean  that  I  myself  would  become  another  person.  I 
remain  certain  of  myself  when  I  understand  the  other.  His 
will  remains  for  me  the  will  of  another,  and  yet  it  enters  into 
my  own  will-activity.  His  will  does  not  lose  anything  by  be- 
coming my  will,  and  my  will  does  not  lose  its  selfhood  when 
it  receives  the  other. 

Every  metaphor  which  is  borrowed  from  naturalistic 
science  falsifies  the  unique  reality  of  understanding.  Every- 
body who  reads  and  understands  Plato  wills  when  he  under- 
stands the  single  sentence  just  what  Plato  wills,  and  Plato's 
will  thus  enters  identically  into  his  will.  Every  Platonic  will- 
act  of  affirmation  lives  undivided  in  its  totality,  identical  in 
the  millions  of  his  willing  readers.  This  act  of  understanding 
forms  the  fundamental  relation  of  all  personal  connection. 
Whether  I  pity  the  crying  child  or  admire  the  national  hero, 
whether  I  follow  the  thinker  and  poet  or  despise  the  crimi- 


150 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


nal,  my  connection  with  any  being  is  dependent  upon  my 
understanding  of  his  will,  and  that  demands  that  his  will 
enter  identical  into  mine.  The  relation  may  be  complex. 
If  I  feel  ashamed  of  another,  I  understand  his  will,  which  again 
itself  includes  an  understanding  of  mine.  Above  all,  this 
identity  is  not  lost  when  my  own  will  is  opposed  to  the  will 
of  the  other.  If  I  deny  what  the  other  affirms  on  the  basis 
of  my  knowledge  of  his  wrong  judgment,  his  affirmation  is 
completely  contained  in  my  denial.  If  I  am  malicious,  his 
pain  becomes  my  joy ;  if  I  am  envious,  his  joy  becomes  my 
pain. 

The  task  is  to  reduce  the  historical  connection  to  such 
identities.  For  that  purpose  the  willing  man  must  be  re- 
solved into  his  partial  volitions,  and  this  resolution  is  not  less 
unlimited  than  the  analysis  of  physical  things  into  mole- 
cules. The  historically  significant  will  of  the  individual  di- 
vides itself  at  once,  perhaps,  into  his  political,  logical,  econo- 
mic, social,  scientific,  artistic,  religious,  and  moral  volitions ; 
and  each  one  can  be  further  resolved  into  similar  will-par- 
ticles. Every  single  group  of  volitions,  then,  leads  to  particular 
identities.  Whoever  says  that  he  is  scientifically  a  Darwinist, 
artistically  a  Wagnerian,  economically  a  Marxist,  and  reli- 
giously a  Calvinist  simplifies  the  identification  by  pointing 
to  historical  personalities  with  whom  he  coalesces  in  taking 
their  will  into  his  will.  But  whoever  says  impersonally  that 
he  is  politically  a  conservative,  artistically  a  symbolist,  phi- 
losophically an  idealist,  and  economically  a  socialist  points 
simply  to  undefined  groups  of  subjects  whose  will  he  accepts. 
The  relation  of  historical  identity  is  no  less  included  in  such 
cases.  Even  to  be  citizen  of  a  town,  member  of  a  group, 
friend  of  a  reform,  opponent  of  a  fashion,  means  historically 
to  receive  certain  volitions  which  can  be  foimd  in  certain 
subjects  identically  in  the  own  will. 

In  such  a  transformation,  we  must  not  forget  that  even 
every  new  creation  is  only  an  original  deviation,  which  as 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


151 


deviation  is  at  first  partial  imitation.  Something  absolutely 
new  cannot  exist  in  the  historical  world  any  more  than  there 
can  be  anything  absolutely  disconnected  in  the  physical 
world.  Whoever  wills  something  new  wills  something  old, 
only  he  wills  it  differently.  He  who  overcomes  an  existing 
scientific  doctrine,  or  opens  new  political  vistas,  or  deepens 
the  religious  consciousness,  or  destroys  social  prejudices, 
or  gives  to  liberty  new  rights  or  to  beauty  new  forms,  every 
time  affirms  the  suggestions  which  he  received  from  a  thou- 
sand sides,  and  the  new  factor  is  small  compared  with  that 
which  was  maintained  from  the  tradition.  The  new  scien- 
tific doctrine,  the  new  law,  the  new  art,  stand  endlessly 
nearer  to  the  preceding  form  of  civilization  than  to  the 
ideas,  the  laws,  the  art,  of  uncivilized  tribes.  The  essentials 
are  taken  over  and  included  in  the  new  deed,  and  the  his- 
torical analysis  may  even  discover  the  new  tone  in  the  whole 
chord  as  identical  echo  of  a  sound  from  other  sides.  The 
new  unity  may  be  really  new,  but  the  contents  resulted  from 
manifold  suggestions  in  identical  co-experience.  The  ideal 
goal  of  historical  inquiry  accordingly  is  an  apperception 
through  which  every  life-deed  is  transformed  from  its  isola- 
tion into  a  relation  of  identity  to  other  volitions.  Every- 
body then  includes  the  acts  which  he  understands  and  which 
have  influence  on  his  will,  and  he  himself  enters  by  his  will 
into  those  acts  which  he  influences. 

Of  course  the  new  will-acts  contain  more  than  mere  iden- 
tities. Even  in  the  simple  case  of  mere  understanding,  the 
fellow-will  is  entirely  received  and  yet  the  own  will  is  inde- 
pendently maintained.  Otherwise  it  would  be  not  an  under- 
standing, but  a  mere  repetition.  In  every  personal  act,  there- 
fore, lies  the  identity  which  constitutes  the  connection  and 
something  new  which  must  be  acknowledged  as  the  expres- 
sion of  the  personality.  To  ask  where  this  new  comes  from 
would  at  once  drag  the  subjective  again  into  the  causal 
world  of  objects.  The  question  of  the  causes  has  no  meaning 


152 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


here.  The  free  existence  of  this  new  self  in  its  actuality  is 
the  ultimate  fact  from  which  the  historical  interest  starts. 
Just  as  it  has  no  meaning  in  natural  science  to  try  to  explain 
why  the  ultimate  ether  atoms  exist  at  all  in  the  universe, 
in  historical  science  it  has  no  meaning  to  ask  why  those  new 
acts  exist.  We  only  know  that  if  there  were  nothing  but  this 
new,  nothing  which  could  be  refound  identical,  we  should  not 
have  historical  connection  at  all. 

The  material  is  so  endlessly  complex  that  here,  too,  the 
practical  science  must  introduce  abbreviations  and  artificial 
perspectives,  to  allow  a  view  of  the  whole  field.  As  in  the  natu- 
ral sciences  the  manifoldness  of  things  demanded  the  elabo- 
ration of  general  laws,  the  historian  has  to  prepare  the  under- 
standing of  the  whole  field  by  the  elaboration  of  controlling 
will-relations.  He  separates  the  important  and  the  unim- 
portant, and  accentuates  as  important  those  personal  acts 
which  live  on  identically  in  a  wide  circle.  As  there  exist 
graded  series  of  special  and  more  general  laws  for  the  things, 
there  are  also  numberless  steps  between  the  influence  of  the 
average  man  whose  will  is  included  only  in  the  will  of  his 
neighbors  and  the  will  of  the  religious  leader,  or  the  artistic 
genius,  or  the  hero  whose  will  tunes  the  will  of  millions 
and  enters  in  pure  identity  into  the  minds  of  whole  nations. 
As  nothing  is  entirely  disconnected,  nothing  is  absolutely 
unimportant  there,  but  only  by  this  emphasizing  of  the  im- 
portant and  decisive  does  the  system  of  identities  become 
an  organized  whole  in  which  the  fate  of  j)eoples  in  their  lead- 
ing spirits  and  in  their  quiet  masses  can  be  understood. 

In  this  historical  world  the  objective  things  have  not  evap- 
orated, but  they  come  in  question  only  in  their  original 
reality,  namely,  as  means  and  ends  of  will.  If  two  children 
quarrel  about  a  cake,  the  cake  is  not  the  chemical  substance 
which  the  chemist  knows,  but  the  sweet  object  of  desire. 
And  if  two  nations  quarrel  about  Manchuria,  it  is  not  that 
part  of  the  globe  which  the  geographer  describes,  but  is  a 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


153 


means  of  economic  and  political  expansion.  The  causal  con- 
nection of  things  does  not  enter  into  the  historical  world  as 
a  physical  process,  but  as  an  object  of  human  interest,  of 
human  knowledge,  of  human  calculation.  And  if  nature, 
perhaps  by  an  earthquake  and  flood,  destroys  civilization, 
it  is  always  only  the  historical  will  which  the  historian  re- 
ports. The  flood  is  that  which  is  feared  or  which  inhibits 
activity,  but  it  is  not  a  natural  process  as  such.  Of  course 
the  presentation  of  the  historian  may  often  make  use  of  the 
conceptional  system  of  the  naturalist,  if  he  wants  to  de- 
scribe the  means  and  ends  of  the  willing  man,  but  such  a 
naturalistic  thing  is  after  all  raised  to  the  sphere  of  history 
only  as  soon  as  it  is  interpreted  in  its  relation  to  the  will. 
The  boat  which  carries  Caesar  may  be  described  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  technician,  but  its  historical  significance 
lies  only  in  its  ability  to  satisfy  his  will  to  master  the  waves. 
A  conflict  between  natural  science  and  history  is  never 
possible,  as  both  move  in  different  dimensions.  A  naturalis- 
tic reply  can  never  be  the  reply  on  a  really  historical  question. 
The  assertion  of  identities  of  things  can  never  satisfy  the 
demand  for  the  identities  of  volitions.  On  the  surface  it  might 
appear  as  if  the  one  science  gives  reality  to  that  to  which  the 
other  science  denies  it.  Of  course  that  in  itself  could  not  be 
settled  by  any  special  science,  as  it  is  not  the  task  of  science 
to  remove  the  possible  contradictions  between  the  differ- 
ent aspects  of  life.  That  belongs  to  the  ultimate  inquiries  of 
religion  and  philosophy.  It  is  the  same  situation  as  in 
the  other  fields  of  values.  If  something  is  perhaps  morally 
admirable  but  aesthetically  ugly,  or  beautiful  but  morally 
despicable,  aesthetics  and  ethics  themselves  cannot  settle 
the  controversy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  history  and  natural 
science  were  really  to  weigh  their  comparative  right  for 
acknowledgment,  it  could  not  be  denied  that  they  do  not 
stand  entirely  coordinated.  Each  of  the  two  seeks  know- 
ledge ;  each  refers  the  facts  to  absolute  values  of  existence  and 


154 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


connection,  and  one  absolute  value  cannot  be  less  valuable 
than  another.  Yet  the  one  may  stand  in  a  certain  depend- 
ence upon  the  other.  On  the  surface  it  appears  as  if  there  is 
no  difference.  The  naturalist  may  say :  It  is  a  physical  uni- 
verse which  produces  the  historical  man  and  also  produces 
the  historian  who  grasps  the  historical  connection.  The 
historian  on  his  side  may  say :  It  is  the  historical  interplay 
of  willing  beings,  which  includes  the  soul  of  the  physicist, 
by  which  the  world  of  objects  is  transformed  into  a  natu- 
ral connection.  But  we  know  now,  since  we  understand  the 
meaning  of  history,  that  the  relations  are  not  quite  so  sim- 
ple. The  historian's  claim  is  correct.  The  connections  of  the 
system  of  nature  indeed  presuppose  the  willing  man,  and 
even  the  existence  of  the  natural  things  is  dependent  upon 
their  being  given  to  every  possible  historical  subject.  But 
we  no  longer  have  any  right  to  say  in  the  same  sense  that 
the  reality  of  the  subjects  depends  upon  the  existence  of  the 
physical  natural  objects.  We  know  now  that  the  objects 
with  reference  to  which  the  historical  man  lives  his  life  and 
to  which  all  his  attitudes  are  related  are  not  at  all  those 
neutral  objects  of  which  the  natural  scientists  are  speaking. 
They  are  rather  objects  of  will,  means  and  tools  of  striving. 
These  objects  of  will  do  not  enter  as  such  into  the  system  of 
nature,  but  remain  in  the  frame  of  history.  Only  when  the 
willing  man  decides  to  detach  the  things  from  his  will  and 
to  consider  them  as  merely  perceivable  objects,  then  those 
things  begin  to  exist  as  parts  of  the  system  of  nature.  The 
existence  of  the  things  in  nature  remains  nevertheless  ab- 
solutely valuable,  and  hence  is  absolutely  true  because  every 
possible  historical  man  must  accept  them  and  must  think 
them  in  such  a  way,  if  he  seeks  an  independent  world  at  all. 
Thus  there  is  no  idea  of  an  arbitrary  character  of  the  natural- 
istic aspect.  The  naturalistic  view  of  the  world  is  indispen- 
sable for  the  tasks  of  the  historical  man ;  it  is  not  simply  a 
kind  of  construction  which  he  invents  like  a  game.   He  can- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION  155 

not  fulfil  his  life,  if  he  does  not  reach  the  truth  of  natural 
science,  and  the  system  of  nature-thought  in  the  consistent 
spirit  of  natural  science  is  the  only  possible  world  of  objects 
which  can  have  truth.  And  yet  the  fact  remains  that  this 
system  of  nature  really  presupposes  the  willing  being,  while 
the  willing  being  for  its  reality  does  not  presuppose  the 
neutral  objects  of  nature.  Hence  it  is  the  free  man  who  in  his 
free  deed,  because  he  wills  an  independent  world,  conceives 
the  things  as  unfree  nature,  up  to  that  height  of  science  at 
which  even  man  himself  is  conceived  as  a  determined  mech- 
anism. But  this  unfree  causal  nature  is  not  needed  to  give 
reality  to  free  willing  beings.  Already  from  here  we  get  a 
vista  of  the  mutual  relations  of  values  which  have  to  be 
brought  to  complete  equilibrium  by  the  metaphysical  values. 
To  turn  to  them  will  be  our  last  task,  but  we  foresee  that 
the  prerogative  of  the  world-will  can  never  be  denied.  The 
world  of  history  is  logically  prior  to  the  world  of  nature. 

C.  —  REASON 

In  the  midst  of  life-reality  we  found  three  experiences  for 
which  we  demanded  an  independent  self-asserting  existence, 
the  things,  the  persons,  and  the  valuations.  They  alone  have 
pure  existence,  and  the  acknowledgment  of  their  independ- 
ence is  the  foundation  of  our  knowledge.  The  independently 
existing  must  persevere.  If  we  are  to  understand  it  as  inde- 
pendent, as  part  of  the  real  world,  we  must  try  to  find  it  again 
in  new  experience.  If  we  find  it  again,  we  have  a  connection 
between  the  various  experiences.  As  this  recurrence  of  the 
identical  means  a  fulfilment  of  our  will,  it  satisfies  us.  The 
objective  connection  is  therefore  satisfactory  for  everybody 
who  wills  a  world,  and  therefore  absolutely  valuable.  The 
affirmation  of  this  connection  is  truth.  Such  a  connection  for 
the  things  meant  the  system  of  nature,  and  such  a  connection 
for  the  persons  gave  us  the  system  of  history.  Finally,  we 
have  to  consider  the  connection  for  the  third  manifoldness 


156 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


157 


of  existing  realities,  for  the  valuations.  But  just  as  in  the 
case  of  the  existence  of  the  valuations,  here  also,  for  the  con- 
nection of  valuations,  a  detailed  discussion  is  not  necessary 
because  this  whole  volume  is  only  an  effort  to  make  those 
connections  clear.  Here  we  have  only  to  characterize  the 
place  which  this  particular  kind  of  knowledge  demands. 

The  connected  system  of  valuations  is  reason.  We  know 
now  that  as  connections,  ultimately  only  those  relations  can 
be  accredited  which  can  be  reduced  to  identities.  Nature 
was  the  connection  of  things  under  the  point  of  view  of  iden- 
tity, history  was  the  connection  of  persons  under  the  point 
of  view  of  identity ;  accordingly  reason  will  be  the  connection 
of  valuations  under  the  point  of  view  of  identity.  We  shall 
have  to  discriminate  all  together,  four  chief  groups  of  such 
valuations.  We  may  call  them  logical,  aesthetic,  ethical, 
and  metaphysical.  These  labels  are  not  very  satisfactory, 
but  they  at  least  point  to  certain  chief  characteristics  of  the 
four  fields.  The  system  of  reason  must  offer  a  connection  of 
identity  in  every  one  of  these  four  fields. 

First,  we  must  make  clear  what  such  a  demand  involves. 
All  valuation  is  a  will  in  us,  but  not  a  will  which  depends  upon 
subjective  individual  needs.  The  evaluating  will  was  willed 
with  the  consciousness  that  we  should  maintain  it  under  all 
changing  circumstances,  unless  we  were  to  abandon  ourselves, 
and  unless  the  world  were  to  lose  its  meaning  and  reality. 
Hence  the  valuation  is  our  own  will,  and  yet  superior  to  every 
will  from  personal  motive  and  therefore  strictly  over-personal. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  over-personal  factor  lies  entirely  in 
our  inner  world  in  contrast  to  the  things  and  the  persons. 
The  sought  connection  of  the  valuations  is  thus  a  connection 
of  will-acts.  Of  course  we  find  a  connection  of  will-acts  also 
in  history,  but  the  difference  is  clear.  Every  historical  being 
lives  his  life  in  personal  will-acts,  and  the  personal  is  just 
characterized  by  the  fact  that  something  new  and  free  is 
superadded  to  the  identical  recurring.    The  historian  who 


seeks  connections,  therefore,  looks  backward ;  he  cannot  look 
into  the  future  because  from  one  given  personal  act  he  can 
never  deduce  the  reality  of  an  act  which  is  not  yet  given.  He 
who  moves  from  personal  inclination  may  change  the  direc- 
tion at  any  time,  and  is  not  bound  to  move  along  on  the 
same  road. 

But  he  who  evaluates  is  bound.  Of  course  he  is  bound  only 
as  such  an  evaluating  over-personal  subject.  As  a  historical 
person,  he  may  bring  his  individual  will  into  conflict  with  his 
over-individual  demand.  He  can  will  the  crime,  while  he 
evaluates  the  moral  deed.  But  as  a  subject  of  moral  evalu- 
ation, he  must  will  everything  which  his  moral  evaluation 
demands.  A  will  which  is  conceived  as  independent  of  all 
personal  motives  and  desires  can  lead  only  to  new  and  ever 
new  over-personal  will-acts,  as  identity  is  the  only  connecting 
principle.  The  whole  connection  of  the  valuations  thus  lies 
outside  of  the  historical  sphere  in  a  system  of  objective  real- 
ity. For  the  individual  subject  the  connection  of  valuations 
is  accordingly  a  necessary  one.  In  this  respect  reason  corre- 
sponds to  nature  in  opposition  to  history.  The  natural  things, 
too,  are  over-personal,  and  therefore  in  their  causal  connection 
independent  of  the  individual  experience.  The  permanence 
of  the  things  can  lead  to  any  calculation  of  future  effects; 
thus  the  naturalist  can  determine  the  future.  Moreover  the 
determination  of  what  is  to  be  expected  is  most  important 
from  his  point  of  view,  while  the  historian  is  entirely  unable 
to  imitate  him.  For  the  valuations,  of  course,  there  exists 
no  future  and  no  causality  because  they  are  not  in  time,  but 
the  necessity  of  the  connection  and  their  remoteness  from 
individual  wills  is  the  same  for  the  over-personal  valuations 
and  the  over-personal  natural  things.  Every  ideal  construc- 
tion of  such  a  connection  of  evaluations  finds  its  definite  place 
in  the  system  of  reason. 

The  fundamental  task  is  the  same  in  all  four  fields  of  log- 
ical, aesthetic,  ethical,  and  metaphysical  valuations.  A  will 


ii* 


158 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


which  posits  values  is  given,  and  a  new  over-personal  will 
which  is  identical  with  the  first  is  sought  in  the  strife  of  life. 
In  our  study  of  history,  we  recognized  how  will-deeds  can 
remain  identical  in  new  form,  and  how  their  imtemporal  per- 
severance is  different  from  the  continuity  of  things.  Yet 
the  situation  is  not  the  same  as  that  in  the  field  of  history. 
In  the  historical  connection  the  will  is  maintained  as  be- 
longing to  an  individual  even  if  it  is  taken  over  by  another 
person.  In  the  over-personal  will-act  the  relation  to  an  indi- 
vidual is  no  longer  in  question.  The  identity  is  found  when  the 
one  valuation  can  be  put  in  the  place  of  the  other  valuation 
in  the  system  without  changing  the  meaning  of  the  will.  Of 
course  a  new  will  must  have  new  relations  and  new  traits, 
just  as  the  one  side  of  an  equation  is  different  from  the  other, 
or  as  the  identical  atoms  of  a  quantity  of  water  have  new 
traits  if  they  are  separated  into  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  But 
the  will-attitude  itself  remains  the  same.  The  logical  acknow- 
ledgment is  under  the  new  conditions  identical  with  that 
under  the  old  ones,  the  new  act  of  aesthetic  devotion  covers 
the  preceding,  the  new  ethical  appreciation  agrees  with  the 
earlier,  the  one  religious  conviction  binds  the  other. 

Of  course  it  is  not  necessary  that  attention  be  directed 
towards  the  total  transformation.  The  particular  task  usually 
demands  merely  interest  in  some  partial  identities.  If  we 
transform  water  by  the  galvanic  current,  we  may  be  inter- 
ested only  in  the  oxygen  and  may  ignore  the  hydrogen.  If 
we  transform  the  affirming  will,  for  instance,  of  a  law,  we  may 
not  be  interested  in  all  the  other  included  cases,  and  may 
devote  ourselves  only  to  a  particular  one.  But  the  will  ex- 
pressed in  this  particular  decision  still  remains  identical  with 
a  part  of  the  embracing  will  of  the  whole  law.  If  in  our  rea- 
son the  logical  acknowledgments,  the  aesthetic  devotions, 
the  ethical  appreciations,  the  religious  convictions,  really  are 
connected,  we  must  presuppose  that  they  are  in  this  sense 
ultimately  identical  with  our  fundamental  will.  The  system- 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


159 


atic  understanding  of  all  our  values  is  thus  an  unveiling  and 
exploring  of  our  deepest  self.  All  those  logical,  aesthetic, 
ethical,  and  religious  values  must  then  be  understood  as 
partial  identities  of  our  fundamental  will.  We  shall  have  to 
return  to  this  point  of  view  in  the  discussion  of  the  meta- 
physical values. 

We  may  interpret  the  process  at  least  in  that  field  which 
we  have  crossed  together,  the  field  of  the  logical  values.  The 
situation  is  more  difficult  here  than  in  the  ethical,  aesthetic, 
and  religious  fields,  which  we  shall  have  to  examine  later.  We 
have  discriminated  two  fundamental  logical  valuations,  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  value  of  existence  and  the  acknow- 
ledgment of  the  value  of  connection.  We  must  now  demand 
that  all  the  connections  of  logical  valuations  be  either  iden- 
tical affirmations  of  existence  or  identical  affirmations  of 
connection.  The  transition  from  one  affirmation  to  another 
which  is  necessarily  posited  with  it,  we  call  a  conclusion. 
Every  judgment,  we  claim,  affirms  or  denies  an  existence  or 
a  connection.  The  judgments  which  express  the  value  of 
existence  say :  Th^e  is  or  there  is  not.  If  I  judge :  This  is  an 
oak  tree,  we  may  look  on  it  as  a  case  of  subordination,  but 
we  may  look  on  it  at  the  same  time  as  an  affirmation  of  ex- 
istence. There  is  here  present  at  this  place  something  which 
has  the  qualities  of  the  oak,  which  I  presuppose  as  concep- 
tionally  known.  It  seems  as  if  we  transcend  such  affirma- 
tions of  existence  if  we  do  not  speak  about  a  single  or  a  few 
objects,  but  if  we  speak  in  general  about  all ;  for  instance :  All 
oak  trees  have  leaves.  But  that  which  we  really  aim  to  say 
is  after  all  only :  There  exist  oak  trees  which  have  leaves,  and 
oak  trees  which  have  no  leaves  do  not  exist.  The  simple 
form  of  such  a  judgment  thus  practically  covers  several 
different  affirmations  or  denials  of  existence. 

But  what  makes  us  proceed  from  one  affirmation  —  it  may 
be  simple  or  complex  —  to  the  new  form  of  the  identical  will? 
In  nature  one  position  of  things  goes  by  perseverance  of  ener- 


160 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


gies  over  into  a  new  position.  In  our  reason  does  one  affirma- 
tion go  over  into  a  new  affirmation  also  by  perseverance  of 
the  will?  The  natural  reply  of  the  logician  would  be :  A  second 
affirmation  must  be  added.  The  conclusion  results  from  two 
premises.  But  let  us  see  clearly  that  the  mere  existence  of 
two  affirmations  never  gives  a  third.  I  may  know  that  all  men 
are  mortal  and  that  Peter  is  a  man,  and  yet  may  have  no 
reason  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  the  mortality  of  Peter.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  have  no  right  to  claim  that  in  the  system 
of  nature  it  is  sufficient  to  have  only  one  position  of  the  atoms 
in  order  that  the  second  may  result  from  it.  The  second 
comes  through  perseverance,  but  the  conception  of  perse- 
verance involves  there  more  than  identity  of  qualities ;  it  also 
includes  progress  of  the  time-series.  One  position  of  things 
emanates  from  the  other  because  a  new  temporal  factor  is 
added  to  the  identical  universe.  This  new  temporal  factor 
demands  a  new  aspect ;  it  presents  a  new  definite  task  with 
the  question :  What  is  this  identical  world  as  soon  as  the  new 
temporal  factor  has  entered?  In  the  logical  world  that  is  the 
role  which  the  second  premise  has  to  play.  All  human  beings 
are  mortal.  We  see  in  it  the  affirmation  of  existence ;  namely, 
there  are  mortal  beings  and  there  are  not-immortal  beings. 
Now  a  new  affirmation  comes  to  that  complex  affirmation  of 
existence.  That  second  judgment  is :  Peter  is  a  man.  In  itself 
this  would  not  carry  us  on.  But  finally  there  arises  in  addi- 
tion still  a  question  which  suggests  the  transformation  of  the 
first  judgment  in  a  particular  direction.  The  second  judgment 
really  means :  How  is  it  with  the  man  Peter?  The  answer  is : 
Peter  thought  with  the  qualities  of  a  mortal  being  has  exist- 
ence, with  the  qualities  of  an  immortal  being  has  not  existence. 
If  any  one  conceives  him  as  immortal,  I  deny  that  this  ima- 
gined object  has  the  value  of  objective  existence.  Of  course 
this  affirmation  of  Peter  as  mortal  is  not  identical  with  every- 
thing which  was  affirmed  in  that  general  affirmation  of  ex- 
istence, but  our  second  premise  had  narrowed  the  question 


THE  VALUES  OF  CONNECTION 


161 


to  the  one  particular  answer,  and  all  affirmations  which  could 
have  been  deduced  as  identical  with  that  general  statement 
had  to  remain  unnoticed.  Every  conclusion  is  in  this  way 
the  transformation  of  a  judgment  of  existence  or  connection 
into  another  identical  one  on  the  basis  of  a  definite  question 
which  introduces  a  new  factor. 

Every  deduction  and  every  induction  is  such  a  transforma- 
tion of  identities.  The  chemist  can  seek  analytically  the  ele- 
ments of  a  substance,  or  he  can  sjrnthetically  build  up  the 
substance  from  the  elements.  In  both  cases  the  things  are 
conceived  as  continuous.  In  the  same  way  in  the  induction 
from  the  persevering  particular  valuations  logic  reaches  a 
general  valuation,  and  in  deduction  from  the  complex  af- 
firmation a  whole  manifoldness  of  particular  affirmations. 
But  some  kind  of  special  question  must  show  a  particular 
task  in  order  that  the  transformation  to  the  identical  may 
find  a  definite  direction  and  a  definite  goal.  The  same  case 
as  for  the  logical  valuation  repeats  itself  in  the  ethical, 
aesthetic,  and  religious  fields.  Every  time  the  over-personal 
will-attitude  remains  identical,  but  a  new  event  and  a  new 
life-situation,  a  new  impression,  a  new  suggestion,  must 
always  present  a  new  life-task  to  the  will,  a  task  in  the  ful- 
filment of  which  the  identical  attitude  can  realize  itself. 
Only  because  the  new  attitude,  the  new  appreciation,  the 
new  conviction,  is  identical  with  the  original,  is  the  transition 
satisfactory  to  the  will  and  therefore  absolutely  valuable. 
To  enter  into  the  special  principles  of  these  fields  is  super- 
fluous here,  as  the  following  parts  of  this  volume  are  devoted 
to  these  aesthetic,  ethical,  and  metaphysical  problems. 


PART  III 


THE  ^ESTHETIC  VALUES 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


The  values  of  existence  and  the  values  of  connection  which 
have  so  far  interested  us  are  ultimately  inseparable.  Both 
groups  present  the  values  of  knowledge.  The  values  of  ex- 
istence are  posited  in  our  naive  life.  The  values  of  connection 
demand  a  persistent  elaboration  which  is  performed  by  the 
sciences,  and  which  therefore  belongs  to  the  achievements  of 
civilization.  Yet  civilization  only  carries  on  what  life  de- 
manded immediately.  The  connections  in  the  realm  of  nature, 
history,  and  reason  allow  us  to  secure  new  values  of  exist- 
ence for  new  things,  new  persons,  and  new  valuations.  When 
we  asked  for  the  ultimate  meaning,  both  existence  and  con- 
nection were  only  different  expressions  of  the  independent 
self-assertion  of  the  world  beyond  the  personal  subjective 
experience. 

In  the  same  way  the  values  of  unity  and  the  values  of 
beauty  belong  together.  Here,  too,  the  former  are  values 
of  naive  life,  the  latter  are  decided  by  the  conscious  work  of 
civilization;  they  are  the  functions  of  art.  Yet  here,  too, 
those  values  of  civilization  are  only  continuations  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  values  of  life.  If  we  are  to  hold  together  the 
values  of  unity  and  the  values  of  beauty,  we  might  use  the 
expression  "aesthetic  values,*'  and  yet  strictly  it  is  as  insuffi- 
cient as  the  term  "logical  values''  is  in  some  respects  for  the 
first  two  groups.  But  for  a  general  survey  such  labels  may  per- 
form their  service.  If  we  penetrate  at  once  into  the  depths  of 
the  problem,  we  find  that  just  as  all  logical  values  express  the 
self-perseverance  of  the  world,  all  the  aesthetic  values  refer  to 
the  self -agreement  of  the  world.  And  both  the  self -perse  ver- 


166 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


167 


ance  and  the  self -agreement  are  necessary  forms  of  that  self- 
assertion  of  the  world  which  we  must  demand,  if  our  life  is  not 
to  be  a  chaotic  dream.  Both  satisfy  the  will  and  are  therefore 
valuable ;  but  they  satisfy  the  will  not  because  they  adjust 
themselves  to  the  personal  desires  of  the  individual,  but  be- 
cause the  over-personal  structure  of  the  beautiful,  as  of  the 
true,  must  satisfy  every  possible  subject.  Every  possible  sub- 
ject must  be  satisfied  because  there  cannot  be  any  subject 
who  does  not  will  a  world,  and  as  the  reality  of  the  world 
involves  self-assertion,  and  as  self-assertion  expresses  itself 
in  perseverance  and  inner  agreement,  the  demand  for  beauty 
and  truth  is  absolute.  They  refer  to  the  structural  principle 
of  the  only  world  which  can  mean  for  us  a  real  world.  Thus 
the  individual  will  finds  both  the  beautiful  and  the  true  world 
as  an  eternally  given  a-prioristically  determined  world.  The 
a-priori  is  not  something  which  lies  ready-made  and  com- 
pleted before  us,  but  is  the  character  of  our  own  will,  which 
demands  the  identity  of  the  experience  in  order  to  have  a 
world  at  all.  Every  subject  whom  we  can  acknowledge  as 
a  possible  subject  of  a  world  must  therefore  be  bound  by 
this  a-priori  in  its  logical  and  aesthetic  experience.  Truth 
and  beauty  are  not  somewhere  maintained  from  eternity  in 
a  world  and  now  to  be  discovered  by  man ;  they  are  tasks 
of  a  world  which  we  are  building.  But  the  world  which  we 
have  to  build  is  the  only  possible  world,  the  only  one  which 
can  have  reality  for  our  will,  and  which  is  therefore  eternally 
shaped  by  the  conditions  under  which  our  will  can  find  a 
world.  Whatever  has  not  entered  the  structural  forms  which 
our  will  demands  cannot  be  a  part  at  all  of  that  world  which 
is  for  us  the  only  possible  real  world. 

We  must  now  open  the  way  for  our  approach  to  the  aes- 
thetic values.  Of  course  there  are  many  ways  which  lead  to 
aesthetics.  Whoever  hears  us  speaking  about  the  self-asser- 
tion of  the  world  may  possibly  suspect  that  we  choose  of  all 
ways  apparently  the  shortest  but  to-day  most  deserted  and 


most  disreputable  one,  the  metaphysical  way.  Yet  nothing 
lies  further  from  us.  The  metaphysical  method  would  de- 
mand that  we  start  from  some  super-reality  and  by  concep- 
tional  deduction  reach  the  aesthetic  facts,  and  that  from  the 
height  of  the  abstract  we  should  step  down  to  experience. 
But  we  try  to  hold  exactly  the  opposite  direction.  Here  and 
everywhere  we  want  to  start  from  the  single  real  immedi- 
ate experiences,  and  want  to  climb  up  slowly  to  the  general 
abstract  ideas.  Does  that  mean  that  our  way  must  start 
from  psychology?  Certainly  not.  The  prejudices  of  our  nat- 
uralistic age  favor  such  an  antithesis.  The  aesthetics  which 
begins  from  above  is  metaphysical ;  the  aesthetics  which  be- 
gins from  below  is  psychological.  But  is  that  really  more 
than  a  prejudice?  An  entirely  different  way  may  start  from 
real  experience  far  removed  from  all  psychology.  That  is 
the  road  of  critical  investigation.  It  must  be  ours.  Whoever 
seriously  wills  a  critical  method  cannot  even  acknowledge 
that  the  psychological  method  really  starts  from  experience. 
The  critical  method  alone  really  begins  at  the  beginning,  and 
only  when  the  way  has  led  up  to  a  certain  height,  the  path 
divides  itself  and  a  by-path  leads  to  the  broad  psychological 
highway. 

This  must  not  be  misunderstood.  The  empirical  aesthetics 
is  fully  within  its  rights  when  it  works  nowadays  essentially 
with  the  means  of  psychology.  The  psychological  description 
and  explanation  of  aesthetic  processes  still  finds  numberless 
problems,  and  their  solution  through  quiet  work  is  indispen- 
sable for  safe  progress.  The  most  important  achievements 
of  modern  aesthetics  lie  in  this  direction.  The  self -observing 
mental  analysis  was  supplemented  most  fortunately  by  the 
experimental  inquiries  of  the  psychological  laboratories,  by 
the  genetic  studies  on  children  and  lower  races,  and  not  least 
by  the  physiological  investigations  of  the  processes  of  sen- 
sation and  movement.  In  the  foreground  stands  the  question 
of  which  ideas,  emotions,  relations,  and  impulses  are  stirred 


I 


168 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


169 


up  in  the  subject  of  aesthetic  enjoyment,  and  near  to  it  the 
other  problem  of  which  mental  processes  lead  to  the  aesthetic 
creation  of  the  artist.  The  work  of  art  must  be  completely 
determined  by  the  mental  forces  which  have  produced  it  and 
by  the  mental  excitations  in  which  it  shows  its  effect.  Such 
psychological  results  can  easily  be  transformed  into  useful 
prescriptions,  and  aesthetics  may  thus  arrive  at  laws  just  as 
hygienic  prescriptions  are  immediately  developed  from  the 
knowledge  of  the  bodily  processes. 

All  that  is  certainly  important.  But  no  one  ought  to  say 
that  such  psychological  study  really  starts  from  the  immedi- 
ate experience  and  represents  the  first  steps  of  aesthetics. 
As  soon  as  I  have  reached  a  point  from  which  the  whole 
world  presents  itself  as  a  sum  of  physical  and  psychical  ex- 
isting objects,  there  remains  no  other  choice.  The  water- 
fall, the  marble  statue,  the  symphony,  are  then  at  first 
physical  objects.  Of  course  no  one  would  seek  their  beauty 
in  the  mere  physical  thing  which  the  physicist  describes  and 
explains.  If  every  drop  of  the  waterfall  is  calculated  in  its 
curve,  every  tone  of  the  symphony  determined  in  its  number 
of  vibrations,  and  the  statue  decomposed  into  the  molecules 
of  carbonate  of  lime,  that  which  delights  us  is  not  found. 
The  consequence  is  that  it  must  be  found  on  the  side  of  the 
psychical  things,  inasmuch  as  the  whole  world  is  now  made 
up  of  physical  and  psychical  contents  only.  The  psychical 
perception  of  the  thing  and  the  memory  ideas  and  the  emo- 
tions then  become  the  starting-point  for  aesthetics. 

But  we  know  now  that  this  whole  way  of  considering 
the  world  is  abstract  and  artificial.  When  we  studied  the 
foundations  of  knowledge,  we  recognized  that  the  contrast  of 
psychical  and  physical  is  not  given  in  the  original  experience. 
The  only  antithesis  which  we  found  there  was  that  between 
the  personality  which  takes  will-attitudes  and  the  objects  of 
this  will.  These  objects  were  neither  perceptions  in  us  as  the 
psychologist  maintains  them  to  be,  nor  the  atomistic  bodies 


which  the  physicist  measures.  In  the  same  way  the  will  was 
not  a  psychical  object,  as  it  was  not  material  of  inner  percep- 
tion. We  will  it,  we  live  through  it,  we  let  it  become  effective, 
we  are  certain  of  it,  we  refuse  the  counter-will,  but  we  do  not 
find  the  will  in  us  as  a  perceivable  content.  The  only  anti- 
thesis which  we  find  in  the  real  subjective  experience,  that 
between  the  willing  subject  and  the  object  of  will,  contains 
accordingly  no  reference  to  the  antithesis  of  psychical  and 
physical.  On  the  other  hand,  there  in  the  immediate  experi- 
ence nothing  is  to  be  described,  as  every  description  presup- 
poses an  object  which  is  independent  of  will  and  determined 
in  itself,  and  only  between  the  describable  objects  exists  that 
connection  which  is  expressed  in  scientific  explanations. 
There  in  the  immediate  experience  we  only  had  the  right  to 
ask  for  the  meaning,  the  significance,  the  value  of  our  will 
and  of  our  object  of  will.  It  is  the  will  towards  objective  de- 
scription and  explanation  which  explodes  the  immediate  ex- 
perience and  creates  that  great  antithesis  of  physical  and 
psychical.  The  subjective  experience  itself  is  in  every  fibre 
only  will  and  will-object.  The  will  towards  description  is  itself 
a  part  of  this  lived -through  reality  which  is  not  describable, 
but  only  interpretable.  We  had  to  return  once  more  to  this 
primary  consideration  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  to  see  that 
if  we  really  want  to  begin  from  below,  really  from  the  im- 
mediate life-experience,  we  certainly  cannot  start  with  the 
explanation  of  psychical  processes.  When  the  waterfall  or  the 
symphony  moves  the  depths  of  my  willing  soul,  it  comes  in 
question  neither  as  physical  movements  of  water  or  vibrations 
of  air,  nor  as  psychical  ideas,  impressions,  and  emotions. 
The  beauty  belongs  in  my  immediate  subjective  experience, 
not  to  my  optical  impression  or  to  my  sound  sensations,  but 
the  sounding  tones  themselves  delight  me  and  the  wonders 
of  the  waterfall.  If  we  are  really  to  begin  at  the  beginning 
and  not  with  thought-conceptions,  however  important,  we 
must  examine  first  the  aesthetically  valuable  objects  them- 


II 


170 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


171 


selves,  not  as  physical  objects,  but  in  their  pre-physical  real- 
ity; we  must  ask  as  to  their  meaning  and  their  significance 
for  our  will. 

We  may  see  the  difference  of  method  more  clearly,  if  we 
examine  a  few  leading  ideas  which  often  return  in  the  aesthetic 
discussions.  The  modern  psychological  aesthetics  has  nowhere 
worked  with  greater  thoroughness  than  in  the  study  of  those 
processes  by  which  we  introject  our  emotions  into  the  things. 
We  feel  ourselves  into  the  beautiful  objects  and  give  life  and 
soul  to  them.  The  question  which  psychology  has  to  raise  is 
very  clear.  Of  course  the  physical  marble  block,  or  the  canvas 
covered  with  oil  color,  or  the  printed  paper  of  the  volume  of 
poetry,  or  the  rocks  of  the  mountain  have  no  soul  and  no 
feeling  for  the  psychologist.  Every  subjective  element  must 
therefore  come  from  the  consciousness  of  the  spectator.  The 
psychologist  now  examines  whether,  for  instance,  special  bod- 
ily movements  in  us  are  necessary  to  awaken  those  feelings 
of  activity  which  we  project  into  the  things,  or  whether  we 
do  it  from  memory  pictures  of  earlier  experiences.  Does  our 
own  activity  fuse  with  the  perception  sufficiently  so  that  we 
entirely  lose  the  consciousness  of  ourselves,  or  do  we  animate 
the  thing  \\nth  the  accompanying  feeling  that  we  ourselves 
are  moved  by  feelings  ?  How  different,  if  we  take  the  stand- 
point of  real  subjective  experience!  There  we  are  really  cer- 
tain of  the  power  and  strength,  of  the  striving  and  feeling,  in 
nature  or  in  the  statue  itself.  Not  we  animate  the  ocean  and 
the  rocks,  not  we  give  joy  and  sadness  to  the  tones,  not  we 
make  living  the  dead  marble  blocks ;  their  life,  their  soul,  their 
pain,  their  joy,  speaks  to  us  in  the  real  experience ;  we  are 
trying  to  feel  their  feeling  and  willing  and  to  understand  it 
with  devoted  soul. 

We  saw  in  our  earlier  discussion  that  we  are  certain  of  the 
will  of  our  fellow-beings  without  any  conclusions  of  analogy 
from  merely  physical  objects.  We  experience  the  will  of  our 
fellow-men  as  an  immediate  suggestion  which  reaches  our 


will.  In  the  same  way,  now,  the  beautiful  comes  to  us  in  the 
real  experience  with  the  whole  richness  of  its  own  striving 
and  feeling  and  willing.  When  we  substitute  for  the  beautiful 
statue  the  dead  molecules  of  the  naturalist,  we  have  killed 
the  life  which  we  found  and  have  annihilated  the  soul  which 
spoke  to  us.  Afterwards,  of  course,  there  remained  nothing  to 
do  but  to  project  our  own  feelings  into  the  things  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  at  least  the  illusion  of  an  inner  life  possible  for 
them.  If  we  really  start  from  experience,  we  must  acknow- 
ledge that  the  beautiful  is  never  given  to  us  as  a  naturalistic 
object,  but  as  a  free  expression  of  attitudes  and  will  which  we 
as  willing  personalities  can  understand  by  feeling  with  them. 
It  is  the  aim  of  aesthetics  to  interpret  these  real  aesthetic 
experiences,  and  in  such  fundamental  aesthetics  nothing  can 
be  described  and  explained,  and  the  objects  are  not  objects 
which  are  at  all  accessible  to  description  or  explanation. 
They  are  values,  but  not  things.  The  moon  which  fills  the 
valley  of  the  poet  with  softly  silver  ray  is  not  the  dead  body 
whose  craters  the  astronomer  studies  with  his  telescope. 

In  the  spirit  of  pure  aesthetics,  this  feeling  of  a  will  in  the 
beautiful  which  approaches  us  represents  a  fundamental  re- 
lation which  needs  no  further  explanation.  If  we  did  not 
understand  the  will  of  the  things,  if  they  were  really  mere 
physical  bodies  for  us,  we  should  not  have  any  aesthetic  ex- 
periences at  all.  Of  course  it  would  also  be  a  complete  mis- 
understanding if  our  claim  were  misinterpreted  to  mean  that 
it  is  the  will  of  the  creating  artist  which  we  add  by  our  ideas 
to  the  lifeless  work  of  art.  In  a  corresponding  way  we  might 
think  that  it  is  the  will  of  God  as  creator  which  we  supplement 
in  the  aesthetic  awareness  of  nature.  No,  it  is  the  column 
itself  which  lifts  itself  and  stretches  itself  to  carry  the  bur- 
dening roof.  We  do  not  ask  what  the  architect  felt  about  it. 
It  is  the  marble  statue  itself  which  wins  us  by  its  charm  and 
its  purity.  We  do  not  care  for  the  feelings  of  the  sculptor. 
And  it  is  the  same  when  the  flower  and  the  brook  confide 


4 


172 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


their  secrets  to  us.  Only  when  we  begin  to  psychologize,  do 
we  reverse  the  order  which  we  really  experience. 

Besides  this  doctrine  of  the  introjection  of  feelings,  it  is 
especially  the  conception  of  unity  which  nowadays  controls 
the  discussion.  Here,  too,  the  antithesis  of  the  methods  is 
evident.  If  we  start  from  the  physical  and  psychical  things, 
we  are  again  certain  that  the  aesthetic  unity  of  the  manifold 
occurs  only  in  the  consciousness  of  the  spectator  and  not  in 
the  beautiful  thing.  Certainly,  the  physical  object  as  such 
has  a  certain  unity  of  its  parts.  The  tree  is  a  unity  for  the 
botanist,  as  the  root  cannot  be  destroyed  without  destroy- 
ing the  branches.  The  unity  is  there  the  causal  interrelation 
of  the  parts.  And  in  a  looser  sense  of  the  word,  even  the  rock  is 
a  imity.  It  may  be  split,  but  as  long  as  it  remains  imchanged, 
the  shifting  of  one  part  in  space  demands  also  a  shifting  of 
all  other  parts.  The  mutual  space-relations  of  the  parts  re- 
main unchanged.  This  kind  of  unity  belongs,  to  be  sure,  also 
to  the  work  of  art,  if  we  conceive  it  naturalistically.  But  it 
is  evident  that  aesthetics  does  not  mean  such  a  unity.  Even 
the  most  absurd  painting  would  have  such  physical  unity. 
The  aesthetician  means  the  unity  which  connects  the  tree  in 
the  painting  with  the  clouds  and  the  sky  and  with  the  brook 
in  the  meadow,  which  are  connected  in  the  unity  of  the  beau- 
tiful landscape,  and  which  certainly  have  no  imity  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  scientist. 

In  this  case  the  psychologist  says  that  we  ourselves  spin 
the  thread  of  relation  by  those  feelings  and  desires  which 
the  manifoldness  of  the  impressions  awakes  in  us.  In  our 
soul  the  indifferent  chaos  of  simultaneous  things  groups  itself 
into  a  harmonious  combination  of  perceptions.  Then  we  call 
related  that  which  awakens  in  us  similar  reactions.  Such  unity 
pleases  us  because  it  lies  in  the  nature  of  our  soul  to  have 
pleasure  from  the  resounding  of  similar  feelings  as  every  ac- 
tivity has  a  tendency  to  spread  in  our  mind.  Again  this  is  all 
quite  correct  psychologically,  but  it  is  a  psychological  con- 


4 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


173 


struction  and  not  a  rendering  of  the  aesthetic  experience.  In 
the  real  experience  the  beautiful  unity  exists  for  us  in  nature 
itself  or  in  the  work  of  art,  and  it  is  our  part  to  understand 
and  to  feel,  and  not  to  create  it.  The  lightning  flashes,  the 
thunder  rolls,  the  black  clouds  threaten,  the  rugged  rocks 
stretch  upward  in  defiant  power,  the  surging  sea  rages  and 
demands  its  victim.  If  we  feel  that  with  sympathizing  soul, 
we  do  not  seek  the  unity  of  the  excited  nature  in  ourselves, 
but  in  this  raving  of  the  elements.  They  are  not  only  filled 
with  the  will  which  we  share,  but  their  volitions  belong  to- 
gether, support  one  another,  reenforce  one  another,  and  point 
to  one  another.  The  rocks  and  the  clouds  and  the  waves  all 
really  want  the  same  thing,  and  we  feel  excited  with  their 
common  emotion. 

It  is  not  different  when  the  unity  of  the  work  of  art  speaks 
to  us.  The  charming  little  rococo  picture  gossips  of  light 
shepherds'  play.  The  position  of  the  figures  betrays  the  gal- 
lant tone ;  the  features,  the  eyes,  the  lips,  frivolously  say  the 
same;  the  laughing  landscape  in  the  background  agrees  with 
the  flowers  in  the  meadow,  and  the  slender  willow  with  the 
fleecy  little  clouds  and  the  glancing  brooklet.  Every  ribbon 
in  the  light  gown  flutters  in  tender  play.  In  the  soft  colors 
and  the  mildly  curved  lines  all  wills  the  same,  all  wills  the 
one,  and  their  real  unity  must  be  felt  if  we  want  to  under- 
stand the  picture.  The  unity  of  the  beautiful  is  the  agreement 
of  its  real  volitions,  which  we  share  only  in  our  feelings.  If 
the  object  of  the  experience  is  transformed  into  physical  and 
psychical  objects,  this  real  unity  has  evaporated. 

The  illustrations  of  the  projection  of  feeling  and  of  unity 
may  be  sufficient.  They  had  to  demonstrate  why  for  us 
the  psychological  method  would  be  misleading,  if  we  want 
to  examine  without  presuppositions  the  values  in  their 
aesthetic  significance  for  the  real  subjective  experience.  But 
now  since  we  know  the  right  starting-point,  we  can  proceed 
straightway  to  our  goal.  And  those  conceptions  which  so  far 


174 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


we  have  used  only  as  illustrations,  the  projection  of  feelings  and 
the  unity,  may  lead  us  on.  Our  thesis  is  that  whenever  in  our 
experience  a  manif oldness  of  wills  approaches  us,  their  agree- 
ment, their  volition  of  mutual  support,  is  to  us  absolutely 
valuable.  The  group  of  values  which  results  in  that  way  is 
aesthetic,  and  among  them  we  find  art.  But  art  is  a  value  of 
civilization ;  we  wanted  to  examine  at  first  the  immediate  naive 
aesthetic  values.  Thus  at  first  we  may  exclude  the  values  of 
art.  We  had  to  speak  of  art  and  nature  together  as  long  as  we 
wanted  to  make  sure  of  the  fundamental  method  and  starting- 
point  for  all  esthetic  treatment.  From  here  we  may  separate 
the  further  work.  We  shall  speak  later  of  art,  but  now  we  turn 
to  the  naive  life-experience  and  inquire  into  its  aesthetic  value. 
Such  immediate  aesthetic  value  must  be  given  to  us  where 
the  manifold  will  of  nature  agrees  in  itself,  and  where  nature 
expresses  accordingly  a  unified  will  in  a  variety  of  mutually 
supporting  expressions.    To  separate  this  group  of  values 
from  those  of  art,  we  may  call  them  the  values  of  unity.  And 
now  we  have  to  seek  their  characteristics  and  to  determine 
their  meaning  and  their  sphere.   We  begin  again  with  the 
outer  world,  and  shall  later  turn  to  the  fellow-world  and  the 
inner  world.    We  start  from  the  fact  that  in  our  life-ex- 
perience nature  approaches  us  with  its  will  and  suggestions, 
and  that  we  feel  this  will  with  nature.  How  that  is  possible, 
we  have  recognized.  We  saw  that  we  do  not  project  the  will 
artificially  into  the  things,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  we  arti- 
ficially eliminate  the  will.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  seen 
that  the  things  of  the  outer  world  do  not  express  a  will  for  us 
all  the  time.   They  are  always  objects  for  our  will,  but,  as 
we  saw,  usually  they  themselves  are  not  subjects  of  will.  In 
the  fellow-beings  the  will  speaks  to  us  as  suggestion  and 
impulse  all  the  time.  With  the  things  it  is  different.  Perhaps 
it  is  especially  different  because  we  all  have  gone  into  the 
school  of  natural  science  and  have  learned  to  notice  the  ef- 
fects of  the  things  and  to  neglect  their  meaning. 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


175 


The  case  where  the  thing,  like  the  other  man,  brings  its  own 
will  to  expression  arises  only  under  special  conditions.  To 
experience  a  thing  in  its  own  will  is  natural  to  us  only  when 
we  have  small  practical  interest  in  it.  Otherwise  we  treat  it 
entirely  as  an  object  of  our  will.  Often  the  impression  itself 
works  as  a  strong  stimulus  to  force  the  own  will  on  the  will 
of  the  subject;  often  again  the  spectator  himself  may  be 
especially  susceptible  through  his  own  mood  for  the  will-sug- 
gestion of  certain  things.  It  always  remains  essential  that  we 
can  understand  this  phase  of  the  outer  world  only  when  our 
practical  desire  which  serves  our  personal  interests  is  little 
concerned.  The  purple  sunset  may  transmit  its  own  excite- 
ment to  our  soul,  but  when  the  sun  troubles  us  with  its  burn- 
ing rays  at  noon-time,  we  try  to  protect  ourselves  from  them, 
and  this  effort  inhibits  every  sympathizing  feeling  with  the 
own  will  of  the  sun  which  expresses  itself  in  its  fiery  glow. 
The  more  significant  the  will  of  nature,  the  more  easily  it 
may  overwhelm  the  petty  personal  will.  The  excited  ocean 
becomes  a  deed  for  us,  while  the  little  lake  is  nothing  but  water 
fit  for  bathing,  fishing,  and  sailing;  only  an  obedient  means 
for  our  will.  And  still  even  the  pond  may  tell  of  its  inner  world 
when  it  reflects  the  overhanging  willows  and  the  sky.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  excited  sea  becomes  expressionless  when  it 
brings  us  into  danger.  Whoever  fights  with  the  waves  does 
not  feel  them  as  angry  fighters,  but  as  a  meaningless  flood.  As 
soon  as  we  come  to  art,  we  shall  find  it  fundamental  that 
every  work  of  art  through  its  artificial  isolation  of  the  content 
favors  and  reenforces  this  entering  into  the  will  of  the  object. 
In  the  face  of  the  world  of  art  this  feeling  with  the  object  is 
the  only  natural  way,  while  in  the  face  of  nature  it  is  the  ex- 
ceptional state.  If  we  want  to  use  the  tree  as  kindling-wood, 
we  do  not  look  at  it  with  the  eyes  of  the  painter,  and  do  not 
ask  about  the  will  of  its  knotty  branches. 

Is  this  will  of  the  outer  world  real?  For  the  one  whose  soul 
understands  and  feels  it,  it  has  exactly  the  same  immediate 


176 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


177 


reality  which  the  own  life-experience  may  have ;  but  of  course 
that  does  not  involve  that  it  can  claim  that  objective  value 
of  existence  which  we  studied  under  the  logical  values.  More- 
over, we  know  that  the  will  of  the  thing  certainly  cannot  have 
this  objective  value  of  existence,  as  we  ascribed  to  a  will  real 
existence  only  when  the  same  will  could  take  attitude  towards 
every  other  possible  thing.  That  alone  gave  real  existence  to 
the  will  of  our  fellow-men.  Yet  that  is  out  of  the  question  for 
the  will  of  the  waves  and  the  clouds ;  their  will  is  exhausted 
in  the  act  of  their  expression.  Yes,  we  can  go  still  further; 
we  can  say  that  the  aesthetically  valuable  thing,  even  as  an  ob- 
ject, does  not  possess  the  objective  value  of  existence.  We  saw 
that  the  real  existence  of  the  outer  world  is  based  on  the  fact 
that  the  object  is  experienceable  for  every  possible  subject. 
The  physicist  demands  that,  but  in  our  vision  of  the  sunset 
this  thought-relation  to  other  subjects  is  not  involved.  The 
beautiful  willing  natxu'e  is  in  that  sense  only  an  impression 
for  us ;  its  objective  reality  as  an  existing  thing  comes  in  ques- 
tion as  little  as  the  objective  existence  of  its  will. 

But  this  fact  must  not  be  misinterpreted  as  if  the  lack  of 
objective  existence  in  any  way  interferes  with  the  aesthetic 
reality.  The  aesthetic  nature  does  not  become  by  it  a  mere 
illusion.  It  has  the  full  immediate  reality  of  life.  If  we  attri- 
bute to  the  life-experience  the  value  of  objective  existence, 
we  have  taken  this  part  of  immediate  reality  into  a  certain 
system  of  will-relations.  We  have  acknowledged  that  we  can 
value  it  at  the  same  time  as  possible  experience  of  every  pos- 
sible subject.  It  does  not  become  more  real  than  the  immedi- 
ate life-experience ;  it  has  only  become  valuable  in  a  certain 
direction,  in  that  direction  which  alone  is  in  question  for 
truth  and  knowledge.  The  aesthetic  nature  and  its  will  does 
not  offer  any  reason  for  this  particular  relation  and  evalu- 
ation. Here  the  life-experience  is  brought  into  an  entirely 
different  system  of  relations  and  evaluations,  the  values  of 
unity.  This  value  of  unity  as  such  has  not  at  the  same  time 


the  value  of  existence;  the  will  of  the  aesthetic  world  has 
therefore  not  psycho-physical  character.  Yet  the  state  which 
demands  the  one  valuation  is  not  less  lifelike  and  not  less 
fundamental  than  the  state  which  suggests  the  other  value. 

We  know  now  that  aesthetic  values  can  be  given  in  the 
world  of  things  only  when  the  things  have  their  own  will.  But 
that  does  not  mean  at  all  that  the  understanding  and  parti- 
cipation in  this  will  sufficient  for  an  aesthetic  evaluation. 
Such  a  view  is  widespread,  but  we  must  decline  to  accept  it. 
Many  conditions  of  aesthetic  attitude  are  fulfilled  as  soon  as 
such  participating  sympathy  begins,  especially  if  our  selfish 
will  is  really  inhibited  by  that  foreign  will  of  nature,  and  yet 
the  most  important  factor  is  still  lacking.  An  aesthetic  value 
is  given  to  us  only  when  a  manifoldness  of  volitions  approaches 
us,  and  when  those  volitions  point  to  one  another  and  agree 
with  one  another.  This  inner  agreement  is  the  deepest  char- 
acteristic of  everything  aesthetic.  Beautiful  nature  must  come 
to  us  as  will  simply  because  agreement  can  reign  only  where 
there  is  will.  In  the  dead  nature  of  science  we  find  the 
unity  of  causal  interconnection,  but  the  unity  of  agreement 
can  never  exist  between  mere  objects.  Agreement  demands 
volitions  of  the  same  tendency,  and  therefore  only  a  nature 
which  wills  can  come  under  the  aesthetic  point  of  view.  Some- 
thing which  is  absolutely  simple  can  never  be  beautiful,  as 
there  can  be  no  agreement  where  there  is  no  manifoldness. 

But  we  must  not  seek  manifoldness  in  the  wrong  direction. 
It  is  not  a  physical  multiplicity :  a  simple  tone  or  a  simple 
light  may  excite  us  by  its  beauty,  because  aesthetically  tone 
or  color  also  appears  as  a  manifold.  Of  course  the  auxiliary 
conceptions  of  physics  have  nothing  to  tell  us  there.  The 
tone  is  composed  of  many  thousand  vibrations  of  air,  the 
light  of  thousands  of  millions  of  ether  vibrations,  but  we 
know  now  that  the  light  ray,  in  so  far  as  it  is  beautiful,  is  not 
at  all  that  physical  light  process;  it  becomes  such  only  when 
we  elaborate  its  objective  existence,  and  this  results  only  from 


178 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


179 


the  relation  to  other  subjects.  The  beautiful  as  such  is  only 
an  impression  and  not  part  of  the  objective  universe  of  the 
physicist,  and  therefore  as  object  of  beauty  not  composed  of 
ether  vibrations.  But  in  another  sense  these  simple  impres- 
sions really  have  a  manifoldness.  The  color  tone  has  its  own 
excitement:  red  does  not  will  what  blue  and  yellow  will. 
Every  simple  color  has  its  own  intensity,  which  again  ex- 
presses an  own  will :  the  faint  light  does  not  express  what  the 
strong  says.  Each  color  has  its  own  saturation :  the  whitish 
blue  resists  the  saturated.  The  light  has  its  space  exten- 
sion ;  even  the  smallest  surface  may  appear  equal  in  its  parts 
or  may  flicker  unequally.  Every  light  has  its  own  time-form : 
the  short  flashing  light  wills  something  different  from  the 
quiet  lasting  one.  The  light  shines  from  the  dark  background, 
the  stillness  of  which  supports  the  luminosity.  In  this  way 
color,  intensity,  saturation,  form,  time,  background,  and 
many  other  factors  express  their  own  will  in  the  simplest  im- 
pression, and  only  when  they  blend  harmoniously  together 
in  their  striving  do  we  experience  the  beauty  of  the  colored 
light.  As  soon  as  light  really  becomes  only  a  point,  or  when 
the  time  duration  is  really  shortened  to  an  instant,  the 
aesthetic  value  disappears. 

If  in  this  way  the  simple  tone  or  light  ray  carries  in  itself  a 
manifoldness  of  agreeing  volitions,  how  incomparable  must 
be  the  internal  richness  which  the  sunny  spring  landscape 
with  the  flowers  and  the  song  of  the  birds  offers  to  us,  with 
the  fleecy  clouds  and  the  merry  brook  and  the  happy  laughing 
meadows.  Like  jubilant  children  who  dance  in  a  ring,  one 
takes  part  in  the  joy  of  the  other,  and  their  agreement  of  will 
becomes  a  unity.  But  this  agreement  of  will  not  only  binds 
them  together ;  at  the  same  time  it  separates  them  from  the 
interplay  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  this  way  the  beautiful 
forms  its  own  boundaries,  which  no  intruder  can  cross.  The 
moon  which  gleams  in  beauty  with  silver  light  over  the  fields 
has  not  the  least  connection  with  the  sun  from  which  its  light 


comes,  in  the  view  of  the  astronomer.  The  doctrine  of  science 
must  connect  the  given  with  the  total  universe,  in  order 
to  carry  through  the  logical  postulate.  The  apprehension 
of  beauty  separates  the  one  given  thing  from  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  finds  the  fulfilment  of  its  demands  in  the  agree- 
ment of  the  internal  manifoldness. 

Now  since  we  find  the  agreement  in  the  centre  of  the  aes- 
thetic world,  we  can  understand  why  a  value  is  in  question 
there.  We  know  that  we  have  a  value  only  where  the  identical 
is  maintained,  that  is,  where  the  return  of  the  starting-point  in 
a  new  experience  fulfils  and  satisfies  our  demand  for  a  world. 
If  we  found  only  a  single  will  in  a  piece  of  nature,  we  could  not 
understand  why  it  would  be  valuable  to  understand  and  to 
feel  this  will.  How  could  it  be  valuable  if  I  simply  exchanged 
my  will  for  that  will  of  the  external  thing  and  thus  felt  myself 
into  the  meaning  of  nature?  iEstheticians  too  often  seek  the 
real  beauty  here.  But  to  throw  myself  down  with  the  water- 
fall or  to  stretch  myself  up  to  the  clouds  with  the  rocks,  to 
make  serpent  movements  with  the  brook  on  the  ground  or  to 
go  up  and  down  with  the  waves,  is  no  enjoyment  even  in  the 
imagination.  It  would  be  only  a  source  of  discomfort,  and 
there  cannot  be  value  where  there  is  no  satisfaction.  That 
changes  at  once  if  I  seek  the  will  in  which  nature  approaches 
me  in  a  new  experience  and  find  it  identical  again  in  new 
volitions  of  nature.  That  is  fulfilment  and  satisfaction  of 
my  desire. 

This  satisfaction,  this  fulfilment,  this  value,  must  be  over- 
personal.  I  do  not  feel  with  nature  and  do  not  maintain  its 
will  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  anything  for  myself  or  to  pro- 
tect myself.  This  finding  of  the  agreement  in  nature  has  no 
relation  whatever  to  my  personality.  As  soon  as  my  personal 
interests  entered,  nature  would  become  a  means  for  my  own 
will,  and  the  will  of  the  things  would  remain  unnoticed.  It 
is  not  my  caprice  that  the  will  of  the  one  thing  ought  to  be 
found  again  in  the  other,  but  the  aesthetic  reality  itself  de- 


180 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


181 


mands  it  from  me.  I  cannot  perceive  the  one  will  without 
looking  out  and  searching  for  an  agreeing  will,  and  without 
being  disturbed  by  an  unlike  disharmonious  volition.  And 
yet  this  demand  to  find  the  agreeing  will  is  after  all  only  a 
special  expression  of  our  fundamental  will  to  apperceive  the 
world  which  we  find  in  our  life  as  an  independent  and  self- 
asserting  one.  It  is  a  necessary  will  for  every  one  whom  we 
are  to  acknowledge  at  all  as  a  subject  that  the  world  is  more 
than  our  mere  immediate  experience,  that  it  is  a  world,  and 
that  therefore  it  expresses  its  selfhood  by  the  agreement  of 
its  parts.  It  is  accordingly  an  absolutely  over-personal  de- 
mand that  the  world  show  its  world  character  by  the  inner 
harmony  of  its  volitions,  and  the  fulfilment  of  this  demand 
must  be  valuable  in  an  absolute  and  necessary  way. 

From  here  we  can  see  clearly  the  antithesis  of  the  aesthetic 
and  the  logical  values.  The  values  of  unity  and  beauty  on  the 
one  side,  the  values  of  existence  and  connection  on  the  other 
side,  are  equally  fulfilments  of  the  over-personal  demand  for 
the  self-assertion  of  our  experienced  world.  In  both  cases  we 
are  satisfied,  because  we  find  that  which  we  experience  iden- 
tical again  in  new  experience,  and  in  both  cases  we  seek  it 
again,  because  only  this  identical  occurrence  means  to  us  the 
selfhood  and  independence  of  the  world.  But  the  direction 
in  which  this  independence  expresses  itself  is  fundamentally 
different.  As  far  as  the  world  of  things  is  concerned,  we  can 
say  the  logical  valuation  demands  that  the  thing  remain 
identical  as  an  object,  the  aesthetic  valuation  demands  that 
the  will  of  the  things  remain  the  same.  In  the  first  case  we 
must  postulate  the  perseverance  of  the  perceivable  parts 
through  all  time,  in  the  second  case  we  must  postulate  the 
eternal  agreement  of  those  volitions  which  we  feel  in  the 
things.  The  object  remains  identical  when  it  perseveres,  the 
will  remains  identical  when  it  is  willed  in  agreement. 

From  this  difference  many  consequences  result.  From  the 
first  we  can  understand  that  the  logical  value  must  link  the 


present  experience  with  the  total  world-series  of  all  thinkable 
experiences.   If  the  things  are  to  continue,  they  must  find 
their  identical  existence  in  the  furthest  past  and  future.  The 
task  is  to  connect  the  given  with  all  which  is  not  yet  given 
or  no  longer  given,  and  to  elaborate  the  causal  connection 
through  this  perseverance.    Science  connects  every  single 
piece  with  the  totality,  every  grain  of  sand  with  the  whole 
universe.   The  aesthetic  aspect,  on  the  other  hand,  isolates. 
The  agreeing  volitions  in  the  experience  together  form  a  unity 
and  exclude  everything  foreign.  Nothing  points  beyond  the 
harmonious  life-experience,  nothing  connects  with  the  past 
or  the  future.   The  value  of  beauty  is  perfect,  if  the  given 
harmonizes  in  its  own  will-manifoldness.  And  it  is  clear  too 
that  this  mutual  agreement  means  at  the  same  time  mutual 
fulfilment;  one  will  can  be  satisfied  by  another  will  in  no 
other  way  than  by  being  realized  once  more,  and  thus  by 
being  willed  again.  A  will  which  wants  to  remain  a  will  can- 
not seek  from  the  other  will  anything  but  agreement,  support, 
and  accord.   Truth  connects  and  beauty  isolates.   Only  ap- 
parently and  externally  is  that  contradicted  by  another  fact 
which  really  stands  in  the  closest  connection  with  it.    The 
truth  ultimately  seeks  simple  elements,  while  beauty  always 
demands  a  manifoldness.    Indeed,  if  in  science  everything 
depends  upon  the  continuation  of  the  objects,  this  persever- 
ing single  thing  is  independent  of  the  existence  of  other  things. 
The  possibility  of  understanding  the  interplay  of  things  from 
the  perseverance  of  partial  things  will  be  the  greater  the  sim- 
pler we  think  the  lasting  objects  themselves.   Therefore  we 
need  the  atoms.  Beauty,  on  the  other  hand,  demands  agree- 
ment, and  therefore  presupposes  manifoldness.   Beauty  thus 
always  leads  to  the  vision  of  many  parts.  But  that  atomistic 
real  object  is,  as  we  saw,  connected  with  all  past  and  future 
positions  of  the  universe,  while  this  manifold  beautiful  is 
entirely  detached  from  the  remainder  of  the  world. 
Knowledge  offers  us  the  ways  and  means  for  action,  as  the 


182 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


insight  into  perseverance  teaches  us  to  determine  beforehand 
from  the  given  that  which  is  not  given,  that  which  is  to  be 
expected,  that  which  is  important  for  action.  Beauty  does  not 
lead  beyond  itself,  is  therefore  useless  for  practical  action, 
but  beauty  teaches  us  to  understand  the  inner  meaning  of  the 
world.  As  knowledge  determines  the  means  of  our  action  and 
decides  about  its  success,  we  subordinate  ourselves  to  truth, 
and  by  this  subordination  we  master  the  world.  It  is  by  de- 
votion that  we  serve  beauty,  but  in  this  devotion  we  over- 
come the  world  and  liberate  ourselves  from  our  needs.  The 
devotion  to  the  beautiful  demands  that  we  feel  the  will  of 
nature  and  bring  to  silence  the  chance  will  of  our  individ- 
uality. By  our  subordination  to  truth  we  grasp  the  world  as 
an  independent  self-persevering  thing;  by  our  devotion  to 
beauty  we  grasp  the  world  as  an  independent  self-agreeing 
will. 

So  far  we  have  sketched  only  the  antithesis  for  the  outer 
world,  but  we  know  that  the  same  postulates  must  also  hold 
for  the  subjects  of  the  fellow-world  and  the  acts  of  the  inner 
world.  Their  perseverance,  and  that  means  their  logical  val- 
ues, we  found  in  the  field  of  history  and  reason.  There,  too, 
we  had  to  seek  the  simple  elements  and  to  connect  them  with 
the  totality  of  the  real.  The  fellow-subjects  and  the  inner 
acts  present  to  us,  like  the  things  for  our  knowledge,  an 
unlimited  system  which  has  objective  value.  It  is  therefore 
natural  to  ask  whether  or  not,  here  too,  the  aesthetic  aspect 
may  be  possible  and  may  give  us  fundamental  values.  For 
the  subjects  and  inner  acts  also  can  we  not  seek  the  internal 
agreement,  and  through  the  inner  agreement  their  isolation? 
Thus  our  question  is  —  and  at  first  this  question  arises  far 
from  cultural  values  of  art :  Are  there  immediate  life- values 
in  which  the  will-agreement  of  the  fellow-subjects  or  the 
will-agreement  of  the  inner  world  comes  to  an  independent 
value?  And  without  hesitation  we  must  give  an  affirmative 
reply.  It  is  arbitrary  to  confine  the  aesthetic  values  of  agree- 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


183 


ment  to  the  things  alone.  The  postulates  which  we  find  ful- 
filled in  the  outer  world  repeat  themselves  in  the  fellow-world 
and  the  inner  world.  Subjects  of  the  fellow- world  reach  this 
agreement  of  will  in  friendship  and  love  and  peace ;  the  ex- 
citements of  the  inner  world  find  unity  in  happiness.  We 
may  perhaps  call  attention  to  the  most  essential  point  if  we 
name  this  agreement  of  subjects  *'love"  and  the  agreement 
of  the  things  ''harmony.''  We  then  have  as  values  of  unity 
in  the  outer  world  harmony,  in  the  fellow-world  love,  in  the 
inner  world  happiness,  and  we  may  turn  to  them  with  a  few 
further  meditations. 


A.  —  HARMONY 

We  have  developed  the  conception  of  the  value  of  unity 
essentially  with  reference  to  the  harmony  of  things,  and  given 
hardly  any  attention  to  the  unity  of  subjects  and  the  unity  of 
the  inner  world.  All  the  essential  points  as  to  harmony  are 
therefore  clear  before  our  minds,  and  we  have  only  to  add 
some  particular  features.  For  instance,  we  have  not  consid- 
ered so  far  the  difference  between  the  aesthetic  valuation  and 
the  sensuous  enjoyment  which  nature  may  offer  us.  The  small- 
est and  the  largest,  the  drop  of  dew  which  glistens  on  the  bud 
of  a  rose,  the  starry  sky  on  a  clear  winter  night,  may  be  spec- 
tacles which  we  evaluate.  But  the  fresh  wind  which  cools  us, 
the  sun  which  warms  us,  the  fruit  which  tastes  well,  the  lips 
which  tempt  us,  promise  and  give  a  personal  gratification 
with  a  pleasure-tone  which  by  principle  stands  in  contrast  to 
the  over-personal  valuation.  The  desire  which  is  gratified  by 
the  sensuous  delight  is  my  individual  desire  for  a  special  per- 
sonal experience.  I  maintain  the  idea  of  the  juicy  taste  of  the 
fruit  until  it  is  realized  in  the  experience  of  my  senses.  The 
will  which  is  directed  towards  my  own  states  determines  at 
first  my  maintaining  such  an  idea  and  later  my  satisfaction 
by  its  identical  realization.  The  idea  itself  was  accompanied 
by  pleasure,  and  the  pleasure  started  the  organic  process 


184  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

which  led  to  the  fulfilment.  In  the  aesthetic  valuation,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  our  will ;  it  is  the  thing  itself,  the  will  of 
which  seeks  its  realization  in  an  identical  will  of  the  surround- 
ing  nature.  We  are  aesthetically  satisfied  when  we  feel  that 
agreement  of  the  volitions  in  the  things.  We  feel  with  the 
things  and  try  to  seek  for  the  will  which  we  feel  in  nature,  a 
sympathizing  will  in  other  parts ;  the  finding  of  the  same 
tendencies  rewards  our  search.  We  seek  the  harmonious  will 
—harmonious  not  with  us,  but  with  the  will  of  the  things— 
because  we  want  to  understand  the  independent  selfhood  of 
nature.  Nature  is  no  self  as  long  as  nature  appears  in  con- 
tradiction with  itself  and  does  not  express  any  inner  agree- 
ment. In  the  practical  pleasure  in  nature,  nature  is  a  means 
for  the  satisfaction  of  our  own  individual  will :  in  the  aesthetic 
valuation  of  nature,  we  are  satisfied  because  the  will  of  nature 
is  in  harmony  with  itself. 

Such  a  fundamental  antithesis  does  not  exclude  the  possi- 
bility  that  both  feelings  may  combine.  When,  heated  from  a 
sunny  road,  we  enter  the  shady  woods  where  the  cool  water 
of  the  spring  relieves  our  thirst  and  berries  in  the  moss  re- 
fresh us,  our  intense  delight  and  sensuous  comfort  may  fuse 
with  the  impersonal  devotion  to  the  peace  of  nature.  Usually, 
of  course,  it  holds  true  that  the  thing  which  we  use  or  which 
we  avoid  from  personal  reasons  is  for  us  only  an  object,  and 
not  an  expression  of  an  own  will.  But  there  are  certain  cases 
possible  in  which  the  own  desire  for  the  thing  is  still  increased 
as  soon  as  we  feel  intensely  the  sympathetic  or  antipathetic 
will  of  nature  itself.  Yet  the  fact  remains  that  even  in  such 
a  case  the  beautiful  nature  is  valuable  not  because  the  will 
which  we  feel  in  it  belongs  to  a  thing  which  can  gratify  our 
desire  for  pleasure,  but  exclusively  because  that  will  which 
we  feel  in  it  harmonizes  with  other  wills  in  the  manifoldness 
of  nature.  It  is  therefore  quite  possible  that  nature  may  re- 
main ^sthetically  valuable  for  us  where  parts  of  it,  or  perhaps 
even  the  whole,  may  be  objects  of  our  personal  rejection. 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY  185 

The  landscape  may  be  awesome,  the  ravine  and  the  wild  tor- 
rent  uncanny,  the  rocky  path  painful,  the  stormy  wind  icy; 
and  yet,  in  spite  of  our  intense  discomfort,  the  mountains  and 
the  stream  and  the  wind  come  to  us  with  life.  We  feel  their 
threatening  will,  and  the  unity  of  their  will  overwhelms  us 
with  insistent  beauty.  Nature  is  aesthetically  free  from  values 
If  we  do  not  feel  its  will  at  all.   But  it  is  aesthetically  anti- 
valuable  only  when  the  will  of  nature  is  felt  as  in  inner  dis- 
agreement, not  when  it  is  simply  an  object  of  personal  resist- 
ance.   Perhaps  the  beauty  of  the  sublime  always  contains  a 
factor  of  personal  displeasure,  since  its  will  overwhelms  and 
suppresses  us.    In  a  corresponding  way  the  beauty  of  the 
charming  may  always  contain  a  separate  element  of  personal 
pleasure.  Only  in  pure  beauty  everything  which  enters  into 
the  harmony  of  volitions  is  given  as  an  aesthetic  harmony  in 
itself  beyond  pleasure  and  displeasure.   In  the  landscape  of 
pure  beauty  grow  only  beautiful  flowers,  and  every  flower 
has  beautiful  colors. 

What  is  the  meaning  and  significance  of  this  will  in  the 
things  of  nature?  On  the  dark  pond  the  swan  softly  glides; 
every  line  of  the  swan-form,  every  light  in  its  white  feathers 
and  in  its  mirror-image,  every  movement  of  the  wings,  and 
even  the  quiet  ripple  among  the  water-lilies,  all  sound  together 
in  the  pure  harmony  of  the  beautiful  impression.  What  is  the 
will  of  nature  which  comes  to  such  unity  of  expression  there, 
and  which  would  be  confused  and  destroyed  if  the  neck  of  the 
swan  were  short,  or  the  lights  colored,  or  the  movements 
violent,  or  the  water  dirty  ?   It  certainly  is  not  an  abstract 
moral  which  is  proclaimed  to  us  there,  not :  Be  like  a  swan.  • 
The  swan  has  nothing  at  all  to  say  which  concerns  us  person- 
ally. Even  the  immediate  suggestion :  Take  part  in  this  peace 
of  nature,  cannot  be  the  meaning  of  the  will  of  nature  there, 
inasmuch  as  this  landscape  can  be  willing  for  us  and  can  have 
meaning  only  as  far  as  our  own  feeling  enters  into  it.  What 
we  do  not  feel  in  our  own  life-experience  remains  dead.   As 


186  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

soon  as  it  becomes  living,  no  advice  is  any  longer  needed  to 
enter  into  it  with  feeling.  Still  less  can  we  find  the  meaning 
of  the  scene  in  a  conceptional  communication.  We  do  not 
evaluate  the  image  of  the  swan  because  it  gives  us  a  know- 
ledge  of  that  which  is  typical  for  the  swan  in  a  naturalistic 
sense.  Our  esthetic  appreciation  does  not  move  at  all  in  the 
direction  in  which  the  zoologist  or  anatomist  would  have  to 
proceed  if  he  wanted  to  grasp  the  characteristics  of  the 
swan.  The  naturalistic  conception  of  the  animal  is  formed 
with  reference  to  causal  connections  which  refer  to  the  ex- 
ternal relations  of  the  bodily  parts.  The  aesthetic  apprehen- 
sion has  nothing  to  do  with  the  bodily  parts,  but  refers  only 
to  the  aims  and  excitements,  the  agreement  of  which  would 
not  be  disturbed  by  any  physiological  impossibility. 

The  beautiful  in  nature  is  thus  neither  advice  nor  natural- 
istic information.  Do  we  come  nearer  to  the  truth  if  we  seek 
its  meaning  in  an  idea  which  lies  beyond  the  real?  Does  such 
supra-real  proclamation  express  itself  through  nature?   No- 
thing lies  further  from  us  here.  If  nature  has  its  meaning  in 
its  will,  the  aesthetic  valuation  does  not  connect  at  all  this 
will  with  any  metaphysical  beyond.  The  beautiful  agreement 
of  nature  is  not  suspended,  but  soars  aloft  on  its  own  wings. 
It  wills  nothing  but  itself.  To  be  sure,  our  metaphysical  con- 
victions may  influence  our  aesthetic  appreciations,  but  the 
effect  is  not  different  from  that  of  our  conceptional  knowledge. 
Our  convictions  and  in  a  similar  way  our  moral  views  can 
reenforce  or  inhibit  our  feeling  for  the  will  of  the  things,  but 
the  aesthetic  harmony  is  not  touched  by  it.  But  then,  what  is 
expressed  after  all  if  it  is  neither  doctrine,  nor  conception, 
nor  metaphysical  idea?  We  can  answer  only :  Nature's  own 
character  is  expressed,  her  own  charm  and  her  dignity,  her 
excitement  and  her  rest,  her  stormy  desire  and  her  quiet 
resignation,  her  serenity  and  her  reverie.  And  yet  every  con- 
ceptional word  leads  us  astray.  Nature  makes  no  program- 
matic  music.  What  the  swan  has  to  say  in  its  soft  movement 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY  187 

through  the  lily-pond  cannot  be  pronounced  in  any  other 
language. 

In  still  another  direction  we  must  characterize  the  value 
of  unity  m  nature.  A  kind  of  agreement  between  the  natural 
things  is  found  also  by  the  naturalist  who  can  recognize 
everywhere  the  fitness  of  the  natural  objects.  The  interrela- 
tions of  the  parts  of  nature  show  at  every  point  a  surprising 
mutual  adjustment,  and  that  appears  to  be  a  new  symptom 
of  the  harmony  of  things.  How  wonderful,  for  instance,  is  the 
mutual  fitness  of  the  blossoms  and  the  insects.  Yet  we  should 
sacrifice  the  most  essential  factor  of  the  ^thetic  theory  if 
those  two  kinds  of  relations  were  acknowledged  as  parallel. 
The  mutual  adjustment  of  the  things  belongs  absolutely  to 
their  external  character,  and  has  no  reference  to  their  mean- 
ing, their  expression,  their  own  will.  The  traditional  conjunc- 
tion of  natural  beauty  and  natural  fitness  must  be  dissolved. 
The  over-personal  value  of  agreement  which  we  seek  demands 
that  we  find  the  will  of  the  one  in  the  will  of  the  other.  That 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the  conservation  of  the 
one  is  secured  by  the  causal  influences  of  the  other.   Such 
external  unity  occurs  in  every  physical  system  and  has  np 
aesthetic  value. 

Only  one  kind  of  aesthetic  valuation  of  nature  may  still  be 
mentioned  because  it  is  sometimes  erroneously  treated  as  the 
only  possible  case.  The  man  of  civUization  who  has  trained 
his  mental  eye  on  the  works  of  fine  art  and  whose  soul  is  filled 
by  the  suggestions  of  lyric  poetry  may  look  into  nature  as  if 
nature  were  a  painting  in  a  frame  and  her  mood  a  lyric  poem. 
If  we  take  such  an  attitude,  we  certainly  are  not  disloyal  to 
the  spirit  of  natural  beauty,  and  many  an  impulse  towards 
the  esthetic  valuation  of  nature  is  enriched  and  developed 
through  this  effect  of  art.  But  it  is  certainly  not  the  primary 
kind  of  aesthetic  appreciation  of  nature.  Nature  which  is 
seen  through  the  eyes  of  a  possible  work  of  art  may  then  bring 
its  aesthetic  values  to  clearest  expression  because  the  work  of 


t 


188  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

art  may  reenf orce  and  elaborate  them ;  but  art  only  reen- 
f orces  those  values  which  exist  for  the  naive  life :  art  does 
not  create  them.    The  aesthetic  valuation  of  the  experienced 
nature  with  its  agreeing  volitions  is  absolutely  the  aesthetic 
starting-point.  The  question  of  how  far  it  is  at  the  same  time 
the  historic  beginning  belongs  to  an  entirely  different  aspect. 
We  may  appreciate  those  values  with  a  new  vividness  by  our 
training  in  the  enjoyment  of  art,  but  this  is  possible  only  be- 
cause art  seeks  and  maintains  those  values.  The  values  them- 
selves exist  independent  and  self-asserting.   The  sociologist 
may  be  right  in  claiming  that  civilization  and  art  have 
helped  to  awaken  in  us  the  sympathizing  feeling  for  the  self- 
agreement  of  the  will  in  nature,  but  our  immediate  experience 
tells  us  that  the  spheres  of  harmony  sound  the  purest  when 
we  forget  all  civilization  and  art. 

B.  —  LOVE 
Can  we,  as  in  nature,  find  an  absolute  value  in  the  world  of 
subjects?  We  studied  that  fellow-world  in  its  value  of  exist- 
ence and  in  its  value  of  connection,  and  understood  how  men 
as  subjects  of  will  enter  into  the  life  of  history.  Is  the  mutual 
harmony  of  their  will  now  an  absolute  value,  too  ?   But  it 
would  be  impossible  to  deny  it  here.  Again  we  have  a  mani- 
foldness  of  will  which  we  feel  with  the  subjects,  and  again  we 
find  such  will  in  mutual  agreement.  All  the  conditions  for  a 
pure  valuation  are  therefore  again  fulfilled.   If  we  call  love 
that  harmony  of  souls  which  sounds  through  friendship  and 
passion  and  peace  and  human  brotherhood,  then  love  must  be 
an  absolutely  valid  aesthetic  value.   It  is  the  over-personal 
beauty  of  the  fellow-world,  as  the  harmony  of  things  was  the 
pure  beauty  of  the  outer  world. 

Of  course  man  also  stands  in  the  midst  of  beautiful  nature. 
There  he  stands  in  the  masquerade  of  his  gay-colored  cloak 
of  civilization  as  a  picturesque  thing  among  things;  or  he 
stands  there  in  noble  nakedness,  and  every  line  expresses  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


189 


purity  of  nature.  But  in  the  realm  of  nature  man  in  his  beau- 
tiful forms  is  found  only  like  the  flowers  in  the  field.  The  value 
of  love  brings  his  soul  to  expression.  What  the  beautiful 
female  body  as  object  of  vision  says  by  the  play  of  its  forms 
and  lights  is  independent  of  that  which  proceeds  in  the  soul 
of  the  woman.  It  is  as  with  the  swan  in  the  pond,  which  ex- 
presses a  meaning  of  its  beauty  of  which  its  bird-understand- 
ing has  no  idea.  Every  new  position,  every  new  foreshorten- 
ing, every  new  line  of  the  hair,  changes  the  will  of  the  figure 
and  brings  new  unities  of  expression.  The  will  of  the  inner 
personality  remains  unchanged  by  it,  and  the  outer  figure 
goes  on  to  will  its  own  meaning  aesthetically  when,  perhaps 
in  sleep,  the  will  of  the  personality  has  come  to  rest. 

But  now  we  want  to  seek  the  harmony  of  that  inner  will. 
That  can  always  have  only  the  one  meaning,  that  your  will  is 
to  become  my  will  and  my  will  your  will.  Only  the  forms  of 
this  fusion  are  endless  in  their  manifoldness.  The  unity  may 
be  short  or  long :  from  the  short  meeting  of  will  in  the  play 
of  children  or  in  light  social  company  to  the  union  which  is 
loyal  to  itself  beyond  death.    The  unity  may  concern  the 
smallest  part  of  the  personality  or  the  whole  self ;  from  sym- 
pathy with  the  pain  of  the  sufferer  whom  we  see  in  the  street 
to  the  life  friendship  from  which  nothing  is  hidden  in  the  soul 
of  the  other.   The  unity  may  arise  in  the  nearest  as  in  the 
widest  circle,  from  the  love  between  man  and  wife  which  ex- 
cludes everything  but  the  loved  one  to  the  humanitarian  love 
for  mankind  which  includes  everything  that  has  the  features 
of  man.  The  unity  may  be  joyous  or  may  be  tragic,  from  the 
happy  delight  with  which  two  young  souls  find  each  other  to 
the  martyrdom  of  the  service  which  sacrifices  itself.  The  unity 
may  be  penetrated  by  selfish  longing  or  may  be  absolutely  un- 
selfish, from  the  passion  of  the  rapturous  bliss  of  becoming 
one,  in  which  the  sensuous  self  is  triumphing,  to  the  mother- 
love  which  renounces  herself  that  another  self  may  be  able  to 
will  its  own  self. 


190 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


The  usual  way  of  looking  on  this  unity  of  selves  either 
denies  to  them  the  absolute  value,  or  shifts  the  value  to  an 
entirely  different  group,  to  the  moral  values.  The  history  of 
philosophy  has  not  seldom  seen  in  it  the  fundamental  and 
decisive  moral  value.    Schopenhauer's  revival  of  the  old 
Indie  doctrine  of  sympathy  gave  the  classical  expression  to 
such  ethical  teaching.    He  alone  acts  morally  who  is  con- 
trolled by  the  certainty  that  the  fellow-man  and  the  own  self 
are  fundamentally  one  and  the  same,  and  he  acts  immorally 
who  counteracts  the  will  of  the  fellow-being  by  his  own  will, 
and  who  by  affirming  his  own  will  denies  the  will  of  the 
other.   In  the  coalescence  of  all  souls  lies  the  beginning  and 
end  of  all  goodness.  To  be  sure,  in  Schopenhauer's  world  the 
immediate  life-experience  finds  only  the  inner  world  as  a  will, 
while  the  fellow-world  is  at  first  merely  an  idea.  To  know  the 
will  of  the  other  man,  we  have  to  project  our  will  into  the 
body  of  the  other  man.  The  volitions  of  the  various  individ- 
uals thus  remain  in  the  spatial  temporal  separation  of  the 
body,  and  can  find  each  other  only  when  all  individuality  is 
eliminated  and  we  sink  from  the  world-experience  into  the 
metaphysical  unreality  in  which  there  cannot  be  any  per- 
sonal individualization.   But  we  must  object  to  such  philo- 
sophy from  the  start.  We  recognize  too  clearly  that  the  im- 
mediate contact  between  will  and  will  does  not  demand  a 
metaphysical  overcoming  of  experience,  but  that  it  is  the  im- 
mediate effect  of  our  relation  to  our  fellow-beings,  not  less 
immediate  than  the  experience  of  things.   We  remain  thor- 
oughly in  the  pure  life-experience  when  we  become  certain 
that  the  will  of  our  friend  is  our  own  will,  that  his  joy  is  our 
joy,  that  his  suffering  is  our  pain.  We  do  not  need  the  break- 
ing  down  of  the  bodily  limitations,  as  the  will  of  the  fellow- 
man  was  from  the  start  for  us  not  a  projection  of  our  will 
into  the  perceived  body,  but  a  special  kind  of  reality  which 
•  we  grasped  in  immediate  life-experience.   Thus  it  is  for  us 
a  question  far  from  metaphysical  speculations  whether  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


191 


fusion  of  the  will  of  two  beings  is  valuable  or  not.  The  value 
of  such  unity  of  will  can  in  no  case  be  found  in  the  idea  that 
it  subdues  experience  and  leads  us  to  an  absolute  trans- 
experience.  Just  this  unity  of  will  is  immediate  life-experience 
for  us.  When  we  artificially  transform  the  immediate  life  into 
perceptions  and  make  out  of  the  willing  beings  causally  con- 
nected things,  then  only  do  we  create  those  walls  over  which 
we  have  to  fly  later  by  a  trans-natural  mutual  soul-contact. 
If  in  such  a  way  the  metaphysical  background  disap- 
pears, in  what  sense  may  we  still  have  a  right  to  look  on  the 
coalescence  of  wills  as  a  moral  value  ?  Of  course  we  cannot 
really  study  here  what  we  ultimately  are  to  call  moral.  We 
shall  have  to  separate  carefully  the  moral  from  the  morally 
indifferent,  when  we  discuss  the  deeds  and  decisions  of  the 
personalities.  But  it  ought  to  be  kept  in  view  from  the  start 
that  we  indeed  have  a  right  to  speak  of  moral  achievements 
only  in  the  realm  of  deed  and  decision.  It  is  no  deed,  no  de- 
cision, no  achievement,  when  in  earthly  or  in  heavenly  love 
we  feel  an  expansion  of  the  own  self,  or  when  the  soul  of  the 
parents  resounds  with  the  joy  or  the  pain  of  their  children. 
How  such  feeling  happened  to  arise  in  us  we  do  not  know 
ourselves ;  we  did  not  choose  it,  we  could  not  do  otherwise. 
To  feel  with  the  others  and  to  have  sympathy  is  our  being. 
If  we  stamp  our  love,  which  is  our  happiness  and  our  treasure, 
as  a  special  personal  merit,  we  enter  into  a  vagueness  of 
feeling  by  which  the  truly  moral  decision  would  have  to  lose 
its  characteristic  value.  It  is  a  gift  of  life,  endlessly  valuable, 
to  find  in  our  soul  friendship  and  sympathy  and  love,  but 
with  the  merit  of  morality  such  emotional  tendencies  have  as 
little  to  do  as  musical  talent  or  mathematical  ability.  If  there 
is  no  moral  merit  in  having  a  devoted  heart  full  of  love,  then 
also  it  is  surely  no  moral  achievement  which  deserves  praise 
when  the  sympathy  expresses  itself  in  a  corresponding  action. 
When  a  mother  acts  for  the  protection  of  her  child  whom  she 
dearly  loves,  she  does  not  think  herself  to  deserve  moral  credit 


192 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


for  it.  Yet  the  principle  is  not  different  when  the  inner  unity 
of  will  goes  beyond  such  narrowest  circle.  If  we  really  love 
our  neighbor  as  ourselves,  then  it  is  not  an  action  which 
moves  in  the  direction  of  ethical  merit  when  we  make  efforts 
to  help  the  neighbor.  Such  an  action  is  not  for  that  reason  less 
valuable  than  a  moral  deed,  only  it  is  not  a  moral  deed.  We 
decline,  therefore,  to  accept  the  unity  of  minds  as  a  demand 
of  morality.   Love  is  one  thing  and  duty  another. 

Duty  and  morality  are  postulated  as  absolute  values.  Are 
we  therefore  obliged  to  accept  the  conclusion  that  love  does 
not  represent  an  absolute  value  ?  The  unity  of  wills  would 
then  only  be  a  personal  joy  and  chance  inclination,  which 
seeks  individual  gratification  in  friendship  and  love  and  hu- 
man welfare,  and  which  is  not  different  by  principle  from  the 
inclination  for  sweet  foods  and  sparkling  wines.  But  that, 
too,  is  entirely  misleading.  The  devotion  of  the  heart  has  no 
moral  value,  and  if  we  were  to  group  all  human  actions  under 
the  one  point  of  view,  that  only  the  moral  achievement  is 
valuable,  we  should  indeed  have  to  eliminate  love  as  indiffer- 
ent, perhaps  even  as  weakness.  The  devotion  of  the  soul 
has  nevertheless  an  unlimited  value,  a  value  as  absolutely 
valid  as  morality  itself,  the  eternal  value  of  perfect  unity. 
Therefore  we  had  to  bring  love  into  line  with  the  aesthetic 
values.  And  we  must  not  misinterpret  the  meaning  of  aes- 
thetic value  in  the  light  sense  of  the  term.  The  unity  of  souls 
is  not  simply  a  charming  spectacle  which  adorns  our  existence 
and  beautifies  the  seriousness  of  life  with  pleasant  play.  We 
called  the  total  values  of  unity  aesthetic  because  all  art  and 
beauty  of  nature  belonged  in  the  same  circle,  but  what  is 
meant  is  a  holy  and  serious  value  which  grasps  the  deepest 
powers  of  our  personality.  As  the  starry  night  in  its  eternal 
beauty  makes  us  feel  the  meaning  of  unity  by  its  sublime 
glory,  the  value  of  unity  comes  to  us  with  no  less  unlimited 
splendor  when  two  souls  have  become  one  for  better  or  for 
worse  in  eternal  loyalty. 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


193 


But  we  must  keep  the  essentials  in  mind.  The  value  which 
we  try  to  grasp  here  must  not  be  sought  in  the  feeling  of 
the  self-surrendering  personality.  If  he  who  seeks  the  will 
of  the  other  man  experiences  at  first  in  his  own  desire  only 
a  personal  excitement,  then  satisfaction  of  his  will  can  have 
only  personal  value.  His  personal  pleasure  in  contact  with  the 
loved  one  may  stand  higher  than  the  joys  of  the  table,  but 
it  remains  strictly  individual,  and  unfit  to  lead  up  to  the 
height  of  the  over-personal  value.  The  real  aesthetic  value 
belongs  entirely  to  the  unity  of  the  will-manifoldness.  It  is 
the  same  satisfaction  as  in  every  other  field  of  values.  The 
one  single  part  as  such  never  has  over-personal  value;  the 
value  always  belongs  only  to  the  relation  between  the  two 
separated  parts,  which  in  a  certain  sense  become  identical. 
Thus  that  which  is  valuable  is  something  quite  different  from 
the  mere  sum  of  the  two  personal  individual  enjoyments. 
The  logical  value  of  an  equation  is  also  destroyed  when  the 
symbol  of  identity  is  erased  and  only  two  groups  of  concep- 
tions remain,  each  of  which  may  have  a  certain  logical  signi- 
ficance, but  which  have  lost  their  relation  of  equality.  The 
enjoyment  of  the  friend  or  of  the  loved  one  in  the  two  single 
souls  is  entirely  different  from  the  consciousness  of  the  unity 
between  the  two,  a  consciousness  which  may  enter  into  the 
mind  of  either.  Of  course  there  is  no  opposition  between 
the  two  possibilities.  In  the  world  of  nature  we  saw  that  the 
personal  pleasure  easily  interferes  with  the  aesthetic  appre- 
ciation of  unity,  because  our  personal  desire  took  the  thing  as 
an  object  and  did  not  listen  to  the  own  will  of  the  thing.  In 
the  relation  to  the  fellow-world,  it  must  be  different.  The 
will  which  is  to  be  found  in  its  agreement  with  other  wills 
must  be  most  accessible  to  the  subject  who  takes  part  in  the 
united  group.  The  friendship  which  brings  the  two  friends 
into  aesthetic  unity  cannot  be  felt  by  any  one  more  vividly 
than  by  each  of  the  friends.  Each  of  them  knows  his  own 
will  from  the  deepest  source,  and  finds  his  joy  in  feeling  with 


194 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


195 


the  soul  of  his  friend.  Each  of  them  feels  the  will  of  both, 
and  accordingly  can  have  not  only  his  own  personal  pleasure 
in  the  sympathy  of  the  friend,  but  at  the  same  time  the  over- 
personal  aesthetic  delight  in  the  identity  of  the  two  will-atti- 
tudes. His  pleasure  refers  to  his  personal  part ;  his  pure  ap- 
preciation refers  to  that  mental  totality  in  its  aesthetic  unity. 

Only  where  two  souls  have  become  a  unity  do  we  find  a  re- 
ality which  is  no  longer  a  flickering  haphazard  experience,  but 
which  has  the  significance  of  self-assertion.  Only  where  two 
souls  have  become  a  unity  does  there  radiate  into  the  world 
of  will  an  own  self-dependent  meaning.  We  seek  such  a  self- 
asserting  meaning,  and  must  seek  it  if  we  want  to  have  a 
world.  We  must  apprehend  one  will,  therefore,  in  such  a  way 
that  we  maintain  it  with  a  desire  to  find  it  again  identical.  If 
we  find  it,  this  demand  is  fulfilled,  we  are  absolutely  satisfied, 
we  have  found  a  fraction  of  the  self-asserting  world.  As  this 
demand  is  not  impelled  by  a  personal  need,  but  by  the  over- 
personal  postulate  for  a  reality,  the  satisfaction,  too,  must  be 
over-personal.  The  unity  of  souls  is  a  pure  absolute  value ; 
it  may  be  a  fleeting  word  of  pity  which  unites  two  indifferent 
beings  just  one  heart-beat  long,  or  it  may  be  the  inexhaustible 
word  of  the  savior  who  brings  love  for  the  neighbor  into 
numberless  souls  and  binds  them  into  a  unity. 

It  is  evident  that  this  value  of  unity  through  love  must 
have  a  certain  contact  with  the  value  of  connection  in  his- 
tory, just  as  we  saw  that  natural  beauty  has  certain  relations 
to  natural  causal  connection,  and  that  aesthetic  and  logical 
values  anyhow  have  certain  factors  in  common.  In  the  con- 
nection of  history,  as  in  the  agreement  of  love,  the  value  lies 
in  the  finding  of  the  identical  will,  and  yet  they  are  separated 
as  much  as  logical  and  aesthetic  values  must  always  be  sepa- 
rated. In  the  truth  we  seek  self-assertion  as  conservation  of  a 
given  unit  which  we  follow  up  through  all  the  manifold  experi- 
ences. In  beauty  we  seek  the  self-assertion  as  mutual  agree- 
ment of  a  closed  manifold.  The  logician  has  found  an  abso- 


lute value  in  the  fellow-world  when  he  can  trace  one  will 
as  identical  in  the  will  of  another,  and  by  this  demonstrate 
the  chaos  of  the  fellow-world  to  be  a  cosmos  of  order.  The 
aesthetician  of  the  fellow-world  has  found  an  absolute  value 
when  he  feels  the  intended  unity  of  striving  in  a  manifold  of 
will  and  demonstrates  the  love  in  the  chaotic  excitement 
of  the  fellow-world.  The  historic  connection  of  the  will-in- 
fluences and  the  sympathetic  connection  of  the  will-devo- 
tions alike  raise  the  fellow-world  to  an  absolutely  valuable 
selfhood. 

Only  one  point  may  be  added.  The  unity  in  manifoldness 
demands  here  as  everywhere  not  only  the  unity  but  also  the 
manifoldness.  The  richness  and  the  inner  variety  of  the  un- 
equal personalities  reenf  orce  the  aesthetic  value  of  the  human 
harmony.  The  realm  of  love  does  not  demand  that  individu- 
alities be  eliminated  and  the  differences  effaced.  The  beauty 
of  the  stormy  sea  wills  that  each  wave  surge  in  foamy  surf 
in  its  own  way,  that  no  two  be  alike,  and  yet  that  all  aim 
towards  the  same  inner  agreement.  There  is  no  deeper  unity 
of  soul  than  where  the  strength  of  the  man  joins  the  tender- 
ness of  the  woman,  where  the  maturity  of  the  parents  is  united 
with  the  innocence  of  the  children.  But  the  unlimited  richness 
of  these  values  of  unity  does  not  belong  only  to  the  manifold- 
ness of  the  personalities ;  it  results,  too,  from  the  manifoldness 
of  their  relations.  Everybody  enters  into  an  abundance  of 
human  bonds.  The  larger  the  circle  of  those  who  are  united 
the  smaller  is  the  group  of  the  volitions  which  enter  into 
unity.  The  harmony  of  peace  which  unites  the  peoples  of  the 
earth  is  not  the  harmony  of  brothers  who  become  one  with 
their  whole  soul. 

C.  —  HAPPINESS 

Whenever  philosophers  discuss  the  value  of  happiness  one 
question  usually  stands  in  the  centre :  Is  happiness  the  high- 
est goal  of  action?  Ought  we  to  raise  happiness  to  the  highest 


196 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


^r 


ideal  of  our  human  tasks,  or  is  happiness  only  a  morally  in- 
different by-product  with  which  the  duties  of  our  life  have  no 
concern?  The  Stoic  and  the  Epicurean  alike  ultimately  strive 
to  find  happiness  through  the  moral  will.  But  the  naive  man 
who  seeks  a  deeper  value  for  his  life  is  imwilling  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  thought  that  every  duty  is  only  a  careful  calculation 
of  his  own  happiness.   Morality  is  more  than  a  weighing  of 
our  own  possible  pleasures  for  the  purpose  of  preferring  the 
lasting  and  unmixed  to  the  fleeting  pleasure  which  may  be 
followed  by  pain.  Any  happiness,  he  says,  leaves  our  life  cold 
and  empty  when  our  work  does  not  also  serve  the  happiness 
of  the  fellow-man.  There  are  the  goals  of  our  really  valuable 
deed.  The  own  happiness  has  no  real  value;  the  ideal  task  of 
the  moral  man  is  to  devote  himself  to  the  greatest  happiness 
of  the  greatest  number.  There  finally  starts  the  contradic- 
tion of  the  idealist.   The  happiness  of  the  others  is  after  all, 
he  says,  no  higher  goal  than  the  own  pleasure.  Whether  the 
greatest  number  of  men  enjoy  their  existence,  and  whether  in 
this  way  the  feeling  of  pleasure  is  multiplied,  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  highest  duties  of  the  will.  That  which  is  most 
valuable,  conscience,  relaxes  in  the  midst  of  happiness.  All 
such  adorers  of  happiness  and  despisers  of  happiness  have 
only  one  presupposition  in  common,  namely,  that  happiness 
is  pleasure,  and  therefore  as  such  a  merely  personal  value.  If 
happiness  is  to  have  an  over-personal  value,  this  must  result 
from  the  relations  of  happiness  to  the  moral  action.  It  is  the 
moral  value  of  happiness  which  the  utilitarian  ethics  preaches 
and  the  conscience  ethics  denies. 

We  know  that  the  problem  of  morality  will  be  ours  at  a 
much  later  stage  of  the  discussion.  But  we  can  eliminate 
it  here  entirely,  and  can  confine  ourselves  to  the  examination 
of  happiness  itself.  We  may  begin  with  a  complete  conces- 
sion. As  far  as  happiness  is  pleasure  it  is  the  satisfaction  of 
a  merely  individual  desire,  and  therefore  without  any  over- 
personal  value.  We  have  no  right  to  acknowledge  any  differ- 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


197 


ences  by  degrees  there.  The  pleasure  in  absinthe,  vaudeville, 
and  gambling  and  the  pleasure  in  chamber  quartettes,  old 
bronzes,  and  aesthetic  talk  with  beautiful  women  may  char- 
acterize two  incomparable  human  beings,  but  the  gratifica- 
tion of  their  desires  remains  equally  free  from  over-personal 
values.  And  in  the  same  way  without  absolute  value  is  the 
satisfaction  of  all  those  single  wishes  which  usually  enter  into 
human  happiness — wishes  for  success  and  fame  and  beauty 
and  wealth  and  power.  We  do  not  preach  that  they  are  with- 
out value  because  they  are  fugitive,  or  that  they  are  without 
value  because  they  are  not  rooted  in  the  moral.  Still  less 
have  we  a  right  to  denounce  them  as  opposed  to  true  values. 
Without  value  are  such  goods  of  our  vanity  because  the 
desire  which  is  gratified  by  them  is  a  strictly  individual  will. 
Happiness  as  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  as  satisfaction  of  personal 
longings,  has  no  place  in  the  realm  of  pure  values.  But  there 
exists  another  happiness.  If  we  do  not  use  the  word  "hap- 
piness" carelessly,  we  ought  after  all  to  speak  of  the  emotion 
of  happiness  only  when  it  means  more  than  a  mere  feeling  of 
pleasure,  more  than  mere  fulfilment  of  a  desire  for  the  things 
of  the  outer  world.  The  difference,  to  be  sure,  usually  remains 
below  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  The  true  happiness  is 
not  the  satisfaction  of  a  will,  but  the  complete  harmony  and 
inner  agreement  of  all  our  volitions.  This  agreement  is  a 
value,  a  pure  aesthetic  value.  Every  single  volition  in  us  may 
be  personal  and  therefore  without  value,  but  a  state  of  the 
soul  in  which  all  the  volitions  harmonize  is  a  complete  value. 
This  unity  is  over-personally  valuable  and  absolutely  valid, 
like  the  unity  of  the  beings  in  love  and  the  unity  of  things  in 
the  beauty  of  nature. 

In  the  unity  of  happiness  it  is  the  inner  world  of  a  single 
being  in  its  own  completeness  which  is  in  question.  If  we 
meet  a  personality  whose  inner  volitions  are  understood  and 
felt  by  us  and  are  felt  as  entirely  harmonious,  his  inner  world 
lies  before  us  with  the  same  pure  value  of  unity  which  the 


^f^ 


198 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


I 


outer  world  offered  to  us  by  a  sunny  spring  landscape  or 
the  fellow-world  by  a  devoted  friendship.  And  if  we  find  all 
that  in  ourselves,  our  own  experience  lies  expanded  before  us 
in  a  pure  over-personal  beauty.  Our  own  self  is  then  raised 
from  the  level  of  mere  personal  desire  to  the  height  of  com- 
pleted unity  in  which  our  over-personal  self  finds  absolute 
satisfaction.  We  must  not  forget  that  the  purity  of  the 
over-personal  value  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  significance 
of  the  content.  Even  the  most  trivial  judgment  is  logically 
absolutely  valuable,  provided  it  is  true.  In  this  way  the 
aesthetic  value  may  be  given  in  perfect  purity,  even  when 
the  happy  soul  shows  unity  of  volitions  of  which  each  is  trivial 
and  insignificant.  We  must  only  demand  as  in  every  case  of 
unity  that  it  is  really  a  question  of  volitions.  That  already 
indicates  the  difference  from  the  mere  satisfaction  of  personal 
desire.  Our  personal  longing  becomes  annihilated  in  its  satis- 
faction by  the  things  of  the  world.  It  is  no  longer  a  striving 
when  it  is  fulfilled.  If  I  am  thirsty  and  long  for  water,  my 
thirst  experience  is  without  any  inner  agreement ;  I  imagine 
my  satisfaction  and  I  experience  my  dissatisfying  thirst.  The 
one  tempts  me  and  the  other  tortures  me,  and  so  my  will  is 
without  rest.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  drink  relieves  my 
desire,  this  longing  comes  to  an  end,  and  if  the  will  disappears 
there  cannot  be  any  agreement.  Hence  the  mere  desire  or  the 
mere  gratification  by  things  cannot  offer  any  true  happiness. 
The  will  must  not  be  extinguished  in  the  happiness,  but  must 
assert  it.  The  mere  absence  of  desires  and  absence  of  pain 
do  not  even  suggest  the  true  meaning  of  happiness.  He  who 
is  merely  gratified  stands  outside  of  happiness  and  unhappi- 
ness. 

Happiness  demands  continuous  willing  which  is  manifold 
and  yet  united  in  itself.  Certainly  the  outer  world  has  to  con- 
tribute to  it,  but  its  part  will  be  the  greater  the  more  the 
experience  of  things,  instead  of  annihilating  the  will,  satisfies 
it  in  stimulating  new  and  ever  new  volitions.   Within  a  cer- 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


199 


tain  limit,  that  may  pertain  to  the  sensuous  pleasures.  The 
pleasure  annihilates  the  original  desire,  but  after  all  it  stim- 
ulates at  the  same  time  the  new  desire  for  the  continuation 
of  the  enjoyment  and  is  therefore  again  a  source  of  will.  That 
is  the  reason  that  the  sensuous  pleasure,  too,  may  contribute 
to  true  happiness.  But  the  happiness  must  flow  in  endlessly 
richer  stream  from  those  sources  in  which  the  external  stim- 
ulus has  its  whole  meaning  in  the  suggestion  of  new  will. 
When  the  fate  of  the  world  intends  well  toward  us,  it  does  not 
carry  us  upward  to  the  goal  of  our  wishes  on  the  wings  of 
fortunate  chances,  nor  does  it  indifferently  leave  us  in  our 
helplessness.  Good  fortune  shows  us  the  way  towards  the 
height,  and  gives  us  a  helping  hand  when  obstacles  are  hin- 
dering us,  and  when  the  way  is  too  steep  for  us  to  advance  by 
our  own  efforts.  To  arrive  at  the  goal  is  nothing  but  a  thrill, 
and  to  stand  still  without  effort  towards  a  new  advance  is 
never  true  happiness,  even  if  we  stand  still  at  the  point  which 
was  our  goal  of  yesterday.  That  is  the  reason  that  all  exter- 
nal goods  have  only  a  relative  value  for  happiness ;  it  is  eter- 
nally impossible  to  imagine  a  state  which  makes  us  absolutely 
happy.  But  that  also  involves  the  pleasing  thought  that  no 
external  state  can  make  us  absolutely  unhappy.  However 
high  the  point  which  is  reached,  to  maintain  it  without  fur- 
ther desire  is  no  value  of  life,  and  however  low  the  starting- 
point,  the  smallest  movement  upward  can  be  a  perfect  happi- 
ness. Happiness  is  unity  of  the  inner  strivings ;  that  which 
lies  beyond  our  expectations  cannot  disturb  it.  The  mind 
which  envies  the  bird  for  its  wings  and  the  fish  for  its  fins  can 
never  become  happy,  and  he  who  does  not  desire  the  yellow 
jacket  of  the  Chinese  dignitary  is  no  less  happy  without  it 
even  though  millions  adore  it  as  the  highest  goal.  Happiness 
is  always  only  unity  of  the  inner  world  in  its  will-impulses; 
hence  the  deep  influence  of  the  personal  temperament.  It  is 
never  the  outer  fate  which  forges  the  optimist  or  the  pessimist. 
The  unhappy  soul  finds  the  disharmony  of  will  even  in  the 


200 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


most  comfortable  situation  of  life,  and  the  sunny  personality 
may  remain  harmonious  in  itself  even  when  the  storms  are 
raging  without.  There  is  no  evil  for  him  whose  will  does  not 

resist. 

Happiness  is  will.  Hence  the  inexhaustible  content  of 
happiness  in  truth  and  beauty  and  morality.  Every  true 
thought  which  we  understand,  every  beautiful  line  which  we 
follow,  every  moral  solution  in  which  we  participate,  is  a 
suggestion  for  us  to  a  new  will  which  harmonizes  with  our 
fundamental  will.  The  situation  there  never  annihilates  our 
will  as  in  a  mere  enjoyment,  but  the  more  deeply  our  logical, 
esthetic,  and  ethical  will  is  fulfilled  the  more  vivid  remains 
the  will  itself.  It  develops  itself  in  the  experience  to  ever  new 
and  ever  richer  volitions.  We  stand  without  wish  for  our- 
selves in  the  face  of  the  work  of  art  or  of  the  scholarly  system, 
but  the  less  we  wish  for  ourselves  the  more  we  wish  and  will 
with  the  lines  and  forms,  with  the  tones  and  words,  with  the 
thoughts  and  fates  which  captivate  us.  Without  wish  we 
follow  the  tragedy  on  the  stage,  and  yet  our  soul  is  moved  in 
its  depths  with  inexhaustible  will ;  and  all  this  willing  is  in 
inner  unity.  As  far  as  this  will  is  projected  into  the  drama 
itself,  its  unity  gives  us  the  aesthetic  value  of  the  work  of  art; 
but  in  so  far  as  we  feel  it  as  the  inner  movement  of  our  inner 
world,  it  makes  us  perfectly  happy  as  long  as  we  are  really 
surrendering  ourselves  to  the  beautiful  spectacle  and  no  outer 
experience  interferes  with  the  harmony  of  our  will. 

This  will-character  makes  work  also  an  unfailing  source  of 
happiness ;  whether  we  influence  mankind  by  our  labor  or  cul- 
tivate the  field,  nowhere  does  the  will  find  its  end  by  its  action. 
In  every  completion  there  lies  a  new  beginning,  and  we  do 
not  want  anything  else  from  the  happiness  of  the  work  but 
that  the  work  may  develop  itself  in  fertility  and  may  always 
open  new  opportunities  for  labor.  To  live  one's  life  in  all  the 
fulness  of  its  creating  energies,  to  will  from  the  deepest  soul 
in  every  experience  with  things  and  fellow-men,  to  feel  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY 


201 


suggestions  of  new  wills  which  stream  together  with  the  fun- 
damental will  of  the  self  —  such  a  moving  equilibrium  of  the 
inner  world  is  the  highest  happiness.  Even  when  any  counter- 
will  by  disappointment  and  grief  intrudes  into  the  mind,  the 
happy  soul  may  vanquish  it.    The  overcoming  of  the  hin- 
drances of  will  strengthens  the  harmonious  will  and  brings 
every  gain  to  more  vivid  validity.  But  to  live  one's  life  does 
not  mean  only  to  bring  to  effectiveness  its  creating  energies. 
To  be  able  to  serve  in  loyalty  and  subordinate  ourselves  to 
the  greater  task  brings  beautiful  unity  not  less  into  the 
abundance  of  the  resulting  volitions.  And  here  belongs  the 
happiness  of  inner  development,  of  learning  and  training  and 
growing,  and  above  all  of  love.   Happy  the  soul  which  loves, 
as  love  indeed  is  a  never-ending  harmony  of  volitions  which 
spring  from  the  own  desire  with  volitions  which  share  the 
feelings  of  the  loved  one.  But  this  unity  of  our  volitions  may 
also  be  strengthened  by  the  inhibition  and  elimination  of  all 
inner  movements  which  are  opposing.  Happy,  therefore,  are 
the  one-sided  ones  who  are  controlled  by  one  will,  and  who 
really  experience  only  that  which  harmonizes  with  their  own 
volition.    The  thousand  counter-excitements  which  might 
disturb  are  brought  to  silence.  Love  has  just  this  power.  One 
group  of  volitions  dominates  in  the  inner  world  and  forgotten 
is  the  chaos  of  our  existence.  Such  is  the  influence  of  ambi- 
tion and  of  fame  and  of  the  true  joy  of  creation.  The  strength, 
the  manifoldness,  the  significance  of  the  volitions  must  give 
to  the  value  of  unity  in  happiness  its  particular  aesthetic 
position.  As  the  symphony  stands  higher  than  the  little  song, 
the  symphony  of  a  powerful,  creative,  rich,  and  influential 
human  life  stands  aesthetically  higher  than  the  happiness  in 
the  comer  and  the  joy  in  the  hut.  But  the  value  itself  is  com- 
plete even  in  its  most  modest  form ;  there  is  no  greater  logical 
value  in  the  truth  that  one  hundred  times  one  hundred  is 
ten  thousand  than  in  the  truth  that  three  times  three  is  nine. 
The  inner  world  which  in  the  experience  of  outer  world  and 


202 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


W\ 


iv^l 


{ 


fellow-world  remains  completely  in  unity  with  itself  is  abso- 
lutely valuable.  All  the  conditions  which  we  demanded  for  the 
value  of  unity  are  fulfilled.  By  that  at  last  the  absolute  value 
of  happiness  has  come  into  its  right.  An  idealistic  philosophy 
may  have  good  reasons  for  separating  the  tasks  of  our  actions 
completely  from  all  reference  to  happiness.  The  meaning  of 
duty  and  of  moral  good  may  be  conceived  so  rigorously  that 
the  moral  worthlessness  of  happiness  may  appear  evident. 
But  that  ought  never  to  be  interpreted  as  if  happiness  cannot 
be  a  true  pure  value,  and  as  if  it  should  be  banished  from  the 
noble  community  with  truth  and  beauty  and  morality.  Those 
who  see  in  happiness  nothing  but  personal  pleasure  cannot 
make  any  concessions,  but  only  the  rage  of  the  iconoclast 
wants  to  expel  all  happiness  from  the  world  of  pure  values  to 
prevent  its  being  made  a  goal  for  our  ethical  actions.  Hap- 
piness is  a  pure  independent  value,  but  an  aesthetic,  not  an 
ethical  one.  The  world  in  its  over-personal  meaning  is  ab- 
solutely valuable  by  the  fact  that  the  glow  of  happiness 
illuminates  human  souls. 
The  relation  of  happiness  to  our  duties  of  life  is  not  touched 

\  by  such  meditations  at  all.  I  may  acknowledge  the  absolute 
vaiueof^happiness,  and  yet  not  acknowledge  it  at  all  as  my 
individual  task  to  propagate  happiness  in  the  social  world. 
I  may  postulate  that  every  one  who  understands  the  happy 
soul  is  perfectly  satisfied  in  its  self-centred  unity,  and,  yet  I 
may  live  my  life  without  any  special  interest  in  the  question 
whether  this  or  that  man,  or  the  majority  of  men,  or  the 
greatest  possible  number  of  men,  experience  such  pure  har- 

|mony  of  their  inner  world.  It  is  the  same  as  with  the  other 
values.  I  may  acknowledge  also  the  absolute  value  of  scien- 
tific truth,  and  yet  may  not  feel  the  slightest  obligation  to 

'^^^  discover  new  truths.  I  may  acknowledge  the  pure  value  of 
music,  and  yet  not  consider  it  my  own  duty  to  invent  new 
melodies.  In  this  way  I  may  appreciate  the  absolute  aesthetic 
value  of  happiness,  and  yet  decline  to  contribute  to  the 


\ 


^m 


THE  VALUES  OF  UNITY  203 

spreading  of  happiness.    It  may  be  that  life  shows  more 
important  tasks  to  me.  It  may  be  that  the  insight  into  the 
dependence  of  happiness  upon  will  convinces  me  that  noi 
external  action  is  really  fit  artificially  to  create  the  happinesi  1 
of  others.   It  may  be  that  I  find  so  many  factors  influential 
m  happiness  —  health,  love,  talent,  work,  friendship,  family, 
success,  patriotism,  fame,  beauty,  liberty,  wealth,  knowledge,' 
art,  religion  —  that  happiness  may  appear  to  me  most  uni- 
formly distributed  if  all  those  factors  are  shuffled  together 
in  a  haphazard  way  just  as  life  always  tries  to  do  it.  I  may 
I  therefore  be  unwilling  to  interfere  artificially  with  the  events 
I  of  life.  Such  a  chance  distribution  may  seem  to  me  to  secure 
happiness  more  uniformly  than  if  we  intentionally  eliminate 
the  inequality  for  a  few  special  factors,  as  for  instance  for  the 
factor  of  wealth  which  some  accentuate  one-sidedly  in  its 
importance  for  happiness.   It  may  even  be  that  ultimately 
I  the  opposition  between  the  aesthetic  and  the  ethical  values 
LHiay  disappear  to  my  view.  We  cannot  proceed  to  our  last 
goal  here.  The  question  of  happiness  will  still  come  back  to 
us  often. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 

The  values  of  beauty  were  for  us  developments  of  the  values 
of  unity.  The  values  of  unity  are  immediately  given  by 
nature  and  life ;  the  values  of  beauty  are  systematically  elab- 
orated by  the  work  of  art  in  the  history  of  civilization.  It  is 
the  antithesis  which  we  are  to  meet  in  every  one  of  the  four 
large  fields  of  values,  and  which  after  all  is  not  an  antithesis 
but  only  a  further  development  of  that  which  is  given  to 
naive  life  by  the  means  of  culture.  The  discussion  of  what 
is  beautiful  and  what  art  aims  at  does  not  begin  here  for  us. 
We  have  pointed  to  the  essentials  before.  Everything  which 
we  found  about  the  unity  in  the  manif oldness  and  its  absolute 
value  is  valid  for  the  work  of  art  also.  The  self-agreement  of 
the  world  in  our  life-experience  gave  us  the  value  of  harmony 
for  the  outer  world,  of  love  for  the  fellow-world,  of  happiness 
for  the  inner  world.  If  art  is  called  systematically  to  bring 
the  self-agreement  of  the  world  to  its  expression  in  the  history 
of  civilization,  fine  art  is  fulfilling  this  task  for  the  outer 
world,  literature  for  the  fellow-world,  and  music  for  the  inner 

world. 

What  must  be  added  to  the  value  of  unity  that  the  values 
of  beauty  may  arise?  The  aesthetic  value  of  self-agreement 
of  the  given  was  completed  for  us  in  every  case  when  the 
experience  was  felt  in  its  own  will-manifoldness,  when  these 
wills  supported  one  another,  and  when  they  separated  them- 
selves as  a  closed  unity  from  the  remainder  of  the  world.  Each 
of  these  factors  was  necessary.  The  given  must  be  felt  in  its 
own  will.  A  thing  which  is  only  object  for  us  can  never  have 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY       205 

aesthetic  significance.  This  will  must  be  really  felt  by  us  in 
living  through  it.  The  fellow-will  can  never  be  ^thetically  in 
question  for  us  if  we  take  attitude  towards  it  only  from  the 
standpoint  of  our  own  will,  and  if  we  do  not  sink  into  the 
other  will.  The  mutual  support  of  the  wills  must  be  complete  ; 
any  inner  discord  can  never  bring  to  a  pure  expression  the 
meaning  of  a  self-asserting  world.  Finally,  there  must  be  per- 
fect separation  of  a  closed  unity  from  every  other  experience  ; 
the  given  manifold  can  never  be  aesthetic  if  we  are  interested 
in  its  connections  and  relations  to  the  remainder  of  the  uni- 
verse. If  now  civilization  endeavors  to  work  out  the  inner 
agreement  of  the  world  with  conscious  purpose,  the  task  must 
be  to  shape  the  chance  experience  artificially  and  intentionally 
in  every  one  of  these  directions.  An  ideal  solution  of  this  task 
is  possible  only  by  pure  art,  which  does  not  aim  merely  in 
one  or  another  of  these  directions,  but  which  by  its  particular 
methods  necessarily  progresses  in  all  of  them. 

As  long  as  not  all  of  these  conditions  of  inner  agreement 
are  fulfilled,  but  only  the  one  or  the  other,  the  chance  world 
is  not  wholly  transformed  into  beauty.  We  are  then  halfway 
to  high  art.   The  side  arts  and  the  applied  arts  arise  here. 
The  landscape  architect,  for  instance,  beautifies  the  given 
nature  purposively.    He  reenforces  the  manifoldness  of  the 
impressions  by  planting  a  variety  of  trees  and  bushes,  by 
introducing  artificial  hills  and  bridges  and  ponds  and  roads. 
If  ever  possible,  he  may  frame  the  landscape  and  limit  it  for 
the  view  from  a  special  standpoint,  and  above  all  he  will  take 
care  to  arrange  the  parts  of  such  a  manifold  in  an  harmonious 
way.  Yet  whatever  the  landscape  artist  may  spread  before 
us  it  remains  far  from  the  ideal  of  a  beauty  which  is  isolated 
in  itself  and  detached  from  our  attitudes.  The  way  may  wind 
gracefully,  but  it  leads  far  away  to  a  distance  which  we  do 
not  perceive,  and  beyond  those  hills  there  live  other  men. 
The  trees  promise  fruit  which  we  hope  to  harvest  in  autumn, 
the  meadows  demand  the  mower,  and  the  bench  there  invites 


206 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


us  to  take  a  rest.  Each  part  connects  itself  with  other  parts 
of  experience  which  are  not  present.  Each  part  links  itself 
with  causes  and  effects,  with  hopes  and  expectations ;  our  own 
will  takes  attitude,  and  the  more  our  will  interferes  the  more 
everything  becomes  merely  an  object  and  we  forget  that  the 
things  themselves  wish  to  say  their  own  say,  and  that  their 
own  will  seeks  the  inner  agreement.  In  a  similar  way  the  art 
of  dancing  brings  the  forms  of  the  body  to  a  manifold  and 
yet  unilBed  expression  by  the  rhythm  of  the  changing  move- 
ments. Nevertheless,  no  beauty  of  the  dance  can  make  us 
forget  that  these  human  beings  of  flesh  and  blood  have  only 
for  a  short  while  thrown  off  the  burden  of  the  hours,  that 
they  do  not  move  dancing  through  life. 

All  that  holds  true  even  for  the  applied  arts,  for  the  arts 
and  crafts,  for  the  stone-work  of  the  architect  and  the  word- 
work  of  the  author.  When  the  gown  is  embroidered  in  rich 
colors  and  lines,  when  the  roof  of  the  castle  is  supported  by 
massive  columns  and  adorned  with  towers,  when  the  historical 
account  of  a  great  period  is  heightened  by  an  imaginative  and 
intuitive  language,  we  are  far  from  the  aesthetically  indifferent 
chance  activity.  Practical  life  needs  the  gown  only  to  cover 
the  body,  the  hall  to  protect  us  against  the  weather,  and  the 
chronicle  to  furnish  information  about  facts.  The  beautiful 
cloak  and  house  and  historical  work  always  lead  far  beyond 
the  immediate  needs  of  life.  They  aim  to  reenforce  the  mani- 
foldness  of  the  content,  and  to  bring  together  this  manifold- 
ness  again  in  a  unity  of  expression ;  they  aim  to  strengthen  its 
own  will,  and  to  suggest  to  us  to  feel  that  will  for  ourselves. 
In  these  embroidered  lines  the  gown  submits  itself  to  the 
form  of  the  body,  in  these  towers  the  will  of  the  palace  uplifts 
itself  and  rests  on  the  columns,  in  the  rich  movements  of  the 
historical  style  the  will  of  the  reported  deeds  expresses  itself 
with  a  vividness  which  no  dry  chronicle  could  reach.  And  yet 
in  every  case  such  work  remains  in  a  world  of  relations  and 
connections.  If  works  of  applied  art  are  to  be  loyal  to  them- 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


207 


selves  and  sincere,  they  cannot  suppress  the  question  whether 
the  gown  fits  the  body,  whether  the  house  serves  the  practical 
interests  of  life,  whether  the  historical  report  is  reliable.  But 
by  that  the  personal  attitude  is  at  once  demanded,  and  a  con- 
nection with  that  which  is  not  given  must  be  noticed.  Even 
the  most  wonderful  cathedral  and  the  ideal  temple  would  not 
satisfy  us  if  they  did  not  suggest  that  it  is  the  right  place  for 
worship.  A  complete  devotion  to  the  meaning  and  will  of  the 
given  manifold,  a  devotion  which  forgets  everything  which 
is  not  present,  thus  becomes  impossible. 

To  reach  this  highest  point  of  detachment,  one  thing  is  ne- 
cessary. The  suggested  experience  must  remain  without  the 
value  of  existence.  Only  that  which  is  unreal  eliminates  every 
relation  and  every  practical  attitude  becomes  meaningless.  In 
the  landscape  painting  there  are  no  people  behind  the  moun- 
tains, and  the  road  never  leads  beyond  the  frame.  The  marble 
lion  will  not  spring  on  us,  the  dying  heroine  on  the  stage  does 
not  expect  us  to  come  to  her  help,  the  figures  in  the  novel 
will  never  enter  into  our  daily  life.  Art  brings  to  us  unreal 
experiences,  and  at  once  all  those  demands  for  agreement  can 
be  fulfilled ;  whether  they  practically  are  fulfilled  depends  only 
upon  the  question  whether  we  have  a  perfect  work  of  art 
before  us.  What  is  the  meaning  of  this  unreality,  and  where 
does  its  significance  lie?  Certainly  the  work  of  the  artist  is 
not  in  every  sense  without  reality.  The  bronze  statue  fills  a 
real  space  exactly  like  a  real  man,  the  Hamlet  on  the  stage 
even  is  a  real  living  man,  and  as  a  matter  of  course  our  im- 
pressions from  the  work  of  art  are  real  experiences  like  the 
impressions  from  the  world  in  which  we  are  acting.  It  is  also 
not  sufficient  to  seek  the  unreality  in  the  fact  that  the  paint- 
ing is  not  the  real  landscape  itself,  but  only  represents  it,  and 
that  the  novel  is  not  the  real  love-affair  itself,  but  only  tells 
about  it.  No,  the  fact  that  a  work  of  art  only  represents 
the  happenings  of  the  world  is  not  that  which  characterizes 
its  aesthetic  unreality.    The  naturalistic  illustration  and  the 


208 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


court  report  are  in  the  same  way  only  representations,  and 
yet  they  do  not  come  into  consideration  at  all  as  unreal. 

What  is  meant  lies  rather  in  the  following.  The  value  of 
existence  which  completes  itself  in  the  value  of  connection 
demands,  as  we  saw,  the  recurrence  of  the  identical  in  new  ex- 
periences. We  studied  how  this  identity  constitutes  the  con- 
servation of  the  things  and  beings  and  their  causal  connection 
and  their  historical  influence.  As  a  matter  of  course,  the  paint- 
ing and  the  statue  and  the  paper  on  which  the  words  are  writ- 
ten remain  identical  too.  As  the  canvas  with  oil  color,  as 
marble,  and  as  paper  they  are  indeed  really  existing  things. 
But  we  do  not  perceive  the  statue  as  a  marble  block :  it  is  a 
hero  to  us,  the  canvas  is  an  ocean  landscape,  the  verses  are  the 
expression  of  an  emotional  soul.  If  we  considered  the  contents 
of  the  works  of  art  as  real  heroes,  as  real  surf,  and  as  real 
despair,  they  would  awaken  in  us  the  expectation  that  they 
might  enter  into  new  connections.  The  real  hero,  the  waves, 
the  emotions,  cannot  go  on  without  expressing  themselves 
in  new  deeds  and  processes.  The  full  apprehension  of  the  pre- 
sented would  then  have  to  awaken  the  wish  for  new  and  ever 
new  forms.  If  we  have  real  waves  before  us,  their  rolling 
must  go  on,  and  the  present  form  must  be  transformed  into 
ever  new  ones.  Even  if  I  see  unyielding  rocks  before  me  in- 
stead of  the  fluctuating  ocean,  those  rocks  are  real  to  me  only 
if  I  may  expect  changes  from  them  by  their  continuation. 
Their  outlines  must  cross  each  other  in  new  lines  when  I 
come  nearer  to  them,  and  they  must  offer  me  a  new  spec- 
tacle if  I  climb  up  on  them.  The  man  who  is  to  be  real  for 
me  must  speak  and  act  and  make  gestures. 

To  be  unreal  in  the  aesthetic  sense  means,  therefore,  not 
to  stir  up  these  expectations.  The  waves  of  the  painting  ought 
not  to  move,  the  hero  of  the  statue  should  not  speak ;  they 
ought  not  to  be  anything  but  just  what  the  presentation 
offers.  They  have  no  past  and  future,  no  connection  and  in- 
fluence ;  all  which  they  have  to  show  is  contained  in  the  offer- 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY       209 

ing.  We  cannot  even  say  that  the  work  of  art  points  beyond 
itself.  The  painting  is  the  landscape  itself,  but  it  is  a  landscape 
which  does  not  connect  itself  with  any  other  experience,  and 
which  therefore  has  no  value  of  existence.  The  marble  is  the 
hero  himself  in  his  unreality.   Photography  and  the  news- 
paper account  represent  something  real  which  awakens  ex- 
pectations ;  the  painting  and  the  novel  do  not  represent  any- 
thing.  Their  content  is  everything  in  itself,  and  only  those 
expectations  are  inhibited  which  refer  to  conservation  and 
connection ;  that  alone  makes  the  content  unreal.  The  means 
by  which  the  artist  suppresses  in  us  the  expectations  are 
manifold.  The  painter  gives  us  nature  in  the  whole  richness  of 
its  colors,  but  deprives  nature  of  the  three  dimensions.  The 
two-dimensional  picture  is  still  the  whole  landscape  with  all 
its  sentiments  and  motives;  the  landscape  still  contains  every 
suggestion  which  would  come  to  us  if  we  were  to  look  through 
a  window  into  the  distance,  but  the  elimination  of  the  depth 
inhibits  all  expectancy.    The  wanderer  on  the  way  in  the 
meadow  will  never  move  on  in  the  painting.  The  expectation 
that  the  wanderer  may  proceed  is  not  destroyed  because  the 
painter  was  unable  to  reproduce  the  landscape  in  its  plastic 
form.  On  the  contrary,  the  painter  transposed  the  landscape 
into  the  flat  plane  just  for  the  purpose  of  completely  destroy- 
ing the  expectation  that  the  wanderer  might  advance.  The 
sculptor  keeps  the  three  dimensions.   Hence  he  must  have 
other  means  of  excluding  expectations.  He  gives  up  the  color. 
The  colored  wax  figure  which  almost  deceives  us  and  almost 
suggests  the  expectation  of  movements  stands  therefore  far 
below  the  level  of  art.  The  true  artist  can  give  to  the  plastic 
work  only  a  soft  unsaturated  color-tone,  or  if  he  wants  to  use 
natural  colors,  he  must  transpose  the  figure  into  small  di- 
mensions  to  exclude  every  possibility  of  a  deception. 

The  poet  makes  use  of  the  measured  rhythm  and  of  the 
rhyme  so  that  no  one  can  misinterpret  his  verses  as  a  mere 
report  of  happenings  and  feelings  in  the  service  of  life.  His 


210 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


X 


epic  and  lyrical  forms  must  exclude  from  the  start  the  ex- 
pectation of  personal  complications.    The  drama  which  is 
played  in  the  darkened  theatre  in  the  frame  of  the  strongly 
illumined  stage  inhibits  by  this  separation  every  possible 
expectation  that  these  people  with  their  heroism  and  their 
intrigues  will  enter  into  the  practical  life.   In  this  artificial 
suppression  of  all  felt  relations  lies  the  true  unreality  of  the 
life  which  art  offers  to  us.  All  the  essential  sensations  which 
the  things  and  beings  might  stimulate  in  us  must  be  con- 
tained in  the  work  of  art,  but  that  alone  does  not  give  them 
any  reality.  Reality  in  the  sense  of  existence  always  means 
a  transcending  of  the  immediate  impression  and  the  ex- 
pectation of  a  recurrence  in  new  experiences.   The  present 
offering  may  therefore  show  itself  in  its  whole  inner  richness 
of  the  valued  manifoldness,  and  yet  may  remain  entirely 
unreal  because  it  does  not  aim  to  be  anything  but  the  present 
experience.  The  unreal  does  not  become  by  that  a  mere  illu- 
sion or  an  appearance,  as  such  words  would  indicate  that 
the  work  of  art  tries  to  come  to  us  as  a  reality,  but  does  not 
succeed.   Moreover,  in  such  words  lies  the  implication  that 
the  unreal  is  something  of  a  lower  order,  something  which  is 
less  valuable  than  the  real.    But  the  unreal  offering  of  art 
should  never  deceive  us  by  the  suggestion  of  reality,  and 
certainly  does  not  stand  on  a  lower  level.  The  unreal  is  only 
something  absolutely  different,  which  is  not  on  that  account 
of  a  smaller  value. 

The  preponderance  of  practical  life-interests  may  tempt  us 
to  conceive  the  relation  as  if  the  real  alone  is  positive  and  the 
unreal  negative.  Then  it  seems  as  if  something  essential  were 
missing  in  the  unreal,  and  as  if  it  would  become  more  valuable 
if  it  could  still  secure  for  itself  also  the  reality.  But  with  the 
same  logical  right  we  might  turn  around  this  whole  relation. 
The  unreal  is  that  which  offers  itself  completely  in  its  presen- 
tation ;  it  is  that  which  is  a  whole,  which  does  not  point  to 
anything  outside  of  itself.  On  the  other  hand,  the  real  has  its 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


211 


meaning  in  the  expectation  which  it  awakens  and  in  the  con- 
nections which  it  postulates.   In  the  given  experience  it  is 
therefore  something  incomplete,  imperfect,  unfulfilled.  Now 
the  real  has  become  negative,  and  that  which  lives  in  art  has 
become  the  positive,  the  higher.   The  real  must  now  in  its 
incompletion  strive  to  reach  by  its  connections  that  self-per- 
fection which  belongs  to  the  work  of  the  genius  in  every  in- 
stant. From  the  standpoint  of  science,  art  gives  us  merely  an 
illusion  instead  of  the  more  valuable  reality :  from  the  stand- 
point of  art,  science  speaks  merely  of  that  which  is  incomplete 
instead  of  the  more  valuable  perfect.  It  would  be  more  correct 
to  acknowledge  that  the  reality  of  nature  and  the  unreality 
of  art  are  two  coordinated  entirely  different  experiences, 
which  have  no  reason  for  mutual  jealousy.    The  unreality 
that  is  the  self-perfection  which  eliminates  every  question 
as  to  changes  and  connections  is  no  humiliation,  but  is  power 
and  strength  in  art.  It  is  the  one-sidedness  of  our  usual  view 
of  the  world  that  we  silently  presuppose  that  the  value  of 
reality  alone  has  fundamental  importance,  and  that  the  value 
of  agreement  has  only  an  accidental  secondary  character. 
Both  stand  at  first  entirely  coordinated.  With  the  same  un- 
justifiable exaggeration  we  might  consider  that  which  agrees 
in  itself,  that  which  is  perfect,  the  beautiful,  as  the  true  valu- 
able world.    Then  it  would  be  an  accidental  side  issue  that 
there  also  occur  in  the  world  experiences  which  cannot  boast 
of  the  value  of  agreement,  but  which  awaken  the  expectation 
of  connections  and  hence  which  have  reality. 

Thus  there  is  nothing  of  a  conscious  self-deception  with 
reference  to  the  reality  in  the  spectator,  and  all  theories  which 
seek  in  such  self-deception  the  significance  of  beauty  are  mis- 
leading. All  that  which  we  seek  in  the  work  of  art  is  really 
present  without  any  deception.  The  traits  of  reality,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  do  not  seek  in  it.  We  can  even  say  that 
art  does  not  seek  to  show  us  things  and  beings  at  all,  as  our 
study  of  the  logical  values  indicates  that  the  mere  conception 


212 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


of  things  and  of  beings  posits  relations  beyond  the  immediate 
impression.  Things  and  beings  belong  to  the  world  of  truth 
and  not  to  the  realm  of  beauty.  "Thing''  is  fundamentally 
a  naturalistic  conception  and  "being''  an  historical  one.  That 
which  the  painter  shows  us  should  not  ask  any  expectations, 
and  therefore  can  never  really  be  a  thing.  It  is  a  stimulation, 
a  suggestion,  a  demand.  It  does  not  say : "  I  am  such  a  thing  " ; 
it  rather  says:  "Understand  me;  take  part  in  my  will."  And 
just  as  the  naturalistic  thing  does  not  enter  into  the  fine  arts, 
the  historical  being  has  no  place  in  the  realm  of  poetry.  The 
poetic  figures  are  for  us  experiences  of  their  volitions,  which 
do  not  belong  to  any  being  in  the  sense  of  reality.  We  recog- 
nized that  the  historical  conception  of  being  involves  a  con- 
nection of  the  given  will  with  not-given  wills.  The  persons 
of  fiction  do  not  enter  into  such  a  connection.  The  lover 
whose  emotions  we  willingly  feel  with  his  lyric  poem  is  not  a 
conceivable  subject  for  other  attitudes.  The  question  with 
what  sentiments  he  takes  attitudes  towards  politics  or  chem- 
istry is  not  a  question  which  we  might  disregard  during  the 
enjoyment  of  the  poem,  but  a  question  which  is  absolutely 
meaningless.  That  love-song  does  not  come  from  a  being  who 
after  the  fashion  of  historical  men  remains  identical  with  him- 
self in  every  situation,  but  is  a  completed  expression  of  the 
love-feeling  itself  without  any  thinkable  connection  with 
other  experiences. 

The  artist  is  therefore  free  from  the  laws  of  nature  and  the 
connections  of  history.  He  can  and  must  eliminate  parts 
which  would  be  indispensable  in  reality,  and  yet  nobody 
misses  them  if  he  has  the  necessary  maturity  for  aesthetic 
appreciation.  The  bust  is  cut  off  at  the  chest  and  no  one  con- 
nects it  with  the  other  parts  of  the  body  which  anatomically 
belong  with  the  head.  The  marble  head  demands  the  legs  as 
little  as  the  color  of  the  skin.  Whoever  asks  to  what  harbor 
the  ship  in  the  ocean  picture  is  sailing,  and  where  the  woman 
is  living  who  is  addressed  in  the  sonnets,  has  left  the  stand- 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


213 


point  of  art.  The  ship  has  never  to  reach  the  harbor,  and  the 
loved  one  has  never  to  become  visible  for  human  eyes.  On 
the  other  side,  the  artist  is  free  to  introduce  connections  which 
would  contradict  all  naturalistic  and  historical  expectations. 
The  female  body  may  end  in  the  tail  of  a  fish,  the  shoulders 
of  a  child  may  bear  wings,  and  the  trees  and  the  stones  may 
be  able  to  speak  in  the  fairy-tale.  Nothing  in  the  realm  of  art 
has  to  make  any  concession  to  those  expectations  which  are 
connected  only  with  the  real. 

If  the  artist  has  to  exclude  those  attitudes  which  refer  to 
reality,  we  must  inquire  what  art  can  ojffer  in  place  of  it.  How 
far  is  the  elimination  of  reality  a  necessary  help  for  the  per- 
ception of  that  unity  which  we  demand?  One  interrelation  is 
evident.    That  which  offers  itself  as  unreal  excludes  every 
expectation  of  practical  effects.  Hence  the  effect  on  ourselves 
and  our  own  surroundings  is  excluded,  and  that  annihilates 
by  principle  our  interest  in  entering  with  an  own  action  and 
in  taking  attitudes.  There  is  no  point  of  contact  between  the 
work  of  art  and  our  practical  personality.  We  cannot  enter 
into  the  painted  landscape,  we  cannot  embrace  the  Venus, 
we  cannot  join  the  conversation  of  the  comedy  scene.   We 
cannot  do  it  because  the  statue  does  not  stand  in  our  physical 
space  at  all,  and  the  scene  does  not  play  in  our  physical  time. 
The  one  space-form  and  the  one  time-form  resulted,  as  we 
saw,  from  the  mutual  relation  of  things.  That  which  is  abso- 
lutely detached  cannot  take  part  in  them,  but  must  remain 
in  its  own  space-time  atmosphere.   Thus  we  stand  without 
wishes  in  the  face  of  the  unreal.  We  do  not  want  to  change 
it,  we  do  not  want  to  make  use  of  it,  nor  do  we  want  to  pro- 
tect ourselves  against  it.  In  this  way  our  own  personality  is 
brought  to  inner  silence  as  we  are  certain  of  ourselves  through 
our  will.  Our  self  with  its  attitudes  is  perfectly  eliminated  in 
view  of  the  content  of  the  work  of  art.  Of  course  we  stand  as 
subjects  of  will  before  the  framed  painting.   We  are  willing 
in  so  far  as  we  desire  perhaps  to  own  the  painting,  or  as  we 


214 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


want  to  praise  the  painter  of  it ;  but  that  refers  to  the  thing, 
to  the  piece  of  canvas  which  as  such  enters  into  the  connec- 
tions of  causes  and  effects.  We  do  not  stand  as  willing  beings 
in  front  of  the  persons  in  the  painting.  No  space,  no  time,  no 
causality,  connects  them  with  us,  and  a  subject  without  will, 
not  our  personality,  apperceives  the  group  of  persons  in  the 
painting.  We  sit  as  willing,  judging  beings  in  the  theatre 
before  the  stage,  but  we  do  not  interfere  with  the  secrecy 
of  Romeo  and  Juliet's  dialogue;  we  cannot  disturb  them, 
we  cannot  warn  them.  Without  individual  personality  and 
without  space  and  time  connection  with  them,  we  witness 

their  love. 

But  for  these  very  reasons  the  own  will  of  the  apperceived 
experiences  can  now  come  to  its  fullest  strength  in  us.  We 
are  eliminated ;  now  the  rocks  and  the  clouds  can  speak. 
We  do  not  want  anything  for  ourselves ;  now  the  hero  of  the 
tragedy  can  will  in  us.  We  ourselves  have  become  the  will  of 
the  landscape  and  of  the  heroes.  In  ourselves  those  experi- 
ences can  will  their  own  intentions  with  uninhibited  purity. 
The  artificial  creation  of  unreality  thus  becomes  the  condition 
for  the  richest  will-development  of  the  experience,  and  only 
through  this  penetration  of  experience  with  will  is  the  condi- 
tion given  for  the  apprehension  of  its  inner  imity.  Only  will 
can  be  in  agreement,  and  the  more  objects  of  the  artistic 
experience  can  express  their  own  will  the  more  they  may  show 
us  their  inner  harmony  of  intention.  The  content  will  be  the 
richer  in  its  own  will  the  more  significant  it  is.  Even  if  the 
unreality  of  the  content  excludes  the  practical  will-attitude 
of  our  own  self,  yet  the  trivial  and  indifferent  remains  unable 
to  plant  its  will  in  our  mind. 

If  the  content  is  significant  enough  to  let  us  feel  with  its 
own  will,  the  artistic  value  must  depend  upon  the  unity  of 
this  will.  What  are  the  conditions  which  favor  it  ?  The  first 
is  evidently  that  we  must  have  before  us  something  which 
represents  a  totality.  As  soon  as  the  experience  contains  a  will 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


215 


which  can  express  itself  only  in  cooperation  with  the  will  of 
that  which  is  not  given,  we  have  no  artistic  unity.  The  sculp- 
tor may  give  us  a  bust  without  the  trunk,  but  he  cannot  give 
us  the  nose  alone,  and  the  dramatist  cannot  give  us  a  fraction 
of  a  conversation  which  we  do  not  understand.  The  copy  of 
the  nose  may  nevertheless  interest  the  anatomist,  and  the 
conversation  the  historian,  but  artistically  they  are  impos- 
sible. On  the  other  hand,  neither  natural  science  nor  history 
can  decide  from  their  own  conceptions  what  should  be  acknow- 
ledged as  a  unity.  It  is  the  agreement  of  will,  that  means  the 
identity  of  purpose,  not  the  causal  connectedness  which  we 
demand.  The  landscape  is  therefore  just  as  much  such  a  unity 
as  a  single  tree,  and  the  closedness  of  the  landscape  is  in  no 
way  disturbed  even  if  perhaps  the  frame  cuts  off  the  open  sea 
or  the  foliage  of  the  tree.  The  novel  is  a  completed  unity  even 
if  the  minor  characters  may  offer  us  no  life-story,  but  exist  only 
in  accidental  occurrences.  All  which  mutually  supports  itself 
in  its  will  belongs  together  there  as  unity ;  all  which  is  neces- 
sary for  the  expression  of  this  unified  will  is  indispensable 
for  the  work  of  art ;  all  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  com- 
mon purpose  is  superfluous ;  all  which  counteracts  the  com- 
mon end  is  disturbing  if  it  does  not  support  it  indirectly  by 
coming  in  for  the  purpose  of  being  defeated.  As  the  artist  is 
free  in  introducing  into  the  unreal  world  and  in  eliminating 
from  it  whatever  he  wishes,  he  will  be  able  to  secure  an  inner 
agreement  which  is  superior  to  any  reality. 

But  his  liberty  goes  still  further.  He  can  connect  in  his 
imreality,  as  in  inner  agreement,  that  which  in  reality  would 
leave  a  complete  discord.  The  painter  can  paint  a  most 
beautiful  picture  of  a  dirty,  ugly  street,  the  poet  can  fill  a 
most  harmonious  tragedy  with  the  destructive  disharmony 
of  human  fates.  It  is  again  the  unreality  which  expands  the 
aesthetic  field  in  this  way.  In  life  the  single  man  stands  in 
relation  to  his  surroundings.  The  dispute  of  two  persons  can 
therefore  awaken  only  imaesthetic  feelings  in  our  daily  life. 


216 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


217 


Either  we  consider  the  dispute  as  a  whole :  then  it  stands  in 
disturbing  conflict  with  the  harmonious  form  of  the  society 
to  which  that  disputing  group  belongs.  Or  we  consider  the 
individual  man :  then  we  find  him  in  conflict  with  his  oppo- 
nent. Life  can  resolve  this  unrest  only  from  the  standpoint 
of  society  in  settling  the  dispute  by  justice,  or  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  individual  by  transforming  the  hatred  into  love. 
For  the  artist  or  the  poet  the  situation  is  quite  different. 
Now  the  question  is  no  longer  what  the  dispute  means  for  the 
other  parts  of  mankind,  as  all  the  threads  which  connected 
them  are  cut  off  by  the  unreality.  The  occurrences  on  the 
stage  or  in  the  novel,  as  they  are  unreal,  must  be  absolutely 
ends  in  themselves.  Disturbing  disharmony  with  the  sur- 
roundings is  thus  excluded  in  the  world  of  art.  That  which 
is  offered  to  us  is  a  piece  of  world-totality  in  itself,  and  every 
individual  man  now  becomes  only  a  part  of  this  new  whole. 
Now  the  dispute  and  the  discord  is  the  real  meaning  and 
purpose  of  this  group,  and  the  drama  is  harmonious  if  every 
figure  adjusts  itself  harmoniously  into  this  controlling  pur- 
pose. The  more  vivid  the  fight,  the  more  unified  and  the  more 
perfect  stands  every  single  person  on  this  background  in  this 
own  little  world.  Now  our  will  is  no  longer  torn  in  different 
directions  by  the  discord  and  the  tragedy.  However  much 
the  individuals  there  desire  to  destroy  one  other,  we  will 
with  all  of  them,  as  only  then  are  we  able  to  bring  the  final 
meeting,  the  destructive  fight,  to  an  expression  which  shows 
agreement  in  all  its  parts.  The  same  repeats  itself  in  all  other 
arts.  That  which  is  ugly  in  nature  can  everywhere  be  trans- 
posed into  beautiful  art,  and  we  never  have  to  take  refuge  in 
the  anti-artistic  thought  that  we  enjoy  there  only  the  over- 
coming of  technical  difficulties  in  the  rendering,  or  that  we 
have  the  artistic  joy  in  recognizing  outer  reality.  Here,  too, 
the  evaluation  rests  entirely  on  the  inner  agreement,  which 
takes  new  form  because  in  that  unreal  world  a  manifold 
may  offer  us  a  completed  whole,  while  the  same  manifold  in 


reality  could  be  considered  only  in  its  relation  to  not-given 
factors. 

But  finally  we  come  to  the  most  important  element.  The 
unreal,  which  as  such  is  without  relation  to  the  forms  of  our 
own  space,  of  our  own  time,  of  our  own  nature,  and  of  our 
own  history,  must  create  for  itself  its  own  forms.  The  men 
of  the  painter  stand  there  firm  on  their  own  feet  in  a  two- 
dimensional  space  without  depth,  the  personalities  of  the 
sculptor  live  there  in  a  world  without  color,  the  heroes  of  the 
tragedy  speak  there  in  rhythm  of  verses,  the  lyrical  feelings 
resound  there  in  rhymes.  Everything  which  is  disturbing 
and  superfluous  is  simply  annihilated,  and  the  beginning  and 
end,  the  frame  and  the  setting  of  the  stage,  close  the  whole 
so  totally  that  nothing  can  leak  through  the  new  form. 
This  new  own  form  of  the  unreal  which  art  has  created,  and 
without  which  reality  is  never  eliminated,  stands  entirely  in 
the  service  of  the  unified  task.  The  form  itself  is  an  expression 
of  the  will,  and  favors,  yes,  makes  possible,  the  inner  agree- 
ment of  the  offered  experience.  The  Ijrical  mood  has  not  only 
its  content,  but  its  own  new  world-form.  It  is  not  only  mean- 
ing but  shape,  is  not  only  joy  or  pain  but  rhythm  and  stanza 
and  rhyme;  and  each  must  contribute  to  the  unified  will. 
We  have  to  follow  up  for  the  special  arts  how  content  and 
shape  cooperate  there  harmoniously. 

The  essential  thing  for  us  is  that  the  manifoldness  of  these 
conditions  of  art  does  not  represent  a  haphazard  combination. 
The  manifold  content  must  be  significant,  it  must  be  unreal,  it 
must  express  a  will ;  this  will  must  be  felt  by  us,  our  own  will 
must  be  eliminated.  If  the  relation  to  surrounding,  to  nature, 
to  history,  must  be  cut  off,  the  whole  must  be  completely 
isolated,  it  must  have  its  own  form,  and  this  form  must  be 
harmonious  with  the  content.  But  all  these  factors  belong 
together;  they  are  not  combined  by  chance,  they  are  con- 
trolled by  one  single  fundamental  demand.  All  this  is  neces- 
sary, if  the  inner  agreement  of  the  oflfering  is  to  come  to  ex- 


llu 


218 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


pression.  Only  because  we  seek  inner  agreement  must  we 
apprehend  it  as  will,  and  only  because  we  want  to  under- 
stand it  as  will  must  it  be  significant  in  itself  and  must  our 
own  true  personal  will  be  eliminated.  Only  because  we  want 
to  eliminate  our  personal  will  must  the  offering  be  unreal,  and 
must  therefore  be  detached  and  must  have  its  own  form. 
Only  under  these  conditions,  therefore,  can  it  be  a  work  of 
beauty.  On  the  other  hand,  we  understand  that  this  inner 
agreement  of  will  must  be  for  us  an  absolutely  valid  value. 
It  must  bring  us  into  a  situation  which  is  independent  of  all 
personal  desires  and  pleasures.  Only  in  so  far  as  the  experi- 
ence agrees  in  itself  has  it  an  own  meaning  which  transcends 
the  chance  flash-like  impression.  If  we  seek  a  world  we  must 
maintain  the  single  experience  with  the  demand  for  an  identi- 
cal  recurring  of  this  will  in  the  tissue  of  the  experienced  mani- 
fold, and  only  when  the  identical  is  felt  are  we  satisfied.  In 
nature  and  life  we  could  never  hope  for  that  perfect  agree- 
ment, because  every  particular  part  stood  in  a  thousandfold 
relation  to  the  universe  and  to  history,  and  thus  influenced 
our  own  hopes  and  fears  and  demanded  our  own  desires  and 
impulses.  Thus  a  complete  sinking  into  the  will  of  the  world 
was  never  possible.  The  inner  agreement,  and  through  it  the 
value  of  unity,  can  become  complete  only  when  all  those 
relations  are  united  and  the  experience  has  found  its  own 
detached  form  by  eliminating  the  expectations  of  reality. 
All  that  can  be  given  to  us  through  art  alone :  by  the  fine  arts 
for  the  will  of  the  outer  world,  by  literature  for  the  will  of 
the  fellow-world,  by  music  for  the  will  of  the  inner  world. 


A.  —  FINE  ARTS 

The  fine  arts  are  to  express  the  inner  will-agreement  of 
the  content  of  the  outer  world  when  it  is  raised  to  its  unre- 
ality. As  we  have  discussed  so  far  the  value  of  unity  espe- 
cially with  reference  to  the  outer  world  and  its  natural 
harmony,  and  the  value  of  beauty  especially  with  reference 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


219 


to  painting  and  sculpture,  we  see  the  field,  on  the  whole, 
clearly  before  us.  There  are  only  a  few  further  considerations 
needed  as  supplement.  Above  all,  it  may  be  desirable  to 
inquire  somewhat  more  carefully  how,  in  the  case  of  the  fine 
arts,  content  and  form  belong  together,  and  how  they  serve 
their  common  task. 

Every  picture  in  a  frame  has  to  communicate  to  us  a  con- 
tent. It  may  be  a  saint  or  a  genre  scene,  still  life  or  landscape. 
We  have  carefully  studied  why  this  content  must  stimulate 
in  us  a  manifoldness,  must  be  significant,  and  must  be  closed 
in  itself,  containing  all  which  is  necessary  for  the  expression 
of  its  intentions  and  excluding  everything  which  points  be- 
yond this  work  of  art.  We  have  seen  also  that  the  value  of 
this  content  for  the  purpose  of  beauty  is  independent  of  the 
question  whether  the  same  content  would  still  be  beautiful 
in  the  worid  of  reality.  Pulled  down  into  the  real  course  of 
nature,  the  beauty  of  many  a  painted  content  would  be  lost. 
We  should  not  enjoy  in  life  the  anatomists  who  stand  around 
the  opened  corpse,  or  the  drunken  comrades  in  the  smoky  inn. 
Compared  with  the  reality,  the  content  of  the  picture  is  fur- 
ther favored  by  the  fact  that  it  is  disburdened  of  everything 
which  does  not  serve  the  unified  will.  The  real  outer  worid 
is  everywhere  stuffed  with  partial  contents  which  are  not 
significant  for  our  experience.   Even  where  the  perceptions 
of  our  senses  come  to  an  end,  we  still  have  to  acknowledge 
many  things  as  real  which  we  discover  by  our  artificial  means. 
The  artist  is  free  from  all  this ;  for  him  there  is  no  content 
beyond  the  perceived  one.  If  we  should  look  at  the  painted 
flower  with  a  magnifying-glass,  we  should  not  find  as  we  do  in 
reality  more  and  more  detail  of  the  plant-tissues ;  the  plant- 
tissue  would  disappear,  and  we  should  see  the  pigment  and 
grain  of  the  oil  color.  The  content  of  the  work  of  art  must  be 
taken  as  it  offers  itself,  and  we  can  ignore  everything  which 
does  not  want  to  show  itself;  we  have  no  right  to  go  into  fur- 
ther details.  It  may  be  that  in  the  portrait  painting  face  and 


220 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


221 


hand  alone  are  really  visible,  every  other  part  of  the  figure 
is  eliminated ;  and  yet  that  is  all  which  has  artistic  existence 
there.  Perhaps  one  single  light  reflex  must  stand  in  place 
of  a  thing :  nothing  else  was  worthy  to  enter  into  the  content 
of  the  painting. 

Of  course  knowledge  and  science  too  perform  a  selection 
from  the  chaos  of  experience.  What  we  call  the  existing  real- 
ity is  certainly  sifted  and  much  is  eliminated.  We  have  stud- 
ied that  carefully.  Only  that  which  can  maintain  itself  and 
which  in  its  self-conservation  can  enter  into  the  connection  is 
acknowledged  as  scientifically  true.  But  this  scientific  elimi- 
nation makes  the  manifoldness  of  the  world  grow  far  beyond 
the  experience.  That  which  we  experience  finds  the  limits 
of  our  senses,  but  that  which  we  scientifically  understand  is 
unlimited,  like  the  system  of  our  numbers,  which  can  endlessly 
add  new  numbers  and  can  divide  them  without  limit.  All 
that  we  experience  is  only  an  infinitesimally  small  fraction  of 
what  knowledge  conceptionally  recognizes.  Science  simplifies 
our  experience  by  ordering  it,  but  multiplies  the  content  of 
our  possible  experience.  Where  the  eye  sees  the  single  drop 
of  dew,  our  physical  knowledge  finds  trillions  of  atoms.  The 
inner  significance  of  the  atom  is  of  course  no  longer  compar- 
able with  the  drop  which  moistens  the  flower  and  which  re- 
flects the  sun.  The  meaning  of  the  particulars  thus  becomes 
empty  while  their  number  increases ;  and  when  natiu-al  science 
speaks  the  last  word,  the  number  of  the  parts  becomes  end- 
lessly large,  but  all  are  of  the  same  kind  and  entirely  insigni- 
ficant in  their  individuality.  The  simplification  of  art  goes 
exactly  the  opposite  way.  Art  reduces  the  number  of  things, 
but  reenforces  their  significance.  All  which  is  not  immediately 
given  does  not  lie  in  art's  world  at  all.  Science  looks  with  its 
conceptions  beyond  the  furthest  stars  which  the  telescope 
may  discover ;  art  never  looks  beyond  the  frame  of  the  paint- 
ing. But  even  in  the  frame  the  artistic  simplification  can 
never  increase  the  details.  Science  may  resolve  the  drop  of 


water  into  millions  of  elements;  the  painter  posits  for  the 
millions  of  drops  one  single  radiant  stroke  of  white  to  express 
the  foam  of  the  surf.  And  yet  the  daring  power  of  this  one 
white  line  may  express  the  meaning  of  that  wave  which 
storms  against  the  rock  more  vividly  than  any  accumulation 
of  details  would  have  succeeded  in  doing. 

We  may  say  in  general  that  art  diminishes  the  details  in 
their  number,  but  reenforces  their  inner  energy.  The  swan  on 
the  pond  becomes  for  the  anatomist  a  long  series  of  organs, 
and  every  organ  becomes  a  series  of  tissues  and  finally  of  cells, 
and  each  of  the  cells  is  necessary  to  make  the  connections 
clear  which  explain  the  organic  functions  of  the  swan.  But 
those  millions  of  cells  which  are  reached  in  such  a  way  are 
entirely  indifferent  for  apperceiving  the  swan  as  it  appears 
to  us  there  on  the  pond.  The  painter,  on  the  other  hand,  does 
not  even  give  us  those  few  parts  which  we  really  see  in  the 
swan.  Even  there  he  still  selects,  and  perhaps  only  a  few 
white  blotches  signify  the  body,  but  one  noble  line  from  the 
head  to  the  wings  brings  us  the  whole  proud  tranquillity  and 
soft  purity.  By  the  confinement  to  a  fundamental  line  the 
whole  being  of  the  bird  has  become  condensed  into  one  im- 
pression. Of  course  this  suppression  of  the  insignificant  con- 
tributes again  to  the  feeling  of  unreality  which  was  so  import- 
ant to  us  for  all  evaluation  of  beauty.  The  suppression  of  all 
sensations  from  other  senses  helps  in  a  similar  way.  The 
painted  wave  does  not  bring  us  the  coolness  and  the  salt  air, 
and  yet  this  lack  is  thoroughly  a  strength  and  a  reenforce- 
ment,  as  it  inhibits  the  expectations  of  reality.  The  content 
of  the  painting  is  thus  offered  to  us  by  those  features  which 
are  most  significant  for  the  expression  of  its  meaning. 

However,  we  must  not  overlook  that  the  offering  of  the 
content  is  by  no  means  the  most  important  factor  of  the 
painting.  We  have  seen  in  what  way  the  value  grows  with 
the  significance  of  the  content,  but  it  deserves  attention  that 
the  value  does  not  grow  at  all  with  the  novelty  of  the  mate- 


222 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


rial,  and  even  decreases  with  the  increasing  ramification  and 
unusualness  of  the  content.  Even  the  most  dramatic  court 
trial,  which  seems  to  be  the  climax  of  a  novel,  is  in  a  painting 
aesthetically  by  far  less  impressive  and  interesting  than  perhaps 
the  picture  of  an  old  peasant  woman,  and  the  most  surprising 
exotic  landscape  is  indifferent  to  us  at  the  side  of  a  picture  of 
an  intimate  little  nook  among  the  familiar  trees.  Everything 
which  is  complicated  and  strange  at  first  leads  us  away  from 
the  given.  It  posits  for  our  imagination  something  real  in  the 
place  of  the  unreal,  and  that  destroys  art.  That  court  scene 
does  not  have  its  meaning  clearly  in  itself ;  it  is  a  middle  piece, 
for  which  we  add  beginning  and  end  in  our  minds,  and  enter 
into  connections  which  are  not  completely  contained  in  the 
appearance  itself,  but  are  simply  attached.  The  exotic  land- 
scape almost  awakens  even  naturalistic  interest.  But  still 
more  important  is  the  other  circumstance  that  in  all  such 
cases  the  content  pushes  itself  into  the  foreground  and  wants 
to  be  the  only  factor  in  the  combination  of  content  and  form. 
That  which  is  new  or  strange  or  instructive  becomes  content 
alone,  and  by  that  pure  art  is  destroyed.  If  the  content  is  to 
be  really  significant  and  important  and  deep,  and  yet  is  not 
to  win  a  preponderance  in  the  whole  which  disturbs  the 
equilibrium,  it  must  be  a  content  which  is  entirely  familiar 
to  us  or  which  has  a  general  character.  This  makes  the  incom- 
parable value  of  the  religious  subjects.  In  Madonna  pictures, 
for  instance,  the  overwhelming  content  in  its  depth  of  emo- 
tion can  be  grasped  and  yet  the  mental  equilibrium  can  be 
kept  because  the  material  is  so  well  known.  And  such  general 
meaning  belongs  to  the  landscape  which  is  nowhere,  to  the 
female  body  which  is  nobody's,  to  the  imaginative  scene  which 
is  at  no  time ;  there  art  can  reach  its  most  harmonious  effects. 
If  the  content  is  not  general,  the  picture  too  easily  serves  nat- 
uralistic or  historical  information  and  instruction ;  the  poetry 
becomes  part  of  the  biography,  the  landscape  becomes  part 
of  the  tourist's  report.   True  art  needs  unity  of  content 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


223 


and  form,  and  the  content  therefore  must  have  a  self- 
dependent  but  only  coordinated  significance.  That  can  be 
only  if  the  form  itself  becomes  expression  of  a  meaning  and 
of  a  will. 

Of  course  for  us  here  the  form  is  not  only  the  spatial  form 
but  the  whole  garment  in  which  the  content  presents  itself. 
There  belongs  the  color  with  all  its  differences  of  intensity 
and  saturation ;  there  belongs  the  line  with  its  curves  and 
angles,  with  its  distances  and  shapes.  All  those  form-parts 
are  made  use  of  also  where  art  is  not  in  question.  The  illus- 
tration in  natural  history  and  even  the  photograph  in  the 
rogues'  gallery  can  fixate  the  content  only  by  lights  and  lines. 
But  in  the  work  of  art  alone  the  demand  arises  that  these 
means  of  form  themselves  contain  the  value  of  unity.  This 
is  indeed  a  demand  which  represents  something  entirely  new 
in  the  vision  of  the  outer  world.  In  the  harmony  of  nature 
we  appreciated  the  perfect  forms,  but  they  were  forms  and 
colors  of  things.  In  the  picture  the  thing  becomes,  from  the 
standpoint  of  form,  something  accidental,  inasmuch  as  that 
which  is  to  be  filled  beautifully  is  no  longer  a  group  of  things 
but  the  space  of  the  picture.  And  this  space,  as  we  recognized, 
is  not  a  part  of  the  one  space  of  the  outer  world,  and  the  light 
which  floods  through  this  picture  space  is  not  the  sunlight 
which  falls  through  the  window  of  our  room  on  the  painted 
canvas.  The  frame  enclosed  a  space  and  an  illumination  both 
of  which  are  entirely  independent  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
The  annihilation  of  all  connections  and  the  introduction  of 
this  new  self-dependent  own  world-form  gives  to  the  lights 
and  the  lines  an  independent  will  and  a  significant  meaning, 
provided  that  the  content  does  not  push  itself  into  the  fore- 
ground. That  is  not  simply  the  consequence  of  the  limitation 
by  the  frame  or  of  the  confinement  to  two  dimensions.  If, 
perhaps,  we  observe  a  large  framed  map  of  America,  we  see 
plenty  of  lines  and  colors.  Every  river  and  every  mountain 
gives  lines  and  forms  and  every  state  has  its  own  color-tone. 


224 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


225 


Yet  it  would  be  difficult  to  feel  an  independent  life  in  these 
colors  and  lines.  Whether  those  rivers  form  an  harmonious 
combination  of  lines  does  not  interest  us  because  those  black 
lines  on  the  map  do  not  seek  to  express  any  will  as  lines,  and 
hence  they  are  neither  in  agreement  nor  in  disagreement. 
They  have  only  one  significance  for  us,  to  represent  relations 
of  the  real  geographical  world,  and  this  connection  with  the 
directions  of  the  real  streams  constitutes  their  whole  import- 
ance. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  lines  and  colors  of  the  Sistine  Ma- 
donna do  not  have  to  represent  anything  but  themselves. 
They  are  not,  like  the  forms  on  the  map,  representations  of 
something  real,  nor  are  they,  like  the  forms  of  the  outer  world, 
suggestions  for  a  practical  action.  Entirely  detached  from 
everything  else,  they  are  determined  in  themselves  as  expres- 
sion of  the  one  framed  space.  Accordingly  each  fold  in  the 
gown,  each  line  in  the  rhythms  of  the  child's  body,  the  out- 
lines of  the  wings  of  the  angels  and  the  sharp  lines  of  the 
side  figures,  the  lines  of  the  curtains  and  the  heavenly  form 
of  the  Virgin,  each  becomes  a  will  which  expresses  its  inten- 
tions and  seeks  most  intimate  connections  with  the  agreeing 
will  of  the  other  lines.  This  will  has  no  other  purpose  but 
itself.  Its  own  demand  is  agreement  with  the  lines  of  the 
whole,  and  no  other  language  but  this  picture  language 
would  be  able  to  express  the  meaning  of  these  folds  and 
forms.  The  endless  harmony  of  this  will  reenforces  the  will 
itself  to  more  and  more  vivid  activity.  And  without  effort 
we  might  submit  ourselves  and  sink  into  the  soul-breathing 
gracious  lines  and  their  harmonious  interplay  until  the  paint- 
ing became  for  us  a  beautiful  swaying  of  melodious  lines.  But 
that  all  holds  true  even  for  the  simplest  forms.  Here  in  the 
landscape  picture  the  steep  ascent  and  the  soft  curve,  the 
mild  wave-form  and  the  acute  angle,  the  broad  foundation 
and  the  slender  height,  all  come  to  us  in  the  pure  detached 
picture  with  their  own  demand,  and  every  confused  mixture 


or  disorder  in  such  volitions  destroys  the  unity.  Every  part 
submits  itself  to  the  whole.  The  one  side  aims  not  to  tumble 
over  but  to  be  balanced  by  the  other  side;  the  loose  play 
of  the  upper  part  demands  that  the  lower  part  have  solid 
bases ;  the  division  into  a  larger  and  smaller  segment  postu- 
lates that  the  one  does  not  suppress  the  other,  and  that  each 
may  express  its  own  being  with  independent  clearness.  And 
from  such  simplest  harmonious  counterplay  leads  the  straight 
way  to  the  most  wonderful  symphony  of  lines  like  Rem- 
brandt's Nightwatch. 

The  same  holds  for  the  lights.  Their  will  is  not  movement 
like  that  of  the  lines.  Their  will  is  excitement,  but  the  endless 
manifoldness  of  these  excitements  enters  in  the  same  way 
into  a  mutual  interplay.  Each  color-tone  has  its  own  way  of 
exciting,  and  quickly  changes  it  with  the  saturation  and  with 
the  expansion.  With  cutting  severity  the  saturated  color 
turns  itself  against  the  softly-toned  unsaturated  colors,  and 
with  antipathy  the  pure  color  stands  beside  the  impure,  the 
warm  beside  the  cold.  The  little  blotches  of  one  color  which 
are  scattered  over  the  painting  charmingly  send  their  saluta- 
tions over  to  the  broad  colored  surface  of  equal  tone,  and  the 
light  color  radiates  exuberantly  between  the  agreeing  dark 
ones.  But  one  step  more.  The  lights  aim  not  only  to  be  in 
agreement  with  each  other,  but  also  with  the  lines.  The  excite- 
ments and  the  movements  must  enter  into  one  harmony.  The 
mild  excitement  cannot  tolerate  the  forcible  movement  of  the 
lines,  and  the  great  pathetic  swing  of  the  lines  does  not  will 
the  faint  color-tone.  And  finally  the  last  and  the  greatest : 
the  excitements  of  the  lights  and  the  movements  of  the  lines 
want  to  be  in  perfect  agreement  with  the  meaning  of  the 
content.  The  enjoying  spectator  of  the  picture  is  rarely  con- 
scious with  what  infinite  certainty  the  genius  of  the  great 
painter  secures  this  highest  unity,  and  how  much  of  the 
beauty  depends  on  this  all-embracing  harmony.  In  itself  it 
would  be  entirely  possible  that  the  sweetest  Madonna  should 


r 


226 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


be  clothed  in  a  gown  the  folds  of  which  are  angular  and  the 
colors  of  which  are  loud,  and  that  the  side  figures  should  be 
given  in  hard  sharp  outlines.  Such  colors  and  forms  might 
in  themselves  harmonize  completely,  and  might  in  full  agree- 
ment characterize  a  wild  loud  struggle.  But  these  acute  angles 
and  excited  colors  would  agree  with  the  content  only  if  the 
subject  were  perhaps  an  exciting  battle.  In  the  same  way 
the  horrible  story  of  the  battle  with  all  its  disasters  might  be 
reported  with  the  softest  colors  and  with  mild  curved  lines 
in  charming  forms.  The  little  white  clouds  might  adorn  the 
sky,  and  the  trees  might  frame  it  in  gracious  curves.  The 
content  itself  would  not  have  to  suffer  at  all  by  such  mild 
whispering  line-forms,  and  yet  the  unity  of  the  picture  would 
again  be  destroyed.  The  ragged  stormy  clouds  in  the  sky,  the 
knotty  branches  of  the  trees,  the  sharp  pointed  stones  at  the 
bottom,  should  all  take  part  in  the  turmoil  of  the  battle  and 
express  their  wild  excitement. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  extend  these  reflections  to  other 
fields  of  the  fine  arts.  The  character  of  the  beautiful  agree- 
ment of  all  parts  remains  the  same  everywhere.  Nothing  is 
changed  if,  for  instance,  in  the  beautiful  ornament  color  and 
form  alone  without  a  content  carry  through  their  play  of  in- 
tentions, or  if  in  the  drawing  the  color  is  absent.  The  sculptor 
simplifies  the  material  still  more;  still  more,  therefore,  he 
reenforces  the  significant.  He  must  reduce  the  manifoldness 
of  the  content  because  the  important  elements  must  stand 
out  from  whatever  point  his  work  is  seen,  and  from  nowhere 
must  one  part  be  allowed  to  cover  the  other  parts  sufficiently 
to  destroy  their  significance.  But  while  he  gives  fewer  parts 
than  the  painter,  he  can  now  take  the  inexhaustible  rich- 
ness of  the  dimension  of  depth  into  his  work  of  beauty.  And 
what  an  abundance  of  will  expresses  itself  in  the  play  of 
lights  on  the  plastic  surface  is  indicated  by  the  difference 
between  the  lifeless  plaster  of  paris  and  the  living  surface  of 
the  marble. 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


227 


B.  —  LITERATURE 

In  the  form  of  language  literature  gives  us  an  understand- 
ing of  the  human  will.  Not  the  outer  world  but  the  fellow- 
world  approaches  us  there  with  the  pure  immediacy  of  its 
suggestions  and  intentions,  which  are  not  to  be  perceived  but 
felt.   The  mathematical  and  astronomical,  the  physical  and 
chemical,  the  biological,  and  even  the  psychological  books 
do  not  belong  to  literature.   They  do  not  deal  with  the  will 
in  its  purposive  aspect,  as  even  the  psychologist,  when  he 
speaks  of  the  will,  treats  it  as  a  meaningless  psychical  content. 
They  all  deal  with  the  world  as  nature,  and  when  such  works 
are  nevertheless  considered  as  literature  it  indicates  that  we 
do  not  reflect  in  that  case  on  the  content  of  the  book,  but  on 
the  writer,  and  that  we  take  the  books,  therefore,  as  expression 
of  will  and  realization  of  the  personality  of  individual  schol- 
ars. Their  content  stands  outside  of  literature.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  works  of  historians  and  philosophers  belong  to  the 
literature  of  the  world  if  they  are  loyal  to  their  highest  task. 
The  historian  indeed  speaks  of  the  personal  volitions  of  sub- 
jects and  the  philosopher  of  the  over-personal  volitions.   In 
both  great  departments  nothing  is  ultimately  to  be  described 
and  to  be  explained,  but  attitudes  are  to  be  interpreted,  and 
to  be  understood,  and  to  be  brought  into  a  will-connection. 
But  history  and  philosophy  are  sciences ;  they  aim  towards 
knowledge.  Their  value  is  the  value  of  connection.  We  want 
to  speak  now  of  that  literature  which  aims  to  be  art.   The 
given  material  is  the  volitions.  The  historian  and  philosopher 
follow  up  those  volitions  in  their  influence,  their  consequence, 
their  return;  the  poet  grasps  a  manifoldness  of  wills,  and 
apprehends  their  inner  agreement,  their  unity,  their  har- 
monious closedness.  In  this  way  history  and  philosophy  are 
led  from  the  particular  will  to  the  world-connection  of  the 
will-totality,  and  yet  steadily  maintain  the  particular.  The 
poet  can  never  begin  with  that  which  is  entirely  simple.  He 


228 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


has  to  start  with  the  manifold,  but  his  manifold  by  its  own 
unity  detaches  itself  completely  from  the  remainder  of  the 
world,  and  leads  nowhere  over  to  another  will. 

It  is  the  task  of  literature  to  find  the  inner  unity  in 
the  manifold  of  the  wills  of  the  fellow-world.  History  and 
philosophy  posit  the  will  in  the  system  of  its  connections, 
literature  in  the  unity  of  its  agreements.  There  the  self- 
assertion  of  the  world-will  shows  itself  by  the  fact  that  nothing 
flashes  up  by  chance ;  that  every  volition  persists  and  main- 
tains itself  in  new  and  ever  new  form.  Here  the  self-assertion 
of  the  world-will  shows  itself  by  the  fact  that  every  volition 
is  in  inner  agreement  with  other  volitions  and  is  thus  expres- 
sion of  an  independent  meaning.  Where  this  unity  is  felt,  it 
must  offer  absolute  satisfaction.  The  life  of  our  real  fellow- 
world  shows  this  unity  seldom,  just  as  the  real  outer  world 
seldom  offers  real  natural  beauty.  We  clearly  recognized 
why  the  connection  of  realities  works  on  the  whole  against 
the  perfect  detachment  and  inner  agreement.  There  the  work 
of  civilization  has  to  set  in.  Literature  is  to  open  to  us 
the  meaning  of  the  fellow-world  just  as  fine  arts  opened  the 
meaning  of  the  outer  world. 

Thus  literature  deals  with  the  will  of  the  fellow-world, 
not  with  the  outer  world.  If  belles-lettres  deal  with  nature, 
they  never  move  in  the  track  of  natural  science,  and  do  not 
even  want  to  offer  that  which  the  painter  offers.  For  the  fine 
arts,  nature  itself  is  willing;  for  the  poet,  not  the  will  of 
nature  but  the  influence  of  this  willing  nature  on  the  willing 
man  is  in  question.  When  the  novelist  sketches  the  landscape 
background  or  the  l5rric  poet  forms  a  piece  of  nature  as  con- 
tent of  his  verses,  nature  as  such  is  never  the  real  content. 
The  content  is  the  feeling  human  soul  in  which  nature  reflects 
itself  and  in  which  nature  becomes  living  with  such  intentions. 
When  in  the  painting  the  moonbeam  reflects  its  glimmer  in 
the  sea,  we,  the  enjoyers,  are  to  understand  this  magical  will 
of  nature.   When  the  poet  shows  us  such  a  picture  in  his 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY  229 

rhymes,  we  are  only  to  understand  and  to  feel  with  the  human 
soul  which  proclaims  what  the  beauty  of  nature  has  brought 
to  it.  Nowhere  in  the  wide  field  of  literature  is  there  any- 
thing under-human  or  over-human  which  in  itself  can  be  poet- 
ical content.  Nature  and  God  exist  in  poetry  only  for  man's 
sake.  His  life  must  be  interpreted  and  must  be  understood 
in  the  agreement  of  its  inner  abundance.  Whatever  does 
not  belong  to  the  human  will  sinks  to  the  bottom  through 
the  meshes  of  poetry.  And  even  if  a  Shelley  makes  the  cloud 
speak,  it  is  not  the  real  cloud  which  speaks  to  us  as  it  would 
do  from  the  canvas  of  the  painter,  but  it  is  an  imaginative 
fellow-mind  in  the  cloud,  which  has  learned  by  far  too  much 
from  natural  science. 

If  the  meaning  of  life  is  to  be  interpreted,  it  must  be  really 
life  itself  which  the  word  of  the  poet  brings  to  us.  But  how 
can  we  combine  that  with  the  fact  that  he  speaks  of  some- 
thing unreal  which  has  its  origin  in  his  own  imagination? 
Nevertheless,  there  is  no  contradiction  at  all.   We  saw  how 
the  same  apparent  antithesis  disappears  for  the  fine  arts  as 
soon  as  we  grasp  the  conception  of  reality  in  its  deeper  mean- 
ing.  Reality  is  a  certain  value  of  conservation.  If  we  say  that 
an  experienced  will  which  we  understand  is  real,  we  accredit 
to  the  will  a  certain  value  which  is  lacking  for  the  unreal. 
But  at  the  same  time  we  are  bound  by  it  to  accept  obligations 
which  do  not  bind  us  in  the  face  of  the  unreal.  To  be  valued 
as  real  meant  to  us  to  be  maintained  through  the  total  con- 
nections of  the  worid  and  to  be  linked  with  the  unlimited 
series  of  phenomena.    To  be  understood  as  unreal  means, 
in  the  first  place,  that  it  is  to  be  interpreted  and  to  be  unified 
out  of  its  own  content  without  any  reference  to  the  other 
processes  in  the  worid ;  that  it  is  independent  in  itself,  com- 
plete and  free.  This  freedom  cannot  be  deprived  of  its  value 
by  our  adding  with  condescension  that  it  is  after  all  only  the 
invention  of  the  poet.   No,  that  which  the  poet  has  created 
is  not  that  unreal  will  which  we  understand  and  feel  as  speak- 


'I 


230 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


ing  in  the  poem.  What  he  has  created  is  the  tissue  of  words. 
Creating  always  means  a  certain  connection  which  as  such 
can  exist  only  between  realities.  The  word,  the  sentence,  the 
story,  can  be  created  because  of  course  they  are  realities. 
The  real  poet  creates  the  real  poem.  The  unreal  will-content 
of  the  poem  cannot  enter  into  any  real  connections,  not  even 
into  connections  with  the  creating  poet,  because  it  is  unreal 
in  itself.  Just  as  the  artist  has  not  planted  the  imaginative 
landscape  which  he  paints,  so  the  poet  has  not  produced  the 
will  to  which  he  loans  his  words.  The  will  which  we  under- 
stand in  the  story  or  in  the  drama  is  an  experience  for  us 
which  nowhere  points  back  to  its  inventor,  and  therefore 
which  never  can  be  lowered  in  its  value  by  such  reference  to 
the  author.  As  soon  as  we  understand  the  will  of  the  tragic 
hero  in  the  drama,  the  experience  is  for  us  an  immediate  life- 
fact,  exactly  as  much  as  if  the  historian  reported  such  a  will 
to  us,  or  as  if  we  heard  about  the  intentions  of  a  fellow-man 
from  his  own  lips.  The  single  deed  which  we  experience  there 
loses  nothing  whatever  by  its  unreality.  The  only  thing  which 
is  eliminated  is  its  relation  to  other  experiences.  Whatever 
goes  on  outside  of  the  work  of  literature  is  repressed,  but  that 
one  deed  which  the  poet  proclaims  stands  before  us  as  the 
true  original  experience,  full  of  the  warmth  of  life. 

The  will  of  the  character  in  the  work  of  literature,  there- 
fore, cannot  gain  anything  for  its  living  selfhood  by  being 
an  imitation  of  a  real  historical  person.  The  characters  of 
"As  You  Like  It"  demand  our  true  participation  with  the 
same  right  as  those  of  "Julius  Caesar.''  The  historical  reality 
of  the  political  model  has  for  hearer  or  reader  only  the  one 
significance  that  his  historical  knowledge  elaborates  and 
enriches  the  olBfered  impressions,  but  this  knowledge  should 
never  lead  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  given  work  of  art. 
The  relations  which  we  know  from  history  are  sharply  cut  off 
by  the  limits  of  the  drama  as  far  as  they  tend  to  bring  about 
connections  with  that  which  is  not  given  in  the  drama  itself. 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY       231 

They  remain  effective  only  as  far  as  they  give  a  more  signi- 
ficant content  to  the  characters.   But  that  holds  true  after 
all  for  every  conception  which  the  author  uses.   Our  know- 
ledge enriches  our  apperception  of  every  word,  and  as  we  must 
understand  the  language  of  the  poet  to  be  able  to  follow  him 
at  all,  in  the  same  way  all  naturalistic  or  historical  knowledge 
may  penetrate  the  content  of  the  verses.    The  localities,  the 
political  and  religious  institutions,  the  historical  events  which 
are  mentioned  in  the  piece  of  literature,  therefore  mean  more 
to  the  well-informed  man,  perhaps  even  more  to  the  read- 
ers than  to  the  poet  himself,  but  only  in  such  a  way  have  we 
a  right  to  support  the  apprehension  of  the  historical  char- 
acters in  literature  by  our  historical  knowledge.  Their  reality 
value,  which  is  the  most  important  thing  for  the  writer  of 
history,  is  in  belles-lettres  entirely  excluded.   The  Macbeth 
of  the  drama  is  not  more  real  than  the  witches.  They  are  all 
equally  unreal,  and  they  are  all  equally  true  experiences  as 
soon  as  their  will  is  really  apperceived  by  us  as  will. 

That  is  indeed  the  indispensable  condition.  We  must  really 
understand  the  will  which  expresses  itself  in  those  words  and 
must  feel  and  live  with  it.  If  it  is  not  a  will,  that  which  we 
hear  remains  only  a  description  of  things.  Then  there  is  no 
life  in  it,  and  the  task  of  interpreting  the  meaning  of  that  life 
cannot  be  fulfilled.  If  we  heard  there  about  beings  who  are 
delighted  over  pain  and  who  are  depressed  by  the  fulfilment 
of  their  wishes,  beings  who  know  only  the  future  and  cannot 
remember  the  past,  beings  who  have  other  senses  than  we 
have  and  who  think  with  another  logic,  we  should  be  unable 
to  understand  them.  They  would  be  objects  for  us,  but  not 
subjects  with  whom  we  could  feel.  The  character,  even  in  the 
fairy-tale,  must  have  the  fundamental  type  of  willing  in  com- 
mon with  the  real  beings.  But  as  soon  as  we  come  in  contact 
there  with  beings  whom  we  can  understand,  it  is  just  their 
unreality  which  offers  the  most  favorable  condition  for  our 
complete  feeling  with  them,  a  feeling  upon  which  the  con- 


232 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


sciousness  of  inner  unity  is  dependent.  As  soon  as  we  deal 
with  real  persons,  all  the  connections  are  given.   We  are 
dragged  in  with  our  own  desires  and  inclinations,  with  our 
partisanship  and  our  hopes.  Only  the  unreal  can  speak  to  us 
and  appeal  to  us  and  demand  our  sympathy,  and  yet  keep 
us  in  quietude  without  own  wishes.   In  the  face  of  the  real 
being,  we  take  attitude  ourselves.  We  will  to  favor  or  sup- 
press his  influence,  to  reward  or  punish  him.  We  want  to 
fight  and  to  assert  ourselves.  In  the  face  of  the  unreal  will,  we 
are  not  conscious  of  any  own  will.   The  feeling  of  our  own 
personality  is  inhibited,  and  impersonally  we  sink  into  the 
will  which  is  suggested  by  the  words ;  we  sink  into  the  will  of 
the  hero.  We  are  without  wishes  in  the  midst  of  the  poem 
because  the  unreality  has  lifted  us  beyond  the  realm  of  ac- 
tion, but  the  will  of  the  intruding  word  forces  us  with  its  own 
demands  the  more  intensely.  Without  any  own  wishes  and 
without  resistance  we  will  the  will  which  is  suggested  by  the 
characters  of  the  poem.    It  is  true  the  historian,  too,  may 
appeal  not  seldom  to  our  artistic  sense.  Then  also  we  enter 
without  personal  attitude  into  the  spell  of  those  life-energies 
of  others.  But  the  typical  attitude  in  every  historical  reading 
is  that  we  are  also  interested  in  the  report  of  historical  oc- 
currences on  account  of  the  influences  and  consequences  of 
those  volitions.   The  world  in  which  we  do  our  daily  work 
stands  in  question  there,  and  we  want  to  understand  its 
products  of  civilization  by  turning  back  to  those  whose  will 
has  prepared  it.  In  the  work  of  literature  the  will  is  an 
end  in  itself.  It  becomes  for  us  a  last  purpose  to  understand 
those  wills  in  their  fulfilment  and  in  their  disappointment. 
And  all  subordinates  itself  to  the  one  ideal  of  finding  in  this 
abundance  of  will  the  inner  unity,  and  that  ultimately  means 
of  finding  a  meaning  in  life. 

If  the  poet  leads  us  away  from  reality  he  does  not  promise 
us  satisfaction  by  showing  us  another  and  more  beautiful,  a 
better  and  fantastic  life.  On  the  contrary,  that  would  have  no 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY  233 

value  whatever,  as  there  cannot  be  any  values  outside  of  the 
wor  d  of  experience.  The  poet  gives  us  exactly  that  life  which 
we  know  and  that  experience  the  meaning  and  inner  agree- 
ment  of  which  we  desire  to  understand.  When  he  repudiates 
the  reality  and  leads  us  to  the  unreal,  he  must  do  so  because 
on  y  then  can  he  bring  us,  without  any  wishes  on  our  part 
before  a  human  will.  Only  then  our  own  fear  and  hope,  liking 
and  disliking,  have  disappeared,  only  then  those  endless  dis- 
turbances  from  the  attached  side-things  and  after-things  are 
cut  off,  only  then  the  will  of  life  can  be  grasped  in  its  original 
punty,  and  can  be  felt  in  its  vividness,  and  can  be  appreciated 
m  Its  inner  agreement.  Whoever  steps  down  to  reality  has 
already  lost  the  deepest  meaning  of  the  fellow-world 

Literature  brings  us  before  the  will  of  man.  Now  we  know 
that  every  human  life  expands  itself  in  three  forms  of  ex- 
penence:  outer  world,  fellow-world,  and  inner  world    Every 
personality  may  awaken  in  us,  therefore,  the  threefold  ques- 
tion of  how  its  will  finds  its  way  in  the  outer  world,  how  it 
relates  itself  to  the  fellow-world,  and  how  it  shows  itself  in  the 
inner  world.    It  would  be  artificial  to  over-emphasize  this 
difference,  which  is  certainly  not  fundamental  in  the  way  in 
which  the  various  attitudes  of  the  different  values  are.  Yet 
to  a  certain  degree  this  separation  may  perhaps  indicate  the 
fundamental  character  of  the  three  types  of  literature.   The 
epos  narrates  what  the  hero  experiences  in  the  outer  world, 
the  drama  presents  how  the  hero  stands  in  the  fellow-world' 
and  lyrics  express  the  way  in  which  the  own  will  in  the  inner 
world  comes  in  contact  with  experience.  On  the  surface  such 
a  separation  seems  denied  by  the  fact  that  as  a  matter  of 
course  in  the  epos,  too,  the  hero  has  dealings  with  the  fellow- 
world.  And  when  we  see  with  what  ease  good  novels  can  be 
cut  into  effective  plays,  we  may  become  doubtful  whether 
there  exists  at  all  a  difference  of  content  between  epos 
and  drama.  The  form  alone  seems  to  decide.  Yet  a  certain 
difference  in  the  treatment  of  the  content  cannot  be  over- 


•f^ 


234 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


looked.    The  dramatic  poem  finds  its  significance  in  a  dis- 
tinct antithesis  of  purposive  personalities.  The  whole  drama 
works  toward  that  opposition  of  characters,  and  through  it 
we  have  the  rise  to  the  climax  and  the  solution.  That  does 
not  hold  for  the  epos.    We  follow  the  hero  in  his  pilgrimage 
through  the  world  and  observe  his  development  and  his  fate, 
and  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  waves  or  the  men 
threaten  him.  The  men  whom  the  epic  hero  or  the  heroic  pair 
find  on  the  way  are  embedded  in  the  outer  world  so  that 
they  fuse  with  the  background  into  a  unity  and  do  not  reach 
the  freedom  of  dramatic  figures.    The  other  men  he  finds 
are  much  more  stimuli,  or  means,  or  resistances,  or  dangers 
for  the  hero,  like  the  temptations  and  hindrances  of  the 
outer  nature.    In  the  drama  the  counterplayers  are  inter- 
nally coordinated  to  the  hero,  they  are  self-willing,  while 
the  epos  makes  their  selfhood  fainter.  And  finally  in  lyrics, 
nature  and  fellow-world  have  become  inner  experience,  and 
their  will  has  been  transformed  into  the  mood  of  the  soul. 
One  factor,  however,  is  common  to  all  three  contents  of 
literatvu-e,  the  manifoldness  of  the  volitions  is  held  together 
as  a  unity.  As  a  matter  of  course  that  does  not  signify  that 
literature  reports  only  loving,  harmonious,  human  beings.  On 
the  contrary,  we  emphasized  that  at  least  for  the  drama  the 
sharp  antithesis  of  opposing  wills  belongs  to  its  deepest  mean- 
ing, and  yet  Hebbel  has  justly  said  that  the  true  drama  does 
not  leave  any  dissonance.  We  know  it  in  our  experience  of 
trembling  enjoyment  when  in  the  highest  tension  we  give  our 
attention  to  the  stage,  where  the  human  passions  crash  against 
one  another  until  the  hero  breaks  down  with  death  in  his 
heart.  We  know  that  our  own  participating  will  demanded 
it,  move  by  move  and  word  by  word,  jxist  as  it  proceeded. 
We  feel  how  this  hateful  attack  was  thrown  out  at  just  the 
right  instant,  we  hear  with  delight  how  the  destructive 
coxmteraction  was  conducted,  and  the  wilder  the  raging  of 
the  battle  the  more  vividly  we  feel  that  every  syllable  from 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY  235 

even,  lip  brin^  just  the  desired,  the  welcomed,  the  longed-for 
word.  In  our  deepest  soul  we  will  with  the  one  who  gives  the 
death-blow,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  with  the  grS  one 
who  .3  stJl  victorious  in  his  death.  It  ought  notThappen 
o  herwise;  every  side  movement,  every  escape,  would  Jave 

ast  fall  of  the  cm^m,  we  ourselves  demanded  the  honible 
just  as  It  developed  itself.  ""moie 

fJ^L^l^^t^^  """*  ^°"°^  "P  ^°^  ^'•^"gh  f^'  and  pity 
this  gr^t  participatmg  will  works  itself  out  and  reaches  ite 

goal.  We  are  interested  here  only  in  that  objective  power  of 

wv  tjJ         u  ^^''  ^  ''^''^  '""^^  ^°  «ff«=t'  the  power 
which  holds  us,  who  have  no  wish  and  no  personal  part  in  the 

f  tot'll     f.'Cf  P^t!^'P^«on  and  sympathy,  and  forces 
us  to  will  ;^th  all  the  parties,  with  the  C^r  and  the  Brutus 
together.   But  again  that  is  possible  only  if  the  drama  as  a 
whole  forms  one  will-unity.  There  in  that  closed  will-mani- 
fold which  the  poet  has  detached  from  the  world  and  in  which 
there  exists  no  expansion  beyond  the  limits,  but  only  self- 
expression,  it  has  no  meaning  that  the  hero  will  unless  his 
enemy  opposes  him.  Ultimately  the  will  of  the  one  demands 
the  counter-will  of  the  other.  What  the  poet  will  give  us  is 
not  the  single  man  in  his  singleness.    Nothing  completely 
single  can  ever  have  aesthetic  value.  The  poet  leads  us  to  an 
isolated  manifold.  Every  particular  element  stands  in  all  its 
connections  in  this  isolated  limited  world.  As  once  Antigone 
always  again  the  heroes  of  the  poem  have  violated  the  laws 
of  the  state  to  remain  loyal  to  the  higher  law,  and  always 
again  the  will  of  the  man  of  the  state  and  the  counter-will 
of  the  man  of  conscience  sound  together  into  a  pure  har- 
mony.  The  hero  who  upholds  his  inner  voice  must  perish  • 
his  individual  will  must  be  defeated  by  the  stronger  force' 
And  yet  he  himself  wills  that  these  earthly  powers  work  and 
fight ;  he  wills  that  his  body  be  destroyed  so  that  his  soul  may 
be  saved.   This  inevitable  conflict  is  just  what  is  unrolled 


236  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

before  us,  and  both  conflicting  sides  enter  without  dissonance 
into  the  whole.  If  we  want  the  whole  at  all,  we  must  will  each 
of  the  two  fighting  parties.  The  more  severe  their  suffer- 
ing  and  the  deeper  their  downfall,  the  more  vividly  we  shall 
feel  with  the  fate  of  the  heroes.  Yet  we  will  it  in  our  own 
wishless  and  disinterested  interest,  because  we  feel  that  in 
this  combination  of  will,  the  hero  must  will  his  outer  defeat 
to  bring  his  personality  to  the  purest  expression. 

In  poor  melodramas  the  torturing  pains  of  the  hero  torture 
us,  and  thus  by  the  artistic  barbarism  eliminate  our  freedom 
from  responsibility.  We  cannot  will  there  with  the  villain 
who  brings  suffering  to  the  innocent,  because  this  group  is  not 
held  together  at  all  by  one  unified  will.  But  the  tragic  hero 
whose  great  will  is  limited  by  the  other  will  sacrifices  himself 
to  save  in  us  the  belief  in  his  will,  and  yet  to  maintain  in  us 
the  right  of  those  who  brought  him  to  downfall.    It  is  the 
deepest  unity  of  the  life-energies  which  manifests  itself  in 
such  tragical  conflict.  And  at  its  side  stands  the  conflict  of 
comedy  in  which  the  will  at  first  poses  as  great,  but  as  soon 
as  it  has  to  confine  itself  under  the  pressure  of  the  counter- 
will  is  just  as  well  satisfied  with  the  smallest  bit  of  fulfilment. 
The  agreement  exists  there,  too,  but  it  shows  itself  in  such  a 
way  that  the  great  will  is  recognized  as  really  a  small  one  for 
which  a  true  opposition  never  existed.  If  the  inner  agreement 
can  be  found  even  in  the  conflict  of  the  tragedy,  it  needs 
hardly  any  further  emphasis  that  such  unity  exists  where  the 
epos  and  the  story  speak  about  the  conflicts  of  the  human 
life  with  the  surroundings.  The  epic  hero,  too,  must  fight.  He 
may  struggle  with  his  enemy,  with  his  love,  with  his  God, 
and  may  go  down  in  suffering,  but  he  must  develop  himself, 
must  remain  loyal  to  himself,  and  must  even  win  death  for 
himself.   Such  a  life  which  the  poet  makes  us  feel  with  the 
hero  demands  that  the  enemies  attack  him;  they  may  be 
human  beings  or  they  may  be  lightnings.  The  whole  sur- 
roundings,  nature  and  man,  become  alive,  but  their  will,  too. 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY  237 

wills  not  what  the  hero  wills,  but  what  this  human  life  wills. 
For  that  reason  only  the  novel  keeps  us  in  breathless  tension. 
Hindrances  may  heap  up  for  the  loving  couple,  but  we  will 
these  dangers,  we  will  these  cabals,  inasmuch  as  we  are  en- 
tirely under  the  will  of  this  isolated  life-totality,  and  we  feel 
that  just  this  counter-will  harmonizes  with  the  will  of  this 
self-agreeing  manifold. 

So  far  we  have  spoken  only  about  the  content  of  the  literary 
work.  We  must  not  forget  that  in  literature  the  form  is  the 
greatest.  We  demand  from  the  poet,  too,  that  his  material 
shall  not  push  itself  into  the  foreground,  and  he  is  most  wel- 
come when  he  sings  once  more  the  old  song  of  the  spring 
and  of  love,  because  nothing  else  matters  but  how  he  is  able 
to  sing  it.  Of  course  in  literature  it  may  often  be  difficult  to 
decide  what  belongs  to  content,  and  what  belongs  to  form. 
In  the  drama,  for  instance,  the  language  may  be  both.   The 
language  is  certainly  a  part  of  the  offered  content  as  far  as  the 
choice  of  words  and  the  positions  of  words  is  to  characterize 
the  speaking  person,  while  the  language  is  form  as  far  as 
through  it  the  poet  is  speaking.  The  language  of  the  poem 
should  be  counted  mostly  as  form.  Dialect  speech  might  be 
considered  essentially  as  content.    In  regard  to  space  and 
time,  too,  we  ought  to  make  a  clean  separation  between  what 
is  content  and  what  is  form.  For  instance,  the  dramatic  rule 
which  demands  from  the  drama  unity  of  time  refers  only  to 
the  content  of  the  drama  and  not  to  its  form,  or  rather  to  the 
form  of  the  content  and  not  to  the  form  of  the  drama.  The 
content  of  the  play  may  demand  that  its  action  occur  in  one 
day,  and  the  form  of  the  drama  may  demand  that  the  play 
may  be  given  in  three  hours.  The  dramatic  time-form  may  be 
short  and  terse,  and  the  time  of  the  content  may  yet  embrace 
many  years.   The  manifoldness  of  form  is  certainly  still 
richer  in  literature  than  in  the  fine  arts.  We  have  the  rhythm 
of  the  line  and  its  melody ;  the  rhyme  and  the  choice  of  the 
words,  their  picturesqueness,  their  strength ;  the  organization 


238  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

in  the  stanzas  and  scenes,  in  chapters  and  acts.  This  organi- 
zation might  be  taken  together  with  the  rhythm  as  a  temporal 
form    The  rhyme,  on  the  other  hand,  belongs  together  with 
the  melody  as  sound  of  the  words.  We  should  then  have 
three  factors,  the  time-form,  the  sound  of  the  words,  and  the 
meaning  of  the  words,  and  this  separation  corresponds  to  the 
space-form,  the  color,  and  the  light-intensity  in  the  fine  arts. 
The  temporal  rhythm  and  organization  would  correspond  to 
the  shape  which  the  play  of  lines  gives  to  the  visible  arts. 
The  musical  tone  and  consonance  of  the  words  would  cor- 
respond to  the  colored  manifoldness,  and  the  strength  and 
the  character  of  the  words  would  correspond  to  the  strength 
of  the  lights.  But  just  here  the  picture  shows  the  gradation 
only  in  the  one  direction,  while  the  language  has  in  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words  an  unlimited  manifoldness  of  directions,  of 
kinds,  of  gradations.  Finally  we  must  postulate  here,  as  m 
the  fine  arts,  that  the  form  not  only  offers  a  complete  umty 
in  itself,  but  also  fuses  with  the  content  in  an  harmomous 

agreement.  _. 

The  meaning  of  the  words  has  the  leading  r61e  there.  The 
artistic  effect  which  emanates  from  the  meaning  of  words 
inspires  and  ennobles  the  poetry.  We  do  not  mean  that  the 
word  awakens  a  beautiful  vision.  No,  in  the  word  itself  lies 
the  beauty,  in  its  intensity,  in  its  suggestiveness,  in  its 
self-dependent  will.   When  in  the  song  word  joins  word, 
as  the  pearls  with  glimmering  lustre  join  each  other  in  the 
gleam  of  the  chain,  the  chance  memory  images  which  may 
be  stirred  up  by  the  single  word  are  almost  insignificant  for 
the  soft  beauty  of  the  poem.  The  purer  the  effect  the  freer 
it  will  remain  from  such  indifferent  fringes  of  consciousness, 
and  the  more  intimately  the  beauty  will  lean  on  the  signi- 
ficant word  itself  and  its  poetic  meaning.  How  strange  the 
effect  of  an  old-fashioned  word  in  which  the  original  mean- 
ing  still  faintly  echoes,  or  a  picturesque  word  that  points  to 
hidden  relations,  or  a  rare  word  which  resounds  long  for  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


239 


feeling.  But  what  is  true  in  this  way  for  the  single  word  holds 
still  more  for  the  complex  phrase,  for  the  whole  sentence,  and 
finally  for  the  total  style.  Certainly  rhythm  and  soimd  enter 
as  important  parts,  but  the  mutual  relation  of  the  word- 
energies  themselves  is  after  all  decisive.  All  this  is  ulti- 
mately felt  as  an  unending  moving  of  actual  forces,  of  im- 
pulses, of  volitions.  To  appreciate  a  style,  each  word  must  be 
for  us  not  a  soimd  and  not  an  image,  but  an  irradiation  of 
intentions.  Just  for  that  reason  it  becomes  possible  to  seek 
an  inner  agreement.  The  wills  of  those  words  must  not 
interfere  with  each  other,  they  must  support  each  other  in 
their  purpose,  must  mutually  reenforce  their  fullest  meaning 
in  order  to  devote  themselves  to  the  expression  of  the  uni- 
fied will  of  the  whole  sentence. 

The  rhythm  of  the  words  is  will,  too,  and  again  it  is  the 
inner  agreement  of  the  volitions  which  satisfies  us.  This  will 
of  the  formal  side  expresses  itself  of  course  most  strongly  in 
verse.  There  comes  perhaps  a  trochaic  rhythm.  The  claim 
which  its  up  and  down  suggests  is  already  expressed  in  the  first 
rising  and  sinking  syllables.  Every  syllable  demands  for  itself 
alone  that  attention  be  given  to  it,  and  yet  this  demand  be- 
comes effective  only  if  the  sound  contrasts  with  less  accented 
syllables.  When  after  the  first  accented  the  first  unaccented 
syllable  follows,  we  feel  how  this  first  sound  secures  for  itself 
the  right  of  the  chief  accent  and  suppresses  the  second.  We 
understand  there  the  will  that  the  first  sound  is  to  domi- 
nate in  the  foot,  a  will  which  demands  agreement  from  its 
surroundings.  Other  trochees  are  following  with  the  same 
demand.  But  an  unlimited  continuation  would  make  it  a 
colorless  indifference.  We  seek  unity,  but  it  must  be  unity  in 
a  manifold,  and  we  have  a  manifold  only  if  every  single  part 
still  brings  its  unity  to  effectiveness.  This  individual  import- 
ance would  be  lost  if  one  should  uniformly  follow  the  other 
without  interruption.  Accordingly  a  small  surveyable  group 
organizes  itself  into  a  unity  of  its  own  with  an  own  chief  ac- 


240 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


cent  in  a  single  line,  perhaps  separated  by  a  final  rhyme  from 
the  next  group  with  a  similar  demand.  In  the  same  way 
verses  join  each  other  in  the  stanza,  the  stanzas  each  with 
the  same  uniform  will  in  the  poem.  They  cannot  be  com- 
bined with  iambics.  The  iambics  will  that  in  their  sphere  in 
every  foot  the  dominating  rdle  shall  belong  to  the  concluding 
syllable ;  the  first  sound  is  to  serve  the  second,  is  to  lead  over 
to  it  so  that  the  hearer  may  linger  on  it.  Each  iambic  has  its 
own  will  which  is  welcomed  by  the  next,  and  yet  each  has  its 
own  phase.  The  sound  and  the  meaning  and  the  shape  of  the 
word  may  easily  bring  about  the  result  that  in  a  natural  read- 
ing of  a  page  not  two  pairs  of  syllables  show  exactly  the  same 
distribution  of  accents.  Everjrwhere  we  feel  the  same  funda- 
mental will,  and  yet  each  word  preserves  its  own  freedom.  It 
is  an  unlimited  movement,  picturesque  like  the  play  of  the 
waves  in  the  ocean.  This  quiet  harmony  of  rhythms  controls 
no  less  the  higher  style  of  prose,  and  the  organization  of  the 
smaller  groups  repeats  itself  with  an  imposing  movement  in 
the  building-up  of  chapters  and  scenes  and  acts. 

Finally  the  tone  and  the  melody  of  the  words  represents  an 
own  will  also.  The  dark  sounds  and  the  light,  the  broad  and 
the  sharp  ones,  the  soft  and  the  hard  and  the  hissing  ones,  the 
words  with  fading  sound  and  those  which  break  off  sharply, 
the  word-melodies  which  ascend  and  those  which  descend,  all 
have  their  own  intentions  which  seek  agreement.  When  at 
the  end  of  the  verse  a  sound  penetrates  the  soul  with  an 
especial  emphasis  and  energy,  it  seeks  a  tone  which  wills  the 
same,  and  satisfaction  arises  when  at  the  same  place  again  a 
rhyme  with  equal  feeling  salutes  it.  The  pure  form  thus  be- 
comes a  moving  to  and  fro  of  will-intentions  in  the  manifold- 
ness,  a  will-satisfaction  through  the  agreement.  But  all  these 
volitions  of  the  form  parts  again  must  sound  together  in 
harmony  with  the  will  of  the  content.  "  Fullest  wieder  Busch 
und  Tal  Still  mit  Nebelglanz''  —  who  will  say  what  relieves 
our  soul  so  magically  there,  the  quiet  landscape  in  the  soft 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


241 


moonlight  which  lies  spread  before  us  as  the  content  in  the 
verses,  or  the  mild  wave  of  the  line  rising  and  sinking,  the 
melody  of  the  tones  in  which  the  first  words  of  the  first  two 
lines  harmonize  like  a  hidden  suggestion  of  a  rhyme,  the  pure 
imaginative  energy  of  the  words  themselves  which  starts  so 
magically  in  the  first  word  ?  Every  sound,  every  tone,  every 
syllable,  every  meaning  there  in  devoted  harmony  wills  the 
same  as  the  content  of  Goethe's  stanza.  . 


C.  —  MUSIC 

What  pure  happiness  brings  to  us  in  practical  life  is  brought 
to  us  in  the  purposive  work  of  civilization  by  the  art  of  music : 
that  internal  unity  in  which  the  unrest  and  conflict  in  us  is 
brought  to  harmonious  agreement.  In  our  naive  attitude  we 
found  happiness  as  the  immediate  unity  of  the  wills  in  the 
inner  world  as  against  the  harmony  in  the  will  of  the  outer 
world  and  the  love  in  the  will  of  the  fellow-world.  In  the 
realm  of  art  in  which  those  naive  life-values  are  raised  to  in- 
tentional values  of  civilization,  the  will  of  the  outer  world 
found  its  unity  in  fine  arts,  the  will  of  the  fellow-world  in  liter- 
ature, and  now  we  demand  that  in  the  same  way  the  will  of 
the  inner  world  find  unity  in  the  art  of  tones. 

For  the  field  of  music  of  course  it  is  as  true  as  for  the  field  of 
poetry  and  painting  and  sculpture,  that  the  most  familiar  way 
of  approaching  it  is  the  physico-psychological  one.  When 
we  spoke  of  fine  arts,  we  might  have  discussed  every  single 
problem  in  a  psychologizing  spirit.  We  should  have  studied 
the  visual  perceptions,  the  associations,  and  reactions  which 
result,  and  from  the  simplest  harmony  of  color  to  the  richest 
painting,  the  whole  effect  of  our  enjoyment  might  have  been 
described  and  explained  as  an  organic  psycho-physical  pro- 
cess. In  the  same  way  we  might  have  analyzed  and  explained 
the  effects  of  the  poem  and  of  the  drama.  Then  those  con- 
flicts would  have  turned  into  organic  interfering  waves;  brain- 


242 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


processes  and  peripheral  changes  would  have  given  account 
of  the  manif oldness  of  effects.  Yet  we  know  that  we  had  to 
avoid  this  convenient  way  of  science.  At  the  threshold  of  our 
aesthetic  discussion,  we  recognized  the  fundamental  difference 
between  such  studies  in  the  psychology  of  art,  which  are  cer- 
tainly important  and  which  are  prominent  in  the  work  of  our 
psychological  laboratories,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  true 
aesthetic  inquiry  which  had  to  be  ours.  In  the  world  of  music 
the  temptation  is  especially  strong  to  avoid  the  difficult  aes- 
thetic study  and  to  stick  to  that  aspect  of  the  sounds  and 
rhjrthms,  of  the  melodies  and  harmonies,  which  seems  so 
much  more  concrete,  the  aspect  of  natural  science  and  psy- 
chology. As  soon  as  science  has  elaborated  the  physico- 
psychological  system  in  the  service  of  causal  understanding, 
every  tone-experience  can  be  brought  to  expression  in  such 
language  of  causes  and  effects.  The  manifold  of  sounds  now 
becomes  describable  and  explainable,  and  with  it  the  mani- 
fold of  the  psychical  processes  in  the  mind  which  enjoys  the 
music.  There  is  no  melody  and  no  chord  in  the  s5miphony 
which  cannot  be  completely  described  by  the  change  of  air 
movements  and  the  combination  of  vibrations.  Here  start 
the  important  investigations  of  modem  tone  psychology. 
The  task  is  to  explain  the  pleasant  effects  of  the  combination 
of  certain  tones,  their  relation  to  the  absence  of  beats,  to  the 
coincidence  of  over-tones,  to  the  difference-tones,  to  the  fusion 
of  the  fundamental  tones,  or  to  explain  the  agreeable  results  of 
rhythms  by  their  relations  to  the  tensions  and  relaxations 
of  the  body,  to  the  attention  and  expectation  and  emotion. 
And  if  we  turn  to  the  melody  and  finally  to  the  whole  of  the 
musical  work  of  art,  we  shall  reach  more  and  more  complex 
problems  of  explanation.  But  by  principle  the  understanding 
of  the  psychological  effect  of  the  symphony  works  with  the 
same  conceptional  scheme  by  which  the  explanation  of  the 
simplest  pleasure  in  the  octave  is  secured.  The  problems  and 
their  solutions  are  controlled  by  the  one-sided  interest  in  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


243 


causal  connection  of  objects  which  the  abstractions  of  an 
objectifying  science  have  posited. 

But  here,  too,  we  have  to  seek  our  way  before  the  experi- 
ence of  music  has  been  conceptionally  transformed  into  a 
series  of  causes  and  effects.  The  tone  is  still  sounding  there 
and  not  composed  of  vibrations,  and  we  who  apperceive  the 
tone  still  understand  the  tone  itself  in  its  excitement,  in  its 
intention,  in  its  will.  It  is  not  our  psychological  mechanism 
which  produces  those  impulses  as  our  psychical  reply  to  the 
tone-impression ;  in  our  experience  we  do  not  know  an5rthing 
of  such  a  process,  and  the  question  of  explanation  is  not  ours. 
We  feel  the  excitement  as  energy  of  the  tone  itself,  and  we 
take  part  in  the  strength  of  the  tone,  feeling  with  it  and  not 
creating  it.  Even  the  particular  sound  nuance  of  the  voices 
and  instruments  is  still  a  characteristic  unity;  it  has  not 
been  resolved  into  different  combinations  of  over-tones  as 
it  has  to  be  in  psychology.  The  more  we  set  ourselves  free 
from  the  naturalistic  thought-forms  of  physics  and  psychology 
the  more  we  can  reach  the  pure  musical  experience  in  our 
immediate  feelings.  It  is  an  experience  which  has  lost  its  soul 
as  soon  as  it  abandons  itself  to  the  dissecting  thought-act  of 
explanation. 

We  may  start  from  the  rhythms  and  sounds.  We  recog- 
nized the  meaning  of  the  rh5rthm  in  true  experience  when  we 
meditated  about  poetry.  The  temporal  values  and  energy- 
values  are  combined  there.  But  we  must  not  think  of  the 
objective  time  and  its  fractions.  Just  as  from  an  aesthetic 
point  of  view  the  marble  statue  does  not  stand  in  our  space, 
but  brings  its  own  space-atmosphere  with  it,  the  times  of  the 
musical  work  cannot  be  measured  with  our  watches.  It  is 
an  own  time,  which  arises  in  the  sounding  itself.  And  the 
temporal  equality  of  the  bars  is  an  equality  which  after  all 
only  the  physicist  refers  to  the  objective  time,  just  as  the 
psychologist  may  refer  it  to  the  organic  movement  of  the 
body.  For  the  listener,  at  first  we  have  only  the  forming  of 


244 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


groups  in  which  each  single  group  as  a  bar  expresses  a  certain 
equality  of  value  in  the  internal  relation  of  its  energies.  An 
identical  will  controls  it.  The  accent  at  the  beginning  of  the 
bar  dominates  the  will-combination  of  the  group.  The  single 
tones  in  the  bar  are  not  short  or  long  in  an  objective  time, 
but  they  are  fugitive,  light,  and  hasty,  are  quiet,  heavy,  and 
sustained,  and  only  from  these  characteristics  results  their 
claim  that  the  flying  movement  of  many  light  tones  does  not 
count  more  than  the  dignified  procession  of  a  few  sounds  or 
the  restful  sounding  of  one  imposing  chord.  Small  groups  of 
equal  values  join  each  other  and  form  larger  groups  with  their 
own  distribution  of  chief  energies  and  side  powers.  But  every 
rhythmic  unity  serves  the  work  of  art  only  by  repeating  it- 
self, and  as  its  own  meaning  is  for  us  a  characteristic  distri- 
bution of  energies,  the  repetition  means  that  the  special  claim 
of  forces  is  acknowledged  in  the  next  group.  It  finds  agree- 
ment there,  and  the  same  plan  of  distributing  the  energies 
becomes  a  new  deed. 

This  mutual  willingness  offers  just  those  presuppositions 
which  we  found  everywhere  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
value,  agreement  of  will.  We  apprehend  the  one  group  in 
which  a  characteristic  will  manifests  itself  and  seek  in  the 
same  given  manifold  the  expression  of  the  same  will.  Then 
only  the  planless  chaos  transforms  itself  into  a  unified,  organ- 
ized, self-asserting  whole.  We  seek  the  will  which  springs 
from  the  same  source,  and  when  we  meet  it  our  over-personal 
demand  is  satisfied:  an  absolutely  valid  value  is  grasped. 
But  uniformity  of  the  bars  does  not  inhibit  the  inner  variety. 
As  in  the  poem  no  one  iambic  has  exactly  the  same  distribu- 
tion of  energies  as  any  other,  no  bar  in  music  is  stamped 
by  a  pattern.  New  and  ever  new  combinations  and  separa- 
tions play  into  the  uniform  order ;  the  second  move  of  the  bar 
prepares  for  the  expression  of  energy  in  the  next  bar,  and 
links  itself  in  this  way  with  the  new  group.  The  energies  may 
stir  about  in  freedom,  and  yet  they  never  lose  their  ready  and 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


245 


willing  inner  agreement.  All  that  repeats  itself  in  the  broader 
groups,  and  perhaps  even  through  the  whole  tissue  of  a  sonata 
this  inner  harmony  of  the  rhythmic  partial  volitions  can  be 
vividly  felt. 

The  harmony  of  the  tones  and  sounds  joins  that  of  the 
rhythms  as  the  harmony  of  the  colors  agreed  with  the  unity 
of  the  space-forms  in  the  picture.  Usually  the  differences  of 
tone-pitch  are  compared  with  the  differences  of  colors,  but 
perhaps  it  would  be  more  helpful  to  give  up  such  a  tradition, 
and  instead  to  compare  the  color  of  the  picture  with  the 
nuance  of  the  sounds,  that  is,  its  instrumental  character,  and 
on  the  other  hand  the  differences  of  pitch  with  the  distances 
in  space.  Then  only  should  we  overcome  the  curious  experi- 
ence of  having  only  six  colors,  red,  green,  yellow,  blue,  white, 
and  black,  but  more  than  ten  thousand  musical  tones.  There 
are  indeed  numberless  tones,  just  as  there  are  numberless 
points  in  space,  and  there  are  only  a  few  colors,  just  as  there 
are  only  a  few  nuances  of  sound.  If  we  see  a  single  light,  we 
say  it  is  blue  or  bluish  green ;  if  we  hear  a  tone,  we  say  it  is 
violin  or  whistle  or  trumpet  or  human  voice.   But  the  only 
essential  thing  for  us  here  is  that  tone-distances  and  sound 
nuances  and  rh5i:hms  are  as  necessary  for  the  upbuilding  of 
the  musical  form  as  the  space-distance  and  colors  and  shapes 
are  for  the  form  of  the  painting  and  sculpture.  What  the  sound 
nuance  has  to  say  to  us  surely  must  not  be  deduced  from 
memories  which  refer  to  the  instrument.  The  sound  of  the 
organ  does  not  say  that  it  is  the  organ  and  that  its  place  is 
under  the  arch  of  the  church.  The  complete  fulfilment  which 
lies  in  the  organ  sound  moves  the  soul  immediately  in  a  way 
which  is  incomparable  with  the  daring  dash  of  the  trumpet 
fanfare.  Each  sound  has  its  own  power  of  energy,  just  as  the 
landscape  appears  imequally  excited  when  it  is  seen  through 
glasses  of  different  colors.   But  the  energy  really  lies  in  the 
sound  itself.  It  would  be  explanatory  psychology  if  we  were 
to  say  that  all  refers  to  feelings  of  energy  in  us  which  result 


246 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


from  a  special  distribution  of  over-tones.  And  these  exciting 
energies  tend  to  remain  in  mutual  agreement,  they  reenf orce 
each  other,  from  the  duet  in  the  chamber  music  to  the  un- 
limited multi-coloredness  of  the  modem  orchestra. 

This  demand  for  inner  agreement  comes  to  us  most  vividly 
in  the  harmony  of  the  sounds  and  in  the  resolved  harmony  of 
the  melody.  If  we  avoid  the  psycho-physical  formulation 
of  the  question,  all  the  fusions  and  over-tones  and  mathe- 
matical relations  of  vibrations  do  not  contribute  anything  to 
our  understanding  of  the  real  problem  of  harmony.  It  is  in 
a  certain  sense  an  ultimate  fact  that  we  experience  perhaps 
in  the  chord  of  the  major  scale  a  manifold  in  which  each  tone 
seeks  the  others  and  favors  them.  The  lowest  of  the  tones 
dominates  in  it;  we  feel  its  controlling  force,  and  yet  at  the 
same  time  its  willingness  to  welcome  the  highest  tone,  the 
similar  finer  and  frailer  octave.  And  both  together  hold  and 
support  the  third  and  the  fifth,  which  want  to  express  their 
own  meaning,  and  yet  which  in  their  whole  intention  refer 
to  the  fundamental  and  its  octave.  It  is  like  one  uniform 
structure  in  which  all  parts  support  one  another,  in  which 
each  submits  itself  to  the  whole,  and  yet  in  which  each  is 
allowed  to  be  more  than  it  could  be  for  itself  alone.  And 
always  it  is  a  moving  equilibrium;  it  is  a  complete  last  ful- 
filment in  the  unity  and  yet  an  endless  swaying  of  the  inner 
movement.  The  octave  might  be  compared  there  with  the 
closedness  and  yet  never  ending  movement  of  the  circle,  the 
fifth  and  third  and  fourth  with  various  ellipses,  the  intervals 
of  more  characteristic  manifoldness  with  richer  figures,  each 
of  which  is  closed  in  itself.  The  inner  agreement  remains 
even  in  the  most  excited  consonance. 

In  the  living  work  of  music  the  chord  is  of  course  by  far 
richer  than  in  such  isolation.  There  in  music  it  is  beginning 
or  mediation  or  procession  or  conclusion,  and  its  value  of 
unity  is  so  strongly  influenced  by  that  which  leads  to  it  and 
by  that  to  which  it  leads  that  even  the  dissonance,  the  inner 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


247 


disagreement  of  the  tones,  may  become  part  of  sounding 
beauty.  The  disagreement  enters  just  so  far  that  its  over- 
coming in  the  following  tones  brings  the  more  vividly  the 
real  inner  agreement.   Only  in  the  succession  of  tones  can 
the  incomparable  meaning  of  the  subtle  sounds  express  it- 
self;  only  in  the  mystery  of  melody  can  the  tone  reach  the 
full  happiness  of  the  pure  fulfilment  of  its  will.  It  is  a  seeking 
and  finding,  a  half -allowing  and  hindering  and  a  fulfilment, 
which  comes  to  us  in  the  play  and  counterplay  of  the  soimds. 
From  the  unlimited  possibilities  of  tones  our  scale  has  se- 
lected just  such  distances  as  bring  the  differences  clearly  to 
expression,  and  yet  which  indicate  distinctly  how  they  are 
related  to  each  other.  The  whole  richness  of  those  mutual 
relations  lives  in  every  musical  manifestation.  Even  in  the 
smallest  melodic  movement,  if  we  really  understand  it,  every 
progress  of  tones  points  to  this  background  of  the  relations 
in  the  scale.  The  tone  from  which  the  movement  starts  does 
not  disappear.  The  new  tone  is  conscious  of  its  dependence 
from  the  first,  and  when  it  proceeds  and  presses  forward,  it 
does  not  seek  without  plan  a  mere  sounding.  Bound  by  the 
inner  law  which  is  proclaimed  by  the  first  tones,  every  com- 
ing tone  is  already  prepared,  and  in  latent  demand  for  har- 
mony in  the  whole  tone  manifold  it  has  found  its  place 
beforehand.  The  clearest  case  offers  itself  at  the  end  of  the 
whole.  If  a  melodious  tone-movement  has  reached  the  tone 
before  the  last,  even  the  immusical  person  feels  that  just  this 
must  be  the  last  tone.  He  does  not  will  it;  the  tones  them- 
selves will  it.   He  feels  how  the  whole  tone-movement  has 
pointed  toward  this  one  tone  and  has  demanded  its  entering 
as  the  conclusion.  Perhaps  nowhere  does  the  self-will  of  the 
tone  come  to  us  more  impressively,  and  if  the  music  is 
suddenly  broken  off,  the  tones  remain  and  wait  for  their 
salvation  by  the  one  tone  which  they  demand,  for  the  return 
to  the  tonica. 
Of  course  it  would  be  flat  and  trivial  music  if  the  hearer 


^ 


248 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


could  always  say  with  the  same  certainty  beforehand  what 
solution  is  to  follow.  And  yet  even  in  the  freest  and  most 
original  creation  of  music,  that  very  tone  when  it  comes  is 
welcomed  by  the  totality  as  the  one  expected.  The  tones 
which  we  have  heard  will  the  following,  they  eagerly  de- 
mand them  in  themselves,  and  the  more  richly  the  flights 
and  runs  of  tone  deviate  and  escape,  and  the  more  frequently 
the  side-intentions  try  to  intrude,  the  more  vividly  remains 
in  the  totality  the  fundamental  desire  for  the  return  and  the 
postulate  of  overcoming  that  which  separates  the  desire  for 
unity.  And  those  side-intentions  and  that  counterplay  all 
come  in  just  as  the  whole  demands  it  to  express  its  own  will. 
Every  single  tone  finds  its  ready-made  little  place,  where  it 
slips  in  as  if  all  the  other  tones  had  prepared  for  its  coming. 
All  this,  too,  can  be  explained  in  the  language  of  psychology. 
For  the  psychologist  the  tones  themselves  do  not  will  any- 
thing. Their  selection  is  determined  by  the  instruments,  by 
the  resonance  of  the  rooms,  and  by  many  other  historical 
conditions,  since  by  the  hearing  of  such  music  our  psycho- 
physical systems  become  trained  in  certain  settings  of  the 
reaction  apparatus.  We  have  acquired  a  latent  disposition  to 
reply  on  hearing  certain  tone  series  with  expectant  psycho- 
physical attitudes  which  are  determined  by  intervals  of  the 
scala.  All  these  feelings  of  expectation  fuse  with  the  percep- 
tion of  the  sound,  and  hence  arises  the  illusion  that  the  tones 
themselves  have  a  desire  and  expect  beforehand  the  joining 
tone.  But  the  matter-of-course  fact  that  such  transforma- 
tions into  the  causal  language  of  physics  are  possible  does  not 
change  the  understanding  of  the  original  experience.  If  we 
enjoy  musical  beauty,  we  may  not  know  anything  of  this 
psycho-physical  scale  knowledge;  and  yet  we  may  not  lack 
in  the  least  a  full  understanding  of  the  chamber  quartette  or 
of  the  symphony.  We  understand  the  glistening  tones  well, 
and  we  should  not  imderstand  them  better  if  we  substituted 
for  the  tones  the  air  vibrations  and  posited  their  will  in  our 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY       249 

own  psycho-physical  attention  and  its  reflex  apparatus.  The 
tones  will  each  other  a^  in  the  poem  the  rhyme  seeks  the 
rhyme.  That  is  the  most  certain  immediate  experience.  But 
with  that  everything  is  posited  which  is  necessary  for  the 
over-personal  satisfaction.  The  tones  are  now  not  impressions 
but  will,  and  we  hold  and  keep  the  will  which  speaks  to  us  and 
seek  a  sympathetic  will  in  the  given  manifold ;  and  tone  after 
tone  comes  and  fulfils  this  demand  for  agreement  of  will 
There  a  value  is  completed.  Rhythm,  sound,  harmony,  and 
melody  thus  equally  represent  will-relations  which  in  the 
beautiful  work  of  music  are  in  inner  agreement.  But  it  hardly 
needs  any  emphasis  that  these  four  kinds  of  agreement  must 
combine  themselves  again  to  common  deed.  As  in  the  paint- 
ing forms  and  colors  and  in  the  poem  the  rhythm  and  the 
rhyme  and  the  strength  of  the  word  must  harmonize,  in 
music  too  the  rhythm  cannot  be  separated  from  the  melody, 
nor  the  sound  from  the  rhythm.  The  change  of  the  one  de- 
mands  the  change  of  the  other.  The  slow  succession  of  tones 
played  in  a  hasty  tempo  has  lost  its  value  of  melody.  An 
unlimited  multiplicity  of  will  must  be  interwoven  in  this 
way,  and  yet  must  support  and  mutually  favor  itself  in  all 
its  parts. 

But  does  that  really  completely  express  the  meaning  of 
musical  beauty?   Has  the  music  really  only  this  fountain 
beauty  and  this  arabesque  value  ?  Are  the  formalists  right 
who  deny  to  the  work  of  music  all  further  meaning  and  con- 
tent ?  Surely,  then,  we  cannot  compare  it  with  a  painting 
m  which  the  lines,  forms,  and  colors  may  delight  us,  and  yet 
which  besides  form  and  light  offers  a  self-dependent  content. 
Nor  can  we  compare  it  with  the  poem  which  also  has  the 
beauty  of  the  sound  and  rhythm  and  the  strength  of  the 
words,  and  yet  which  besides  all  that  moves  our  heart  by 
the  meaning  of  its  content.  But  is  it  really  true  that  in  music 
the  beauty  of  those  moving  tone-forms  does  not  allow  also  an 
harmonious  content?  Of  course  those  are  surely  in  the  right 


250 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


who  do  not  consider  it  the  purpose  of  music  to  describe  the 
things  of  the  outer  worid.  Such  meaning  and  content  really 
do  not  belong  to  the  tones.  Where  the  programmatic  music 
begins  to  describe  the  things,  the  programme  usually  has  to 
help  out  to  show  the  way  for  the  imagination.  Even  when 
the  things  are  imitated  by  their  accompanying  noises,  when 
the  rolling  of  the  thunder  or  the  trampling  of  the  horses 
•  proceeds  through  the  orchestra,  it  remains  external,  acciden- 
tal, and  ultimately  unmusical.  Only  when  the  mediation  is 
brought  about  by  accompanying  feelings,  music  enters  into 
its  own  right.  But  then  the  awakening  feeling  is  in  question 
and  not  the  impression  of  things,  and  that  touches  an  entirely 
different  ground. 

But  can  we  even  say  that  music  presents  feelings?  Whose 
feelings  are  meant?  The  piece  of  music  may  tell  us  something 
of  the  feeling-life  of  the  composer  and  also  something  of  the 
player,  and  yet  surely  this  individual  manifestation  of  soul- 
life  cannot  be  the  meaning  of  the  music.  When  we  see  a 
drama  on  the  stage,  we  also  have  a  strong  impression  of  the 
internal  life  of  the  writer,  and  independent  from  it  an  impres- 
sion of  the  mental  life  of  the  actor.  And  yet  neither  is  the 
inner  content  of  the  play  for  us.  The  composer  has  no  right 
to  be  dreamy  when  he  composes  reveries,  and  the  virtuoso 
who  plays  them  still  less.  If  a  dreamy  feeling  expresses  itself 
in  the  tones,  it  must  be  detached  from  the  composer  and  the 
musician  as  such,  as  the  feeling-content  of  the  poem  is  sepa- 
rated from  the  reader  and  the  poet.  But  others  believe  that 
music  itself  has  to  render  feelings ;  and  there  cannot  be  any 
doubt  that  composers  have  sometimes  consciously  tried  to 
do  so.  Yet  the  artistic  effect  hardly  transcended  an  external 
imitation.  That  cannot  be  the  deepest  life-nerve  of  music. 
Such  a  description  of  the  feelings  of  other  men  remains  inde- 
finite and  accidental.  Again  we  are  ultimately  dependent  on 
the  title  and  the  printed  programme.  The  lyric  poem  gives 
us  such  expression  of  the  feelings  of  the  other  man.  In  music 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY       251 

we  cannot  link  the  feeling  with  any  definite  fellow-being. 
The  verses  speak  to  us  as  a  neighbor  speaks,  but  the  tones  do 
not  refer  to  any  definite  place,  and  do  not  start  from  any 
defmite  person,  even  if  we  see  with  our  own  eyes  the  artist 
who  draws  the  bow  over  the  strings  of  the  violin.  Painting 
speaks  with  the  language  of  the  outer  worid,  verses  speak 
with  the  language  of  the  fellow-worid,  but  tones  do  not  come 
from  without  and  as  strangers:  in  ourselves  live  all  their 
movements.   It  does  not  belong  to  their  meaning  that  the 
tones  start  there  without  from  the  instruments  and  are 
mechanically  produced  by  human  beings.  The  melody  is  not 
changed  if  it  comes  from  right  or  left,  from  above  or  below. 
As  soon  as  we  apperceive  it,  it  has  become  spaceless,  and  its 
whole  existence  develops  itself  in  our  own  inner  life.   That 
is  not  meant  in  a  psychological  sense;  that  would  be  indiffer- 
ent and  insignificant.   Psychologically,  the  painting  and  the 
drama,  too,  must  become  my  own  idea  to  interest  me  at  all. 
Here  we  stand  far  from  any  psychology,  at  a  point  from 
which  we  see  the  outer  worid  and  the  fellow-worid  in  contrast 
to  the  inner  worid  of  the  self.  The  fine  arts  and  poetry  thus 
refer  to  the  not-self,  but  from  such  a  standpoint  of  immediate 
experience  the  tone-movement  appears  in  the  own  I.    The 
sounds  of  the  symphony  are  not  our  contents  of  consciousness. 
As  such  they  would  not  play  a  particular  r61e.  The  paintings 
and  poems  would  be  such,  too.  But  those  sounds  are  our  own 
life-experiences,  their  intention  is  our  intention,  their  will  is 
our  will,  their  fulfilment  is  our  perfect  rest. 

In  this  sense  we  say  that  just  as  the  fine  arts  manifest  the 
outer  worid  and  literature  the  fellow-worid,  music  expresses 
our  inner  worid.  Nothing  definite,  nothing  conceptionally 
determined,  is  communicated  by  the  tones.  They  awake  the 
own  self,  and  only  what  there  is  in  ourselves  can  get  life 
through  the  tones.  The  same  tones  may  awaken  in  one  the 
image  of  the  spring  landscape  and  in  another  the  picture  of 
beautiful  beings,  may  awaken  here  love  and  there  joy  or  en- 


252 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


thusiasm,  but  the  truth  is  that  they  do  not  present  anything 
and  do  not  describe  anything,  but  liberate  the  own  willing 
self  to  its  free  life  in  the  moving  tones.  The  work  of  music 
forms  our  own  inner  world  to  a  unified  tissue  of  volitions,  and 
thus  brings  meaning  into  the  wilderness  of  our  feelings.  The 
will  which  music  brings  to  us  is  thus  not  a  metaphysical  worid 
of  will  which  comes  to  description.  No,  it  is  our  personal  life- 
will,  and  our  personal  feelings  develop  themselves  in  it. 

Moreover,  those  volitions  and  emotions  and  feelings  are  un- 
real, just  as  the  landscape  of  the  painting  and  the  hero  of  the 
poet  are  imreal.  They,  too,  do  not  demand  connections  which 
lead  beyond  the  aesthetic  experience  itself.  They  do  not  de- 
mand any  action,  they  do  not  intrude  into  the  practical  exist- 
ence; they  are  perfect  in  the  experience  itself,  and  never- 
theless they  remain  true  immediate  experiences  with  the  full 
warmth  of  life.  The  painter  who  shows  us  the  outer  worid  as- 
sures us  of  the  unreality  by  presenting  to  us  a  mere  two-dimen- 
sional extension  and  avoiding  the  depth ;  the  poet  who  brings 
the  fellow-world  to  us  emphasizes  the  unreality  by  speaking  in 
verses  or  from  the  framed  stage.  The  composer  who  shows  us 
the  volitions  of  our  inner  worid  brings  out  the  imreality  of 
this  will  by  intertwining  it  with  the  spaceless  fugitive  tones 
which  have  no  model  in  the  worid  of  things  and  beings,  and 
which  therefore  offer  no  hold  for  our  actions.  But  as  soon  as 
we  are  conscious  that  our  will  is  not  a  real  will,  and  that 
means  that  it  is  no  will  which  demands  actions  and  which 
enters  into  the  world  of  connections,  then  it  can  without  in- 
hibition live  itself  into  the  will  of  the  tones,  and  can  feel  itself 
in  the  abimdance  of  their  will. 

The  other  arts  touch  us  with  the  things  and  the  beings ; 
the  tones  lead  us  back  to  ourselves.  We  will  with  them  as 
they  have  their  own  reality  in  us  and  do  not  want  to  be  any- 
thing but  our  own  self.  Our  own  will  thus  becomes  that  fun- 
damental will  from  which  the  tonal  movement  starts.  The 
dominating  will  of  the  tonica  is  felt  as  our  own  I,  and  the  play 


THE  VALUES  OF  BEAUTY 


253 


of  the  melody  enters  into  this  will  of  ours  just  as  the  outer 
worid  of  experience  penetrates  into  the  inner  worid;  and  as 
we  remain  continually  conscious  of  ourselves  also  in  finding 
the  outer  worid,  every  tone  in  the  melody  is  felt  in  relation  to 
the  fundamental  tone.  In  the  manifoldness  of  the  harmony, 
it  is  as  if  the  whole  multiplicity  of  our  own  inner  worid  comes 
to  consciousness,  and  yet  here,  too,  every  intention  remains 
related  to  the  self.  It  is  not  the  outer  worid  itself  which  we 
find  in  the  melody,  not  the  fellow-worid  itself  in  the  harmony, 
but  only  outer  worid  and  fellow-worid  as  experiences  and  in- 
clusions of  our  inner  worid.   Everything  remains  related  to 
the  striving  and  counter-striving  of  the  feeling  and  willing  of 
the  self  and  returns  to  it  in  the  unity  of  the  I.   Life  with  its 
connecting  reality  can  bring  us  this  perfect  inner  agreement 
of  our  will  only  in  the  instant  of  purest  happiness :  in  beauti- 
ful music  it  comes  to  us  lastingly.  The  tones  which  realize 
their  will  and  hold  what  they  have  aimed  at  from  the  begin- 
ning, through  all  the  hindrances  and  deviations,  become  to 
us  expression  of  our  own  will,  which  asserts  itself  in  its  inner 
worid  through  all  its  outer  experiences.  And  this  inner  agree- 
ment of  our  desires  finally  gives  to  our  own  life  its  perfect 
meaning.   Music  does  not  picture  this  will :  the  tones  have 
become  music  only  when  they  have  become  our  inner  world 
and  its  will.  Then  only  can  our  inner  life  form  itself  in  such 
a  unity  through  their  manifoldness  that  it  becomes  pure 
beauty  itself  in  its  rhythm,  in  its  harmony,  in  its  life-melody. 
But  the  tones  to  which  our  life  thus  gives  meaning  and  con- 
tent in  the  perfect  form  express  a  will  which  asserts  itself,  and 
this  maintaining  of  the  identity  of  the  will  completes  the 
eternal  validity  of  the  absolute  value. 


PART  IV 


THE  ETHICAL  VALUES 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


Everything  which  we  have  considered  so  far  was  lying  be- 
fore us  finished  and  completed  when  we  evaluated  it.  It  was 
something  entirely  given,  which  was  valuable  in  its  existence, 
in  its  connection,  in  its  unity,  in  its  beauty.  But  that  which  is 
to  be  valuable  for  its  development's  sake  gains  the  value  just 
in  its  transition  from  the  given  to  the  not-given.  It  is  not 
being,  but  becoming.  Experience  alone  is  not  sufl5cient  there ; 
the  deed  is  needed.  As  soon  as  the  deed  is  performed,  the 
development  completed,  we  have  again  only  something  which 
is  finished,  and  as  such  it  can  again  claim  only  the  value  of 
connection,  no  longer  the  special  value  of  development.  Such 
becoming  may  go  on  in  the  outer  world,  in  the  fellow-world, 
and  in  the  inner  world,  and  the  inner  forming  may  be  abso- 
lutely valuable  even  where  the  deed  is  done  without  any  con- 
scious evaluation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  valuable  deed  may 
subordinate  itself  to  a  conscious  purpose;  it  then  becomes  an 
achievement.  Such  purposive  intentional  realization  of  values 
meant  to  us  civilization.  Hence  the  values  of  achievement 
are  values  of  civilization;  the  values  of  development  are 
immediate  values  of  life.  Both  belong  intimately  together. 
Civilization  carries  on  in  the  values  of  achievement  what  is 
enclosed  in  the  values  of  development  in  naive  experience. 
Thus  they  are  related  to  each  other  like  the  values  of  existence 
and  of  connection,  or  the  values  of  unity  and  of  beauty. 
The  values  of  achievement  which  civilization  upbuilds  are 
those  of  industry,  of  law,  and  of  morality.  We  must  study 
them  carefully  later,  but  our  next  step  must  be  to  inquire  into 
those  life-values :  when  is  the  becoming  which  does  not  aim 


258 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


to  be  a  real  achievement  yet  absolutely  valuable?  We  shall 
have  to  separate  as  before  the  outer  world,  the  fellow-world, 
and  the  inner  world;  and  correspondingly  we  ask  for  the 
development  in  nature,  in  society,  and  in  personality.  In 
nature  we  call  it  growth,  in  society  progress,  and  in  the  per- 
sonality self-development. 

So  far  we  have  considered  facts  which  were  given  and  there- 
fore withdrawn  from  any  free  decision.  The  system  of  nature 
or  of  history  or  of  reason  is  given  to  us  and  binds  us  by  its 
objective  fact-character,  and  so  does  art  and  love  and  happi- 
ness. In  development  and  achievement,  on  the  other  hand, 
our  evaluation  depends  upon  the  freedom.  The  value  itself 
does  not  yet  exist,  and  does  not  necessarily  result  from  that 
which  is  given.  Of  course  much  depends  upon  the  standpoint. 
The  drama  and  the  symphony  also  pass  by,  and  when  I  see 
the  first  scene  or  hear  the  first  bars,  the  remainder  has  to  un- 
veil itself  slowly.  Nevertheless,  I  consider  the  work  of  art  as 
something  completed ;  I  value  it  in  its  completion.  The  same 
holds  true  as  to  the  succession  of  natural  connections  or  of 
the  acts  of  reason  which  science  reports.  The  solar  eclipses  of 
the  next  thousand  years  do  not  yet  exist  as  experiences,  and 
still  they  belong  as  parts  to  the  universe  which  I  can  calculate 
from  the  given  facts.  No  deed  of  freedom  can  change  their 
being.  Unnoticed  factors  may  interfere  with  my  calculation, 
but  whatever  may  come  is  completely  determined  by  that 
which  is  given,  and  it  comes  in  consideration  only  as  an 
entirely  necessary  connection.  Whatever  stands  in  such  a 
causal  relation  does  not  allow  a  deed  and  in  this  sense  no  free 
becoming.  Everything  is  closed  beforehand.  That  also  holds 
true  for  the  connections  of  reason.  Whatever  the  mathe- 
matician may  find,  of  course  his  seeking  and  finding  is  a  free 
deed  and  an  achievement,  but  his  mathematical  magnitudes 
do  not  show  a  becoming.  Their  unlimited  system  is  necessary 
and  in  its  structure  completed.  For  the  connections  of  history 
this  evidently  does  not  hold.  The  historian  cannot  calculate 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


259 


the  artistic  or  political  history  of  the  future  as  we  calculate 
a  solar  eclipse.  History  is  really  deed,  liberty,  development. 
Historical  science  therefore  can  deal  only  with  that  which  has 
become  a  given  fact,  that  is,  with  the  history  of  the  past. 

Of  course  there  cannot  be  anything  in  the  world  which 
cannot  be  made  a  possible  object  of  knowledge.  Everjrthing 
can  be  brought  into  scientific  connections.  If  yet  free  develop- 
ment is  to  be  possible,  it  cannot  mean  that  there  are  parts  of 
the  world  which  are  inaccessible  to  the  explanation  of  science. 
That  which  characterizes  the  difference  must  be  rather  a 
different  standpoint.  That  which  is  from  one  point  of  view 
a  series  of  given  facts,  the  completed  connection  of  which 
science  has  logically  evaluated,  is  from  another  standpoint  a 
development  which  we  value  as  the  free  deed  of  the  becoming. 
Just  as  the  completed  connection  is  accessible  to  science  even 
when  the  end  is  not  reached  but  only  calculated  beforehand, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  evaluation  of  the  free  deed  and  develop- 
ment may  very  well  be  possible  even  when  the  goal  is  already 
reached.  We  have  only  to  put  ourselves  in  o\ir  thought  into 
that  instant  in  which  the  decision  and  development  are  start- 
ing. The  solar  eclipse  of  the  future  is  treated  by  science  as 
if  it  were  already  a  settled  fact.  Correspondingly,  if  perhaps 
we  want  to  evaluate  the  achievement  of  Mucius  Scaevola,  we 
have  to  think  ourselves  into  that  moment  in  which  he  stood 
still  free  before  the  decision  whether  he  should  thrust  his  hand 
into  the  flames.  In  the  same  way  development  and  achieve- 
ment stand  in  contrast  to  unity  and  beauty.  Here,  too,  it  is 
a  fundamentally  different  standpoint.  The  inner  agreement 
which  is  material  for  the  aesthetic  valuation  belongs  again 
only  to  that  which  is  completed  and  finished,  while  that 
which  we  are  to  value  as  achievement  and  development  must 
be  incompleted  and  unfinished.  That  which  is  to  be  beauti- 
ful must  have  performed  its  decision;  that  which  we  are 
to  appreciate  as  achievement  must  show  itself  to  us  at  first 
before  its  decision. 


260 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


261 


\ 


When  are  the  conditions  given  for  this  special  kind  of 
valuation?  We  said  the  world  must  come  in  question  in  its 
becoming.  The  experience  which  comes  to  us  must  accord- 
ingly be  the  starting-point  for  the  transition  to  something 
else.  It  must  extinguish  itself  to  let  a  new  experience  take 
its  place.  But  the  mere  otherness  can  never  be  valuable  in 
itself,  as  we  saw  that  every  satisfaction  rests  in  the  grasping 
of  the  identical.  This  transition  can  be  valuable,  therefore, 
only  under  the  one  condition,  that  the  other  which  comes  is 
a  realization  of  the  first  which  has  gone  and  is  thus  identical 
with  the  first  purpose.  If  we  apprehend  a  given  in  such  a 
way  that  it  wills  to  be  another,  the  transition  into  that  other 
is  a  realization  which  satisfies  us.  It  is  this  transition  which 
we  call  development.  If  such  a  will  to  a  particular  otherness 
is  a  will  in  which  everybody  must  participate,  the  satisfaction 
in  the  transition  is  over-personal,  and  the  value  of  the  de- 
velopment is  accordingly  absolute.  The  value  of  a  develop- 
ment or  of  an  achievement  is  thus  dependent  upon  the  fact 
that  an  experience  comes  to  us  with  the  will  to  be  something 
else.  The  seed  which  wants  to  be  a  sunflower  may  develop 
itself.  If  it  does  not  grow,  if  the  sprout  withers,  this  value  of 
development  does  not  become  fulfilled.  And  if  a  rosebush 
grows  up  where  we  expected  the  sunflower,  again  there  is  no 
development.  In  that  particular  life-situation  in  which  we 
deposit  the  seed-corn  in  the  ground,  we  apperceive  it  as  a  seed 
which  wants  to  become  a  flower.  Its  will-purpose  is  the  true 
experience  for  us,  and  in  the  change  of  things  the  full  flower 
alone  can  satisfy  our  desire  for  the  identical  content.  In  this 
way  the  change  becomes  valuable.  We  see  clearly  the  con- 
trast to  knowledge  here.  For  the  physicist  the  seed  also  has 
its  will,  but  only  the  will  to  remain  itself.  For  the  purpose  of 
explaining  the  changes  which  later  come  when  the  seed  lies 
in  the  moist  soil,  the  naturalist  must  apperceive  that  seed- 
corn  as  the  combination  of  innumerable  particles  of  which 
each  remains  conserved.   If  the  flower  grows  out  of  the  soil, 


the  naturalist  does  not  consider  it  as  a  change  in  the  con- 
tent of  the  seed.  For  him  it  is  now  the  material  of  the  seed 
together  with  the  water  and  the  chemical  substances  of  the 
soil  and  the  air,  which  all  in  common  build  up  the  flower,  but 
which  all  remain  imchanged  in  this  upbuilding.  For  the  nat- 
uralist, the  flower  is  therefore  in  causal  connection  with  the 
whole  sum  of  originally  separated  substances  among  which 
the  seed  was  an  essential  but  small  fraction.  The  connection 
is  logically  valuable  because  the  flower  is  identical  with  that 
mass  made  up  of  seed  and  soil  and  water  and  air,  and  can  be 
understood  by  the  mere  conservation  of  those  substantial 
particles.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  value  development,  the 
flower  is  identical  with  that  which  the  seed-corn  willed,  and 
all  those  substances  of  its  surroundings  were  only  means 
which  it  utilized  to  realize  its  goal  in  becoming  the  other. 

In  the  midst  of  a  given  definite  manifold  a  will  which  is 
directed  towards  a  not-given  can  never  find  its  satisfaction. 
In  the  world  which  is  given  we  cannot  find  value  unless  every 
demand  is  completely  satisfied  in  the  given  itself.  Every 
logical  and  aesthetic  valuation  is  directed  towards  such  a 
given  manifold.  Thus  the  will  to  the  otherness  can  never  have 
a  place  in  the  true  or  in  the  beautiful.  In  the  logical  values  the 
given  will  conserves  itself  in  the  given  totality;  in  the  aes- 
thetic values  the  single  will  agrees  with  the  other  wills  in  the 
given  manifold.  Only  in  the  values  of  development  and 
achievement  the  single  will  gives  up  the  given  and  by  its 
deed  goes  over  into  a  not-given.  The  appreciation  of  this 
transition  is  therefore  never  knowledge  and  never  aesthetic 
estimation;  and  yet  the  valuation  which  expresses  this  en- 
tirely different  attitude  has  a  completely  coordinated  inde- 
pendent claim.  In  one  of  these  three  forms  every  possible 
valuation  of  the  world-experience  must  express  itself.  Every 
evaluation  had  to  be  based  on  identity.  The  experience  may 
come  to  us  as  completely  determined.  In  that  case  we  may 
either  follow  up  the  single  experience  in  its  identity,  or  we 


[iS! 


262 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


may  perceive  the  identity  of  the  many  experiences  in  the 
manifold.  But  if  the  experience  is  not  yet  determined  and 
still  dependent  upon  a  free  deed,  there  is  only  the  one  possi- 
bility of  finding  an  identity;  the  final  end  which  is  reached 
must  show  itself  identical  with  the  intention.  Any  other,  any 
fourth  relation  of  identity,  cannot  be  possible  in  the  midst  of 
the  experiences.  It  was  the  independent  self-conservation 
of  the  world  which  constituted  that  logical  value;  it  was  the 
independent  self-agreement  of  the  world  which  constituted 
that  aesthetic  value ;  and  the  fact  that  now  the  will  to  the  not- 
given  leads  to  an  identity  between  intention  and  fulfilment 
brings  us  the  independent  self-realization  of  the  world.  We 
might  call  it  the  ethical  value.  By  it  alone  the  self -asserting 
world  expresses  its  deepest  meaning.  Of  course  we  still  must 
examine  whether  the  world  really  has  this  deepest  meaning  of 
the  ethical  value.  It  depends  upon  the  question  whether  we 
really  find  an  absolutely  valid  will  to  otherness  and  its  realiza- 
tion. It  would  be  possible  that  every  will  in  the  experiences 
is  directed  only  towards  self-conservation  and  agreement, 
and  that  every  other  will  has  only  individual  character.  In 
that  case  we  should  have  truth  and  happiness  and  beauty  in 
the  world,  but  no  deed  which  as  such  can  claim  absolute  value. 
Then  there  would  be  no  development,  no  progress,  no  achieve- 
ment in  its  purest  meaning,  and  while  the  actions  and  pro- 
cesses and  new  formations  might  secure  personal  satisfaction, 
they  would  not  oflfer  a  basis  for  an  absolutely  valid  valuation. 
This  new  group  of  values  is  similar  to  those  which  we 
considered  before  in  the  circumstance,  that  the  evaluation 
always  refers  to  a  relation  and  not  to  the  contents  which 
enter  into  the  relation.  We  saw  every  time  that  the  single  as 
such  never  has  a  value.  The  value  belongs  only  to  the  relation 
between  that  which  we  grasp  and  which  seeks  its  identical 
counterpart  and  the  new  experience  in  which  the  identical 
content  is  found.  Not  the  impression  has  logical  value,  but 
its  return  in  new  form  secures  the  value  of  existence.  Not 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT    263 

the  single  parts  of  the  manifold  have  aesthetic  value,  but 
their  relation  of  inner  agreement.  The  same  holds  true  for 
the  value  of  development,  and  just  that  is  too  easily  over- 
looked. The  final  end  of  a  development  is  in  itself  not  more 
valuable  than  the  starting-pomt.  It  is  the  transition  from 
one  to  the  other  which  is  valuable.  The  becoming  is  valuable, 
not  that  which  has  become.  Only  if  we  keep  this  fundamental 
principle  of  the  doctrine  of  values  firmly  in  mind  shall  we 
be  able  to  avoid  later  a  distortion  of  the  deepest  meaning  of 
the  values  of  achievement.  The  values  of  industry  and  law 
and  morality  depend  upon  the  clear  recognition  that  it  is  the 
deed  and  not  the  result  which  constitutes  their  value.  The 
development  is  valuable,  but  we  have  no  right  to  say  that 
the  reality  to  which  it  leads  is  better  than  the  reality  from 
which  the  development  started.  We  separate  again  the  con- 
sideration for  the  outer  world,  the  fellow-world,  and  the 
inner  world,  and  thus  begin  with  the  growth  in  nature. 

A.  —  GROWTH 

The  natural  science  of  our  day  is  proud  to  be  a  science  of 
development.  The  rigid  being  of  things  has  been  moulded  into 
an  insistent  becoming,  and  only  through  the  knowledge  of 
developments  have  "the  riddles  of  the  universe''  been  trans- 
formed in  our  time  into  such  convenient  matter-of-course 
solutions.  We  know  how  world-bodies  develop  themselves 
new  and  ever  new  from  rotating  nebular  masses,  how  the 
earth  developed  itself  from  the  sun,  how  the  surface  of  the 
earth  developed  itself  by  cooling  off,  how  "  fourteen  hundred 
million  years  ago"  the  first  little  living  lump  developed  itself 
from  inorganic  substances,  and  how  the  lowest  protists  de- 
veloped themselves  from  it,  and  later  the  other  invertebrates, 
and  then  the  fish  and  reptiles  and  birds  and  mammals,  and 
finally  the  men.  And  yet  the  theory  of  knowledge  must  stick 
to  it  that  in  the  nature  of  the  naturalist  by  principle  no 
development  exists. 


264 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


Development,  we  claimed,  cannot  be  asserted  without 
valuation.  We  did  not  demand  that  the  goal  of  the  develop- 
ment  itself  be  more  valuable  than  the  starting-point,  but  the 
development  is  a  transition  and  a  change  which  is  valuable. 
It  would  be  meaningless  to  speak  of  development  without 
this  reference  to  a  value.  But  just  this  valuation  is  entirely 
opposed  to  the  deepest  meaning  of  natural  science.    We 
recognized  that  by  principle  the  things  which  enter  into  the 
causal  connection  of  nature  cannot  have  any  other  will  than 
the  will  to  conserve  themselves.  The  only  value  which  the 
naturalist  can  acknowledge  is  the  value  of  connection,  which 
is  completed  as  soon  as  the  changing  appearances  are  reduced 
to  the  perseverance  of  the  parts.  The  direction  of  the  change 
cannot  itself  again  be  valuable  without  our  completely  leav- 
ing the  circle  of  naturalistic  conceptions.    The  will  to  be 
something  else  can  never  enter  into  the  connection  of  nature 
in  so  far  as  nature  is  to  be  object  of  knowledge.  All  purpos- 
iveness  is  thus  excluded  from  natural  science,  and  it  is  pur- 
posiveness  which  gives  meaning  to  the  value  of  development. 
This  does  not  in  any  way  exclude  the  use  of  teleological  as- 
pects for  the  work  of  the  naturalist.  The  purposive  considera- 
tion is  there  only  an  instrument  towards  the  causal  knowledge. 
Science  starts  there  from  the  end-point  of  a  series  of  changes, 
but  its  aim  in  looking  backward  is  to  find  the  causes  which 
led  to  this  end-point.  The  will  towards  the  end  does  not  be- 
come for  that  reason  itself  an  effective  cause.  In  this  sense 
even  the  physicist  and  astronomer  may  group  their  facts 
under  teleological  points  of  view.  They  may  speak  of  move- 
ments which  aim  towards  the  smallest  possible  loss  of  energy, 
or  of  an  exchange  of  energies  which  leads  to  the  greatest 
possible  energy  that  can  be  transformed  into  labor. 

Such  teleological  treatment  is  still  more  natural  in  biology. 
The  whole  modem  Darwinism  is  in  this  justified  sense  con- 
trolled by  the  reference  to  goals.  Everything  is  related  to  the 
aim  of  nature  to  produce  completely  adjusted  organic  beings. 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


265 


Everything  there  seems  subordinated  to  the  goal;  and  yet 
the  meaning  and  the  success  of  this  modern  biological  view 
lies  just  in  the  fact  that  no  will  which  aims  towards  this  goal 
is  put  into  the  calculation  itself.  Everything  is  deduced  from 
causes  which  are  effective  without  aim  and  purpose ;  every- 
thing becomes  finally  explained  by  the  conservation  of  things 
and  energies.   Whether  the  investigator  examines  the  facts 
with  reference  to  the  effect,  or  starts  with  the  causes,  is  then 
fundamentally  indifferent  for  the  character  of  the  final  solu- 
tion of  the  problem.  If  he  starts  from  the  effect  for  which  he 
seeks  the  causes,  he  may  hold  that  end  before  his  eyes  as  a 
goal.  Even  in  the  final  presentation  he  may  group  the  causes 
in  such  a  way  that  they  seem  to  be  directed  towards  a  goal, 
but  among  those  causes  he  does  not  acknowledge  an  energy 
which  as  such  is  intentionally  directed  towards  a  goal.  In  the 
system  of  nature  no  teleological  energy  has  brought  about  the 
change  from  the  protists  to  the  other  animals,  and  no  teleo- 
logical energy  makes  the  acorn  grow  into  the  oak  tree.  The 
vitalism  which  would  like  to  coordinate  such  teleological 
energies  to  the  physical  chemical  energies  in  explaining  the 
life-processes  is  untenable  and  logically  reckless.  Such  vital- 
ism may  be  welcomed  if  it  seeks  only  to  be  the  reaction  against 
the  superficiality  with  which  certain  naturalists  try  to  give 
the  impression  that  science  to-day  can  already  mechanically 
explain  all  processes.   There  it  is  perhaps  quite  useful  that 
such  a  reaction  points  to  those  many  occurrences  in  nature 
which  still  resist  the  mechanical  interpretation.  But  vitalism 
is  then  only  a  collective  name  for  the  problems  which  are 
still  unsolved  to-day.  Vitalism  itself  does  not  offer  the  smallest 
handle  for  their  explanation.    The  mere  acknowledgment  of 
a  teleological  energy  cannot  contribute  in  the  least  to  our 
understanding  of  nature  as  nature. 

The  relation  is  only  apparently  changed  where  a  mental 
consciousness  of  purposes  really  enters  into  the  question  of 
the  natural  phenomena.  In  the  realm  of  the  natural  mechan- 


266 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


ism,  even  the  psychical  thought  of  a  goal  is  only  an  ideational 
content  which  is  coordinated  to  the  other  causes  of  the  event. 
By  principle  the  method  of  explanation  is  not  changed  by  it. 
The  psychical  process  of  thinking  a  purpose  is  only  a  part 
of  the  psycho-physical  process  which  works  causally  like 
any  other  cause.  From  the  standpoint  of  subject-reality,  and 
therefore  from  the  standpoint  of  the  historian,  every  aiming 
and  positing  of  purposes  means  a  transcending  into  that 
which  is  distant.  But  that  is  an  aspect  of  the  will  in  which 
the  attitude  is  felt  and  participated  in  and  willed  in  its 
subjectivity,  and  which  is  entirely  different  from  everything 
objective,  perceivable,  and  causal.   From  the  standpoint  of 
natural  explanation  the  intention  itself  becomes  a  content 
of  consciousness  which  cannot  be  more  or  less  effective  than 
other  contents  of  the  world.  It  is  a  partial  cause  of  the  follow- 
ing events.  The  finding  of  plans  and  purposes  in  the  organic 
beings  ought  never  to  push  natural  science  away  from  its 
causal  track.  Even  the  inventor  who  constructs  the  machine, 
with  all  his  anticipating  thoughts,  is  for  the  explaining  natural- 
ist only  a  part  of  a  causal  system,  and  his  inventive  thoughts 
and  impulses  are  only  a  part  of  the  causes  which  cooperate  in 
the  construction  of  the  machine.  His  deed,  which  for  the  his- 
torian of  civilization  is  important  just  by  being  apperceived 
in  its  purposiveness,  becomes  for  the  naturalist  and  psycho- 
logist a  content  of  consciousness  which  causally  produces 
certain  bodily  movements.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  natur- 
alist, therefore,  nothing  is  simplified  even  when  the  hypothesis 
of  a  purposive  intelligence  of  God  is  posited  at  the  beginning 
of  things.   God's  mind  itself  then  becomes  a  complex  psycho- 
logical problem ;  God's  thought-purpose  itself  then  demands 
an  explanation  through  causes  and  an  explanation  of  its 
effects,  but  it  does  not  in  itself  explain  anything.  The  religious 
vitalism  is  in  no  better  situation  than  the  biological.  The  will 
—  it  may  be  that  of  animal  or  of  man  or  of  God  —  no  longer 
wills  anj^hing  as  soon  as  it  has  entered  the  system  of  nature. 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT  267 

Accordingly  it  is  settled  for  us :  the  real  will  towards  other- 
ness and  its  fulfilment  do  not  represent  a  naturalistic  con- 
ception.   They  have  nothing  to  do  with  knowledge.    The 
value  of  development  which  belongs  to  such  fulfilment  of  a 
real  will  in  its  will-purpose  therefore  leaves  natural  science 
untouched.    The  will  towards  becoming  and  growing  may 
slumber  in  every  grain  of  seed,  and  yet  the  naturalist  would 
and  could  never  find  it.  But  has  natural  science  therefore  the 
right  to  proclaim  that  the  relation  which  does  not  exist  in  its 
world  must  not  be  acknowledged  at  all  as  valuable  and  as 
valid  ?  Such  a  demand  would  evidently  involve  an  arbitrary 
and  one-sided  over-estimation  of  one  single  kind  of  valuation. 
The  reality  of  nature  with  its  value  of  existence  resulted  from 
the  fact  that  we  recognize  in  the  experience  the  will  to  self- 
assertion,  to  perseverance,  to  conservation.   That  certainly 
does  not  exclude  the  acknowledgment  of  the  will  to  changing 
and  to  becoming.  If  we  apperceive  the  experience  of  the  outer 
world  under  the  point  of  view  of  the  one  demand,  we  build 
up  the  world  of  nature ;  if  we  apperceive  the  same  outer  world 
under  the  point  of  view  of  the  other  demand,  we  build  up  the 
world  of  deed,  of  progress,  of  achievement.  The  one  does  not 
interfere  with  the  other  as  long  as  they  are  not  carelessly 
mixed  with  each  other.    If  the  will  to  conservation  is  ful- 
filled, we  reach  the  value  of  connection ;  if  the  will  to  altera- 
tion is  fulfilled,  we  reach  the  value  of  development.    The 
connection  means  to  us  a  truth  which  we  recognize;  the 
development  means  to  us  a  deed  which  we  estimate.   Just 
as  we  acknowledged  that  in  the  system  of  nature  there  can- 
not be  any  progress,  we  certainly  must  also  acknowledge  that 
in  the  system  of  the  teleological  self-realization  of  the  world 
there  cannot  be  any  truth. 

We  cannot  take  any  other  attitude  towards  the  progress  of 
the  world  but  that  of  estimation.  We  can  welcome  it  with 
enthusiasm,  we  can  serve  it  unselfishly,  but  to  make  it  a  part 
of  our  knowledge  would  be  a  self  contradictory  intention.  If 


268  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

we  seek  the  connection,  we  must  find  the  persevering  elements 
so  that  we  may  give  an  explanation  for  the  apparent  change. 
If  we  seek  development,  we  must  find  the  intentions  so  that 
we  may  interpret  the  meaning  of  the  apparent  connection. 
We  may  return  to  our  earlier  illustration.  The  botanist  who 
follows  up  the  grain  of  wheat  considers  it  as  a  combination 
of  numberless  chemical  atoms  which  never  disappear  in  the 
course  of  natural  events  and  never  in  themselves  can  grow. 
The  grain  is  lying  between  soil  material,  which  also  perseveres, 
and  by  the  conservation  of  its  given  elements  and  energies 
transpositions  must  result  by  which  the  soil  loses  material 
and  becomes  assimilated  by  the  seed.  The  blade  thus  nses  by 
the  conservation  of  the  total  mass  of  substance,  which  trans- 
forms itself  in  the  position  of  the  atoms,  but  remains  the  same 
in  its  content.  The  sower,  on  the  other  hand,  who  confides 
his  grain  to  the  field  has  no  interest  in  this  chemical  equation 
because  his  whole  hope  is  turning  to  the  un-equation  between 
the  seed  and  the  ripened  wheat.  Of  course  it  is  an  un-equation 
only  as  far  as  a  connection  is  in  question.  The  sower,  too, 
wants  the  relation  of  an  equation.  The  wheat  is  finally  to  be 
identical  with  that  which  the  seed  promises  and  intends.  The 
elements  of  the  seed,  therefore,  do  not  interest  him  at  all. 
The  seed  as  a  whole  is  for  him  a  unity  which  is  turning 
towards  a  goal,  and  only  the  meaning  of  this  will  towards  a 
goal,  not  the  parts  of  the  content,  have  a  significance  for  the 
development  for  which  he  hopes.  Now  the  seed  itself  becomes 
the  wheat,  but  the  relation  between  that  which  is  sowed  and 
that  which  is  harvested  is  valuable  only  as  the  securing  of 
the  intended  goal,  —  valuable  by  the  fulfilment  of  nature's 

purpose.  . 

The  independent  right  of  an  unnaturalistic  valuation  of 
development  thus  seems  beyond  doubt.  Whether  the  things 
fulfil  their  intention  must  be  decided  without  any  reference 
to  the  causal  connections.  Of  course  we  need  not  inquire 
whether  in  practical  life  the  sower  may  not  have  learned 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


269 


plant  chemistry,  and  whether  the  botanist  does  not  also 
think  of  the  hopes  of  the  sower.  The  mutual  relations  of  the 
valuations  will  have  to  be  discussed  much  later.  Now  at 
first  we  have  to  follow  up  each  value  in  its  pure  original  char- 
acteristics. Our  next  question,  therefore,  must  be  whether 
there  really  exist  purposes  and  intentions  which  belong  to  the 
apperception  of  the  outer  world  in  such  a  necessary  way  that 
the  things  cannot  be  thought  without  such  intentions.  If  the 
purposiveness  of  the  things  should  be  merely  a  personal 
expectation  of  ours,  the  fulfilment  also  would  bring  merely 
a  personal  satisfaction.  Only  if  the  things  are  filled  with  pur- 
poses which  are  independent  of  every  personal  desire  and 
which  are  superior  to  every  chance  individual  will,  can  the 
satisfaction  in  their  fulfilment  represent  an  over-personal 
value.  Only  the  fulfilment  of  an  absolutely  valid  will  towards 
otherness  means  a  progress  which  has  absolute  value.  Hence 
our  fundamental  question  must  be :  How  far  does  the  outer 
world  show  a  purposiveness  which  is  independent  of  individ- 
ual interpretation? 

At  the  first  glance  it  appears  as  if  it  must  be  simple  to  find 
a  convincing  answer.  If  we  want  to  explore  the  objective 
intention  in  the  becoming  of  nature,  it  only  seems  necessary 
to  search  out  what  nature  has  really  performed.  The  direction 
in  which  it  has  changed  must  be  an  expressive  sign  of  its 
fundamental  intentions,  and  even  if  the  deeper  meaning 
remain  a  secret  to  us,  we  may  presuppose  that  all  will  move 
on  in  the  same  direction  in  which  it  has  proceeded  for  un- 
counted millions  of  centuries.  If  nature  has  a  meaning  at  all, 
it  is  impossible  that  the  total  way  of  transformations  in  the 
pa^t  has  denied  it.  If  at  the  beginning  of  time  the  things  had 
an  intention  at  all,  that  which  has  come  about  must  have 
brought  them  nearer  to  the  goal,  however  far  the  goal  itself 
may  be.  In  looking  out  for  this  fundamental  direction,  we  are 
certainly  independent  of  every  personal  chance  attitude,  and 
we  can  see  nature,  as  it  proceeds  to  its  own  great  goals,  xmcon- 


270  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

cerned  about  the  little  human  wishes.  Man  himself  is  then 
only  a  small  addition  in  the  gigantic  process  of  development, 
and  even  his  field,  the  earth,  becomes  a  particle  of  dust  m  the 
total  process  of  the  becoming  worlds. 

But  as  soon  as  we  begin  to  inquire  somewhat  more  care- 
fully into  the  meaning  of  this  spectacle  and  to  recognize  the 
direction  of  this  progress,  this  confidence  evaporates.  Num- 
berless forms  arise,  and  yet  not  one  which  does  not  in  the 
same  spectacle  disappear  again.    There  is  no  life  which  is 
not  succeeded  by  death,  no  upbuilding  which  is  not  followed 
by  downfall,  and  however  many  world-bodies  arise  from  the 
nebulous  masses,  as  many  crash  into  each  other  and  are  de- 
stroyed. If  we  expand  the  view  over  the  totality,  we  see  an 
endless  coming  and  going,  growing  and  dying;  an  eternal 
rhythm  in  which  there  can  no  longer  exist  one  single  direc- 
tion   It  is  an  insistent  pendulum  play  without  beginmng, 
without  end,  without  aim.    Returning  and  returmng,  the 
worlds  are  built  up  and  crumble;  billions  and  trillions  of 
years  there  is  always  the  same  periodic  coming  and  going  — 
no  aim,  no  meaning,  in  endless  movement.  Who  can  say  that 
in  this  circle  of  movement  the  one  direction  means  progress 
and  the  other  regress  ? 

How  could  it  be  otherwise?  About  which  nature  are  we 
speaking  here  ?  Surely  that  is  not  the  nature  with  which 
our  life  is  intertwined  and  which  in  our  real  life-experience 
comes  to  us  to  be  interpreted  in  its  meaning.  In  our  own 
experience  no  new  worlds  have  been  built  up  and  have  died 
away  For  us  the  becoming  worlds  are  glimmenng  little 
points  in  the  midnight  sky.  And  the  times  through  which  the 
world  has  passed  are  not  reported  by  the  memory  of  man- 
kind  in  a  triUionth  part.  The  world  which  vibrates  without 
meaning  is  not  a  content  of  experience,  but  the  result  of  the 
calculations  of  the  naturalist,  calculated  under  that  particular 
point  of  view  of  science  in  order  to  fulfil  the  special  demands 
of  causal  explanation.  We  recognized  beforehand  that  scien- 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


271 


tific  connection  and  a  real  development  must  contradict  each 
other  in  their  presuppositions.  The  world  which  the  astron- 
omer constructs  in  cosmic  endless  times  to  satisfy  the  demand 
for  explanation  must  indeed  ultimately  transform  every  ap- 
parent change  into  periodic  rhythm  and  thus  hold  it  at  a 
meaningless  standstill.  This  is  necessary  because  that  which 
science  wants  to  recognize  as  true  must  be  thought  as  that 
which  perseveres.  The  real  fundamental  becoming  into  an 
otherness  which  would  be  indispensable  for  a  real  develop- 
ment is  therefore  excluded  by  the  presuppositions  as  soon  as 
the  calculated  world  of  the  naturalist  is  substituted  for  the 
world  of  immediate  experience.  The  world  which  emanates 
from  nebulous  masses  is  fundamentally  unfit  to  express  to  us 
the  over-personal  meaning  of  the  outer  world.  The  nature 
which  moves  by  mechanical  laws  and  is  not  concerned  about 
man  is  not  a  nature  about  which  man  has  to  be  concerned 
on  his  part  when  he  tries  to  grasp  the  purposes  of  the  world. 
Thus  it  seems  that  we  might  take  rather  an  anthropocentric 
view.  Development  and  progresses  then  ever5rthing  which 
leads  towards  man,  regress  everything  which  hinders  the 
origin  and  spread  of  mankind.  Of  course  there  also  experience 
may  be  transcended,  perhaps  endlessly.  But  the  construction 
of  primitive  mankind  which  led  to  the  civilized  man,  of  the 
kingdom  of  animals  which  led  to  mankind,  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  earth  which  led  to  living  beings,  is  now  all  directed 
toward  one  clearly  distinguishable  goal.  Here  is  no  pendulum 
movement.  How  the  world  reached  its  great  goal  may  be  left 
to  the  decision  of  the  naturalist.  He  may  find  out  whether 
meteorites  brought  the  germ  of  life  from  foreign  worlds  to 
the  earth,  or  whether  moneres,  which  developed  into  mono- 
cellular beings,  formed  themselves  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea, 
or  whether  endlessly  lower  life-forms  arose  at  first,  which 
through  a  long  development  grew  into  microscopically  visible 
substances.  Even  death  in  the  realm  of  the  multicellular 
beings  is  then  not  a  regress;  death  itself  becomes  a  necessary 


272 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


adjustment  to  secure  the  higher  and  higher  abilities  of  the 
organisms,  and  finally  to  lead  to  man.  From  here  it  can 
be  clearly  recognized  in  which  direction  nature  wants  to 
move.  The  progress  must  lead  beyond  man  towards  the 
superman,  in  whom  everything  which  characterizes  man  be- 
yond the  animal  is  still  reenforced  and  concentrated. 

Yet  we  must  absolutely  refuse  this  view,  too.  This  inter- 
pretation of  the  meaning  of  the  world  is  also  only  an  encroach- 
ment of  natural  science.  This  whole  train  of  thought  belongs 
to  the  causal  scientific  aspect,  and  if  it  is  true  that  scientific 
connection  and  progressive  development  exclude  each  other, 
this  belief  in  development  towards  man  cannot  be  accepted, 
as  it  is  really  only  masked  natural  science.  We  call  it  "  nat- 
ural science''  first  because  in  the  experience  of  mankind  there 
does  not  exist,  and  cannot  exist,  anjrthing  which  makes  man 
the  product  of  lower  forms  of  nature.  In  the  experience  of 
man  there  could  of  course  never  arise  a  man  where  there  were 
no  men.  The  whole  connection  with  the  lower  forms  thus 
again  belongs  entirely  to  the  constructed  world  of  the  nat- 
uralist, which  by  principle  is  without  intention  and  develop- 
ment. From  the  standpoint  of  natural  science,  it  is  arbitrary 
to  detach  the  one  short  phase  which  leads  from  the  cooling- 
oflf  of  the  earth  to  the  spread  of  the  civilized  man  and  to 
separate  it  from  the  cosmic  movement  in  its  unending 
rhythm,  growth,  and  destruction  of  stars.  All  that  paleonto- 
logy teaches  us  can  always  be  used  only  to  increase  our  know- 
ledge of  the  outer  world,  but  such  phylogenetic  natural  sci- 
ence can  never  help  us  to  understand  the  development  which 
we  estimate  as  a  progress.  Experience  itself,  not  the  con- 
structed truth,  must  show  us  that  world  of  which  we  want  to 
understand  the  intentions  and  aims.  But  this  whole  view  is 
a  naturalistic  one  for  a  still  more  important  reason.  The  man 
who  is  the  product  of  the  phylogenetic  development  is  not 
at  all  the  man  who  finds  nature  in  his  outer  world  of  experi- 
ence and  who  seeks  the  value  of  the  outer  world.  This  seeking 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


273 


subject  of  attitudes  is  the  historical  being;  it  is  man  in  his 
will-subjectivity,  who  as  such  does  not  at  all  belong  to  the 
causal  process  which  has  led  from  the  cooling-ofi  of  the  earth's 
surface  to  the  causal  production  of  the  human  race.  That 
being  who  posits  goals  and  estimates  nature  cannot  possibly 
be  the  goal  of  nature,  because  he  is  not  included  in  the  natural 
course  of  objects,  but  belongs  to  the  entirely  different  connec- 
tion of  subjects.  The  naturalist  cannot  know  any  other  man 
than  the  speaking  mammal ;  but  however  richly  he  may  equip 
this  being  with  psycho-physical  functions,  it  remains  a  mis- 
understanding to  consider  him  at  the  same  time  as  a  subject 
which  takes  attitudes  towards  the  real  experiences  of  the 
world.  Nature  has  as  little  the  intention  of  letting  man  and 
superman  grow  as  it  is  nature's  goal  to  let  nebulous  rings  roll 
and  to  condense  them  into  world-bodies.  Biology  can  inter- 
pret the  meaning  of  our  natural  surroundings  as  little  as 
cosmology. 

There  remains,  then,  only  one  way  to  come  to  the  meaning 
of  nature.  We  must  consider  that  nature  which  we  find  as 
object  of  our  real  practical  will-attitudes.  What  this  world 
of  things  was  caused  by  and  what  it  was  millions  of  years  ago 
now  has  no  interest  for  us.  There  is  only  one  thing  which  must 
necessarily  be  demanded  from  the  outer  world,  in  order  that  it 
may  be  able  to  come  into  action  at  all :  nature  must  be  object 
for  the  will  of  the  historical  man.  This  alone  can  be  the  task 
and  the  goal  of  the  outer  world.  It  is  to  be  material  for  the 
deed  of  the  willing  subject.  The  purpose  of  nature  is  not  that 
the  causally  determined  man  be  produced  by  it,  but  that  the 
free  man  may  stand  on  it.  Nature  wants  to  be  his  domicile 
and  his  tool.  If  this  relation  to  human  will  did  not  exist,  it 
would  have  no  significance  for  man  to  speak  of  a  value  in  the 
becoming  of  the  outer  world  and  thus  of  development  or  of 
regress. 

Such  a  task  of  course  does  not  exist  as  a  psychical  pur- 
posive thought  of  the  seed  buried  in  the  soil  of  the  field, 


274  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

and  no  conscious  will  moves  the  wind  and  the  waves;  but  for 
us  subjects  of  attitude,  nature  can  be  active  only  if  its  task  of 
entering  into  the  life  of  man  is  recognized.  Only  in  this  rela- 
tion to  the  striving  man  can  nature  be  object  of  estimation, 
just  as  only  in  relation  to  the  law  of  causality  which  takes  no 
concern  of  man  can  it  become  object  of  knowledge.  To  be 
sure,  nothing  remains  there  of  the  proud  trillions  of  years. 
That  nature  which  alone  has  meaning  and  goal  in  itself  does 
not  lead  to  endless  distances  either  in  space  or  in  time.  It  is 
the  nature  with  which  we  strive  daily  and  which  daily  serves 
us.   Not  by  personal  demand,  but  necessarily,  we  apperceive 
it  with  the  task  of  being  for  us.  With  reference  to  this  goal  we 
measure  the  value  of  its  changes  and  of  its  becoming  another. 
Such  nature  alone,  therefore,  has  development.    The  fruit 
which  grows  for  us,  the  ground  which  offers  its  metals  to  our 
labor,  forest  and  stream,  fresh  air  and  water  and  sunlight, 
fulfil  in  this  way  a  purpose  which  stands  independent  of  the 
chance  wishes  of  individual  beings.  To  be  material  of  human 
deed  is  the  absolutely  necessary  purpose  without  which  we 
cannot  think  that  nature  which  we  find  in  our  real  life.  Only 
in  being  means  and  help  for  our  human  purposes  can  nature 
have  significance  for  us.  Only  in  fulfilling  this  purpose  can 
nature  show  its  deepest  meaning  and  its  purest  value.  Not 
every  blossom  becomes  a  fruit,  not  every  wave  is  willing  to 
carry  us.   As  everywhere,  here  too  that  which  is  valuable, 
that  which  is  free  from  values,  and  that  whtch  interferes  with 
values  are  near  together.    We  find  the  same  situation  in  the 
circle  of  the  logical  values.  Not  every  world-impression  has 
the  value  of  existence.   Only  by  following  up  the  persever- 
ing  impressions  can  we  gain  that  which  really  exists  and  in 
this  way  work  out  from  the  chaos  of  experience  that  which 
is  naturalistically  real.  And  in  the  same  way  not  every  ex- 
perienced manifold  was  harmonious.   We  had  to  raise  the 
beautiful  from  the  mass  of  the  indifferent  and  ugly.    In  the 
same  way  now  not  every  change  in  the  world  is  a  progress, 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


275 


a  development,  a  valuable  growth.  Only  in  following  up  that 
which  is  directed  towards  its  goal  can  we  hold  fast  the  living, 
meaningful  nature  in  its  pure  value. 

Our  idea,  accordingly,  is  not  to  posit  man  in  the  centre 
of  the  causal  nature  as  anthropocentric  science  of  past  days 
tried  to  do.  We  stand  entirely  outside  of  every  possible  causal 
science.  In  the  nature  of  knowledge  all  mankind  is  but  a 
microbe  on  the  surface  of  the  earth,  and  the  earth  itself  only  a 
little  speck  of  the  universe.  But  in  the  nature  which  we  meet 
and  estimate  in  life,  man  with  his  thought  of  an  unlimited 
causal  world  stands  there  as  the  one  unique  being  for  whom 
nature  exerts  itself  in  order  that  he  may  live  out  his  life  in 
freedom.  He  could  not  take  a  step,  he  could  not  perform  a 
deed,  he  could  not  realize  a  plan,  if  nature  were  not  to  help 
and  to  serve;  and  even  where  nature  seems  reluctant  and 
demands  hard  labor,  it  offers  resistance  only  to  the  chance 
individual,  but  remains  in  its  meaning  the  tool  and  the  source 
of  energy  for  historical  mankind.  It  is  the  right  and  even  the 
duty  of  the  naturalist  to  presuppose  that  nature  will  ulti- 
mately prove  itself  a  complete  causal  connection,  however  far 
science  may  be  to-day  from  such  an  end.  He  therefore  pre- 
supposes that  nature  really  is  such  a  connection.  In  the  same 
way  it  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  the  striving  subject  of 
historical  life  to  presuppose  that  nature  is  ultimately  con- 
trolled by  the  purpose  of  serving  the  rational  being,  however 
many  life-plans  of  the  individual  may  be  interfered  with  by 
nature.  The  intention  of  nature  remains,  then,  the  effort 
steadily  to  approach  this  goal.  For  the  striving  man  the  nature 
of  the  astronomical  distances  and  of  the  trillions  of  years  is 
exactly  as  unreal  as  for  the  naturalist  the  nature  which  is 
guided  by  intentions.  How  both  forms  of  valuation  ultimately 
may  be  combined  we  cannot  yet  consider  here.  It  is  evident 
that  they  must  touch  each  other  because  in  seeking  know- 
ledge the  naturalist  too  becomes  a  striving  subject  and  the 
world  which  he  tries  to  know  enters  into  the  human  will ;  on 


276 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


the  other  hand,  the  striving  subject  becomes  a  knower  when 
he  selects  nature  as  a  tool  for  a  particular  will-purpose. 

Of  course  the  development  of  nature  is  not  valuable  because 
it  helps  us  as  individuals.  That  could  make  the  result  of  de- 
velopment useful  and  agreeable,  but  it  could  never  give  to 
development  itself  an  absolutely  valid  value.  The  value  lies 
exclusively  in  the  fact  that  nature  in  its  development  realizes 
itself,  is  loyal  to  its  own  purpose,  fulfils  its  own  intention. 
This  goal  of  nature,  to  be  sure,  is  to  serve  mankind,  but  that 
which  raises  the  becoming  of  nature  to  the  level  of  an  ab- 
solute value  is  not  the  fact  that  the  goal  is  the  service  for 
man,  but  that  this  intended  goal  is  really  reached  by  nature 
through  its  own  energies.  If  there  were  any  other  goal  which 
we  should  have  to  recognize  absolutely  as  the  aim  of  nature, 
however  strange  or  dangerous  to  man,  it  would  nevertheless 
remain  a  pure  value  if  nature  fulfilled  its  purpose.  But  there 
is  not  and  cannot  be  any  other  goal  for  nature.  Nature  must 
be  conceived  as  filled  with  this  aim  because  in  our  experience 
we  mean  by  nature  only  the  object  of  man's  will  and  thus 
the  tool  and  means  of  mankind.  Our  fundamental  will  from 
which  all  valuation  arose  was  the  one  will  that  the  experience 
was  to  be  more  than  mere  experience  and  that  it  should  hold 
and  assert  its  own  selfhood  in  itself.    The  will  to  be  tool  of 
man,  material  of  his  deed,  must  be  conceived,  therefore,  as 
the  objective  character  of  nature  if  nature  is  to  assert  itself 
independently  at  all.    Whether  nature  can  reach  this  self- 
hood can  be  recognized  only  when  nature  really  turns  to 
this  goal  and  proves  that  it  is  in  unity  with  itself.   Every 
becoming  by  which  it  devotes  itself  to  this  service  and  trans- 
forms the  seed  into  fruit  demonstrates  that  it  fulfils  the 
fundamental  demand  to  be  a  self-asserting  world.  Wherever 
nature  really  serves,  its  deed  fulfils  the  absolutely  necessary 
demand  for  its  self-identity,  and  its  performance  is  there- 
fore absolutely  valuable. 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


277 


B.  —  PROGRESS 

We  saw  how  everything  which  is  historical  refers  to  willing 
beings,  and  how  an  historical  connection  can  be  understood 
only  from  the  continuation  of  identical  attitudes.  We  reached 
in  this  way  a  system  of  history  which  had  the  same  reality  as 
the  system  of  nature,  and  which  equally  demands  our  ac- 
knowledgment and  our  submission.  But  in  an  equal  way 
such  treatment  must  then  find  its  limitations.  We  saw  that 
the  naturalist  can  speak  only  of  changes  and  transpositions, 
which  are  ultimately  perseverances,  but  that  he  does  not 
know  anything  of  improvement,  growth,  and  development. 
The  historian  must  be  in  the  same  situation.  We  saw  that 
he  has  to  separate  the  important  from  the  unimportant, 
the  influential  from  the  uninfluential,  when  he  elaborates  the 
real  connections  in  history.  But  his  historical  interest  is  not 
in  touch  with  the  question  whether  it  turns  to  the  better  or 
to  the  worse,  whether  the  change  leads  upward  or  down- 
ward. The  connection  which  constitutes  the  decay  of  class- 
ical antiquity  is  for  the  truth-seeking  historian  not  less  a 
goal  of  scientific  inquiry  than  the  other  connection  which 
constitutes  the  upbuilding  of  ancient  civilization.  As  the 
biologist  must  explain  equally  health  and  disease,  life  and 
death,  the  historian  too  has  to  give  the  same  interest  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  times  of  inspiration  and  to  the  times  of 
horror  in  the  history  of  mankind.  He  has  only  to  make  us 
understand  how  everything  happened  to  occur. 

To  be  sure,  there  is  this  difference  between  the  material  of 
the  historian  and  the  material  of  the  naturalist,  that  the  stuff 
of  the  historian  is  itself  will  or  related  to  the  will,  and  such 
will  in  itself  can  have  reference  to  values.  Yet  the  historical 
connection  must  impartially  interpret  the  just  and  the  im  just, 
the  truth-seeker  and  the  teacher  of  errors,  the  martyr  and  the 
criminal.  He  has  to  examine  how  far  their  will  influenced 
the  will  of  others  and  ultimately  the  will  of  our  fellow-world. 


278  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

The  purpose  of  the  historian  is  not  to  estimate  and  to  ap- 
preciate them.  That  which  grows  in  freedom  has  become  for 
him  an  unchanging  series  of  existing  facts  on  which  he  looks 
retrospectively  to  understand  the  connection.  He  does  not 
have  to  decide  whether  it  had  an  absolute  value  that  there 
were  heroes  and  traitors,  thinkers  and  fools ;  that  the  nations 
blossomed  and  died.  Yet  the  question  as  to  the  value  of  the 
historical  process  cannot  be  disregarded.  The  historian  may 
with  a  cool  heart  look  on  the  crawling  and  swarming  of  the 
nations,  but  somewhere  outside  of  the  historical  research 
a  standpoint  must  exist  from  which  it  can  be  cleariy  seen 
what  in  such  an  historical  movement  was  really  progress  and 
development.  It  might  be  called  philosophy  of  history.  But 
somewhere  it  must  be  asked  whether  the  changes  in  mankind 
are  a  coming  and  going  without  meaning  and  goal,  and 
whether  history  has  not  purpose  and  ideals  as  well  as 
connection.  And  where  absolutely  valid  purposes  are  to  be 
fulfilled  and  ideals  to  be  reached  there  exist  values. 

He  who  enters  practically  into  historical  life  to  build  up  or 
to  break  down,  to  reform  or  to  teach  or  to  revolutionize,  does 
not  want  to  know  how  it  came  about,  but  he  wants  to  bring 
to  power  that  which  in  his  conviction  is  valuable.  He  unself- 
ishly puts  his  energy  and  perhaps  his  life  into  the  work 
because  he  is  convinced  in  his  deepest  soul  that  this  human 
history  is  no  indifferent  purposeless  natural  process,  but  that 
every  hour  has  its  solemn  task.   The  opposite  parties  may 
quarrel  over  which  change  would  represent  real  progress  and 
development,  but  that  the  right  change  has  an  absolute  value 
is  their  common  presupposition,  and  they  assert  this  convic- 
tion in  unselfishly  serving  it.  And  this  belief  in  the  absolutely 
valid  value  of  the  right  ways  of  mankind  cannot  possibly  be 
confined  to  the  narrow  little  practical  sphere  of  our  personal 
activity.  In  the  hurry  of  the  daily  work  the  reference  to  the 
totality  may  disappear  to  our  eye.  Yet  this  daily  fight  itself 
gains  meaning  and  significance  only  when  it  subordinates 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


279 


itself  to  the  movement  of  mankind  and  acknowledges  in  that 
totality  the  unlimited  values.  We  saw  that  nature  shows  its 
development  only  when  it  is  detached  from  the  thought-forms 
of  natural  science.  History,  too,  can  show  the  progress  of 
mankind  only  when  it  is  separated  from  the  thought-forms 
of  the  historian. 

Development  in  the  changes  of  mankind  can  be  found  only 
if  we  reach  a  standpoint  for  a  general  evaluation.  Historical 
research  as  such  cannot  help  us  there,  even  indirectly.  Em- 
pires are  built  up  and  crumble.  What  remains  of  the  proud 
life  of  Babylonia?  Five  thousand  years  hence  what  will  test- 
ify to  our  existence?  The  masses  migrate  and  migrate,  fight 
with  each  other,  subjugate  each  other,  mix  with  each  other; 
now  here,  now  there,  inner  movements  arise,  spread  out,  and 
disappear  again :  without  plan  and  without  purpose  the  stream 
rolls  on  through  the  thousands  of  years.  The  historian  has 
no  right  to  contradict  such  a  view.  Others  again  may  say  that 
nothing  depends  upon  the  conservation  of  that  which  arose, 
but  that  the  happiness  of  those  who  live  is  essential.  In  their 
view  the  history  of  the  world  may  have  been  a  great  regress 
of  mankind.  In  the  beginning  there  was  happiness;  the  hap- 
piness of  the  narrow  carelessness  which  served  the  senses  and 
did  not  ask  for  the  morrow.  That  golden  age  of  laziness  which 
was  not  obliged  to  make  any  sacrifices  for  what  was  distant 
is  destroyed  by  civilization,  and  every  day  expands  the  re- 
sponsibility and  by  it  the  unrest  of  the  community.  Every 
pulse-beat  of  culture  thus  means  less  happiness,  and  no  arti- 
ficial return  to  nature  to-day  can  hinder  the  downfall  of  man- 
kind. Again,  the  historian  has  no  right  to  contradict  such  an 
interpretation.  Others,  to  be  sure,  may  claim  with  the  same 
right  that  civilization  is  just  what  has  opened  the  inexhaust- 
ible sources  of  joy  and  has  broken  the  intolerable  chains  of 
earlier  days,  and  that  pleasure  has  therefore  been  steadily 
increasing.  Again,  others  may  convince  us  that  the  human 
feeling  of  pleasure  always  oscillates  about  a  middle  position, 


280 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


^11 


and  therefore  that  there  must  be  on  high  and  on  low  levels 
always  the  same  quantity  of  pleasure  and  of  pain.  The  his- 
torian as  such  never  has  any  reason  to  object  to  any  of  these 
interpretations. 

The  historic  connections  remain  the  same,  independent  of 
the  question  whether  the  whole  is  imderstood  as  an  ascent  or 
as  a  descent,  or  as  an  indiflFerent  remaining  on  the  same  level 
of  enjoyment.  Moreover,  the  historian  has  not  the  least  reason 
to  object  if  still  others  are  opposed  to  all  those  three  views 
and  claim  that  progress  or  regress  has  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  the  feeling  of  pleasure.  History  as  such  has  indeed 
no  reason  to  consider  the  greatest  possible  number  of  happy 
human  beings  as  the  goal  of  development.  It  might  with  the 
same  right  acknowledge  as  such  a  goal  the  greatest  possible 
number  of  healthy  human  beings  or  of  musical  human  beings. 
But  it  would  not  be  less  arbitrary  if  the  historian  were  to 
use  as  standard  for  the  past  simply  the  state  of  our  civiliza- 
tion to-day.  In  that  case  he  would  have  to  praise  everything 
which  led  to  our  present  situation  and  condemn  everything 
which  hindered  the  movement  towards  our  modern  life.  The 
fact  is  that  our  own  time  is  full  of  movements  which  interfere 
with  one  another,  and  combines  many  kinds  of  civilization 
which  are  to  a  high  degree  unequal.  Above  all,  the  mere  fact 
that  our  situation  is  as  yet  the  latest  cannot  give  to  it  an 
overweight  of  value.    If  we  were  simply  to  say  that  our 
present  state  is  the  most  valuable  because  it  is  the  latest,  we 
should  already  have  accepted  the  presupposition  that  history 
is  a  development  which  goes  on  exactly  in  temporal  succession 
without  any  regress.   But  if  we  were  to  presuppose  that,  then 
we  might  just  as  well  leave  our  hands  idle  and  not  make  any 
effort,  and  let  things  go  as  they  please ;  whatever  to-morrow 
may  bring,  it  must  be  more  valuable  because  it  is  the  later. 
Partisanship  in  favor  of  our  time  in  contrast  to  the  past  is 
thus  just  as  imfit  to  offer  us  general  aspects  of  valuation  as 
partisanship  for  our  nation,  or  for  our  profession,  or  for  our 

church,  or  for  our  politics. 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


281 


Of  course  there  has  never  been  a  lack  of  efforts  which 
tried  to  force  on  history  such  narrow  and  arbitrary  pseudo- 
valuations,  but  they  do  not  contain  a  scintilla  of  theoretical 
necessity.    Yet  the  situation  is  not  better  if,  instead  of  a 
chance  party  creed,  so-called  objective  characteristics  be- 
come emphasized.  The  fundamental  question  always  remains 
open :  Why  is  the  valuation  to  be  anchored  just  at  this  point  ? 
Most  deceiving  and  therefore  most  dangerous  are  all  those 
presuppositions  which  get  their  apparent  objectivity  from 
the  field  of  natural  science.  The  silent  presupposition  there 
is  that  the  direction  in  which  the  changes  in  nature  move  on 
must  also  determine  the  goal  for  the  free  human  deed.  But 
the  fallacy  of  such  an  idea  is  evident.  Two  cases  are  possible. 
Either  we  call  nature  the  total  organic  process  including  all 
human  history :  then  the  question  of  any  ideals  and  duties 
is  meaningless.  Whatever  may  occur  is  then  equally  prede- 
stined by  nature,  and  no  human  move  and  no  human  reform 
can  ever  produce  anything  which  does  not  carry  the  stamp 
of  nature.  The  good  and  the  bad  are  then  equally  the  outcome 
of  the  natural  processes,  and  no  line  of  change  can  claim  to  be 
more  in  harmony  with  nature  than  any  other.  Or  the  other 
case :  we  call  nature  only  that  which  lies  below  human  activity 
and  which  is  material  for  the  human  deed.  In  that  case  the 
will  is  entirely  free  in  its  decision  whether  it  wants  to  take  the 
changes  in  nature  as  its  model,  and  whether  civilization  is  to 
imitate  nature  or  not.  Progress  in  the  social  development  may 
then  perhaps  consist  just  in  deviating  from  the  ways  of  un- 
feeling nature  and  in  seeking  new  paths  which  may  lie  in  an 
opposite  direction.    In  short,  if  we  silently  presuppose  that 
culture  goes  with  nature,  we  have  a  right  to  do  so  only  if  we 
consider  civilization  itself  as  a  part  of  nature.   In  this  case 
the  presupposition  is  a  matter  of  course  which  does  not  affirm 
and  does  not  deny  any  particular  mode  of  action.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  we  separate  civilization  and  nature,  we  have  no 
right  whatever  silently  to  presuppose  that  culture  has  to  shape 


282 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


itself  after  the  model  of  nature.  Of  course  there  is  no  doubt 
that  every  life  can  be  conceived  from  the  point  of  view  of 
natural  science.  But  if  the  transition  of  the  living  beings 
from  the  monocellular  organism  to  the  man  of  civilization 
is  really  apperceived  as  a  natural  process,  nothing  from 
the  naturalist's  point  of  view  shows  an  improvement  or  a 
development.  The  man  of  the  twentieth  century  runs  by  rail- 
ways, he  swims  by  steamers,  he  perceives  through  his  news- 
papers, he  speaks  by  cables,  he  remembers  by  libraries,  he 
strikes  by  cannons;  and  yet  he  is  in  no  way  better  adjusted 
to  his  external  conditions  of  life  than  the  tiniest  infusor  is 
adjusted  to  its  conditions  in  the  drop  of  water.  We  have  only 
an  increase  in  the  differentiation,  an  increase  in  the  mani- 
foldness  of  the  parts,  an  increase  in  the  complexity  of  the 
reactions.  But  who  has  the  right  to  claim  that  the  complex 
is  better  than  the  simple,  and  that  the  differentiated  is  more 
valuable  than  the  undifferentiated  ? 

In  such  a  naturalistic  view  of  the  social  organism  nothing 
can  claim  to  be  more  in  accordance  with  nature  than  any- 
thing else ;  however  fate  may  turn,  everything  remains  a  ne- 
cessary natural  process.  If  in  our  industrial  life  to-day  the 
employers  and  the  laborers  oppose  each  other,  it  remains  in 
the  midst  of  such  a  naturalistic  spectacle  a  fight  equally 
natural  if  the  power  of  capital  presses  down  the  life  of  the 
laborer  to  the  lowest  limit,  or  if  the  laborers,  strong  by  their 
union,  force  their  will  selfishly  on  the  owners,  or  if  the  state 
forces  the  compliance  of  both  parties  and  thus  secures  an 
equilibrium.  The  strong  may  force  the  weak,  or  the  weak 
in  their  combination  may  dominate  the  strong,  or  the  coun- 
teracting forces  may  be  inhibited  by  external  pressure.  Each 
of  those  three  possibilities  can  be  found  a  thousand  times  in 
nature.  Nature  does  not  have  to  suggest  an3rthing  there,  and 
whatever  results  must  be  equally  accepted  as  development 
simply  because  it  happened  to  result. 

But  let  us  consider  the  other  case.  Instead  of  considering 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT  283 

mankind  as  part  of  the  necessary  process,  we  may  posit  man 
in  his  freedom  as  against  and  over  nature,  and  now  we  speak 
of  development  when  he  goes  on  in  his  freedom  in  the  paths 
of  nature.  For  instance,  in  the  spirit  of  Darwinism,  the  pro- 
gress of  nature  must  be  referred  to  the  selection  of  those  indi- 
viduals who  are  best  adjusted  to  the  surroundings.  Thus  it 
seems  logical  to  say  that  mankind  will  move  on  in  a  progress- 
ive line  only  if  care  is  taken  that  the  badly  adjusted  individ- 
uals  are  eliminated,  and  that  mankind  will  sink  down  if  those 
are  artificially  maintained  who  are  not  sufiiciently  adjusted 
to  the  surroundings.  That  sounds  almost  self-evident,  and 
yet  it  is  a  fallacy.    It  veils  the  decisive  fact  that  the  anti- 
thesis of  good  and  bad  adjustment  already  includes  the  whole 
problem  of  valuation.  Only  by  independent  decisions  con- 
cerning the  values  are  we  able  to  say  what  ought  to  be  called 
well  adjusted  in  the  structure  of  civilization.   In  our  cultural 
sphere,  for  instance,  is  only  the  strong,  muscular,  strenuous 
body  the  well  adapted,  and  the  weak,  nervous  organism  badly 
adjusted  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  brain-cells  of  the  latter 
perhaps  force  the  movements  of  mankind  into  new  paths? 
It  may  have  been  rightly  said  that  the  world  of  antiquity 
collapsed  just  because  the  best  part  became  eliminated  by  the 
partisan  fights,  by  persecutions,  by  death  punishments,  and 
by  asceticism.  But  the  question  who  were  the  best  can  be 
decided  only  if  we  already  see  a  line  of  development  towards 
certain  goals  of  civilization.   From  the  standpoint  of  mere 
nature  those  victorious  persecutors  would  have  to  be  counted 
the  better  adjusted  ones  on  account  of  their  victory. 

We  have  no  safer  ground  when  the  naturalists  of  society 
insist  that  their  historical  goal  is  the  purity  of  the  race,  a 
doctrine  which  has  recently  pushed  itself  into  the  foreground. 
It  is  not  essential  that  such  a  race  theory  lacks  every  safe 
foundation,  and  that  the  conception  of  the  pure  race  is  en- 
tirely arbitrary.  The  results  of  linguistics,  of  anatomy,  and 
of  social  psychology  undermine  all  such  speculations.   The 


4 


284 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


decisive  fact  is  rather  that  goals  are  here  prescribed,  the 
evaluation  of  which  can  never  be  found  by  real  naturalistic 
considerations.  The  result  is  reached  merely  by  superficial 
comparisons  with  the  processes  in  breeding.  The  pure  race 
is  a  possible  naturalistic  conception.  The  conception  of  an  ex- 
cellent race  already  points  to  human  purposes  and  transcends 
the  conceptions  of  natural  science.    But  the  chief  question, 
whether  we  are  to  evaluate  as  excellent  in  history  those  traits 
which  are  decisive  for  the  conservation  of  the  pure  races,  can 
be  affirmed  or  denied  only  by  entirely  independent  consid- 
erations.  We  have  no  right  to  decide  beforehand  that  'ex- 
cellence coincides  with  purity.  At  first  we  must  know  what 
excellence  from  a  human  point  of  view  means.  Only  then  can 
we  examine  whether  purity  of  race  or  mixture  of  races  offers 
the  more  favorable  condition  for  the  development  of  such 
excellent  nations.    A  philosophy  of  history  which,  uncon- 
sciously influenced  by  practical  prejudices,  claims  that  the 
cultural  purity  of  society  which  we  call  excellence  demands 
that  natural  purity  of  the  race  which  means  freedom  from 
mixture,  is  merely  based  on  a  confusion.  With  the  same  log- 
ical right  it  might  be  maintained  that  a  morally  pure  painting 
could  be  painted  only  with  chemically  pm-e  colors.    But 
whether  the  purity  of  the  race  or  any  other  naturalistic  con- 
ception is  posited  as  the  standard  of  social  development,  it 
always  remains  a  mixing  of  explanation  and  estimation. 
Fundamentally,  no  problem  of  explanation  can  at  all  touch 
the  problem  of  evaluation.  Hence  it  also  remains  indifferent 
for  the  estimation  of  progress  and  regress  which  factors  were 
most  influential  for  the  historical  occurrences.  The  discussion 
whether  the  masses  or  the  leaders  are  more  responsible  for 
the  changes  of  the  historical  world,  whether  the  surroundings 
of  the  nations  or  their  inherited  disposition  is  most  influen- 
tial, whether  the  economic  conditions  are  fundamental  for 
the  political  and  cultural  events  —  all  these  problems  may 
be  decided  in  the  one  or  the  other  direction  to-day:  they 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


285 


cannot  contribute  anything  as  to  what  is  to  be  estimated  as 
an  upward  or  a  downward  movement.  Wherever  evaluation 
intrudes  into  the  objective  historical  account,  it  is  by  prin- 
ciple no  better  than  the  theories  of  the  old  astronomers  that 
the  stars  moved  in  a  circle  because  a  circle  aesthetically  is  the 
noblest  line. 

Instead  of  all  this,  our  question  must  be  whether  in  the 
social  historical  life  any  one  goal  must  be  necessarily  con- 
ceived as  belonging  to  the  reality  of  mankind.  Only  if  our 
demand  for  a  self -asserting  world  involves  the  postulate  of  a 
certain  will  in  mankind  must  every  fulfilment  of  such  a  will 
be  acknowledged  as  valuable.  Here  again  it  is  not  a  question 
of  a  psychological  discovery.  The  community  has  not  the  will 
to  a  certain  goal  as  a  conscious  idea  in  itself,  nor  may  we  in 
apperceiving  the  community  have  such  an  aim  in  clear  con- 
sciousness. The  question  is  only:  What  must  we  logically 
will  and  maintain  as  the  purpose  of  the  community,  if  we  are 
to  raise  the  experience  of  a  fellow-world  at  all  to  a  reality 
with  independent  meaning  ?  We  may  approach  an  answer 
to  this  question  by  the  following  considerations.  The  human 
beings  do  not  interest  us  here  with  reference  to  their  individ- 
ual inner  world,  but  as  parts  of  a  fellow-world,  that  is,  as  be- 
ings who  have  relation  to  each  other.  The  fellow-world  can 
have  meaning  only  in  so  far  as  the  members  are  related  to 
each  other.  We  have  to  abstract,  therefore,  from  the  indi- 
viduals in  so  far  as  they  express  their  own  desires.  Only  their 
mutual  relations  and  their  common  purposes  enter  into  the 
community  as  such.  Now  we  demand  that  such  a  community 
shall  have  its  own  purpose  by  which  it  asserts  itself  as  self- 
dependent.  That  can  mean  only  that  the  members  of  the 
community  are  to  reach  a  common  will  by  which  the  com- 
munity as  such  is  upheld  and  asserted.  This  is  secured  the 
more  fully  the  more  every  single  member  in  his  will  repre- 
sents the  standpoint  of  the  whole  group. 
The  inner  life  of  the  individual  remains  untouched  by  that. 


286  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

In  the  community  every  individual  expresses  his  belonging 
to  the  group  the  more  clearly  the  more  he  detaches  his  will 
from  his  individual  desire  and  emphasizes  in  himself  the  com- 
mon will.  Such  a  group  may  be  a  pair,  or  a  family,  or  a  city, 
or  a  profession,  or  a  church,  or  a  nation,  or  a  concert  of  na- 
tions, or  all  the  men  of  to-day,  or  the  whole  history  of  man- 
kind.   That  does  not  indicate  at  all  that  every  one  in  the 
circle  has  to  fulfil  an  equal  task.  We  do  not  speak  of  lack  of 
discrimination.  If  we  play  a  game  of  chess,  I  may  take  care 
of  the  black  men  and  my  opponent  of  the  white,  but  the  rules 
of  the  game  must  be  willed  by  us  in  common,  and  the  proced- 
ure of  the  game  in  accordance  with  the  rules  must  be  equally 
important  to  both  of  us.  If  I  protect  my  king  and  attack  his 
king,  my  opponent  wills  with  me  and  I  do  not  by  it  one- 
sidedly  attack  the  standpoint  of  our  whole  little  group.  My 
opponent  and  I  will  the  same.  If  instead  I  were  to  will  that 
I  win  at  any  price,  even  if  I  am  the  worse  player,  I  contradict 
the  will  of  the  group.  The  group  willed  that  the  better  player 
win.  Thus  the  manifoldness  of  the  individual  will-act  in  no 
way  suffers  by  subordinating  the  individual  will  to  the  larger 
will-structure  of  the  group.   The  community  has  found  its 
ideal  form  only  when  each  one  considers  his  particular  task 
from  a  standpoint  which  is  equally  given  for  every  other 
member  of  the  community.  Not  only  many  heads  but  many 
tasks  compose  the  life  of  a  nation,  but  the  national  standpoint 
can  and  ought  to  be  the  same  for  every  one  in  his  task.  With- 
out such  a  postulate  the  particular  group  has  lost  its  self- 
dependent  meaning. 

Even  from  here  we  can  see  the  values  of  development.  We 
claim  that  we  cannot  think  a  group  otherwise  than  as  filled  by 
the  desire  that  each  member  give  up  for  his  will  the  merely 
individual  standpoint  and  take  the  standpoint  of  the  group. 
Every  transition  to  the  fuller  realization  of  this  demand  must 
therefore  be  a  pure  value.  We  say  every  transition,  not  the 
final  end  of  it.  Value  always  belongs  only  to  the  fulfilment  of 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


287 


the  will.  The  group  which  wills  such  a  transformation  of  its 
members  produces  a  value  in  satisf3dng  this  will  for  becoming 
a  true  group.  But  as  soon  as  the  satisfaction  is  reached,  the 
will  fulfilled,  the  development  perfected,  then  simply  a  certain 
state  of  society  is  given  in  which  there  is  no  longer  anjrthing 
to  be  fulfilled  and  to  be  developed,  and  where  therefore  no 
value  is  to  be  estimated.  The  movement  towards  the  goal  is 
the  only  valuable  factor.  The  goal  itself  may  be  entirely  in- 
different. We  must  never  forget  that  an  absolute  value  may 
always  belong  to  something  which  in  another  direction  may 
be  unimportant  and  trivial  and  indifferent.  The  silly  judg- 
ment that  two  times  two  is  not  three  hundred  is  as  true 
as  the  most  valid  mathematical  discovery.  In  this  way  the 
development  of  a  group  may  be  valuable  as  a  development 
even  if  that  which  is  finally  developed  is  only  a  superfluous 
association,  or  a  dangerous  party,  or  a  selfish  nation.  If  we 
consider  that  particular  community  at  all  as  a  self-dependent 
group,  we  must  necessarily  conceive  for  it  the  goal  that  every 
member  is  to  take  the  over-personal  group  standpoint,  and 
every  change  in  the  direction  towards  this  goal  then  must  'be 
a  satisfaction  of  our  objective  sympathizing  will. 

Nevertheless,  we  can  at  once  go  beyond  this  point.  We  do 
not  give  any  interest  to  the  unlimited  number  of  silly  and 
unfertile  judgments  which  at  any  time  can  be  asserted  with 
full  logical  value  of  truth ;  we  maintain  only  those  which  may 
enter  with  a  certain  significance  into  wider  connections  of 
thought.  In  the  same  way  we  subordinate  the  many  possible 
values  of  development  to  larger  and  wider  connections  of 
progress.  That  does  not  mean  that  the  narrower  group  ought 
to  disappear  in  the  wider  one,  perhaps  the  townships  in  the 
states  or  the  states  in  a  colorless  mankind.  On  the  contrary, 
every  development  demands  manifoldness.  But  we  cannot 
really  hold  in  our  own  participating  will  the  goal  of  a  group  if 
a  more  important  will  in  us  is  directed  against  it.  In  itself  we 
can  grasp  the  community  goal  of  a  gang  of  thieves  as  well  as 


ii 


M 


288 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


289 


that  of  an  academy  of  philosophers.  Yet  if  we  cannot  really 
will  with  them,  the  transition  towards  that  goal  cannot  be  felt 
as  a  fulfilment  of  an  over-personal  will,  and  the  character  of  a 
pure  value  is  then  lost.  In  this  way  every  social  development 
must  refer  to  a  more  fundamental  purpose  and  ultimately 
to  a  last  goal.  This  ultimate  end  is  evidently  the  pure  abso- 
lutely over-personal  standpoint,  which  does  not  belong  to  the 
individual  as  member  of  a  particular  group,  but  which  belongs 
to  every  thinkable  subject  as  such.  Each  individual  is  to  aim 
towards  a  standpoint  at  which  he  shares  the  pure  over- 
personal  will,  as  this  will  only  characterizes  every  subject  as 
belonging  to  the  community  of  those  who  will  a  world  at  all. 
The  ultimate  controlling  goal  of  the  human  commimity  is 
thus  a  transition  towards  a  standpoint  at  which  every  indi- 
vidual wills  in  accordance  with  the  over-personal  will,  that  is, 
with  the  pure  valuation.  Whatever  moves  towards  this  goal 
is  pure  progress;  whatever  moves  away  from  this  goal  is 
regress. 

In  this  way  alone  every  single  formation  of  groups  and 
development  of  communities  receives  its  own  definite  place 
in  the  valuable  totality.  The  community  which  has  reached 
its  own  goal  now  has  no  longer  simply  reached  an  indifferent 
state  of  society,  but  its  own  completeness  becomes  a  step  in 
the  development  towards  the  absolute  aim  of  the  human 
totality.  A  higher  goal  cannot  exist,  nor  yet  a  coordinated 
one.  It  is  the  one  goal  which  is  unattainable,  but  which  is 
fimdamentally  necessary.  Without  it  we  cannot  think  the 
fellow-world  in  its  totality.  Every  individual  as  member  of 
the  fellow-world  ought  to  become  a  subject  of  pure  valuation. 
Such  valuations  are  many.  Some  of  them,  the  values  of 
knowledge  and  of  unity  and  of  beauty,  we  have  discussed, 
others,  such  as  the  values  of  law  and  industry  and  of  morality 
and  of  religion,  will  interest  us  later.  In  every  one  of  these 
directions  a  true  development  can  go  on.  We  have  a  real 
progress  which  is  absolutely  valuable  in  itself  wherever  the 


understanding  of  things  is  carried  forward  to  its  truth,  where 
the  perception  is  raised  to  its  beauty,  where  unity  and  love 
and  harmony  are  propagated,  where  nature  is  remodelled  to 
economic  values  of  industry,  where  human  instincts  are 
ordered  by  law,  where  morality  is  victorious  in  the  inner  world, 
where  belief  grows  towards  true  religion.  On  the  other  hand, 
wherever  beauty  is  torn  down  to  the  level  of  mere  enjoyment, 
where  the  understanding  of  things  is  ruined  by  cutting  off 
the  connections  with  the  totality,  where  discord  and  misery 
are  spread,  where  the  common  tasks  are  ruled  from  a  selfish 
standpoint,  where  economy  becomes  a  short-sighted  utiliza- 
tion and  political  life  becomes  a  one-sided  misuse  of  power, 
where  morality  becomes  cunning  and  religion  becomes  selfish 
superstition,  there  mankind  sinks  down,  even  when  it  boasts 
of  the  shining  means  of  daring  civilization. 

Consequently  we  have  no  right  to  seek  a  definite  order 
of  stages,  perhaps  from  uncivilization  to  half -civilization  and 
from  half-civilization  to  civilization,  or,  as  positivism  liked 
to  formulate  it,  from  a  theological  thinking  to  a  metaphysical 
thinking  and  finally  to  a  positivistic  thinking.  In  the  same 
way  all  those  interpretations  which  refer  the  progress  of 
mankind  to  a  goal  which  lies  beyond  possible  experience  are 
excluded  for  us.  In  the  midst  of  a  religion  there  may  arise 
the  reference  of  mankind  to  a  holy  last  judgment,  but  this 
religion  itself  first  has  to  demonstrate  itself  as  a  valuable  part 
of  human  development.  The  examination  of  a  social  value  of 
progress  must  not  lead  beyond  our  world  of  possible  experi- 
ence. On  the  other  hand,  we  must  acknowledge  such  pro- 
gress wherever  in  the  midst  of  experience  the  transition 
leads  towards  the  standpoint  of  pure  valuation.  Progress  is 
therefore  possible  even  on  the  lowest  level  of  society,  and 
even  the  richest  and  most  complex  society  may  move  back- 
ward. Moreover,  the  manifoldness  of  possible  valuations  may 
bring  it  about  that  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  social 
organism  progress,  standstill  and  regress  may  exist.    The 


290 


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THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


291 


religious  consciousness  of  a  nation  may  raise  itself  in  a  glori- 
ous development  to  a  standpoint  of  pure  valuation,  and  yet 
its  scientific  recognition  of  truth  may  be  of  the  lowest  order. 
The  valuation  of  beauty  may  be  lifted  up  to  splendid  heights, 
and  yet  the  moral  valuation  may  be  declining.  Nobody 
would  take  the  philosophy  of  India,  the  art  of  China,  the 
religion  of  Palestine,  the  literature  of  Greece,  the  law  of 
Rome,  as  standards  for  judging  the  total  development  of  those 
nations. 

It  would  have  to  be  examined  whether  it  is  possible  any- 
how for  every  kind  of  pure  valuation  to  find  its  full  develop- 
ment simultaneously  with  every  other.  It  may  be  that  the 
one  inhibits  the  other,  and  that  therefore  an  historical  division 
of  labor  may  be  necessary.  In  the  primeval  forest  there  may 
be  a  progress  in  a  certain  direction  which  far  surpasses  the 
moral  depravity  in  many  electrically  illuminated  metropolitan 
streets.  And  all  that  repeats  itself  in  narrower  and  narrower 
circles.  In  the  midst  of  a  single  nation  or  a  single  community 
or  a  single  group,  the  progress  in  one  direction  may  go  on  at 
one  place  while  the  progress  in  other  directions  may  find  its 
best  energies  somewhere  else.  It  can  hardly  be  expected,  for 
instance,  that  religiousness  and  morality  find  their  strongest 
development  in  those  spheres  of  the  state  which  are  devoted 
most  eagerly  to  the  raising  of  the  economic  or  of  the  artistic 
life.  Progress  in  the  endless  manifoldness  of  life  does  not 
know  simply  a  general  yes  or  no.  Everywhere  there  is  an 
unlimited  play  of  movements  upward  and  downward.  And 
yet  of  course  it  remains  true  that  in  the  history  of  all  mankind 
the  civilized  nations  represent  a  higher  stage  of  development 
than  the  uncivilized,  and  that  between  these  extreme  con- 
trasts many  intermediate  stages  of  half-civilization  can  be 
discriminated.  It  may  be  left  doubtful  whether  every  people 
can  climb  up  from  step  to  step  by  its  own  energy,  whether  the 
so-called  half -civilizations  can  be  transformed  at  all  into  full 
civilizations,  or  whether  the  world  of  history  has  to  make 


new  and  ever  new  independent  starts  to  lead  to  the  richest 
developments.  The  decisive  factor  remains  that  in  the  sphere 
of  civilization,  we  find  raised  to  the  height  of  over-personal 
pure  valuation  that  which  in  the  uncivilized  circle  results 
still  essentially  from  a  mere  personal  individual  standpoint. 

That  is  not  contradicted  by  the  fact  that,  just  on  the  low 
level,  life  goes  on  in  such  pattern-like  way  that  every  one  ap- 
pears like  his  neighbor,  while  only  in  the  sunlight  of  highest 
culture  the  finest  flower  of  individuality  comes  to  develop- 
ment. To  be  pattern-like  does  not  mean  to  be  over-personal, 
but  rather  under-personal,  and  to  show  the  flavor  of  person- 
ality in  the  life-functions  does  not  mean  to  be  selfish.  That 
which  really  characterizes  the  antithesis  is  rather  the  instinct- 
ive, the  accidental,  the  desultory,  the  immediate  element  in 
the  life  of  the  savages  in  contrast  to  civilization.  There  pas- 
sion is  dominant,  here  discretion ;  there  the  instinctive  reac- 
tion and  here  the  careful  planning  of  the  deed ;  and  all  this 
evidently  lies  on  the  way  from  the  haphazard  personal  will 
to  the  over-personal  group-will,  and  finally  to  the  absolutely 
valid  valuation.  It  is  this  transition  which  leads  slowly 
from  the  mere  sensuous  perception  of  the  things  among  the 
lower  races  to  a  conceptional  apprehension,  and  ultimately  to 
a  firmly  formed  science  which  is  valid  for  everybody.  In  the 
same  way  the  original  naive  haphazard  life  which  does  not 
take  care  for  the  next  day  is  slowly  transformed  into  the 
serious  responsible  maturity  of  society  which  demands  sacri- 
fice in  the  service  of  a  coming  generation.  In  the  same  way 
the  unsteady  activity  which  is  moved  by  every  external 
impulse  goes  over  into  the  steady  work  of  the  nation  which  is 
anchored  in  the  traditions  of  the  past  and  in  the  consciousness 
of  ideal  goals.  In  the  same  way  the  selfish  laziness  changes 
into  respect  for  labor  and  for  creative  work.  Everywhere  it  is 
the  ascent  from  the  personal  to  that  which  has  common 
validity,  from  the  individual  will  to  the  pure  valuation. 

Of  covirse  the  movement  itself  must  be  influenced  by  the 


1,  ♦; 


^. 


292 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


particular  dispositions,  means,  starting-points,  and  inclina- 
tions.  It  is  meaningless  to  discuss  whether  to-day  perhaps 
one  or  another  civilized  nation  stands  higher.  There  are  dif- 
ferent foundations  and  different  chief  accents.  Inclination  to 
mathematics  and  natural  science  may  not  go  together  with 
inclination  for  history,  nor  talent  for  fine  arts  with  talent  for 
music.    Especially  significant  differences  may  show  them- 
selves in  the  will  to  action.  The  will  may  realize  itself  more 
with  reference  to  the  outer  world,  or  more  with  reference  to 
the  fellow-world,  or  more  with  reference  to  the  inner  world. 
In  this  way  there  must  result  three  fundamental  types  which 
may  come  together  even  in  the  narrowest  circle.  But  those 
three  types  determine  in  the  same  way  the  large  parties  and 
divisions  in  the  land,  and  finally  whole  nations  and  groups  of 
nations.  Even  in  the  most  primitive  societies  these  three  con- 
trasts must  exist,  and  therefore  do  not  at  all  represent  dif- 
ferent stages  of  civilization,  but  coordinated  traits.  Each 
of  the  three  may  be  maintained  from  personal  savagery  up 
to  the  highest  level  of  over-personal  fully  civilized  valuation. 
These  three  groups  are  those  of  the  laborers  who  shape  the 
outer  world,  the  warriors  who  deal  with  the  fellow-world,  and 
the  thinkers,  poets,  and  priests  who  give  expression  to  the 
inner  world.  The  first  group  is  controlled  by  attention,  the 
second  by  will,  the  last  by  imderstanding  and  feeling.  Trad- 
ing, fighting,  and  religious  tribes  have  existed  at  all  times, 
just  as  there  exist  in  every  state  unpolitical  groups,  con- 
servative groups,  and  liberal  groups.    The  first  must  put 
chief  emphasis  on  effort,  the  second  on  loyalty,  the  third 
on  justice.   The  first  aims  towards  an  increasing  mastery 
over  nature,  the  second  strives  for  the  power  of  the  nation, 
the  third  for  its  moral  and  cultural  development.  In  this  way 
we  also  still  find  to-day  civilized  nations  which  work  towards 
the  highest  possible  achievement,  others  which  see  their  aim 
in  the  most  perfect  development  of  their  state  organization, 
and  others  which  recognize  their  task  in  the  freest  possible 


THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


293 


initiative  of  every  individual.  One  does  not  stand  higher  than 
another,  and  each  moves  on  the  path  of  pure  development 
as  far  as  in  its  particular  kind  of  will  it  approaches  the  stand- 
point of  the  over-personal  subject.  On  the  other  hand,  each 
of  the  three  types  can  also  enter  into  regress.  The  power  may 
be  misused  and  dragged  down  to  personal  spheres,  and  in- 
dustry and  energy  and  liberty  may  be  put  into  the  service  of 
selfish  arbitrariness  and  mere  enjoyment. 

It  is  nevertheless  not  by  chance  that  in  this  endless  play  of 
numberless  forward  and  backward  movements  the  conviction 
stands  firm  that  the  general  movement  is  an  insistent  pro- 
gress, and  that  every  regress  is  overcome  by  a  reenforced 
development.  If  that  were  not  so,  the  growth  and  disappear- 
ance of  the  cultural  values  of  mankind  would  be  simply  like 
the  growth  and  disappearance  of  the  flowers  in  the  field. 
Instead  of  an  education  of  humanity  to  a  higher  and  higher 
aim,  we  should  see  only  a  planless  up  and  down.  Every  in- 
dividual life  would  then  ultimately  be  meaningless,  and  it 
would  be  meaningless  to  serve  a  party,  a  profession,  a  nation, 
and  mankind,  inasmuch  as  we  serve  them  in  order  to  fulfil 
their  meaning.  But  that  cannot  be,  because,  as  we  saw,  pro- 
gress always  leads  from  the  personal  to  the  over-personal, 
regress  from  the  over-personal  to  the  personal.  The  over- 
personal,  just  because  it  does  not  refer  to  one  or  another 
chance  individual,  figures  as  an  incomparably  greater  power 
of  self -conservation  and  impressiveness.  The  personal  has 
a  haphazard  character ;  it  is  carried  only  by  the  single  will,  it 
has  no  strength  to  propagate  itself  and  to  suggest  itself  to  the 
neighbor  and  to  the  fellow-world.  All  progress  therefore  leads 
to  something  which  in  itself  has  the  strength  to  hold  its  own, 
all  regress  leads  to  something  which  must  soon  disappear 
again  because  it  has  no  strength  of  propagation  as  it  is  a 
merely  individual  affau-.  The  outcome  of  the  whole  interplay 
of  progressive  and  regressive  movements  must  therefore  be 
after  all  increase  in  the  power  of  progress.  The  regress  is 


V 


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THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


295 


ultimately  always  only  an  individual  personal  desertion  from 
values.    Progress,  on  the  other  hand,  creates  new  values 
which  propagate  beyond  the  creator,  and  which  are  gained 
for  the  community,  never  to  be  lost.  If  a  new  truth  is  dis- 
covered, others  may  come  who  leave  it  unnoticed  and  go 
backward,  but  the  discovery  itself  is  gained,  and  will  touch 
other  souls  which  can  rise  to  the  understanding  of  that  value. 
If  high  art  has  found  the  perfect  expression  of  unity  for  a 
piece  of  the  world,  its  beauty  may  become  for  a  declining  time 
a  mere  low  enjoyment  of  the  senses,  but  others  will  come  who 
will  be  overwhelmed  by  the  power  of  this  unity  and  who  will 
rise  to  the  apprehension  of  this  over-personal  value.   The 
same  holds  in  a  similar  way  for  law  and  morality,  for  economy 
and  state,  for  religion  and  philosophy.    The  regress  there 
always  has  something  chance-like  and  can  be  eliminated :  the 
progress  always  has  an  element  of  indestructibility  because 
all  progress  creates  values  which  as  such  hold  for  every  one 
at  any  place  and  at  any  time.  The  sand  of  the  deserts  may 
cover  old  civilizations,  but  their  inmost  spirit  must  always  be 
left  to  the  great  forward  movement  of  history.    Only  the 
externals  crumbled  when  their  time  had  passed.   This  pro- 
gress can  never  reach  an  end.  Every  new  value  opens  new 
tasks  which  at  first  appeal  to  the  personal  will,  and  only  in 
the  struggles  of  history  can  be  led  towards  an  over-personal 
solution.  Every  pure  value  is  complete  in  itself,  and  yet  in 
the  evaluating  subject  every  new  value  posits  a  new  situation 
of  will  which  demands  a  new  equilibrium  and  which  therefore 
leads  beyond  itself.  In  this  way  not  only  the  ultimate  goal 
of  the  progress  of  mankind  is  an  endlessly  unattainable  ideal, 
but  each  partial  development,  too,  carries  in  itself  infinite 
opportimities. 

C.  —  SELF-DEVELOPMENT 

The  inner  world,  too,  knows  its  otherness  and  the  disap- 
pearance of  that  which  is  given.  We  have  discussed  the  log- 


ically valuable  self -conservation  of  the  inner  world ;  it  gave  us 
the  connections  of  reason.  We  further  considered  the  given 
experiences  of  the  inner  world  with  reference  to  their  unity; 
there  we  found  the  aesthetic  value  of  happiness.  Now  we 
stand  before  the  self  which  is  to  shape  its  experiences :  when  is 
the  change  in  the  inner  world  and  its  becoming  absolutely 
valuable  and  accordingly  a  true  development?  But  we  must 
emphasize  at  once  one  point  which  will  be  of  decisive  import- 
ance for  us  later.  The  valuable  self-realization  is  at  first  not 
at  all  morally  valuable.  The  conception  of  morality  must  be 
held  back  for  that  cultural  value  in  which  the  valuable  self- 
realization  becomes  a  conscious  goal,  and  in  which  accord- 
ingly the  deed  becomes  a  real  achievement.  At  first  the  self- 
development  is  a  pure  value  of  naive  life  and  no  purposive 
deed  of  civilization.  It  develops  itself  with  reference  to  pur- 
posive tasks,  but  however  manifold  the  goals  may  be,  the  pur- 
posive raising  of  the  own  self  to  become  a  value  is  at  first  not 
itself  one  of  the  goals.  As  soon  as  we  proceed  to  the  value  of 
morality,  we  shall  recognize  the  opposite.  The  valuable  self- 
realization  then  becomes  the  conscious  purpose. 

The  way  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  naive  life-value  of 
self-development  lies  clear  before  us.  All  shaping  of  our  inner 
world  must  be  a  transition  from  that  which  is  given  to  that 
which  is  not  yet  given.  This  transition  must  be  valuable  if 
it  fulfils  a  will  which  is  necessarily  involved  in  that  which  is 
given.  If  our  conscious  inner  experience  is  of  such  a  kind  that 
we  cannot  conceive  it  at  all  otherwise  than  with  a  certain 
will  which  we  acknowledge  without  reference  to  our  individ- 
ual desires,  the  fulfilment  must  satisfy  us  in  an  over-personal 
way  and  yield  us  an  absolute  value.  But  we  know  already  the 
will  which  necessarily  belongs  to  every  inner  world  which  is  to 
be  acknowledged  as  such.  It  is  the  one  will  which  we  recog- 
nized as  the  fundamental  will  of  our  personality,  the  will  that 
our  inner  experience  is  not  only  a  dream,  but  has  its  self- 
asserting  reality  and  thus  belongs  to  a  real  world.  Our  own 


U 


296 


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THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


297 


or  any  other  self,  which  as  an  "  T'  stands  as  against  a  "  thou," 
is  to  be  more  than  a  haphazard  piece  of  mere  experience, 
and  is  to  have  an  independent  significance  and  meaning.  The 
true  question  is  then :  If  the  self  is  to  have  an  own  meaning, 
what  is  the  not-given  towards  which  the  given  self -experi- 
ence necessarily  aims  —  aims  as  the  blossom  in  nature  aims 
towards  the  fruit,  as  uncivilization  in  mankind  aims  towards 

civilization? 

But  we  must  keep  clearly  in  mind  what  that  I  really  is 
whose  possible  progress  and  regress  comes  in  question.  That 
I  is  certainly  not  the  whole  content  of  consciousness  in  a 
psychological  sense.  The  idea  of  the  outer  world  and  the  de- 
mand of  the  fellow-world  are  enclosed  in  that  psychological 
mental  experience  just  as  much  as  the  perception  of  the  self. 
The  I  of  which  we  are  speaking  can  be  only  that  will  by  which 
we  take  attitudes.  The  aim  for  the  transitions  of  this  I  can 
always  be  only  again  a  new  will.  The  given  will  may  be  di- 
rected towards  a  content  which  is  not  yet  given,  but  the  real- 
ization of  that  content  and  the  arising  of  pleasure  do  not 
change  the  I  and  do  not  bring  it  forward  or  backward.  By 
the  fulfilment  of  a  will  which  is  directed  towards  a  content, 
the  I  becomes  neither  expanded  nor  reenforced.  That  which 
the  self  must  will  in  order  to  affirm  by  the  fulfilment  of  this 
will  its  own  meaning  must  therefore  necessarily  refer  to  its 
own  willing.  That  means  the  self  wills  to  develop  its  own  will- 
ing, wills  to  unfold  and  strengthen  its  own  volitions,  and 
yet  always  remain  in  unity  with  itself. 

This  is  indeed  the  only  possible  change  in  the  I  which  can  be 
valuable,  because  it  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  only  possible  plan 
by  which  the  I  can  get  self-dependent  meaning.  If  it  does  not 
will  to  remain  in  unity  with  itself,  if  it  wills  that  its  own  voli- 
tions are  no  unfoldings  and  reinforcements  of  the  experienced 
own  will,  it  ceases  to  be  a  self  and  becomes  a  meaningless 
series.  If  the  I  is  to  be  conceived  with  reference  to  its  own 
valuable  changes,  the  unfolding  of  the  will  which  remains 


loyal  to  itself  is  the  only  possible  goal  for  it,  and  only  a  transi- 
tion in  this  direction  can  have  the  value  of  development.  We 
must  again  separate  the  different  stages  as  we  did  in  the  social 
development.  The  first  demand  will  be  that  the  single  voli- 
tions which  compose  the  work  of  our  day  shall  not  be  in  con- 
tradiction to  each  other.  The  self  develops  itself  in  every  new 
deed  to  new  volitions  which  are  in  harmony  with  the  given 
ones,  and  manifests  the  purpose  of  the  given  I  by  new  ex- 
pressions. If  we  were  to  classify  the  millionfold  will-efforts, 
we  should  say  that  here  belongs  everything  which  results 
from  patience  and  assiduity  and  eagerness,  from  self-mod- 
eration and  courage.  Everywhere  the  old  will  becomes  un- 
folded and  carried  out  in  new  volitions  which  have  the  same 
tendencies  and  direction.  In  another  way  the  same  end  is 
reached  by  modesty,  by  contentment,  by  humbleness  of 
mind.  They  can  make  the  will  remain  in  unity  with  itself  be- 
cause from  the  start  they  do  not  allow  the  will  to  turn  to  the 
unattainable.  But  we  emphasized  that,  in  all  this,  no  virtue, 
no  duty,  no  conscience,  no  obligation,  no  morality,  is  in 
question,  but  only  a  choice  according  to  free  inclination.  To 
be  contented  and  assiduous  and  brave  and  industrious  are 
qualities  which  the  individual  develops  in  his  inner  world  in 
accordance  with  his  disposition.  They  are  given  not  other- 
wise than  artistic  talent  or  mathematical  faculties,  a  gay 
mood  or  a  loving  heart.  He  who  is  industrious  by  nature 
does  not  constantly  have  to  fight  against  his  laziness  by  a 
moral  achievement;  he  who  is  frugal  does  not  struggle  in 
moral  strife  with  avarice;  the  courageous  man  goes  bravely 
on  his  way  without  being  at  all  tempted  by  cowardice. 

The  same  holds  true  for  all  the  inclinations  and  tendencies 
in  which  the  new  will  remains  not  only  in  unity  with  the  orig- 
inal,, but  unfolds  it  with  reenforced  energy.  The  desire  for 
higher  culture,  for  solid  achievement,  for  creative  deeds  be- 
longs here.  The  whole  personality  comes  to  richer  expression, 
and  yet  it  always  remains  only  a  joyful  self-realization  which 


I 


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THE  VALUES  OF  DEVELOPMENT 


299 


cannot  expect  any  special  estimation  of  such  achievement. 
But  the  new  must  always  really  lie  in  the  plan  of  the  old  if  we 
are  to  recognize  the  development  as  such  at  all.  If  rich  know- 
ledge should  sink  into  our  mind  as  in  a  dream,  so  that  we 
could  suddenly  and  without  mediation  take  attitude  towards 
the  whole  world,  or  if  a  sublime  artistic  work  could  be  created 
by  us  without  any  previous  inclination  on  our  part  to  such 
artistic  rendering,  the  transition  would  have  no  value  of 
development.  It  would  not  be  a  becoming,  not  a  progress, 
but  a  sudden  disappearance  of  one  state  in  favor  of  an  un- 
prepared other  state.  We  ourselves  are  growing  in  our  edu- 
cation and  culture  because  the  expanded  mental  horizon 
grew  before  our  eyes,  and  the  new  attitude  is  felt  by  us  as 
a  development  of  the  preceding  tentative  apprehension.  The 
artistic  deed  is  ours  not  because  we  know  and  could  explain 
how  we  have  performed  it,  but  because  it  is  an  expression  of 
our  leaning  and  of  our  intentions.  Self -conservation,  self- 
realization,  self-reenforcement,  must  set  in,  in  order  that 
transition  from  the  given  to  the  new  volition  may  become  a 
true  progress  for  the  inner  world.  Every  counter-movement, 
then,  signifies  regress.  If  the  will  is  lost  because  we  are  lazy 
or  cowardly  or  without  patience,  if  the  power  is  wasted  and 
the  interest  wanders  fugitively  from  one  thing  to  the  other, 
if  the  faculties  are  unused,  and  if  high  plans  are  crumbling 
and  the  self  stands  before  the  world  without  task,  then  the 
value  of  self-development  is  sacrificed. 

Yet  this  practical  realization  of  the  intended  volition  repre- 
sents after  all  only  the  first  step  of  the  valuable  self -develop- 
ment. A  contemptible  inclination  and  even  a  criminal  voli- 
tion may  also  grow  in  us  and  the  superficial  conditions  of  a 
valuable  development  then  seem  fulfilled  too.  But  it  is  quite 
different.  The  growth  and  change  were  really  valuable  for  us 
only  when  they  were  the  fulfilment  of  an  intention  which  we 
willed  and  felt  as  necessary  when  we  apperceived  the  self. 
The  criminal  volition  may  grow,  but  we  cannot  apperceive 


a  self  in  such  a  way  that  the  growth  of  the  destroying  will 
itself  becomes  aim  of  the  volition.  We  cannot  apperceive 
it  in  this  way  because  such  an  intention  would  be  inhibited 
by  that  reasonable  fundamental  will  which  we  recognized 
in  the  deepest  layer  of  every  human  soul,  inasmuch  as  it 
made  the  man  a  man.  We  cannot  conceive  a  self  otherwise 
than  as  having  the  will  for  a  self -asserting  world  at  its  deepest 
bottom,  and  that  means  that  it  really  wills  that  which  is 
absolutely  valuable.  That  involves  that  if  the  subject  should 
be  able  to  unfold  himself  fully,  he  could  not  have  satisfaction 
in  the  error,  in  the  ugly,  in  the  discord,  in  the  misery,  in  the 
regress,  in  the  crime,  in  the  sin,  and  his  satisfaction  would 
be  transformed  into  disgust.  We  cannot  conceive  a  subject 
without  this  fundamental  will  to  the  absolute  values,  because 
we  saw  that  this  affirmation  of  the  absolute  values  was  no- 
thing else  but  the  affirmation  of  a  world  which  asserts  itself, 
and  we  cannot  acknowledge  any  subject  as  subject  at  all  who 
does  not  will  to  share  with  us  a  world.  He  becomes  a  subject 
for  us  only  by  affh-ming  the  world,  and  that  means  by  de- 
manding ultimately  absolute  values. 

The  inner  life  which  is  controlled  by  criminal  and  sinful 
will  may  thus  appear  on  the  surface  as  if  it  expressed  the 
meaning  of  its  personality  even  by  reenforcing  the  anti- 
valuable  volitions.  But  the  fact  that  we  must  necessarily 
demand  from  every  subject  who  does  not  become  for  us  an 
irresponsible  insane  person  or  a  beast  the  fundamental  affirma- 
tion of  the  values  makes  such  a  surface  view  impossible.  The 
will  to  the  negation  of  the  values  may  be  felt  and  found  at 
any  time  as  the  particular  state  or  trait  of  an  individual,  but 
can  never  be  understood  as  his  deepest  meaning,  and  its 
fulfilment  and  reenforcement  can  therefore  never  express  the 
self-development  of  the  personality.  The  question  of  what 
in  the  individual  person  has  to  be  conserved  and  to  be  re- 
enforced  in  order  that  his  personal  aim  may  gain  the  pure 
value  of  real  self -development  thus  idtimately  depends  upon 


/ 


300 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


that  general  will  of  reason  without  which  we  cannot  acknow- 
ledge any  subject  as  a  self.  Man  therefore  finds  his  true  value 
of  self-development  only  when  the  particular  will  which 
grows  in  him  is  in  harmony  with  the  ideals  of  his  reason,  that 
is,  with  his  demand  for  the  self-assertion  of  the  world.  And 
this  demand  includes  the  totality  of  the  logical,  aesthetic, 
ethical,  and  metaphysical  values.  To  be  the  bearer  of  these 
values  is  the  noblest  meaning  of  life.  Life  alone  gives  the 
possibility  of  this  self-expression,  this  self-unfolding,  this 
self-reenforcement  through  the  self-directing  will.  To  think 
low  of  life,  to  play  with  life,  or  to  throw  it  away  therefore 
means  negation  of  the  absolutely  valid  value  of  self -develop- 
ment. It  is  characteristic  of  a  low  state  of  society  and  of  low 
character  in  the  personality.  On  the  other  hand,  to  estimate 
the  life  merely  for  its  pleasures'  sake  means  to  draw  it  down 
from  the  height  of  the  over-personal  to  the  chance  life,  which 
is  nothing  but  just  experience.  Only  as  bearer  of  the  develop- 
ment towards  the  pure  valuation,  life's  content  becomes  more 
than  a  personal  experience  and  enjoyment,  becomes  itself 
independent,  self -asserting,  a  value.  Life  and  the  develop- 
ment of  its  energies  to  the  highest  purposes  are  therefore  ab- 
solutely valuable.  And  nothing  is  taken  away  from  this  pure 
value  if  we  must  yet  insist  that  the  mere  ascent  of  life  is  not 
a  value  of  achievement,  and  that  its  endlessly  valuable  self- 
realization  still  remains  outside  of  the  morally  good  and  the 
morally  bad. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 

The  values  of  existence  completed  themselves  in  the  scientific 
values  of  connections,  the  values  of  unity  demanded  their 
elaboration  in  the  values  of  artistic  beauty :  in  the  same  way 
the  values  of  development  must  lead  on  to  the  values  of 
achievement.  In  each  case  the  first  were  given  immediately 
in  naive  life,  the  others  were  created  in  a  conscious  purposive 
effort  of  civilization.  Outer  world,  fellow-world,  and  inner 
world  are  filled  with  the  tendencies  which  lead  them  to  the 
goals  of  development,  but  only  that  intentional  purposive 
elaboration  of  values  which  we  call  civilization  secures  the 
achievements  of  industry,  of  law,  of  morality. 

Development,  too,  as  we  saw,  exists  only  where  a  becoming 
begins  through  a  free  deed.  The  world,  seen  from  the  point  of 
view  of  causal  connection,  knows  changes  but  no  develop- 
ment ;  effects  result,  but  they  are  not  better  than  the  causes. 
Transpositions  as  such  cannot  be  ennobling.  We  often  hear 
the  careless  opprobrium  that  the  great  historians  recognized 
the  "ideas'*  in  the  development  of  the  nations,  but  that  they 
did  not  sufficiently  demonstrate  what  the  causes  of  those 
ideas  were  and  which  effects  came  from  them.  But  that  is  a 
confusion.  When  the  world,  the  social  or  the  natural  one,  is 
considered  causally,  it  is  not  controlled  by  ideas ;  and  when  it 
is  conceived  as  animated  by  ideas,  then  we  have  chosen  a 
standpoint  from  which  the  question  of  causes  and  effects  is  as 
meaningless  as  the  question  of  its  fifth  dimension.  Develop- 
ment in  the  world  is  possible  only  where  there  is  inner  free- 
dom for  the  unfolding  deed.  In  the  causal  system  that  which 


302  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

arises  anew  is  conceived  as  already  completely  determined  in 
the  totality  of  the  given,  and  thus  ultimately  nothing  new. 
Only  from  the  standpoint  of  development  does  the  becoming 
lead  to  something  new  which  is  inaugurated  by  a  free  deed, 
and  which  exists  in  the  given  only  as  a  goal  and  a  purpose. 
In  this  realm  of  freedom  we  saw  the  uncausal  outer  worid 
move  towards  its  goal,  and  we  recognized  that  its  goal  is  its 
suitability  and  efficiency  for  the  purposes  of  man.  In  the  same 
way  we  saw  the  fellow-worid  moving  towards  its  goal  and 
recognized  that  its  only  possible  goal  was  the  over-personal 
generality  of  its  will.  And  finally  we  saw  the  individual  m  its 
inner  worid  move  towards  its  goal,  and  the  goal  was  the  unfold- 
ing of  its  real  will.   All  these  goals  were  necessary  ones.   We 
recognized  that  they  must  be  conceived  as  belonging  to  the 
will  of  those  worids,  if  outer  worid,  fellow-worid,  and  inner 
worid  are  to  have  a  meaning  at  all.  But  because  these  aims 
had  to  be  conceived  as  necessarily  posited  with  the  inde- 
pendent apperception  of  the  worid,  therefore  the  fulfilment 
of  those  purposes  must  be  absolutely  valuable.  This  value  is 
absolute  because  it  must  hold  for  every  one  who  is  to  think 
a  worid  as  such  at  all.    On  the  other  hand,  no  one  can  be 
acknowledged  as  a  subject  who  does  not  agree  in  this  demand 
for  a  self-asserting  worid,  but  who  is  satisfied  with  experi- 
encing it  as  a  dream  and  a  chaos.  It  is  therefore  absolutely 
valuable  that  the  seed  becomes  the  nourishing  fruit,  that  the 
tribe  becomes  a  responsible  nation,  that  the  pupil  becomes 
a  mature  man.  And  yet  this  transition,  however  valuable,  is 
never  consciously  aimed  at  on  account  of  its  value. 

We  cannot  think  the  immature  without  recognizing  the 
aim  towards  maturity  as  its  meaning.  But  the  boy  who 
grows  through  that  valuable  development  and  becomes  a 
unified  personaMty  is  not  himself  moved  by  the  will  to  become 
mature  and  to  pa^  through  an  absolutely  valuable  develop- 
ment. He  simply  has  the  desire  to  unfold  himself.  And  it  is 
the  same  with  the  fellow-worid.   Not  the  development  itself 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


303 


is  intended,  but  the  task  of  the  day.  The  development  comes 
in  this  sense  by  itself  and  unintended.  Only  he  who  evaluates 
the  transition  compares  the  meaning  of  the  beginning  with 
the  final  end,  and  recognizes  in  the  fruit  the  purpose  of  the 
seed  and  in  the  empire  the  aim  of  the  warrior  tribe.  The  own 
value  is  nowhere  at  first  felt  as  a  real  task.  He  who  creates 
evaluates  only  his  work,  but  not  the  creation  of  his  work. 
Development  is  objectively  valuable,  but  for  the  subject  who 
develops  himself,  his  own  state  is  not  in  question  as  a 
value. 

Here  begins  the  new  group  of  cultural  achievements.  The 
task  of  the  development  can  be  secured  and  reenforced  by 
intentional  purposive  effort.  The  natural  progress  of  outer 
world,  fellow-world,  and  inner  world  can  be  protected  against 
inhibition  and  reenforced  against  obstacles  by  the  artificial 
work  which  we  call  civilization.  The  social  group  which  ap- 
proaches its  goal  with  the  own  intention  to  upbuild  values, 
the  individual  who  consciously  works  towards  the  realization 
of  his  ideal  plan  of  self-development,  are  no  longer  chance 
bearers  of  values.  They  really  perform  an  action  in  order  that 
the  value  may  become  realized.  Then  only  we  have  an 
achievement,  then  only  estimation  and  appreciation  are  de- 
manded, then  only  the  self-realization  of  the  world  reaches  its 
highest  goal.  The  situations  in  the  three  large  fields  of  outer 
world,  fellow-world,  and  inner  world  are  here  so  different  that 
it  may  be  more  useful  to  divide  the  consideration  from  the 
start  and  to  follow  up  this  purposive  development  for  the 
three  fields  separately.  But  in  spite  of  this  separation,  the 
fundamental  uniformity  of  all  these  values  of  achievement 
ought  to  appear.  Yes,  just  here  it  may  become  evident  how 
only  the  systematic  deduction  of  the  values  allows  us  to 
recognize  their  mutual  relations.  For  instance,  the  law  of 
the  fellow-world  and  the  morality  of  the  inner  world  offer 
a  similarity  which  is  too  easily  hidden.  At  fu^t  we  have  to 
ask  for  the  purposive  achievement  of  nature. 


I 


ill 


304 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


A.  —  INDUSTRY 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


305 


In  the  philosophical  household,  economy  has  always  been 
the  Cinderella.  When  her  more  fortimate  sisters,  richly 
adorned,  drove  to  the  dance,  she  was  scolded  and  had  to  sit 
at  home  in  the  kitchen.  And  yet  if  the  young  prince  ever  could 
see  her —  It  is  curious  indeed,  and  yet  on  the  other  hand 
easily  understood  how  little  idealistic  philosophy  has  taken 
care  of  economy  and  industry.  Truth  and  beauty,  morality 
and  law  and  religion,  are  eternal  values  which  uplift  strug- 
gling mankind,  but  commerce  and  trade,  manufacturing  and 
consumption,  are  low  functions  which  pull  down  the  human 
soul.  Without  value  in  themselves,  they  are  tolerated  only 
to  satisfy  the  needs  of  man.  The  god  in  man  creates  the  moral 
and  the  true  and  the  beautiful,  but  the  hungry  and  freezing 
animal  in  man  creates  economy,  from  the  harvest  and  the 
chase  of  the  savage  to  the  mills  and  the  stock  exchange  of  a 
tamer  generation.  To  create  pure  values  means  to  lift  one's  self 
above  the  mere  economic  labor,  and  the  philosopher  whose 
eye  turns  to  the  ideals  of  world-development  has  no  reason 
to  waste  his  interest  trading  and  marketing  and  egotistic 
earning.  All  that  has  seemed  such  a  matter  of  course  that 
it  hardly  needed  a  special  argument.  It  seemed  sufficient 
simply  to  banish  the  industrial  life  from  the  realm  of  philo- 
sophy. 

This  scornful  attitude,  of  course,  did  not  exclude  the 
philosopher  of  history  from  always  giving  serious  attention 
to  the  economic  side  of  social  existence.  Often  even  especial 
emphasis  was  put  on  the  economic  foundations  of  the  histor- 
ical development.  The  materialistic  view  of  history  finally 
saw  in  the  industrial  life  not  only  an  important  part,  but  the 
decisive  basis  of  all  social  forms  and  changes.  But  whether 
the  economic  conditions  have  determined  the  historical 
development,  or  whether  the  political,  the  intellectual,  the 
moral  interests,  had  an  equally  strong  influence,  the  ideal 


worthlessness  of  the  economic  factor  is  not  changed  by  that 
in  any  case.  The  realistic  historian  of  civilization  may  con- 
sider the  economic  factors  as  the  essential  ones,  and  may  yet 
estimate  their  intrinsic  value  no  higher  than  the  idealist.  It 
remains  for  him,  too,  merely  the  material  metabolism  of  the 
social  body  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  really  valuable 
mental  life.  The  philosopher  and  the  historian  may  disagree 
as  to  whether  the  mental  goods  have  only  relative  historical 
character,  or  whether  they  have,  as  we  demand,  an  absolute 
value  which  unfolds  itself  in  the  historical  world.  But  they 
are  accustomed  to  agree  that  the  technical  industry  is  not  at 
all  valuable  in  itself,  and  has  only  indirect  value  by  its  relation 
to  the  social,  political,  intellectual,  legal,  and  moral  goods. 
Ultimately  it  all  refers  to  the  fact  that  the  impulse  of  the 
market  is  the  own  selfish  interest.  Such  greediness  of  gain 
represents  almost  a  mental  antithesis  to  the  unselfish  devo- 
tion to  the  eternal  goods.  Everything  which  enters  into  in- 
dustry and  economy  thus  becomes  almost  a  pure  anti-value. 
The  inferiority  of  the  economic  life  has  also  been  recently 
demonstrated  with  emphasis  without  reference  to  those 
mental  motives,  but  rather  with  reference  to  the  character 
of  the  product.  It  has  been  claimed  that  the  value  of  human 
creations  must  be  graded  in  accordance  with  the  influence 
which  they  exert.  The  highest  value  belongs  to  that  which 
has  the  strongest  and  widest  and  most  lasting  importance  for 
the  development  of  mankind.  But  every  human  work  has  the 
more  prospect  of  exerting  influence  beyond  the  space  and 
time  of  its  origin,  the  more  easily  it  can  be  detached  from  the 
conditions  of  its  becoming,  and  that  means  after  all,  the  more 
spiritual  it  is.  Religion  and  philosophy  therefore  represent 
the  highest  values,  and  science  and  art  and  morality  come 
very  near  to  them.  Finally,  state  and  law  and  social  order  are 
found  at  a  considerable  distance  because  they  are  much  less 
fit  to  be  carried  over  to  other  conditions,  and  as  the  last  in  the 
series  there  comes  the  economic  life.  It  belongs  to  the  soil  in 


306 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


307 


which  it  grew;  it  has  in  a  way  low  earthy  character.  The 
peoples  themselves  may  be  graded  thus  in  their  value  for 
civilization.  A  nation  stands  the  higher  the  more  it  has 
created  for  the  spiritual  goods,  and  the  lower  the  more  its 
work  has  been  directed  towards  the  economic  life  only. 

But  can  this  really  be  the  last  word?  It  may  be  doubtful 
anyhow  whether  the  possibility  of  becoming  detached  from 
its  surroundings  is  really  decisive  for  the  lasting  influence  of  a 
cultural  achievement.  But  in  any  case  we  should  have  to  ask 
this  question  only  for  the  inner  meaning  and  content  of  the 
work,  not  for  the  work  in  its  external  characteristics.  Tem- 
ples and  palaces  are  certainly  not  detachable  from  the  soil  on 
which  a  people  has  erected  them,  but  the  style  of  architecture 
which  characterized  such  works  of  stone  may  become  detached 
and  propagated  over  the  globe.  The  Greek  temples  could  not 
be  moved,  but  the  order  of  their  columns  has  wandered 
further  and  has  lasted  longer  than  the  religion  for  the  worship 
of  which  those  temples  had  been  built.  Might  it  not  also  hold 
of  industry  that  its  material  content  may  be  bound  to  the 
soil,  but  its  meaning  and  spirit  may  be  movable,  detachable, 
and  may  exert  influence  at  a  far  distance?  It  would  then  even 
externally  fulfil  the  conditions  which  are  claimed  for  true 
culture.  Is  not  the  spirit  in  which  the  economic  life  is  con- 
ducted as  different  from  tribe  to  tribe,  from  nation  to  nation, 
from  age  to  age,  as  the  spirit  in  which  temples  are  built  and 
scientific  systems  are  created?  Chinese  and  Japanese  art 
stand  much  nearer  to  each  other  than  Japanese  and  Chinese 
business  ideas  and  economic  views.  Romanic  and  Anglo- 
Saxon  economic  life  are  filled  with  an  entirely  different  mean- 
ing. If  we  really  want  to  examine  the  possibility  of  propaga- 
tion, we  certainly  must  ask  how  far  this  characteristic  spirit 
can  become  detached  and  can  realize  itself  in  new  spheres. 

But  with  this  we  have  already  touched  the  point  the  neg- 
lect of  which  has  led  to  such  one-sidedness  in  the  valuation 
of  the  economic  life.   Not  only  the  economic  form  but  the 


inner  spirit  of  the  economic  life  can  be  as  different  as  the  dif- 
ferent stages  of  morality  and  law,  of  science  and  art.  Indus- 
try, too,  can  be  brought  under  an  ideal  aspect,  while  the  only 
view  of  economic  life  which  has  so  far  always  formed  the 
background  of  the  evaluating  history  of  civilization  has  been 
a  low,  almost  a  hostile  one.  How  would  it  have  been  if  the 
philosophy  of  values  had  always  been  treated  only  in  a  puri- 
tanical community,  in  which  the  fine  arts  and  worldly  music 
were  perhaps  counted  as  sins  against  the  demands  of  the 
church,  and  in  the  best  case  as  mere  sensual  enjoyment  of 
the  eyes  and  as  a  low  feast  of  the  ears  ?  Such  a  community 
would  then  take  it  as  self-evident  that  art  only  serves  ego- 
tistic desires  and  has  no  position  in  the  circle  of  the  absolute 
values.  Art  might  then  perhaps  be  placed  even  below  eco- 
nomy, as  the  selfish  desires  for  the  satisfaction  of  economic 
needs  are  at  least  posited  by  nature  itself,  while  the  longing 
for  mere  tickling  of  the  nerves  by  art  is  a  superfluous  aber- 
ration. And  yet  that  would  be  the  same  art  which  by  its 
over-personal  value  of  beauty  forms  the  inexhaustible  enjoy- 
ment of  unpuritanical  mankind. 

May  not  the  work  of  industry  and  economy  to  an  equal 
degree  allow  of  different  interpretations  ?  It  may  be  looked  on 
with  the  narrowness  of  those  who  recognize  there  only  the 
satisfaction  of  low  instincts,  and  it  may  be  considered  with 
the  wide  view  of  those  who  recognize  there  too  a  highest 
absolute  value.  The  philosophy  of  values  has  no  right  simply 
to  accept  that  low  confused  view  in  which  the  pure  valuation 
has  not  found  its  historical  unfolding,  but  has  to  see  the  value 
with  the  eyes  of  those  who  have  the  vision  of  its  over-personal 
content.  It  is  entirely  natural  that  in  philosophy  the  narrow- 
hearted  aspect  of  economic  life  has  prevailed.  The  standard 
of  the  values  was  chosen  by  philosophical  thinkers,  and  yet 
at  all  times  the  spirit  of  scholarly  research  finds  its  best  energy 
in  a  certain  opposition  to  the  impulses  which  control  the  life 
of  the  market.  Let  the  world  all  around  pursue  the  earthly 


^Y 


308 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


309 


treasures ;  the  thinker  follows  the  ideals  of  knowledge  unin- 
fluenced by  gold,  and  he  almost  instinctively  arms  himself 
for  his  calling  by  a  condescending  aspect  towards  lucrative 
labor.  He  may  devote  indefatigable  care  to  the  investigation 
of  economic  facts,  and  yet  while  his  special  calling  is  the  in- 
quiry into  economic  life,  he  may  couple  the  highest  estimation 
of  his  calling  with  the  lowest  estimation  of  its  material.  How- 
ever important  industry  may  appear  to  him,  he  may  yet  con- 
sider it  as  a  low  fxmction  of  life. 

But  if  we  want  to  understand  art,  we  must  see  it  with  the 
eyes  of  the  true  artist.  If  we  want  to  understand  the  economic 
life,  we  must  look  on  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  captain 
of  industry  and  with  the  spirit  of  those  who  have  opened  new 
paths  to  the  economic  life  of  the  nations.  If  we  observe  the 
economic  factors,  wherever  the  commercial  and  industrial 
life  find  their  proudest  development  in  the  various  ages,  we 
must  feel  that  egotistic  greediness  has  been  on  the  whole  only 
the  small  coin  in  the  market,  but  that  all  great  transitions 
and  developments  demanded  very  different  impulses.  To 
create,  and  to  create  with  the  whole  soul  for  that  wonderful 
work  of  the  economic  development  is  the  desire  and  the  am- 
bition of  the  true  worker.  The  gain  is  estimated  because  it 
indicates  that  the  problem  is  solved,  that  the  conquest  is  com- 
pleted, and  that  which  is  earned  is  used  again  for  a  new  pro- 
gress. To  take  part  in  the  work,  to  toil  for  the  enterprise,  is  the 
joy  of  life.  In  pioneer  days  it  comes  to  its  most  enthusiastic 
expression.  Young  and  old,  poor  and  rich,  are  joined  by  the 
one  feeling  that  it  is  a  gigantic  work  which  they  are  to  build 
up  together.  To  open  a  land,  to  make  the  desert  fertile,  to  dig 
out  the  treasures  of  the  soil  and  to  send  the  works  of  industry 
over  the  globe,  to  awaken  in  the  millions  new  and  ever  new 
demands,  to  satisfy  them  in  a  million  ways  —  that  is  an 
inspiration  and  an  ideal  which  stands,  in  the  feeling  of  the 
worker,  not  lower  than  justice  and  freedom  and  truth  and 
morality.  Where  one  blade  grew  and  two  are  now  growing, 


where  one  railroad  track  went  through  the  valley  and  now 
two  are  built,  where  one  chimney  smoked  and  now  a  thousand 
testify  to  useful  labor,  there  an  absolutely  valid  progress  has 
been  secured  by  which  the  world  has  become  more  valuable. 
And  such  a  noble  view  of  economic  life  is  detachable  from 
the  soil  as  well  as  art  and  philosophy ;  it  can  spread  and  has 
always  spread  at  the  periods  of  the  golden  ages  of  industry. 
As  soon  as  the  economic  life  is  penetrated  by  such  enthusiastic 
feeling,  it  is  not  difficult  to  recognize  in  it  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  true  value  which  is  common  to  all  industrial 
activity.  But  then  it  becomes  indifferent  whether  such  an 
absolutely  valuable  process  connects  itself  in  the  practical 
world  with  low  or  with  high  motives,  just  as  the  eternal  value 
of  truth  is  not  touched  by  the  question  whether  the  individual 
misuses  knowledge  for  selfish  ends  or  perhaps  even  for  con- 
temptible purposes.  That  which  stands  for  decision  is  only 
the  problem  whether  the  economic  progress  is  in  itself  a  pure 
value  independent  of  the  question  of  how  far  the  conscious 
appreciation  of  this  value  has  unfolded  itself  in  the  historical 
development  of  society.  But  all  this  connects  the  considera- 
tion of  industry  with  our  study  of  the  values  of  develop- 
ment. 

In  discussing  the  development  of  nature,  we  recognized 
clearly  that  the  nature  of  the  naturalist,  the  nature  of  mathe- 
matical physics,  does  not  know  any  progress,  and  that  its 
transformations  are  without  value.  But  that  did  not  exclude 
the  fact,  as  we  saw  that  the  true  outer  world  has  its  purposes, 
its  aims,  its  values.  We  saw  that  the  outer  world,  in  which 
and  with  which  we  live,  at  first  had  not  entered  into  the 
thought-forms  of  causal  science.  In  the  life-contact  with  the 
willing  man  the  outer  world  is  only  means  and  obstacle  and 
material  for  our  purposes.  A  real  own  meaning  of  nature  only 
shows  when  it  adjusts  itself  to  the  human  purposes,  when  it 
helps  the  purposive  will  of  man,  and  only  the  change  towards 
this  goal  appeared  to  us  as  a  true  growth  and  development. 


310  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

As  soon  as  we  have  liberated  ourselves  from  the  one-sidedness 
of  the  causal  sciences,  —  of  course  without  in  the  least  touch- 
ing by  it  the  unlimited  right  of  the  natural  sciences  in  their 
own  circle,  —  nothing  can  hinder  us  from  proceeding  in 
exactly  the  same  direction  towards  new  values. 

The  true  no-remodelled  nature  wills  to  serve  man  —  not 
man  in  the  petty  personal  selfish  meaning,  but  in  the  abso- 
lutely valid  rational  sense.  The  outer  world  remains  without 
significance  when  this  deepest  relation  to  mankind  is  not 
conceived  with  it,  and  if  instead  of  it  the  world  of  indifferent 
atoms  is  substituted  for  the  world  of  natural  experience.  As 
soon  as  this  direction  of  the  outer  world  is  recognized,  we  see 
the  necessary  goal  of  the  work  of  civilization.  A  conscious 
effort  must  be  made  to  help  nature  in  the  fulfilment  of  its 
intention,  to  secure,  to  reenforce,  and  to  strengthen  without 
limit  the  progress  towards  this  ideal.  That  is  the  meaning  of 
industry  and  economy.  Just  as  the  conscious  labor  of  the 
arts  alone  can  complete  that  aim  of  the  outer  world  towards 
inner  unity  which  manifests  itself  in  the  beauty  of  nature, 
in  the  same  way  the  desire  for  development  in  nature  com- 
pletes itself  only  in  the  industrial  life. 

The  outer  world  aims  to  serve  the  purposes  of  man.  Every 
step  forward  must  therefore  necessarily  be  determined  both 
by  the  given  world  and  by  the  ever  new  human  purposes. 
Both  must  remain  in  steady  correlation.  Economy  is  always 
a  system  of  natural  goods  serving  the  human  community. 
We  do  not  say,  as  it  has  been  said,  that  economy  is  a  human 
community  served  by  a  system  of  natural  goods.  The  differ- 
ence seems  small  and  yet  it  is  fundamental  for  us.  As  soon 
as  only  the  social  community,  with  its  wishes  and  needs  and 
satisfactions,  is  in  question,  everything  moves  in  the  circle 
of  the  merely  historical :  there  are  no  absolute  values.  But  if 
the  goods  themselves,  if  nature  in  its  purposive  adjustment 
is  conceived  as  the  real  content  of  economy,  the  way  is  open 
to  estimate  economy  also  as  pure  value.    The  community 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


311 


which  satisfies  its  hunger  and  protects  itself  against  the  cli- 
mate, or  which,  many  stages  higher,  gathers  together  the 
treasures  of  the  globe  by  steamers  and  railroads  to  enjoy  life, 
fulfils  only  personal  purposes.  But  the  nature  which  nour- 
ishes and  protects  man,  and  in  endless  transformation  distrib- 
utes itself  everywhere  in  order  to  fulfil  the  human  purposes, 
really  offers  an  over-personal  value.  For  those  who  can  see 
the  outer  world  only  through  the  spectacles  of  the  naturalist, 
this  difference  falls  away.  If  nature  is  meaningless  and  dead, 
nature  cannot  have  any  task  and  purpose,  and  only  the  man 
who  uses  nature  can  interest  us.  If  we  start  from  man,  we 
can  have  only  personal  valuations.  But  if  we  start  from 
nature,  we  reach  the  over-personal  value  because  everything 
is  now  based  on  the  fact  that  nature  fulfils  its  only  thinkable 
task.  This  fulfilment  must  satisfy  every  one  who  recognizes 
the  meaning  of  nature  at  all,  and  we  saw  that  every  one  who 
wills  a  world  must  sympathize  with  and  apprehend  this 
intention  of  nature.  As  it  is  the  will  shared  by  every  one 
whom  we  can  acknowledge  as  a  subject  at  all,  its  fulfilment 
has  over-personal  value. 

It  is  the  same  difference  as  that  between  the  merely  agree- 
able and  the  truly  beautiful.  If  it  were  merely  the  satisfaction 
of  the  human  needs  seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  will 
of  man,  every  economic  change  would  be  only  an  effort  for 
the  personal  satisfaction  of  oiu^elves  and  of  our  neighbors. 
But  the  mere  comfort  cannot  be  a  source  of  pure  values,  and 
it  makes  no  difference  whether,  after  the  fashion  of  the  sav- 
ages, the  comfort  is  secured  by  a  few  cocoanuts  picked  from 
the  next  tree,  or  whether  a  hundred  thousand  hands  are 
necessary  to  bring  the  pleasures  of  a  life  of  luxury  to  the  mod- 
ern city  man.  And  where  there  is  no  valid  ideal,  enthusiasm 
has  no  point.  Economic  labor  then  remains  on  that  low  level 
which  is  controlled  by  pleasure  and  pain.  But  everything 
is  changed  at  once  when  the  demand  of  nature  itself  is  in 
question.  Now  it  becomes  a  task  to  awaken  the  slumbering 


¥t 


t 


312  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

desire  in  the  outer  world,  to  lead  nature's  faint  will  by  helpful 
human  work  to  fuller  and  fuller  success,  and  finally  to  bring 
to  fulfilment  that  which  must  be  accomplished  as  the  neces- 
sary general  task  of  nature.    Now  the  real  meaning  is  no 
longer  related  to  pleasure  and  displeasure.    Of  course  it  may 
also  belong  to  the  tasks  of  nature  to  spread  pleasure  and  to 
eliminate  pain,  but  the  real  purpose  of  the  economic  develop- 
ment is  then  not  this  pleasure  but  the  fulfilment  of  this  mis- 
sion of  nature.  By  that  truly  an  ideal  is  posited,  and  to  serve 
it  in  devotion  becomes  a  pure  goal  of  the  work  of  civilization. 
Then  it  is  a  dignified  duty  for  noblest  enthusiasm  to  help  in 
order  that  slumbering  nature  may  awake  and  perfect  itself 
just  as  the  seed  develops  into  the  fruit.  Whoever  contributes 
to  the  economic  life  of  his  time  in  such  a  spirit  reaches  an 
idealistic  achievement  even  if  he  only  tills  the  field  or  steers 
the  ship,  sells  his  wares  or  hammers  the  iron.  In  truth  and 
beauty  and  morality,  too,  he  who  serves  faithfully  is  but  sel- 
dom called  to  perform  the  great  and  decisive  deed.   The  task 
of  the  hour  may  be  small,  but  its  idealistic  content  is  not 
diminished  by  that.  The  world  is  too  easily  inclined  to  con- 
fuse the  contrast  between  materialistic  and  idealistic  feeling 
at  work  with  the  contrast  between  material  and  not-material 
means  of  work.  As  the  business  man  has  to  deal  with  material 
things,  every  idealistic  value  is  disclaimed  for  his  labor,  while 
the  intellectual  work  is  easily  recognized  as  idealistic.   But 
that  is  misleading.    The  work  with  not-material  stuff  can 
have  very  selfish  materialistic  motives.  Even  in  science  and 
art  and  law  and  religion,  many  a  man  without  ideals  serves 
professionally  from  materialistic  motives,  and  on  the  other 
hand  the  purest  idealism  may  control  the  simplest  economic 
deed.  The  only  decisive  question  is  whether  the  act  was  per- 
formed from  self-seeking  motives  or  from  a  devoted  belief 
in  the  absolute  value  of  that  which  is  to  be  done.  Whoever 
recognizes  or  at  least  dimly  feels  that  in  industry,  too,  a  great 
unlimited  world  task  is  performed  will  cooperate  in  this 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


313 


gigantic  work  with  unselfish  devotion  just  as  the  true  artist 
or  scholar  or  judge  or  minister  may  work  in  his  place. 

This  pure  valuation  of  the  economic  progress  must  not  be 
mixed  up  with  that  pride  with  which  the  man  of  civilization 
gladly  looks  on  his  growing  technical  mastery  over  the  ener- 
gies of  nature.  The  one  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  other. 
This  triumph  of  applied  physics  and  chemistry  is  admired 
there  entirely  as  scientific  achievement.  Not  the  progress  of 
nature,  but  the  overcoming  of  nature,  satisfies  such  ambition. 
The  labor  which  overcomes  all  hindrances  is  in  question  there 
not  as  an  economic  but  as  a  scientific  value.  When  the  bridge 
is  built  and  the  tunnel  pierced  and  the  wireless  message  sent 
over  the  ocean,  this  proud  feeling  of  progress  of  the  positivist 
turns  directly  to  the  thinker  whose  calculations  were  so 
splendidly  confirmed.  Not  nature  made  the  progress,  but 
society  with  its  deeds  of  thought.  It  is  a  philistine  pride  of 
the  ages  of  enlightenment.  Nature  is  still  without  rights, 
without  will,  without  purpose,  in  slavery. 

But  as  soon  as  the  chains  of  slavery  are  broken,  in  order 
that  nature  may  be  estimated  in  its  own  will  and  that  human 
effort  may  be  understood  as  a  cooperation  with  nature,  then 
technical  science  itself  enters  into  a  new  relation.  The  free 
will  of  nature  remains  dominant.  Without  it  the  outer  world 
and  all  industry  and  economy  would  be  without  own  mean- 
ing and  value,  but  where  nature  is  turning  towards  a  goal 
which  is  important  for  man,  the  cooperation  becomes  possi- 
ble only  when  the  transition  from  the  given  to  the  desired  can 
be  completely  understood.  And  only  this  transition  awakes 
the  human  interest,  which  slowly  grows  into  the  theories  of 
science.  Thus  economy  does  not  find  the  one  mechanical 
nature  of  the  physicist  in  which  the  atoms  have  been  moving 
for  trillions  of  years  without  purpose  in  accordance  with 
causal  laws  in  the  universe.  Economy  rather  finds  a  nature 
which  works  with  us  and  the  meaning  of  which  lies  in  its 
intention  to  fulfil  the  purposes  of  the  willing  men.  Only  in  the 


i!' 


l\ 


314 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


315 


interest  of  this  cooperation  does  the  causal  interpretation 
produce  the  conceptional  vision  of  the  useless  world  mech- 
anism. Economy  is  thus  not  included  in  physics,  but  physics, 
as  far  as  it  becomes  technical,  is  a  part  of  economics.  Nature 
in  a  way  accepts  the  physical  form  as  soon  as  it  is  willing  to 
enter  into  cooperation  with  man,  because  only  in  this  form 
can  it  be  determined  beforehand  and  therefore  can  combine 
its  activity  with  the  purposes  of  the  thinking  men. 

As  soon  as  this  unity  between  nature  and  man  has  been 
reached,  the  activity  of  man  himself  becomes  a  part  of  the 
nature  which  unfolds  itself  with  reference  to  its  purpose.  The 
things  of  the  outer  world  are  then  filled  with  the  energy  of 
the  laboring  men.  Nature  in  a  way  absorbs  there  the  muscle 
work  of  the  human  being.  Whether  the  hand  works  or  the 
electrical  machine,  whether  the  arm  or  the  steam  engine  lifts 
the  weight,  whether  the  feet  or  the  electric  wire  carry  the 
message,  makes  by  principle  no  difference  for  the  economic 
success.  Everjrthing  is  determined  in  this  way  by  the  will  of 
man,  but  the  outer  world  aims  towards  the  common  purpose 
by  its  own  energy  in  its  natural  development,  and,  absorbing 
the  forces  of  man,  nature  pushes  forward  to  the  highest  cul- 
tural achievements  of  industry.  At  every  point  of  the  human 
development  nature  stands  ready  to  make  its  goods  a  unity 
with  the  will  of  man  and  so  to  produce  economic  goods.  From 
the  fruit  on  the  next  tree  and  the  fish  in  the  next  brook  which 
satisfy  the  primitive  man,  the  way  leads  forward  to  our  world 
of  economy  in  which  the  tea-plant  of  China  and  the  sugar-cane 
of  Cuba  and  the  silver-mines  of  Nevada  and  the  porcelain  of 
Germany  and  the  flax  of  Ireland  and  hundreds  of  other  gifts 
of  nature  must  be  developed  and  detached  until  our  tea-table 
tempts  us.  The  fire  flashed  up  and  helped  the  human  purpose, 
the  clay  formed  itself  in  the  pottery,  and  com  and  grain  grew 
in  the  scratched  earth ;  the  stones,  later  the  bronze,  and  soon 
the  iron  moulded  themselves  into  weapons  and  tools,  and 
every  progress  created  unlimited  new  satisfactions  and  new 


demands.  Larger  and  larger  became  the  masses  of  goods 
which  streamed  together  in  order  to  serve  man,  more  and 
more  varied  their  transformation,  their  elaboration,  and 
above  all  their  mutual  adjustment.  The  hollow  tree  which 
satisfied  the  barbaric  seafarer  became  the  gigantic  steamer 
which  carries  thousands  over  the  ocean,  the  sling  of  the 
savage  became  the  cannon,  his  hut  of  clay  grew  into  the 
cathedral  with  its  dome  and  into  the  skyscraper,  his  signs 
on  the  bark  of  a  tree  became  the  newspaper  which  carries  to 
millions  the  cabled  news  of  the  whole  globe,  the  fire  in  his 
cave  became  the  electric  arc-light  which  drains  its  energy 
from  the  waterfall  miles  distant,  his  garment  of  skins  became 
the  costume  in  which  the  cotton  of  America  and  the  wool 
of  Europe  and  the  silk  of  Asia  and  the  diamonds  of  Africa 
were  brought  together;  but  simple  or  endlessly  complex, 
everjrthing  is  a  part  of  that  nature  which  helps  to  fulfil  the 
purpose  of  mankind. 

Of  course  the  modelling  of  nature  into  useful  tools  and  the 
fusing  of  the  goods  does  not  alone  reach  the  goal  of  nature. 
That  which  the  mines  and  the  fields  and  the  mills  may  pro- 
duce must  be  distributed,  and  must  flow  through  millions 
of  channels  to  get  where  it  reaches  the  human  will  which  it 
aims  to  satisfy.  Here  begins  the  exchange  and  the  market, 
the  buying  and  selling  near  and  far.  It  is  a  meaningful  spread- 
ing and  exchanging  of  places  between  the  things  of  nature, 
entirely  different  from  the  meaningless  movements  of  the 
natural  atoms.  The  money  is  only  one  among  these  flowing 
natural  things,  but  for  nearly  five  thousand  years  the  domin- 
ant one.  By  its  neutral  exchange- value  and  its  possibility  of 
being  conserved,  the  money  can  reenforce  the  service  of  na- 
ture for  the  human  will  in  an  unlimited  way.  But  even  when 
in  the  midst  of  a  developed  financial  system  the  check  of  the 
millionaire  can  be  exchanged  for  goods  with  which  whole 
tribes  might  satisfy  their  needs,  it  remains  after  all  a  piece  of 
nature.  In  an  almost  magical  way,  it  has  absorbed  into  itself 


t  i 


316 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


the  effective  powers  of  an  endless  manifoldness  of  natural 
energies,  but  it  still  remains  nature  which  serves  mankind. 
This  economic  artificial  growth  of  nature  demands  such  mani- 
foldness of  energies  that  it  can  never  be  sufficient  for  it  to 
fuse  with  the  energy  of  a  single  human  being.  Division  of 
labor  is  necessary  in  order  that  nature  may  fulfil  the  task 
of  liberating  its  material,  of  moulding  it,  of  elaborating  it, 
and  of  distributing  it,  from  the  lowest  stage  to  the  modem 
swarming  in  the  mills  and  the  markets. 

It  is  not  essential  for  us  to  remind  ourselves  once  more 
of  the  well-known  wonders  of  our  world  of  economy,  but  only 
to  emphasize  the  absolutely  valuable  meaning  of  this  move- 
ment and  its  difference  from  the  naked  personal  interest. 
In  every  stage,  in  every  form,  the  economic  content  is  not 
the  society  with  its  needs  and  its  pleasures  and  pains,  but  the 
content  is  nature  with  its  absolutely  valid  purposes,  the  fulfil- 
ment of  which  must  be  an  absolute  value.  Yet  it  must  be 
especially  emphasized  that  the  value  is  never  bound  up  with  a 
particular  result  of  this  economic  development  of  nature.  We 
know  that  a  single  thing  can  never  represent  a  pure  value, 
but  that  the  valid  value  always  refers  to  a  relation  between 
two  identical  points.  Whatever  economy  may  reach  as  some- 
thing completed  and  given,  has  no  value  at  all,  measured 
by  the  absolute  standard.  It  may  satisfy  demands,  but  then 
it  is  only  agreeable  and  useful,  not  absolutely  valuable.  Ab- 
solutely valuable  only  is  the  development  itself  in  which  na- 
ture fulfils  its  tasks,  and  in  which,  therefore,  nature  brings 
about  the  identity  between  the  goal  which  must  be  necessarily 
conceived  as  belonging  to  it  and  the  real  fulfilment.  Only  this 
relation  of  identity,  this  transition,  this  progress,  is  a  true 
value  in  economy.  The  lazy,  careless  will  of  the  bushman 
becomes  satisfied  by  the  fruits  and  beasts  just  as  well  as  our 
will  is  satisfied  by  the  world  of  industry  of  the  twentieth 
century.  Measured  by  mere  personal  satisfaction,  the  one  is 
no  better  than  the  other,  and  as  source  of  such  personal 


317 


comfort,  neither  one  nor  the  other  is  valuable.  But  it  is  valu- 
able that  nature  offers  its  gifts  to  such  richer  and  richer  will, 
and  remoulds  its  treasures  with  clear  purpose  into  goods 
which  satisfy  the  ever  new  will  and  lead  it  to  more  and  more 
complex  volitions.  That  is  a  deed  comparable  only  to  the 
always  new  unfolding  of  science  and  art.  Nature  fulfils  in 
the  light  of  consciousness  its  own  task.  That  is  the  meaning 
of  industry  and  economy.  And  not  the  result  but  the  free 
deed  of  this  fulfilment  is  an  incomparable  pure  value,  the  self- 
realization  of  the  outer  world. 

B.  —  LAW 

We  saw  that  values  arise  whenever  nature,  community, 
and  self  imfold  themselves  and  fulfil  the  task  which  must  be 
necessarily  conceived  as  their  own.  We  called  such  free  transi- 
tion from  intention  to  realization  an  absolutely  valuable 
development.  We  then  asked  as  to  the  achievement  of  civil- 
ization which  secures  and  reenforces  such  development  with 
conscious  purpose.  For  nature  we  found  such  achievement 
in  the  economic  work  of  industry.  The  next  turn  of  the  road 
must  therefore  lead  to  the  question  whether  the  develop- 
ment of  the  community,  too,  can  be  made  a  conscious  pur- 
pose. In  the  case  of  the  community  it  may  be  difficult  to 
characterize  by  one  single  conception  such  an  achievement 
of  civilization.  Of  course  there  are  many  possibilities  to  se- 
cure and  to  reenforce  the  upward  development  of  society. 
And  these  possibilities  are  so  manifold  and  so  different  that 
it  might  appear  artificial  to  render  them  in  a  simple  formula. 
It  is  evident,  for  instance,  that  education  belongs  there,  that 
every  political  reform  has  its  place  there,  as  well  as  many 
other  purposive  acts  which  serve  the  true  development  of 
the  fellow-world.  And  yet  one  factor  is  fundamental  and 
central :  it  is  law.  Law,  and  the  state  as  far  as  it  serves  the 
law,  offer  the  achievement  sought  in  the  safest  and  purest 
way. 


318 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


We  assert,  then,  that  we  find  in  law  a  new  absolute  value  ; 
but  we  do  not  forget  that  such  a  claim  of  absoluteness  is  for 
the  value  of  law  perhaps  more  threatened  by  misunderstand- 
ings than  in  any  other  field  of  values.  The  historic  relativity 
of  the  ideas  of  law  appears  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  ar- 
bitrary legislative  intrusion  into  the  formation  of  law  seems 
a  daily  occurrence.  Above  all,  the  old-fashioned  ideas  of  a 
natural,  eternal,  higher,  divine  law  seem  so  entirely  abolished 
that  it  appears  almost  reckless  still  to  speak  to-day  of  an  ab- 
solutely valid  value  of  law.  Yet  we  must  look  more  carefiilly. 
Is  there  really  any  possibility,  in  spite  of  the  changing  laws 
of  the  Assyrians  and  the  Romans,  the  Icelanders  and  the 
Japanese,  of  proceeding  to  the  one  immutable  eternal  law? 
Various  ways  seem  to  stand  open.  The  legal  statutes  of 
the  nations  are  as  manifold  as  their  languages,  but  just  be- 
cause mankind  proceeds  in  a  continuous  striving  from  a 
lower  to  a  higher  legal  life,  we  are  sometimes  assured  that 
every  historic  law  can  be  taken  only  as  the  uncertain  tenta- 
tive eflfort  to  express  the  one  eternal  law  of  mankind  which  is 
written  in  the  stars.  As  the  scientific  theories  of  the  ages 
change,  and  yet  beyond  those  striving  imperfect  theories  the 
one  perfect  truth  remains  immutable,  in  the  same  way  the 
absolutely  valuable  law  is  far  superior  to  the  law  tablets  of 
Hammurabi  or  the  penal  code  which  a  modem  parliament 
has  laid  down.  Only  pure  reason  can  grasp  this  unwritten 
eternal  law.  At  all  times  a  Platonizing  idealism  has  postu- 
lated such  an  over-historical,  absolutely  valuable  law. 

All  this  cannot  tempt  us.  We  now  know  surely  that  the 
values  which  our  critical  philosophy  is  seeking  are  not  hidden 
in  an  over-reality  which  is  inaccessible  to  our  experience. 
Truth,  too,  was  for  us  not  a  ready-made  completed  ideal 
structure  beyond  experience,  but  in  our  real  true  judgments 
was  lying  the  whole  value  of  truth.  And  the  necessity  which 
dominates  beforehand  our  true  judgments  lies  not  in  an 
absolute  beyond  experience,  but  lies  in  the  fundamental  char- 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


319 


acter  of  oxir  own  will  which  necessarily  seeks  the  identities. 
The  same  holds  true  for  every  value :  its  only  possible  place 
is  in  this  world  of  life-experience.  The  form  of  every  pos- 
sible value  is  predetermined  and  independent  of  any  arbi- 
trariness, and  therefore  absolute;  but  it  is  predetermined 
only  by  our  own  will,  which  constitutes  our  character  as  sub- 
jects who  have  a  world.  It  remains  meaningless  to  seek  the 
absoluteness  of  the  value  in  any  relation  of  it  to  a  metaphys- 
ical beyondness.  The  outer  world,  the  fellow-world,  the  inner 
world,  can  satisfy  our  will  or  can  violate  it;  to  seek  absolute 
values  means  to  examine  when  this  satisfaction  has  over- 
personal  meaning.  But  it  is  always  satisfaction  in  this  ex- 
perienced world,  and  anything  which  holds  for  worlds 
beyond  experience  must  not  throw  even  a  faint  glimmer 
of  light  on  our  way;  that  can  only  mislead  us.  With  better 
right  even  than  the  naturalist,  we  could  assert  that  we  do  not 
know  another  world  than  the  world  of  experience,  and  every 
reference  to  a  super-world  would  not  have  given  the  firmness 
of  an  absolute  meaning  to  the  values  which  we  find,  but  by 
principle  would  have  destroyed  them.  All  this  cannot  be  dif- 
ferent for  the  value  of  law.  If  there  is  anything  absolutely 
valuable  at  all  in  the  sphere  of  law,  it  must  be  demonstrated 
in  the  historical  legal  life.  Even  the  ideal  as  far  as  it  has  not 
been  reached  must  take  its  whole  meaning  from  the  possible 
formations  of  the  given  social  community. 

Those  who  in  this  way  turn  to  the  historical  life  of  the 
nations  may  perhaps  seem  tempted  to  seek  the  absolutely 
valuable  by  sifting  it  from  that  which  is  accidental  in  the 
historical  forms.  That  which  changes  from  nation  to  nation 
must  be  perishable.  But  if  we  could  find  laws  which  return 
everywhere,  or  if  at  least  we  could  find  certain  lasting  norms 
of  law,  even  if  they  are  expressed  in  unequal  formulations, 
then  we  should  after  all  have  a  certain  stock  of  law  com- 
mon to  all  which  might  claim  such  superior  value.  Ethno- 
logists, to  be  sure,  would  be  skeptical  about  it  from  the  be- 


320 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


ginning.  The  statutes  show  themselves  everywhere  so  entirely 
determined  by  the  particular  forms  of  society  that  at  various 
places  and  times  not  only  different  rules  have  been  upheld, 
but  even  practically  opposite  rules.    But  let  us  grant  that 
there  exists  some  kind  of  law  which  can  be  uniformly  found 
wherever  men  separate  right  and  wrong.   The  nearest  ap- 
proach to  it  would  perhaps  be:  "Thou  shalt  not  kill.'*    Of 
course  every  community  has  its  exceptions.  There  is  a  wide- 
spread right  to  kill  the  weak  or  the  old  members  of  the  tribe, 
and  with  us  it  is  a  right  to  kill  enemies  in  a  war  or  to  kill  the 
degenerates  as  punishment  for  their  crimes.  But  even  if  it 
should  hold  without  exception  that  the  killing  of  man  is 
an  absolute  wrong,  we  should  have  to  discriminate  carefully 
two  aspects.   On  the  one  side  it  means  that  slaying  is  de- 
tested, and  on  the  other  it  means  that  this  existing  abhor- 
rence is  forced  on  the  members  of  the  community  with  com- 
mon coercive  measures.    The  question  is  whether  it  is  this 
forcing  or  that  detesting  which  is  to  represent  the  value. 
But  it  seems  evident  that  the  mere  abhorrence  for  the  mur- 
derous deed  does  not  at  all  represent  law.   Such  an  aver- 
sion does  not  differ  from  other  feelings  which  developed 
themselves  in  the  social  community.  Of  course  it  may  be 
valuable  that  a  disinclination  for  killing  has  developed  in  the 
social  life,  but  as  such  an  emotion  it  remains  only  a  value 
of  social  development.   The   abhorrence  for    killing   thus 
stands  at  first  on  the  same  level  with  other  inclinations  and 
disinclinations  which  are  legally  quite  indifferent.  The  slay- 
ing is  detested  just  as  the  consumption  of  rotten  food  is  de- 
tested. It  is  an  instinct  which  may  protect  the  community, 
but  which  has  in  itself  no  meaning  of  a  legal  value.  There 
may  be  superadded  a  moral  value.   It  may  be  a  matter  of 
conscience  for  the  individual  not  to  kill  under  any  circum- 
stances.   But  the  moral  value  of  this  domination  over  an 
impulse  is  of  course  again  something   different   from  the 
value  of  law.   The  real  value  of  law  finds  place  only  in  that 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


321 


second  factor  which  had  to  be  added  to  the  mere  abhor- 
rence for  killing  to  make  out  of  it  a  legal  prohibition  of  kill- 
ing, namely,  the  order  which  forces  that  social  dislike  on 
every  single  member  of  the  social  group. 

But  if  it  is  really  true  that  the  legal  value  belongs  to  the 
social  order  which  forces  the  volitions  of  the  community  on 
the  individual  members,  then  the  prohibition  of  slaying  loses 
its  exceptional  position.  We  turned  to  this  particular  inter- 
diction only  because  it  returns  so  frequently  and  thus  belongs 
to  the  stock  of  prescriptions  which  are  general.  But  if  the 
legal  value  does  not  lie  at  all  in  the  content  of  the  interdiction, 
but  only  in  the  superadded  order  of  coercive  measures,  then 
of  course  it  is  quite  indifferent  for  the  question  of  values 
whether  we  consider  a  law  which  returns  frequently  or  an 
accidental  and  isolated  law.  The  order  of  coercion  is  anyhow 
common  to  all  laws  even  if  their  content  is  quite  different. 
The  absolutely  valid  value  of  law  thus  never  lies  in  the  fact 
that  certain  contents  of  law  return  everywhere ;  such  an  idea 
moves  by  principle  in  a  wrong  direction.  The  content  of  the 
laws  may  represent  a  value  of  social  development,  and  may 
be  combined  with  moral  values,  but  the  value  of  law  must  be 
entirely  independent  of  the  content. 

Also  that  possible  but  not  at  all  necessary  connection  with 
the  moral  conscience  can  never  constitute  the  legal  value  as 
such.  There  exists  no  legal  instinct  as  an  inner  voice.  For 
a  moral  decision  we  ask  our  conscience,  and  no  one  else  can 
be  substituted  for  ourselves  there.  In  a  legal  doubt  we  ask 
the  lawyer,  and  it  is  only  a  chance  if  we  ourselves  know  what 
to  do.  Morality  is  always  an  affair  of  the  inner  world,  the 
law  an  affair  of  the  fellow-world.  The  social  life  of  ideally 
moral  personalities  would  surely  lead  to  results  which  would 
be  in  many  respects  similar  to  the  ideal  legal  life  of  internally 
unmoral  persons.  But  in  the  first  case,  there  would  be  no 
law,  just  as  in  the  second  case  there  would  be  no  morality. 
Morality  and  law  are  perfectly  parallel,  but  just  for  that 


322 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


reason  they  can  never  touch  each  other.  Morality  must  al- 
ways remain  in  the  field  of  the  personality  and  law  always 
in  the  field  of  the  community.  The  inner  world  of  the  per- 
sonality, conscious  of  its  moral  duties,  is  never  simply  a  frac- 
tion of  the  community,  and  the  community,  conscious  of  its 
legal  duties,  is  never  simply  a  combination  of  moral  person- 
alities. We  shall  soon  recognize  that  between  those  two 
parallels,  while  they  never  touch  each  other,  there  exist 
many  lines  of  connection.  For  the  understanding  of  law  in 
its  necessary  values  we  must  hold  to  the  law  itself  and  can- 
not get  any  help  from  the  moral  conscience. 

After  these  negative  considerations  we  may  now  turn  to 
the  positive  factors.  We  insisted  that  the  content  of  every 
prescription  or  restriction  expresses  at  first  merely  the  sat- 
isfaction or  dissatisfaction  with  certain  deeds;  as  such  an 
expression  of  the  common  will  it  is  not  a  legal  value,  but  a 
value  of  development.  We  have  carefully  studied  this  social 
development.  We  saw  that  we  had  to  accredit  the  will  of  the 
individual  to  the  community  only  in  so  far  as  it  really  referred 
to  the  common  work,  and  that  all  progress  demanded  the 
transition  from  the  selfish  will  to  the  social  will,  and  finally 
from  the  social  will  to  the  absolutely  general  evaluating  will- 
standpoint.  In  this  way  the  family  and  the  community  and 
the  tribe  and  the  nation  grow  in  pure  life-development,  just 
as  the  seed  grows  in  the  field.  Far  from  right  and  law  the 
community  must  thus  develop  a  common  will  and  desire. 
The  individual  wills  more  and  more  that  which  every  other 
member  of  the  community  would  will  in  the  same  way.  In- 
stead of  the  selfish  splitting-ofi  there  arises  the  unity  of  the 
manifold,  in  which  every  single  member  takes  attitude  in 
the  sense  of  the  whole  group.  Only  where  such  transitions 
arise  can  we  recognize  progress  and  development. 

Now  we  are  seeking  that  work  of  civilization  which  secures 
and  reenforces  intentionally  such  a  development.  We  said 
beforehand  that  there  must  be  many  means  to  secure  it.  If, 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


323 


for  instance,  the  community  has  developed  a  certain  over- 
personal  way  of  looking  on  the  world  or  a  common  way  of 
interpreting  or  feeling,  then  civilization  will  have  to  take 
care  that  artistic  education  or  scientific  instruction  of  the 
youth  forces  on  the  individual  just  this  mood  of  feeling  and 
thinking.  But  there  are  evidently  certain  volitions  which  are 
superior  in  importance  for  the  development  of  the  community 
as  such,  namely,  those  volitions  which  themselves  constitute 
the  social  life.  It  is  clear  that  those  will-acts  by  which  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  members  of  the  community  are 
formed  at  all  must  remain  the  foundation  of  all  social  exist- 
ence. If  the  development  of  the  group  is  to  continue,  and  if 
the  progress  is  not  to  be  lost  again  by  counter-movements, 
then  the  community  must  take  care  that  those  volitions 
which  refer  to  those  mutual  social  relations  are  really  willed 
and  realized  by  every  single  member.  If  it  is  the  purpose  of 
civilization  to  secure  by  an  intentional  effort  the  natural 
development  of  the  social  group,  then  the  community  must 
force  on  its  members  in  the  first  place  those  actions  which  the 
community  wills  as  means  of  binding  the  social  group  to- 
gether. The  community  must  oblige  the  individual  members 
to  will  with  the  social  group,  whatever  will  may  have  devel- 
oped in  it.  Society  must  take  care  with  coercive  measures 
that  in  its  midst  all  which  society  as  a  whole  wills  in  order 
to  remain  a  society  at  all  be  really  done. 

The  character  of  these  mutual  relations  necessarily  shows 
far-reaching  differences.  It  is  conditioned  by  the  different 
heights  of  development  which  are  reached,  and  especially 
by  the  unequal  conditions  of  life.  If  the  community  is  to 
form  a  social  unity  and  is  to  unfold  itself  in  mutual  adaptation 
of  its  members,  a  trading  people,  for  instance,  must  develop 
entirely  different  estimations  and  disinclinations  from  a 
warfaring  people  and  again  different  from  a  religious  people. 
The  economic  situations,  the  political  forms,  the  geographic 
conditions,  the  climate,  the  natural  racial  disposition,  the 


hJ 


324 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


325 


common  traditions,  unite  to  bring  about  very  unlike  inclina- 
tions and  disinclinations  for  mutual  human  relations.  The 
admiration  for  faithfulness  and  obedience  fits  the  one  com- 
munity better,  the  admiration  for  self-dependence  and  in- 
dustry fits  the  other  better.  The  one  community,  to  protect  its 
own  social  existence,  may  consider  life  as  holy,  while  the 
other,  under  its  entirely  different  life-conditions,  may  be  able 
to  protect  itself  only  if  it  permits  the  killing  of  the  weak  and 
the  old  members  of  the  group.  With  the  one  perhaps  the 
deepest  abhorrences  will  turn  against  economic  fraud,  with 
the  other  against  cowardice,  and  again  with  others  against 
irreligiousness.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  no  less  necessary 
that  in  certain  fundamental  directions  satisfaction  and  dis- 
satisfaction concerning  mutual  treatment  must  have  some- 
thing uniform  in  all  communities.  The  fact  that  stealing, 
robbing,  and  murdering  is  on  the  whole  almost  everywhere 
detested  only  indicates  that  the  development  of  a  society 
demands  everywhere  this  feeling-tone  because  without  it  the 
social  life  as  such  would  be  undermined  under  any  condi- 
tions. Just  as  the  food  is  different  from  country  to  country 
and  the  nourishment  of  the  Eskimo  would  be  unfit  for  the 
African  Negro,  and  yet  certain  fundamental  relations  of 
nourishing  material  are  the  same  for  the  whole  globe  and 
must  be  the  same  from  physiological  reasons,  in  the  same 
way  in  social  life  a  certain  minimum  of  appreciation  of  deeds 
must  develop  itself  uniformly  everywhere.  The  economic, 
political,  religious,  and  climatic  factors  work  towards  the 
difference  of  those  valuations  of  actions.  On  the  other  hand, 
that  which  is  common  results  from  the  fact  that  everywhere 
only  women  bear  children,  everjrwhere  men  aVe  stronger  for 
fight,  everywhere  the  personal  talent  for  various  achievements 
is  different,  everywhere  industry  and  laziness,  far-sightedness 
and  stupidity,  strength  and  weakness,  stand  opposed  to  each 
other,  and  everywhere  agreement  gives  greater  strength  than 
discord.  The  decisive  fact  for  us  is  only  that  a  richly  devel- 


oped valuation  of  mutual  treatment  unfolds  itself  in  every 
community,  while  this  common  will  in  itself  does  not  hold  any 
element  of  law.  The  fact  that  stealing  and  murdering  is 
detested  by  every  single  member  of  the  group  belongs  to  the 
progress  which  lies  outside  of  law. 

But  this  is  sure:  the  advance  from  the  mere  satisfac- 
tion of  selfish  instincts  to  the  detesting  of  the  injury  to 
others  is  really  a  progress  from  personal  desires  to  over- 
personal  attitudes.  It  is  a  step  forward  on  the  way  to  an 
absolutely  valid  valuation.  And  when  we  discussed  develop- 
ment of  the  fellow-world  we  saw  that  this  transition  alone 
characterizes  every  possible  social  development.  To  hold 
this  development  firmly  and  to  make  sure  that  it  is  not  lost 
by  a  slipping  backward  of  individual  members  must  be  the 
work  of  civilization,  which  aims  to  secure  and  to  continue 
this  value  of  natural  development.  If  the  progress  is  not  to 
be  lost  by  chance  counter-movements,  the  community  must 
find  means  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  individual  member 
to  strike  against  those  will-tendencies  which  hold  the  group 
together  as  a  unity.  Such  coercive  measures  already  exist 
in  the  customs  of  the  group.  With  the  customs  begins  the 
securing  of  the  common  will,  and  this  power  of  the  customs 
goes  on  partly  supporting  and  especially  supplementing  the 
less  important  volitions  at  a  time  when  more  energetic 
means  of  force  have  been  already  established.  In  the  same 
way  the  religious  support  secures  this  common  will ;  the  rules 
and  prescriptions  of  the  gods  protect  it.  Yet  the  protection 
becomes  a  real  conscious  deed  of  the  community  only  through 
the  legal  order. 

Hence  law  is  for  us  the  order  by  which  the  realization  of 
the  common  will  in  the  mutual  treatment  of  the  members 
of  the  community  is  intentionally  secured  and  guaranteed  by 
coercive  measures.  This  order,  this  guarantee,  this  certainty 
for  the  realization  of  the  common  will,  forms  the  only  abso- 
lutely valid  value  of  law.  The  content  of  that  common  will, 


326 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


on  the  other  hand,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  value  of  the 
law  as  such.  Whether  the  group-will  is  highly  developed  or 
still  stands  on  a  low  stage,  whether  it  contains  an  important 
content  or  an  indifferent  one,  a  content  which  is  conditioned 
by  accidental  circumstances  or  a  content  which  agrees  with 
the  deepest  demands  of  morality,  all  has  no  influence  on  the 
value  of  law.  The  only  important  question  is  whether  that 
which  the  community  really  wills  is  intentionally  guaranteed 
by  coercive  measures.  The  value  of  law  can  therefore  come 
to  a  rich  development  where  the  content  of  the  law  still 
manifests  a  low  stage  in  the  development  of  the  common 
will;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  estimation  and  detesting 
of  human  actions  may  have  reached  a  high  level  and  yet  the 
value  of  law  may  still  be  poorly  developed. 

Hence  what  is  absolutely  valuable  in  law  is  not  the  con- 
tent of  the  law,  but  the  order  of  law  by  which  the  realization 
of  that  which  is  willed  in  common  is  forced  on  every  member 
of  the  community.  But  it  is  clear  that  this  order  of  law  must 
represent  an  extremely  complex  structure,  which  contains 
much  more  than  the  mere  written  laws.  If  we  look  to  the 
most  highly  developed  forms  of  the  modem  civilized  states, 
we  must  recognize  as  legal  order  the  whole  organization  by 
which  the  will  of  the  nation  transforms  itself  into  coercive 
measures  for  the  individual.  There  belongs  the  constitution 
of  the  state  which  gives  power  to  the  legislatures,  to  the 
head  of  the  state,  and  to  the  representatives  of  the  people ; 
there  belong  the  laws  which  are  proclaimed ;  there  belong  the 
public  attorneys,  the  courts,  the  judges,  the  lawyers ;  there 
belong  the  means  of  punishment,  the  jails,  and  many  other 
factors.  The  state  itself  with  its  essential  functions  is  thus 
a  part  of  the  legal  order. 

If  that  is  the  situation,  we  know  also  what  must  be  anta- 
gonistic to  the  values  of  law.  It  is  not  the  legal  wrong,  the 
crime,  which  is  anti-valuable,  but  the  lawlessness.  All  the 
ways  are  anti-valuable  by  which  the  will  of  the  community 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


327 


is  falsified,  by  which  perhaps  the  legislative  bodies  do  not 
represent  through  the  mode  of  election  the  real  common  will, 
or  by  which  legislators  themselves  do  not  formulate  with 
their  best  conscience  the  common  will  in  the  laws.  Laws 
which  contradict  the  common  will  and  state  attorneys  who 
submit  to  the  prejudices  of  single  groups  are  anti-valuable  ; 
unfair  judges  or  useless  penalties  or  arbitrary  methods  of 
procedure  are  anti-valuable.  A  law  which  faithfully  renders 
the  will  of  the  community  and  is  carried  through  without 
partisanship  maybe  absurd,  because  that  particular  commun- 
ity may  have  absurd  ideas  on  that  special  point,  but  the  law 
can  never  lose  by  that  anything  in  its  valid  legal  value.  Of 
course  the  essence  of  this  coercive  measure  can  be  already 
given  where  such  manifold  division  of  labor  does  not  yet 
exist.  There  may  be  no  written  laws  and  no  legislators,  but 
only  judges  who  decide  the  quarrel  by  their  own  opinion  and 
who  punish  the  guilty.  But  that  does  not  change  the  funda- 
mental principle.  Such  a  judge  or  such  a  head  of  the  tribe 
can  perform  this  function  only  because  he  is  sustained  by 
the  will  of  the  community,  and  his  personal  opinion  is  thus 
accepted  beforehand  as  the  expression  of  the  common  will. 
Even  where  an  apparently  autocratic  will  is  super-ordinated 
on  the  community,  its  power  remains  the  result  of  the  com- 
mon will,  and  by  the  living  creation  of  right  through  his 
irresponsible  volition  the  community  gives  to  itself  a  legal 
order  which  secures  the  development  of  its  own  will. 

That  which  holds  true  for  the  order  of  the  state  repeats 
itself  in  the  same  way  in  every  group  which  controls  itself  or 
which  acknowledges  traditional  rights.  It  may  be  a  small 
club,  the  statutes  of  which  bind  the  members ;  it  may  be  the 
concert  of  the  civilized  nations,  which  by  international  agree- 
ment force  the  common  will  on  every  particular  nation.  The 
most  different  groups  may  penetrate  each  other.  The  church 
community  may  develop  its  own  law  beside  the  state  law, 
and  always  the  conceptionally  formulated  law  will  be  only  a 


328 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


section  of  the  whole  valuable  legal  order.  The  state  remains 
superior  to  all  other  groups  from  the  start  because  the  club 
or  the  party  or  the  commimity  or  the  denomination  ultimately 
derives  its  order  from  the  coercive  measures  of  the  state. 

If  in  this  way  the  value  belongs  to  the  legal  order,  that  is, 
to  the  objective  law,  and  there  again  not  to  the  content  of 
the  law  but  to  the  coercive  guaranteeing  of  the  common  will, 
then  the  personal  legality  of  the  individual  actions  does  not 
represent  an  absolute  legal  value  at  all,  and  the  illegality  is 
not  destruction  of  a  value.  The  subjective  legality  may  be 
morally  valuable :  that  does  not  interest  us  here.  Correspond- 
ingly the  crime  of  the  individual  would  be  morally  anti-valu- 
able. But  actions  which  deny  the  value  of  law  can  thus  be 
performed  only  by  the  community  and  not  by  the  individual. 
Under  this  aspect  the  individual  legislator  and  the  individual 
judge  of  course  must  be  considered  as  representatives  of 
the  community.  The  individual  criminal  may  oppose  the 
absolute  values  by  his  immorality,  but  not  by  his  illegality. 
If  he  does  not  will  to  fulfil  the  law,  but  prefers  to  suffer  the 
penalty,  or  rather  if  he  is  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  a  penalty, 
it  is  his  individual  practical  decision  which  belongs  in  the 
sphere  of  personal  experiences  of  pleasure  and  displeasure, 
besides  the  relation  to  the  question  of  morality.  The  criminal 
deed  of  stealing  or  killing  or  deceiving  or  committing  adultery 
is  no  negation  of  the  absolute  value  of  law ;  but  selfish  legis- 
lation, perversion  of  the  law  by  the  judge,  unfair  penalty, 
arbitrariness  of  prosecution,  antiquated  laws  which  no  longer 
express  the  common  will,  in  short,  uncertainty  of  the  law  and 
lawlessness,  alone  can  interfere  with  the  absolute  value  of  law. 

And  after  all,  have  we  a  right  to  call  this  value  absolute? 
Could  this  whole  task  not  be  understood  as  a  relative  func- 
tion? But  here  no  wrong  concession  ought  to  confuse  the 
situation.  The  absolute  value  of  the  legal  order  stands  be- 
yond every  relativism  and  skepticism.  We  demanded  from 
the  absolutely  valid  values  the  identity  of  experience  so  that 


-  I< 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


329 


the  will  to  self-assertion  which  is  recognized  in  the  first  ex- 
perience became  satisfied  by  the  identical  realization  in  the 
new  experience.  If  the  community  is  to  maintain  its  own  self, 
the  only  indispensable  demand  must  be  that  its  deeds  be 
identical  with  its  intentions.  If  the  common  will  is  turned 
aside  before  it  realizes  itself,  the  total  meaning  of  the  common 
life  is  destroyed.  The  transition  from  the  common  will  to 
the  identical  action  of  the  community  is  therefore  the  satis- 
faction of  an  over-personal  demand,  and  that  means  a  pure 
absolute  value.  Where  the  community  has  reached  a  stage 
of  development  in  which  the  slaying  is  detested,  in  that 
group  no  slaying  must  be  allowed  if  the  social  will  is  not  to 
negate  itself.  The  guaranteeing  of  a  common  life  without 
murder  by  the  threat  of  punishment  for  the  murderer  and 
by  just  prosecution,  jurisdiction,  and  punishment  is  there- 
fore an  achievement  of  the  community  by  which  its  own 
fundamental  will  is  realized.  The  community  would  become 
an  accidental  nothing-but-experience  without  own  meaning, 
without  own  goal,  and  without  own  value,  if  the  demand  for 
the  identity  between  its  will  and  its  action  should  disappear. 
It  is  the  one  demand  which  gives  to  it  the  meaning  of  an  in- 
dependent self -asserting  significance.  Therefore  its  fulfilment 
by  the  legal  order  remains  eternally  valuable.  The  jurist  has 
a  right  to  say  that  justice  must  be  done  even  if  the  world  is 
to  perish.  It  means  that  the  legal  order  remains  eternally 
valuable,  while  the  world  of  the  merely  personal  individual 
demands  may  break  down. 


C.  —  MORALITY 

The  problems  which  the  moral  life  forces  on  the  philosophic 
thought  are  abundant.  While  men  within  wide  limits  always 
agreed  as  to  the  ways  in  which  they  ought  to  act  as  moral 
personalities,  in  our  times  as  in  former  times  they  have  dis- 
agreed with  reference  to  the  meaning  and  significance  of  mor- 
ality.   We  have  to  detach  our  particular  question  from  this 


330 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


large  background  of  ethical  problems,  and  we  shall  be  able 
to  answer  our  special  problem  the  more  directly,  the  more 
we  focus  our  attention  on  this  one  question  and  leave  all 
others  untouched.  But  while  it  is  in  no  way  our  aim  to  wander 
through  the  whole  field  of  ethics,  we  cannot  help  recognizing 
that  our  particular  question  carries  us  to  the  centre  of  the 
field  to  a  point  where  practically  all  ways  meet.  This  one 
question  is  of  course :  is  there  in  our  moral  life  anything  ab- 
solutely valuable?  If  we  have  to  acknowledge  any  absolute 
value  of  morality,  we  must  further  examine  whether  we  are 
justified  in  locating  it  just  at  this  place  in  the  system  of  values. 
We  know  where  we  stand.  We  have  found  in  industry  the 
conscious  purposive  development  of  the  outer  world  and  in 
law  the  conscious  purposive  development  of  the  fellow-world. 
That  which  remains  must  be  the  conscious  purposive  devel- 
opment of  the  inner  world.  If  morality  is  to  fill  this  place  in 
the  system  of  values,  it  will  mean  that  morality  is  that 
achievement  by  which  the  self -development  of  the  personal- 
ity, its  self-realization,  becomes  a  conscious  deliberate  task. 
Is  that  really  the  value  of  morality,  and  does  not  the  value 
perhaps  belong  rather  to  the  result  which  is  to  be  reached 
by  the  moral  deed? 

But  the  situation  has  already  been  cleared  for  us,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  ultimately  the  same  that  we  find  in  the  case  of  the 
value  of  law.  The  relations  of  law  and  the  relations  of  moral- 
ity correspond  to  each  other  with  surprising  exactitude,  and 
every  solution  which  we  found  there  fits  in  here  also.  That 
does  not  mean  in  the  least  that  morality  leans  on  the  law. 
On  the  contrary,  even  if  we  were  to  conceive  the  principle  of 
law  in  its  widest  sense,  including  perhaps  all  the  social  coerc- 
ive measures,  even  the  customs  and  the  church  influences, 
nevertheless  morality  would  remain  independent  of  it.  In 
a  corresponding  way  we  emphasized  that  the  law  is  entirely 
independent  of  morality.  We  said  that  law  is  never  an  en- 
forced morality,  as  morality  belongs  in  the  sphere  of  the 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


331 


individual  will.  The  law  is  the  achievement  of  the  commun- 
ity, and  that  means  of  the  community  as  a  unity,  not  as 
a  bundle  of  isolated  personalities.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  law- value  that  the  demands  of  law  may  conform  to  the 
moral  will.  And  it  is  also  no  law-value  that  it  is  moral  to  sub- 
ordinate one's  self  to  the  law.  The  law  with  its  own  values 
would  be  unchanged  if  no  morality  existed.  The  community 
would  be  able  to  secure  the  realization  of  its  own  will  by 
coercive  measures  even  if  no  individual  should  feel  bound 
by  moral  obligations.  In  the  same  way  morality  is  free  from 
law  and  any  other  social  coercion.  Custom  and  law,  church 
and  state,  may  press  on  the  conscience  with  all  their  powers, 
but  the  moral  deed  itself  begins  where  those  influences  stop. 
The  moral  is  entirely  an  action  of  the  inner  world. 

In  the  moral  field,  too,  we  can  start  at  first  from  the  or- 
dinary daily  experiences  to  find  out  what  constitutes  the 
pure  value.  A  thing  in  the  possession  of  another  man  tempts 
us,  but  we  detest  the  stealing,  and  finally  overcome  our  de- 
sire in  accordance  with  the  voice  of  our  conscience.  It  may 
be  that  such  an  example  of  stealing  still  too  much  suggests 
law  and  right.  We  may  therefore  just  as  well  substitute 
actions  which  no  judge  punishes.  Let  us  say  that  we  can 
protect  ourselves  against  damage  by  a  lie,  but  we  despise 
the  lying  and  again  we  follow  our  conscience;  we  suffer  the 
damage  in  order  to  stick  to  the  truth.  Or  to  point  not  only 
to  the  suppression  of  actions  which  the  conscience  condemns, 
but  to  the  performing  of  actions  which  the  conscience  de- 
mands :  we  see  a  stranger  in  a  burning  house,  we  are  afraid 
of  the  danger  into  which  we  come,  yet  we  feel  that  the  saving 
deed  is  our  duty,  and  without  hesitation  we  rush  into  the 
flaming  house  as  conscience  orders. 

In  the  sphere  of  law  we  always  separated  the  will-content 
of  the  law  from  the  legal  order.  Here,  too,  in  the  same  way 
we  may  sharply  separate  the  content  with  its  feeling-tone 
from  the  enforcement  by  conscience.    The  content  is  the 


332 


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THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


333 


detested  theft,  or  the  despised  lie,  or  the  estimated  life- 
saving.  Exactly  as  in  the  case  of  the  law,  we  must  now  ask 
again :  After  all  what  is  valuable,  the  fact  that  these  contents 
are  despised  or  are  estimated,  or  the  other  fact  that  the 
realization  of  these  feelings  is  enforced  by  conscience?  The 
first  possibility  would  be  the  most  convenient  solution  of 
the  problem.  The  dislike  of  the  theft  is  so  strong,  we  might 
say,  that  it  overcomes  the  pleasure  in  the  possession.  The 
pleasure  in  the  life-saving  deed  is  so  vivid  that  it  suppresses 
the  displeasure  of  danger.  The  absolute  value  accordingly 
lies  in  the  fact  that  this  overwhelming  pleasure  is  attached 
to  the  valuable  saving  of  fellow-men,  or  that  this  superior  dis- 
pleasure is  attached  to  the  violation  of  the  other  man's  pro- 
perty. The  value  of  the  moral  deed  could  thus  be  deduced 
from  the  pleasure  and  displeasure  in  certain  effects.  It  is 
morally  valuable  to  prefer  the  fellow-life,  the  fellow-happi- 
ness, and  the  fellow-welfare. 

It  is  indifferent  for  us  which  special  nuances  are  given  to 
such  effect-morality.  It  may  be  the  most  trivial  utilitarian- 
ism which  gives  value  to  the  production  of  pleasure,  it  may 
be  the  more  serious  doctrine  of  ethical  culture  which  evalu- 
ates the  wholesome  development  and  efficiency.  The  doc- 
trine may  perhaps  even  sink  down  to  naked  egotism,  which 
demands  the  pleasure  of  the  neighbor  only  because  it  ulti- 
mately guarantees  the  own  comfort.  Or  it  may  raise  itself 
to  the  highest  point  and  demand  a  deed  because  the  general 
imitation  of  it  would  correspond  best  to  the  life-conditions 
of  the  whole  community.  We  do  not  ask  why  pleasure  of  the 
neighbor  is  to  be  preferred  to  our  own  pleasure.  We  do  not 
even  ask  why  the  securing  of  happiness  or  of  common  wel- 
fare by  moral  actions  is  to  be  more  valuable  than  the  pro- 
duction of  the  same  effect  by  accidental  processes.  Indeed 
very  often  this  mere  happiness  goal  can  be  reached  more 
quickly  by  rather  immoral  actions.  We  leave  all  these  ques- 
tions untouched,  as  they  would  lead  us  away  from  our  goal. 


For  us  everything  depends  only  upon  the  one  point :  Have 
we  really  a  right  to  seek  moral  value  in  the  fact  that  man 
prefers  certain  ways  of  action  and  detests  certain  others? 

But  we  have  answered  this  question  beforehand.  When  we 
discussed  the  self-development,  we  recognized  that  this 
affective  value  of  certain  modes  of  action  belongs  entirely 
to  the  valuable  development  of  the  self  and  represents  the 
progress  from  the  selfish  instinct  to  the  pure  evaluating  will. 
We  found  the  individual  abhorrence  of  the  lie  and  the  theft 
and  the  cowardice  in  the  sphere  of  the  values  of  development 
before  there  was  any  question  of  special  merit,  and  before  the 
action  took  the  character  of  morality.  All  which  exists  before 
morality  is  in  question  may  become  a  condition  for  the  moral 
life,  but  cannot  constitute  its  real  meaning  and  value.  This 
is  indeed  the  situation.  The  evaluation  of  the  happiness 
of  the  neighbor  and  of  his  welfare  and  of  the  life  of  the  com- 
munity is  one  of  the  conditions  for  morality,  but  this  evalua- 
tion itself  still  entirely  lacks  the  value  of  morality,  just  as 
we  saw  that  the  mere  detesting  of  slaying  and  robbing  does 
not  at  all  constitute  a  value  of  law.  Every  ethics  which  deals 
with  results  and  effects  necessarily  remains  at  the  standpoint 
of  the  pre-moral.  He  who  does  not  take  any  evaluating 
attitude  at  all  towards  lying  and  stealing  and  life-saving  is 
unable  to  act  morally:  but  he  is  not  immoral,  he  is  a  moral. 
The  conditions  are  lacking  for  the  possibility  of  amoral 
process.  But  this  moral  factor  is  after  all  something  new 
which  has  to  be  superadded  to  that  evaluating  attitude. 

We  saw  that  if  the  inner  life  is  to  be  a  development,  it 
necessarily  leads  from  the  short-sighted  selfish  longing  up- 
ward to  a  pure  evaluating  apperception  of  the  world.  We 
saw  how  the  inner  world  can  realize  itself  only  when  every 
volition  comes  more  and  more  into  agreement  and  harmony 
with  the  total  will-structure  of  the  self.  And  we  saw  how 
this  practical  inner  unity  of  will  finally  leads  to  an  ideal  of 
higher  unity  in  which  all  volitions  are  controlled  by  an  inner 


'  ^1 


^i 


334 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


335 


fundamental  will.   This  controlling  ultimate  will  demanded 
that  the  world  be  no  dream,  no  chaos,  no  mere  flash-experi- 
ence, but  have  its  own  meaning,  its  self-dependent  significance, 
its  self-asserting  reality.  Just  that  involved  the  postulate 
for   pure   values.   We  saw  that  therefore  in  the  natural 
development  the  self  which  wills  to  unfold  itself  approaches 
more  and  more  the  standpoint  of  pure  valuation.  It  is  not 
a  question  of  an  external  force,  and  not  a  regard  for  the  social 
community,  it  is  simply  the  development  of  the  inner  world, 
a  free  self-unfolding  which  leads  from  the  selfish  desire  up- 
ward to  the  valuation  of  all  that  which  gives  the  meaning 
of  self-assertion  to  the  world  and  represents  absolute  value. 
It  depends  in  the  first  place  upon  the  historical  progress  of 
the  community  in  which  stage  of  this  development  the  indi- 
vidual may  stand.  Even  the  lowest  citizen  of  a  modem  state 
stands  nearer  to  the  pure  evaluation  of  the  world  than  the 
most  magnanimous  member  of  a  barbarian  tribe.  Again  in 
the  midst  of  every  community  any  individual  can  stand  much 
higher  than  other  members  of  the  same  group.  Yet  we  know 
that  the  moral  achievement  and  the  moral  feat  does  not  de- 
pend upon  the  height  of  this  development.  If  we  were  simply 
to  accept  the  value  of  development  as  a  value  of  morality, 
then  responsibility  and  merit,  conscience  and  duty,  would 
have  lost  their  real  meaning,  and  instead  of  reaching  an  obli- 
gation we  should  remain  in  the  sphere  of  inclination.   Cer- 
tainly he  who  wills  pure  values  instead  of  desiring  the  mere 
personal  objects  of  desire  is  the  higher  kind  of  man.  He  who 
seeks  science  instead  of  the  mere  sensuous  enjoyment,  who 
seeks  the  happiness  of  mankind  instead  of  the  personal  ad- 
vantage, who  seeks  progress  instead  of  decay,  who  seeks  right 
instead  of  arbitrariness,  religion  instead  of  superstition,  in 
short,  who  seeks  a  world  of  meaning  instead  of  remaining 
with  a  meaningless  dream  of  life-experience,  certainly  stands 
nearer  to  the  goal  of  mankind.  He  is  superior  to  his  fellows, 
and  our  admiration  must  do  homage  to  his  soul.  But  all  joy 


in  such  a  pure  evaluating  soul  is  of  the  same  kind  as  our 
joy  in  a  creative  talent  or  in  a  far-reaching  intelligence.  It  is 
something  high  and  beautiful  which  helps  towards  the  noblest 
purpose,  but  something  which  has  grown  and  has  developed 
itself  without  personal  merit.  The  pure  will  of  his  soul  is  in 
no  higher  degree  his  own  deed  than  an  artistic  talent  or  the 
genius  for  statesmanship  or  an  optimistic  temperament.  We 
may  and  must  value  it  as  the  development  of  such  a  great, 
beautiful,  pure  soul  in  its  ascent  to  the  heights  of  mankind, 
but  it  is  not  a  moral  admiration  which  we  feel.  Correspond- 
ingly he  who  still  stands  undeveloped  on  a  low  state  of  valua- 
tion may  awaken  our  pity,  but  his  low  degree  of  development 
alone  cannot  lead  us  to  a  moral  contempt.  An  entirely  differ- 
ent kind  of  consideration  must  come  in  if  we  are  to  recognize 
the  real  moral  value.  Any  ethics  which  refers  to  the  content 
can  never  lead  us  to  our  goal.  Such  an  ethics  remains  in 
every  form  by  principle  at  a  pre-moral  standpoint. 

However,  we  must  consider  one  point  more  before  we  reach 
the  decisive  stage.  The  upbuilding  and  the  destruction  of  val- 
ues are  influenced  by  our  own  doing.  Of  course  we  find  values 
and  anti-values  about  us  all  the  time  which  lie  beyond  our 
own  activity.  But  life  continually  brings  us  into  situations 
in  which  it  depends  upon  ourselves  whether  a  value  is  to  be 
realized  or  to  be  destroyed.  In  such  a  case  our  action  itself 
is  a  part  of  the  forming  of  a  value.  In  such  a  life-situation 
we  will  our  action  not  because  it  leads  to  a  value,  but  because 
it  is  itself  a  part  of  the  value.  Of  course  in  itself  an  action  is 
indifferent.  As  muscle  activity  it  has  no  value  whatever; 
but  when  it  enters  into  a  process  of  the  outer  world,  or  the 
fellow-world,  or  the  inner  world,  so  that  a  value  becomes 
completed  by  it,  the  action  itself  becomes  a  part  of  the  value. 
It  enters  into  the  total  situation  like  an  harmonious  color  in 
the  picture,  like  a  tone  in  the  melody.  If  we  will  that  value, 
we  must  also  will  that  particular  way  of  acting,  because  this 
kind  of  action  itself  raises  that  particular  piece  of  the  world 


« 


336 


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THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


337 


to  the  height  of  a  value.  When  the  value  is  built  up  or  de- 
stroyed by  our  own  action,  the  action  is  not  an  external  means 
which  might  be  replaced  by  some  other  means,  but  is  itself 
an  indispensable  part  of  the  value.  Only  by  that  particular 
action  the  totality  of  the  result  becomes  a  value ;  not  the  end 
alone,  but  the  action  itself  is  willed.  The  saving  and  helping 
actions  themselves  are  desired,  the  lying  and  stealing  actions 
themselves  are  detested.  As  long  as  we  do  not  evaluate  but 
only  desire  and  selfishly  demand  the  end,  we  do  not  care  for 
the  action  as  such.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  mere  impulse 
we  will  nothing  but  the  result ;  it  is  indifferent  to  us  by  what 
means  it  is  reached.  We  desire  the  thing,  but  we  do  not  desire 
the  action  which  gains  the  thing.  For  the  selfish  enjoyment 
it  is  entirely  indifferent  whether  by  the  action  itself  a  meaning 
and  a  will  of  absolute  value  are  posited  into  the  thing.  Only 
the  life  which  builds  up  values  demands  those  actions  by 
which  we  affirm  the  world  as  value.  And  yet  we  must  say 
again  that  we  still  have  not  touched  on  a  moral  relation.  We 
will  the  action  as  a  part  of  our  valuation.  The  valuation  en- 
closes and  involves  the  will  of  the  action,  but  it  is  really  only 
a  willing  of  the  action,  not  an  obligation.  It  is  a  valuable 
development  that  we  have  progressed  to  such  a  valuation 
and  therefore  to  such  volition  of  certain  actions,  but  this 
volition  is  no  duty  and  no  moral  value.  The  personality 
which  has  reached  a  point  at  which  it  wills  those  actions 
which  build  up  values  of  course  stands  much  higher  on  the 
ladder  of  development  than  the  other  personality,  which  only 
desired  the  result  of  actions.  Nevertheless  this  whole  devel- 
opment remains  outside  of  morality.  We  evaluate  the  ac- 
tion as  such  because  it  builds  up  a  value,  but  we  perform  it 
simply  because  we  will  it. 

Now  we  have  only  to  take  one  step  further.  The  self- 
development,  we  say,  has  brought  it  about  that  in  certain 
situations  of  life  we  will  certain  actions  without  reference  to 
the  effects  which  they  have  on  us,  but  merely  for  their  own 


sake  as  acts  which  affirm  a  value.  If  now  the  conscious  effort 
of  culture  aims  to  secure  a  guarantee  of  this  value  of  de- 
velopment, one  thing  alone  is  needed.  Whenever  the  action 
which  we  will  as  such  comes  in  conflict  with  another  action 
which  we  do  not  will  as  such,  but  which  promises  a  result 
desirable  for  us  as  individuals,  the  first  action,  the  one  which 
constitutes  the  value,  must  be  enforced.  This  can  be  done 
by  a  perfectly  new,  perfectly  unique  valuation :  we  learn  to 
consider  our  selves  as  an  absolutely  valid  value  which  realizes 
itself  through  our  own  actions.  As  long  as  we  merely  want 
things  and  effects  while  the  action  itself  is  indifferent  to  us, 
we  the  acting  subjects  cannot  be  in  question  for  our  selves  as 
valuable  or  worthless.  But  as  soon  as  we  will  our  selves  in 
a  particular  activity,  the  fulfilment  of  such  a  will,  that  is  the 
realization  of  the  valued  activity,  makes  our  selves  valuable. 
We  will  our  selves  as  truth-speakers  or  as  life-savers  only  on 
account  of  the  action  itself,  not  on  account  of  the  desirable 
results.  When  the  self  which  is  willed  in  such  a  way  becomes 
realized,  a  pure  over-personal  demand  is  fulfilled.  Our  life- 
saving  or  truth-speaking  personality  now  becomes  a  reality 
which  asserts  itself. 

If  an  external  effect  tempts  us  to  the  opposite  action,  we 
might  reach  a  desirable  result,  but  our  action  no  longer  cor- 
responds to  our  will  to  action.  Our  own  deed  makes  us  as 
acting  persons  worthless.  That  which  becomes  realized  in 
our  action  is  then  no  longer  that  self  which  we  wanted  in  an 
over-personal  way,  and  our  pure  will  does  not  become  satisfied 
by  the  action  of  our  personality.  If  I  look  inactively  on  the 
burning  house  instead  of  helping  at  the  saving  of  men,  I 
secure  my  personal  comfort  which  I  had  a  right  to  will  and  to 
desire.  But  besides  my  comfort  I  willed  at  the  same  time  my 
self  as  a  life-saving  person.  My  action  has  therefore  really  not 
realized  my  own  self.  I  have  not  asserted  myself.  I  am  no 
longer  identical  with  my  self.  I  have  become  worthless.  If 
I  lie  or  steal,  I  always  reach  my  purpose,  and  the  result  was 


338 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


indeed  desired,  but  the  action  itself  was  not  desired.  I  did 
not  wish  to  lie  or  to  steal.  I  truly  willed  my  own  self  as  speak- 
ing the  truth  or  as  respecting  property.  My  lying  and  stealing 
have  fulfilled  and  reached  what  I  wanted  in  one  respect, 
namely,  the  agreeable  effect,  but  they  have  not  realized  the 
opposite  action  which  I  demanded  as  a  part  of  my  own  acting 
self.  My  self  as  I  apperceived  it  has  not  transformed  itself 
at  all  into  a  new  experience,  but  has  been  lost.  The  lying  or 
the  stealing  has  destroyed  the  value  of  my  personality. 

This  identity  between  the  will  to  that  action  which  we 
really  will  as  action  and  the  final  action  itself  is  the  value  of 
morality.  Not  the  action  is  valuable,  but  the  personality 
which  in  the  performed  deed  realizes  its  will  to  action  and 
by  it  the  own  willed  self.  A  man  is  immoral  if  he  does  not 
perform  the  action  which  he  wills  as  action,  and  therefore 
does  not  realize  himself,  but  prefers  instead  to  perform  an 
action  which  is  desired  only  in  order  to  secure  some  desired 
result.  Morality  is  the  realization  of  the  action  which  we  will 
as  such.  Where  a  particular  kind  of  action  is  not  willed  at  all, 
the  personality  can  never  lose  its  moral  value  by  another 
action.  The  criminal  who  steals  must  will  the  action  which 
respects  property,  as  action.  If  he  does  not  will  it  at  all,  his 
theft  may  have  legal  importance  but  is  morally  indifferent. 
The  self-value  of  the  personality,  then,  is  not  diminished,  as 
he  did  not  deny  his  own  will  to  action.  He  who  does  not 
desire  himself  as  speaking  the  truth  may  speak  an  objective 
untruth,  but  he  cannot  lie.  His  untruth  is  morally  as  indif- 
ferent as  the  babbling  of  the  insane. 

To  look  on  ourselves  as  possible  values  must  be  learned. 
It  is  a  deed  of  self-realization.  We  must  learn  to  separate  the 
self  which  we  willed  and  the  self  which  arises  through  our 
actions,  in  order  that  we  may  apperceive  the  identity  of  both. 
As  long  as  we  will  only  the  effects  of  our  actions  and  not  the 
actions  themselves,  such  a  separation  is  foreign  to  us.  Our 
action  then  comes  in  question  only  as  means  of  an  effect,  and 


339 


not  as  realization  of  a  self  which  we  will.  But  as  soon  as  this 
new  cultiu-al  apperception  is  learned  and  we  know  how  to 
compare  the  action  itself  before  and  after  the  deed,  the  ful- 
filment of  the  willed  action  really  represents  an  absolutely 
valid  value.  The  self  which  willed  its  action  now  stands  be- 
fore us  as  an  independent  self -asserting  reality.  It  is  as  if 
from  an  over-personal  point  of  view  we  participate  in  its  will 
and  are  satisfied  in  its  realization.  As  soon  as  this  standpoint 
is  reached,  the  valuable  development  of  the  personality  is 
indeed  completely  safeguarded.  We  recognized  the  develop- 
ment of  the  personality  in  the  fact  that  more  and  more  the 
evaluating  standpoint  is  taken  and  not  the  selfish  one,  more 
and  more  the  world  is  acknowledged  in  its  self-assertion  and 
not  accepted  only  as  a  mere  meaningless  flash  of  experience. 
If  we  now  come  into  a  situation  in  which  the  valuation  would 
lead  to  one  action  and  the  selfish  desire  to  the  opposite  action, 
the  value  is  in  danger  at  first.  The  impulse  to  the  personal 
enjoyment  might  be  stronger  than  the  will  to  that  action 
which  builds  up  the  over-personal  value,  but  if  we  have 
learned  the  new  apperception,  the  whole  situation  has  been 
entirely  changed.  Now  the  choice  is  no  longer  between  one 
result  which  we  selfishly  demand  and  another  result  which 
we  unselfishly  evaluate.  No :  we  now  find  on  the  one  side  the 
selfish  demand,  and  on  the  other  side  the  value  of  the  own 
personality.  To  follow  the  selfish  desire  now  means  to  sacri- 
fice the  value  of  the  self;  to  give  up  the  promised  personal 
enjoyment  means  to  gain  the  value  of  the  self. 

Moreover,  the  situation  is  not  such  that  we  have  to  make 
the  decision  whether  we  want  to  evaluate  the  absolute  value 
of  our  self  or  not.  As  soon  as  we  have  become  at  all  consci- 
ous of  our  own  absolute  value,  we  cannot  take  any  other  atti- 
tude towards  it  than  that  of  evaluation.  We  always  saw  that 
just  that  is  characteristic  of  every  pure  value  ;  nobody  can 
apperceive  it  without  participating  in  the  evaluation.  Just 
as  we  cannot  understand  the  logical  conclusion  without  willing 


i 

.all' 


340 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


341 


it,  we  also  cannot  apperceive  ourselves  in  our  moral  self- 
realization  without  necessarily  willing  ourselves  in  such  an 
act.  Just  as  it  may  be  that  we  do  not  understand  the  conclu- 
sion, we  also  may  not  have  reached  the  moral  apperception 
of  ourselves,  we  may  not  have  proceeded  to  that  separation 
between  our  will  towards  an  action  and  its  identical  realiza- 
tion ;  but  as  soon  as  such  a  standpoint  has  been  reached,  it 
becomes  impossible  not  to  evaluate  that  identity  between 
the  volition  and  the  action.  We  cannot  prefer  a  self  which 
remains  not  identical  with  itself  to  a  self  which  asserts  itself 
and  therefore  becomes  valuable.  The  new  view  which  is 
reached  by  civilization  therefore  gives  a  guarantee  that  the 
evaluating  standpoint  has  become  protected  against  the  de- 
sire for  pleasurable  effects.  In  evaluating  the  acting  personal- 
ity as  such  we  protect  and  guarantee  those  actions  which 
serve  the  values. 

This  guarantee  is  no  complete  one.  The  consciousness  of 
the  endangered  self -value  may  still  be  overcome  by  the  desire 
for  an  enjoyment.  Then  we  have  an  immoral  action  in  which 
the  self  unfolds  itself  in  opposition  to  the  value  in  order  to 
satisfy  a  personal  demand.  But  no  external  force  would  be 
able  to  secure  the  maintaining  of  the  stage  of  development 
which  has  been  reached  so  effectively  as  this  apperceiving 
of  the  own  personality  as  an  absolute  value.  Now  we  recog- 
nize it  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  true  value  of  morality 
must  be  independent  of  every  determination  of  the  content. 
Which  action  we  will  is  entirely  indifferent.  We  are  moral 
as  soon  as  we  realize  the  action  which  we  really  will  as  action. 
It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  moral  value  whether  the  action 
which  we  will  as  part  of  our  acting  self  represents  a  high  or 
a  low  stage  of  development.  At  all  times  endlessly  much  pure 
morality  has  been  achieved  which  as  to  the  mere  effect  of  the 
action  represents  a  low  stage  of  development. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  valuation  of  development,  we 
have  not  even  the  right  to  insist  that  the  moral  man  stands 


higher  than  the  one  who  serves  the  values  without  the  force 
of  this  self-valuation.  The  noble  soul  whose  will  towards  the 
values  is  in  itself  strong  enough  to  overcome  all  selfish  im- 
pulses without  being  forced  by  any  regard  for  the  moral  self- 
value  may  stand  higher  than  many  a  man  whose  faint  will 
towards  values  can  overcome  the  selfish  will  only  by  the  feel- 
ing of  his  own  moral  value.  It  would  be  over-rigorous  to  give 
value  only  to  the  moral  action.  An  action  which  without 
effort,  without  struggle,  and  without  reference  to  the  abso- 
lute value  of  the  own  personality  results  only  from  devotion 
to  values,  may  represent  the  highest  personal  value  of  devel- 
opment. But  such  an  action  has  no  moral  value.  Such  an 
action  does  not  become  immoral,  but  it  remains  amoral, 
without  losing  by  that  anything  as  manifestation  of  an  abso- 
lutely valuable  personal  development.  In  general,  however,  it 
will  hold  that  the  moral  will  which  is  anchored  in  the  abso- 
lute self- value  of  the  acting  person  also  represents  the  higher 
stage  of  the  self-development.  This  is  the  more  the  situation 
because  then  alone  the  action  in  the  service  of  values,  that 
is  the  ideal  purpose,  is  secured  against  all  influences.  Whether 
the  beautiful  life-impulse  really  overwhelms  by  its  own  en- 
ergies the  selfish  longings  must  always  remain  accidental. 
Even  the  purest  love  for  values  may  become  ineffective  when 
perhaps  a  great  personal  grief  can  be  eliminated  or  a  fasci- 
nating enjoyment  can  be  gained  by  a  worthless  action.  Only 
the  evaluation  of  the  own  self  can  raise  the  action  which 
serves  the  values  beyond  every  possible  action  for  pleasure, 
and  can  lead  the  martyr  to  the  stake  for  the  sake  of  truth. 
Only  in  the  face  of  this  self-value  arises  an  obligation,  a 
duty,  a  conscience.  We  have  fully  convinced  ourselves  that 
not  every  value  involves  an  obligation,  an  ought.  When  we 
studied  the  meaning  of  the  values  we  recognized  that  we  have 
no  right  to  refer  our  over-personal  will  to  an  obligation  which 
comes  to  us  from  beyond  experience.  An  obligation  exists 
in  the  sphere  of  law  when  society  threatens  the  individual 


'=11 


342 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


with  its  coercive  measures.  An  obligation  exists  in  the  same 
way  here  in  the  field  of  morality  when  the  consciousness  of 
our  endangered  self -value  threatens  our  will.  We  stand  be- 
fore two  possibilities  of  action :  the  one  action  we  do  not  care 
for  as  such,  but  it  leads  to  the  desired  result ;  the  other  action 
we  desire  as  action.  There  enters  the  threatening  of  the  obli- 
gation. If  we  do  not  act  as  we  want  to  have  our  selves  as 
actors,  we  shall  lose  our  selves.  The  voice  of  conscience  cannot 
say  anything  else  to  us.  Thus  there  is  only  one  fundamental 
moral  obligation :  you  ought  to  realize  that  action  which  you 
really  will  for  the  action's  sake.  There  exists  no  moral  law : 
you  ought  not  to  lie,  and  you  ought  not  to  steal,  and  you 
ought  not  to  kill,  and  you  ought  to  help,  and  you  ought  to 
save.  Whether  your  helping  and  speaking  the  truth  is  that 
kind  of  action  which  you  really  will  as  action  of  your  person- 
ality depends  upon  the  height  of  your  development.  No  one 
can  demand  that  from  you  as  an  obligation.  But  if  you  will 
this  action,  then  you  ought  to  perform  it,  and  you  ought  not 
to  be  tempted  by  pleasure  or  displeasure  to  actions  which 
you  do  not  at  all  will  as  actions.  Realize  the  action  which  you 
will  on  its  own  account.  That  is  the  only  possible  obligation. 
It  is  true  even  this  categorical  imperative  might  be  trans- 
formed into  a  hjrpothetical  one :  realize  the  action  which  you 
will  yourself,  if  you  do  not  will  that  your  own  self  lose  its 
identity  and  by  it  its  value.  But  this  condition  is  absolutely 
impossible.  You  can  never  really  will  that  your  self  shall  not 
remain  identical  with  itself. 

Self -faithfulness,  self -loyalty,  is  accordingly  the  only  moral 
obligation  and  the  only  moral  value.  Burglary  and  murder 
are  in  themselves  not  opposed  to  morality,  but  only  opposed 
to  the  value  of  development.  If  my  extra-moral  development 
had  led  me  to  the  detesting  of  the  action  and  yet  I  carried  it 
out,  it  would  be  antagonistic  to  morality.  But  then  it  is  not 
the  burglary  which  is  immoral,  but  the  non-realization  of  that 
acting  self  which  I  willed.  Even  the  struggle  between  various 


THE  VALUES  OF  ACHIEVEMENT 


343 


conflicting  motives  of  value  is  not  really  a  moral  conflict,  but 
an  extra-moral  one.  It  is  not  a  conflict  between  two  moral 
duties,  but  the  only  moral  duty  is  to  realize  that  action 
which  we  really  will.  The  inner  struggle  refers  only  to  the 
question  which  of  two  actions,  both  serving  certain  values, 
is  really  willed  by  us.  Only  when  this  decision  has  been  made 
can  the  moral  realization  set  in.  Only  if  we  know  internally 
what  we  really  will  can  we  be  faithful  to  ourselves. 

The  far-reaching  agreement  between  the  moral  value  of 
the  personality  and  the  legal  value  of  the  community  is  now 
evident.  Both  have  only  the  one  meaning,  to  demand  self- 
faithfulness,  and  by  it  to  guarantee  the  stage  of  valuable 
development  which  has  been  reached.  The  mutual  will- 
relations  between  the  members  of  a  community  have  been 
developed  outside  of  law,  and  the  volitions  of  the  individuals 
have  unfolded  themselves  outside  of  morality.  Whether  the 
communities  and  the  personalities  have  really  developed 
themselves  depends  merely  upon  whether  they  have  more 
and  more  fulfilled  that  task  which  necessarily  had  to  be  con- 
ceived as  belonging  to  their  self-asserting  reality.  This  will 
of  the  community  and  of  the  personality  may  have  grown 
to  any  stage  of  development,  and  now  self-realization  must 
take  care  that  it  is  protected  against  a  sinking  down  to  a 
lower  stage.  It  must  be  guaranteed  in  its  valuable  height, 
and  that  can  be  done  only  by  the  force  which  law  brings  to 
the  community  and  the  moral  conscience  brings  to  the  per- 
sonality. Both  law  and  conscience  demand  that  the  com- 
munity and  the  personality  perform  those  actions  which  they 
really  will.  The  value  of  law  is  thus  destroyed  only  by  a  law- 
lessness in  which  the  will  of  the  community  no  longer  becomes 
action.  The  value  of  morality  can  be  destroyed  only  by  the 
disloyalty  to  our  selves  by  which  we  leave  unrealized  the  ac- 
tion which  we  really  demand.  That  which  is  protected  and 
secured  by  law  and  conscience  must  change  and  may  perish, 
but  eternally  valuable  remains  the  power  by  which  that 


344  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

which  is  really  willed  in  fellow-world  and  inner  world  is  safely 
protected.  The  community  can  secure  the  realization  of  its 
own  will  only  by  law,  and  the  personality  can  secure  the  real- 
ization of  its  own  will  only  by  morality.  But  to  realize  itself, 
to  remain  faithful  to  one's  self  in  freedom,  and  in  this  way  to 
posit  will  and  act  as  identical,  means  for  community  and  per- 
sonality alike  that  an  independent  reality  must  unfold  itself 
in  them.  By  this  self-identity  they  are  no  longer  merely  iso- 
lated flashlike,  dreamlike  experiences,  but  really  absolute 
values. 


PART  V 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  VALUES 


CHAPTER  Xm 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


Once  more  we  look  backward.  In  the  swarming  of  our  ex- 
periences we  sought  that  which  is  valuable.  We  recognized 
that  anjrthing  single,  anything  which  is  nothing  but  a  mere 
impression,  is  in  itself  necessarily  without  value.  We  gain  a 
true  satisfaction  only  when  that  which  is  experienced  can  be 
maintained  to  be  found  once  more  in  a  new  experience,  and 
in  this  way  self-asserting  in  the  midst  of  change.  Satisfaction 
demands  tension  and  relaxation,  demands  starting-point  and 
goal.  The  realization  of  the  agreeable  and  desired  gives  such 
satisfaction,  and  may  thus  reflect  on  the  experience  the  glim- 
mer of  value.  But  such  are  chance  values  which  depend  upon 
the  standpoint  of  the  individual  personality.  Even  if  in  a 
social  group  such  pleasure  valuations  of  the  individuals 
agree,  it  remains  merely  an  accumulation  of  personal  satisfac- 
tions as  long  as  for  every  member  the  conservation  of  his 
pleasure  or  removal  of  his  pain  is  decisive.  It  remains  the 
confused  practical  interplay  of  enjoyments  and  advantages, 
of  comforts  and  vanities. 

But  we  sought  pure  values  which  belong  to  the  true  mean- 
ing of  the  world.  We  sought  the  values  which  satisfy  abso- 
lutely without  reference  to  the  states  of  the  individual :  the 
over-personal  values.  Such  pure  values  must  glow  wherever 
things  and  impressions  and  expressions  assert  themselves 
in  the  new  experience  and  thus  remain  identical  in  spite  of 
the  new  forms  which  they  take  in  the  changes  of  life.  There 
we  have  a  satisfaction  which  does  not  depend  upon  enjoy- 
ment; there  we  have  a  fulfilment  which  is  not  determined  by 
personal  desire.  The  life-experiences  rush  by  and  are  nothing 


348 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


349 


but  flashlike  bits  of  experience,  valueless  and  worldless,  or 
the  experience  asserts  its  ideality,  manifests  by  it  its  self- 
hood, and  builds  up  an  independent  world.  Such  a  world  is 
absolutely  valuable  because  everything  which  enters  into  it 
must  necessarily  satisfy  every  possible  subject  who  demands 
a  self -asserting  world.  The  things  and  the  volitions  enter  into 
that  world  at  first  in  so  far  as  they  maintain  themselves  in 
the  return  of  the  experiences.  The  valueless  dream  sensa- 
tions then  transform  themselves  into  a  valuable  experience. 
The  meaningless  single  bits  become  an  absolutely  valuable 
world  which  is  object  of  knowledge.  And  this  world  of  know- 
ledge and  truth  is  absolutely  valuable  without  any  reference 
to  the  question  whether  our  independent  chance  experience 
takes  hold  of  much  or  little  in  it.  But  further,  the  things  and 
the  volitions  also  enter  into  this  world  of  values  in  so  far  as 
their  manifoldness  shows  itself  in  inner  agreement.  When 
the  many  are  ultimately  only  one,  when  the  separated  parts 
of  the  manifold  harmonize  in  such  a  way  that  we  become  cer- 
tain of  the  one  through  the  other,  the  totality  of  such  harmony 
again  must  be  absolutely  valuable.  Every  single  is  here  again 
not  only  starting-point,  but  also  fulfilment.  The  world  of 
love,  of  happiness,  of  beauty,  arises  before  us  in  eternal  purity. 
Finally  we  recognize  in  that  absolutely  valuable  world  the  de- 
velopment and  the  deed.  Whenever  the  single  bears  in  itself 
a  richer,  fuller,  more  effective  end,  consciousness  must  be  ab- 
solutely satisfied  as  soon  as  this  end  becomes  realized  in  new 
experience.  The  seed  becomes  harvest,  and  law,  progress,  and 
morality  realize  themselves  in  a  world  which  leaves  every 
mere  personal  desire  far  behind.  And  yet  here,  too,  the  value 
lies  entirely  in  the  identity  of  will  and  realization. 

We  have  followed  up  how  each  of  these  three  groups  of 
values  arises  from  immediate  life-experience,  and  how  each 
can  be  elaborated  and  enriched  by  the  conscious  purposive 
labor  of  civilization.  We  have  further  seen  how  each  equally 
refers  to  the  outer  world,  to  the  fellow-world,  and  to  the  inner 


world.   Every  step  showed  to  us  clearly  how  everything  in 
this  world  of  values  depends  upon  the  self-assertion  of  the 
experience.  The  equal  had  to  be  grasped  as  equal  in  new  ex- 
perience. The  old  must  show  itself  in  the  new  form  as  con- 
servation, as  fulfilment,  as  realization.   Each  such  identi- 
cal self-assertion  must  be  again  a  starting-point  for  a  new 
volition.    Everything  which  belongs  to  this  sphere  of  self- 
asserting  experience  must  be  eternally  valuable,  as  it  must 
satisfy  every  one  who  wills  a  self-asserting  world ;  and  nobody 
can  be  acknowledged  as  a  subject  at  all  who  does  not  will  such 
a  world.  To  acknowledge  a  subject  as  such  means  to  pre- 
suppose that  whatever  life  and  world  may  bring,  everything 
which  fulfils  the  conditions  of  self-assertion  must  be  abso- 
lutely valuable  to  him.  It  makes  no  difference  whether  this 
self-assertion  shows  itself  as  self-assertion  in  the  logical  val- 
ues, or  as  self-agreement  in  the  aesthetic  values,  or  as  self- 
realization  in  the  ethical  values.   But  in  spite  of  all  these 
conformities  of  structure,  after  all  we  then  have  three  inde- 
pendent worlds.  The  world-formula  which  binds  every  one  of 
them  in  itself  is  ultimately  the  same ;  the  threefold  realization 
of  the  formula,  however,  leads  to  three  world-realities  which 
are  closed  in  themselves  and  independent  of  each  other.  The 
logical  values  of  the  first  are  grasped  by  our  knowledge,  the 
aesthetic  values  of  the  second  are  reached  by  our  devotion, 
the  ethical  values  of  the  last  demand  our  estimation.   To 
confound  them  with  one  another  necessarily  involves  a  de- 
struction of  all  three  kinds  of  values. 

Of  course  an  experience  may  enter  into  manifold  relations 
of  values.  A  development,  for  instance,  which  represents  a 
valuable  progress,  and  which  is  estimated  as  such,  may  be  in 
its  completion  an  harmonious  whole  which  fascinates  us  by  its 
natural  beauty ;  and  at  the  same  time  we  may  group  each 
phase  of  that  development  into  a  logical  scientific  connection. 
In  this  way  the  same  experience  may  be  accessible  to  a  three- 
fold valuation.  But  that  does  not  change  the  fact  that  it  is 


.1 


1 


350 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


351 


something  different  in  every  one  of  those  relations  of  value. 
The  chain  of  causes  as  such  can  be  neither  beautiful  nor 
morally  inspiring;  the  moral  achievement  as  such  is  not  a 
scientific  connection;  and  the  completed  harmony  as  such 
does  not  seek  to  be  estimated  as  an  achievement,  but  rather 
excludes  everything  not  completed  from  the  aesthetic  appre- 
ciation. The  valuations  are  not  only  independent  of  each 
other ;  they  usually  lead  to  different  ways  even  when  they  are 
externally  parallel.  A  novel  may  reach  the  highest  value  of 
beauty,  and  yet  its  characters  may  be  historically,  as  objects 
of  logical  truthful  connection,  without  any  value.  They  have 
no  value  of  existence  in  the  world  of  our  valuable  knowledge, 
and  moreover  the  deed  of  the  hero  may  be  a  moral  crime.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  achievement  may  deserve  the  highest 
possible  ethical  estimation,  and  yet  may  nowhere  offer  a  hold 
for  aesthetic  enjoyment.  But  the  mere  independence  and 
separation  do  not  express  the  whole  meaning  of  their  rela- 
tion. Life  insistently  shows  us  that  the  values  directly  clash 
with  each  other.  It  is  the  sharp  mutual  opposition  of  the  pure 
values  which  pushes  us  forward  to  new  desire  and  to  new 
deed.  The  world  of  the  existing  facts  too  often  denies  the 
demands  of  morality  and  the  desire  for  harmonious  unity; 
the  world  of  beauty  may  hinder  progress  and  may  deny  the 
connection  of  things;  the  world  of  valuable  realization  and 
development  may  destroy  happiness.  Our  whole  existence 
is  filled  by  the  tension  of  these  opposing  forces. 

In  all  this  we  have  no  right  to  super-ordinate  on  principle 
one  affirmation  of  our  world-experience  above  the  others. 
Each  of  the  three,  entirely  coordinated  with  the  others,  arose 
from  the  same  primary  material  of  life-experience  which  itself 
was  still  without  value.  In  our  daily  thinking  we  are  all 
inclined  to  super-ordinate  the  logical  group  of  values  over 
the  other  two.  We  have  the  feeling  that  the  world  which  we 
apperceive  with  the  value  of  existence  and  connection  is  the 
only  standard  world.  The  worlds  of  happiness  and  of  morality 


seem  to  vanish  at  its  side.  They  almost  become  worlds  of 
illusion,  while  the  world  of  existence  is  the  world  of  reality. 
Or  they  become  side  determinations  to  the  one  true  world. 
The  world  is  then  really  the  world  which  has  existence  and 
connection,  and  the  happiness  and  morality  are  only  in  a 
secondary  way  attached  to  that  world  of  true  knowledge.  Of 
course  we  now  know  that  such  a  preference  is  unjustified; 
we  know  that  to  acknowledge  the  world  as  really  existing  does 
not  mean  an5rthing  else  than  to  evaluate  the  experiences  with 
reference  to  certain  relations.  The  existence  of  the  world, 
its  reality  and  its  connection,  means  to  us  a  certain  evaluation 
of  life-experiences.  If  we  emphasize  the  other  relations  and 
in  this  way  gain  other  values  out  of  the  life-material,  they 
arise  with  exactly  the  same  right.  The  world  which  has  ex- 
istence because  it  maintains  itself  is  not  more  important  and 
not  more  immediate  and  not  more  certain  than  the  world 
which  has  harmony  because  it  agrees  with  itself,  or  the  world 
which  is  meritorious  because  it  realizes  itself.  All  three  are 
coordinated  necessary  structures  equally  held  together  by  the 
over-personal  form  of  our  consciousness,  by  our  over-personal 
demand  for  the  self-assertion  of  experience,  and  the  over- 
personal  satisfaction  in  the  fulfilment  of  this  demand. 

The  more  clearly  we  recognize  the  coordination  of  these 
various  worlds  the  more  we  must  become  impressed  by  the 
idea  that  the  conflict  cannot  be  eliminated  by  their  own 
means.  Every  compromise  not  only  remains  external,  but 
interferes  with  the  meaning.  When,  for  instance,  the  science  of 
past  days  made  the  values  of  beauty  an  argument  of  explana- 
tion, deduced  the  movement  of  the  stars  from  the  beauty  of 
their  curves  or  the  central  position  of  the  sun  from  the  noble 
purity  of  its  fu-e,  the  true  purpose  of  explanation  and  know- 
ledge was  evidently  sacrificed.  It  is  not  better  when  the  sci- 
ence of  our  time  breaks  the  chain  of  causal  processes  in  the 
brain  in  order  to  secure  an  uncausal  freedom  for  the  will  on 
account  of  its  moral  value.  In  the  same  way  the  attitude  of 


r-  it 


1; 


Iv*- 


352 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


V 


sesthetics  is  given  up  when  scientific  information  or  moral 
achievement  is  demanded  from  the  work  of  art.  And  the 
moral  deed  becomes  emasculated  when  not  the  ethical  value 
of  the  deed  as  such,  but  the  aesthetic  value  of  the  resulting 
happiness  is  taken  as  standard.  If  we  allow  the  boundaries 
of  the  fields  of  values  to  become  effaced,  we  cannot  do  justice 
to  any  evaluation.  To  combine  the  values  must  mean  much 
more  than  carelessly  to  confound  them. 

But  it  is  certain  they  must  be  combined  somehow  if  the 
world  as  a  whole  is  not  to  become  contradictory  and  by  that 
ultimately  worthless.    We  have  sufficiently  recognized  and 
understood  in  its  necessity  the  fundamental  fact  that  only 
that  which  in  the  changing  experiences  remains  identical  with 
itself  can  be  valuable.  Only  this  identity  brings  satisfaction 
to  the  seeking  will.  That  which  is  absolutely  new  necessarily 
remains  illogical,  unaesthetic,  immoral.  The  totality  of  worids 
would  therefore  have  to  be  anti-valuable  if  the  achievements 
of  morality,  the  beauties  of  happiness,  and  the  connections  of 
truth  could  not  be  ultimately  apperceived  as  identical.  The 
world  crumbles,  life  becomes  meaningless,  and  by  principle 
must  leave  dissatisfaction  if  the  transition  from  the  one  group 
of  values  to  the  other  is  to  be  a  transition  to  an  entirely  new 
reality.  Of  course  we  must  not  think  of  truth  and  beauty  and 
progress  in  the  light  in  which  our  philosophical  investigation 
has  shown  them,  ultimately  controlled  by  the  same  funda- 
mental attitude  of  our  consciousness.   We  have  no  right  to 
substitute  here  the  insight  of  philosophy  for  the  real  life.  The 
individual  personality  which  does  not  philosophize  is  not 
conscious  of  the  way  in  which  the  over-personal  consciousness 
works.  Those  over-personal  transformations  which  constitute 
the  ethical,  aesthetic,  and  logical  experience  are  known  to  us 
in  ordinary  life  only  by  their  final  work,  but  not  by  the  act. 
To  possess  the  ethical,  aesthetic,  and  logical  values,  therefore, 
does  not  mean  to  be  conscious  of  the  steps  which  lead  to  these 
systems  of  absolutely  valid  satisfaction.  In  other  words,  we 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS  353 

may  have  the  true  and  the  beautiful  and  the  good,  as  ab- 
solutely valid  values,  and  yet  may  not  know  anything  as  in- 
dividuals of  that  philosophical  unity  which  we  slowly  begin 
to  recognize  by  our  critical  examination.  For  the  naive  in- 
dividual  the  natural  process  and  happiness  and  morality  are 
simply  separated  spheres  which  we  find  as  such  and  which  we 
must  acknowledge.  And  yet  in  every  act  of  our  life  we  are  in 
contact  with  all  those  spheres.  How  could  we  act,  how  could 
we  merely  step  forward,  if  the  separation  should  remain  by 
principle  one  of  fundamental  character?  We  aim  to  create 
values  in  freedom,  and  yet  we  acknowledge  the  causal  neces- 
sity of  the  processes ;  we  seek  the  value  in  the  creating  deed, 
and  yet  find  happiness  and  beauty  in  the  completeness  which 
no  longer  allows  any  transformation.  Thus  our  life  becomes 
torn  and  without  hold ;  our  will  is  tending  to  and  fro,  and 
when  we  hold  the  one  worid,  the  other  remains  for  us  some- 
thing strange,  incomparable,  unreconcilable. 

The  meaning  of  our  life  depends  upon  the  possibility  of 

apperceiving  our  worid  ultimately  as  one  and  the  same.  And 

it  is  not  only  that  the  worid  then  gives  meaning  to  our  life, 

but  under  this  condition  the  worid  as  a  whole  becomes  ab^ 

solutely  valuable  because  it  remains  identical  with  itself  and 

asserts  itself  when  we  step  from  the  truth  to  beauty  or  to 

morality.   We  found  this  self-assertion  in  the  midst  of  the 

logical  and  in  the  midst  of  the  aesthetic  and  in  the  midst  of  the 

ethical ;  we  recognized  that  there  cannot  be  any  other  kind  of 

self-assertion,  and  therefore  no  other  kinds  of  values,  in  the 

midst  of  our  life-experience.  The  worid  as  a  whole  must  now 

be  valuable  if  this  self-assertion  can  lead  from  one  group  of 

values  to  the  others ;  that  is,  if  the  total  world  of  connections 

realizes  itself  again  in  the  totality  of  the  moral  and  of  the 

beautiful.  As  long  as  our  thinking  and  feeling  remain  before 

a  worid  which  falls  into  three  pieces,  the  desire  for  identity 

is  not  satisfied,  the  result  not  valuable.  Therefore  we  know 

beforehand  that  only  a  worid  which  asserts  itself  in  truth, 


354 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


morality,  and  beauty  as  identical  can  have  an  ultimate  value 
for  us.  This  a-prioristic  fact  necessarily  binds  us  in  every 
particular  act  of  apperception.  If  the  world  as  a  whole  is  to 
be  valuable  and  not  only  an  inner  chaos,  we  must  feel  bound 
by  the  conviction  that  the  identity  of  the  three  worlds  of 
values  itself  has  validity.  As  in  all  the  other  groups,  we  find 
the  affirmation  of  this  value  in  immediate  life-volitions,  and 
we  elaborate  it  in  the  work  of  civilization.  The  life-value 
which  secures  this  unity  of  the  various  worlds  of  values  is 
religion.  The  conscious  purposive  work  towards  this  end  is 
philosophy. 

Thus  we  claim  that  religion  and  philosophy  have  the  same 
task.  Both  aim  to  apprehend  the  worlds  of  values  as  ulti- 
mately identical  with  each  other,  and  therefore  the  world- 
totality  as  absolutely  valuable.  Both  philosophy  and  religion 
must  transcend  the  life-experience  for  that  end.  They  lead 
us  to  a  world  which  is  enlarged  and  expanded  in  the  spirit  of 
this  over-personal  postulate  which  overcomes  the  apparent 
opposition  of  the  values.  But  have  we  the  right  to  consider 
such  an  overworld  which  lies  beyond  experience  still  as  real- 
ity? It  is  true  the  real  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word  is 
confined  to  that  which  is  logically  valuable,  that  which  has 
existence  and  connection.  A  religious  or  philosophical  tran- 
scending of  experience  is  in  this  sense  certainly  unreal,  or 
better  extra-real,  or  perhaps  over-real.  But  we  saw  from  the 
start  that  realization  can  mean  something  more  fundamental 
than  the  mere  entrance  into  the  world  of  existence.  We  al- 
ways found  realization  when  the  new  experience  became  foot- 
hold and  starting-point  for  a  planned  action.  The  realization 
is  always  completed  and  therefore  a  new  reality  reached  as 
soon  as  the  new  formation  of  the  identical  allows  us  a  definite 
basis  for  the  intended  activity.  That  might  sometimes  lead  us 
from  the  merely  imagined  to  the  world  of  physical  existence, 
but  not  less  often  both  the  expected  and  the  realized  may  lie 
in  the  same  sphere  of  ideas  or  of  thoughts.  Our  own  will  and 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS  355 

our  own  action  must  decide  whether  the  change  in  our  life- 
experience  is  to  be  acknowledged  as  a  realization.  It  is  such 
a  realization  when  it  supports  our  new  deed.  We  recognized 
this  before,  and  we  now  only  have  to  consider  the  result  for 
our  particular  case.  Religion  and  philosophy  demand  a  pro- 
gression over  the  limits  of  the  experienceable,  and  we  hesi- 
tated to  subordinate  this  apparently  over-real  to  the  con- 
ception of  value,  because  every  value  demands  that  the  given 
be  realized  in  an  identical  reality  in  a  new  form.  But  we  now 
can  say  that  the  world  indeed  realizes  itself  in  such  religious 
and  philosophical  enlargement  of  experience.    Such  over- 
experience  can  certainly  never  become  a  part  of  the  experi- 
enceable worid  of  physical  existence.  It  remains,  therefore, 
unreal  m  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word.  But  it  is  a  content 
of  our  convictions,  and  as  our  conviction  gives  us  the  very 
firmest  hold  for  our  actions,  the  final  realization,  in  the  wider 
sense  of  the  word,  is  here  fulfilled  in  the  highest  degree. 

The  experienceable  world,  which  is  split  into  the  logical, 
ethical,  and  aesthetic  special  worids,  realizes  itself  in  the  all- 
embracing,  ultimate  worid,  which  is  maintained  by  our  relig- 
ious and  philosophical  convictions  and  in  which  all  opposi- 
tion disappears.  And  as  this  ultimate  worid  is  identical  with 
the  totality  of  the  worids  of  values  and  yet  a  complete  real- 
ization, the  relation  between  the  experienceable  and  the  over- 
experienceable  again  represents  an  absolute  value.  It  is  the 
metaphysical  value.  But  the  supplementation  of  all  possible 
experience  in  religion  and  philosophy  takes  opposite  direc- 
tions. In  both  cases  the  conviction  supports  the  new  world- 
totality,  and  in  both  cases  the  conviction  gives  us  full  reality 
because  the  transcending  worid  offers  us  a  hold  for  action  and 
thus  dominates  our  life.  Yet  the  antithesis  of  the  directions 
is  fundamental.  To  make  it  clear  at  once,  we  may  say  that 
religion  transcends  experience,  but  that  philosophy  goes  back 
to  the  presuppositions  of  experience.  Religion  constructs  a 
superstructure  which  overarches  the  experienced  worid,  phil- 


356 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


357 


osophy  builds  a  substructure  which  supports  the  experienced 
world.  For  that  purpose  religion  creates  God,  who  gives  the 
value  of  holiness  to  the  world ;  philosophy  seeks  the  ultimate 
foundation  in  the  eternal  act,  which  gives  to  the  world  the 
values  of  absoluteness.  Both  groups  of  values,  the  religious 
values  of  holiness  and  the  philosophical  values  of  absolute- 
ness, stand  together  as  metaphysical  values  as  against  the 
logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical  values. 

A  sharp  demarcation  line  between  the  metaphysics  of  the 
religious  feeling  and  the  metaphysics  of  the  philosophizing 
reason  is  not  in  question  for  practical  life.  The  religion  of  a 
Plato,  of  a  Spinoza,  of  a  Fichte,  certainly  belongs  by  principle 
to  philosophy,  and  the  historical  worid-religions  are  pene- 
trated  by  philosophical  elements.  The  philosophical  way  is 
sought  essentially  when  the  last  unity  which  gives  meaning 
to  all  the  metaphysical  values  is  to  be  reached  by  conscious 
purposive  efforts  of  thought.  Religion  in  its  way  reaches  the 
same  goal  by  following  the  feelings  and  emotions,  and  with- 
out a  conscious  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  purpose.  In  this 
sense  —  and  as  a  matter  of  course  only  in  this  sense  —  we 
group  philosophy  among  the  values  of  civilization,  but  religion 
among  the  immediate  values  of  life,  inasmuch  as  we  always 
demanded  that  the  values  of  civilization  be  expressions  of 
a  purposive  effort  consciously  directed  towards  the  goal  of  up- 
building a  valuable  world. 

The  immediate  values  of  life  interest  us  first ;  they  are  the 
values  of  the  world  of  God,  the  values  of  holiness.  In  the  sys- 
tem of  values  the  holy  thus  represents  the  last  value,  coor- 
dinated with  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good.  But  we 
now  understand  that  in  another  sense  it  is  super-ordinated  on 
those  other  three  values,  inasmuch  as  the  purpose  of  religion 
had  to  be  the  unification  of  all  the  other  values.  The  world 
which  is  penetrated  by  the  belief  in  God  no  longer  knows  the 
opposition  between  the  true  connections,  the  beauty  of  happi- 
ness and  the  moral  realization.  And  this  world  of  God  is  real 


because  our  conviction,  which  in  the  sphere  of  religion  we  call 
belief,  realizes  it. 

Religion  must  fulfil  this  task  even  at  a  level  where  a  de- 
veloped idea  of  gods  is  not  yet  in  question.   At  least,  the 
directions  towards  these  ultimate  values  may  be  recognized 
wherever  a  symbol  reflects  on  the  world  in  such  a  way  that 
for  the  excited  emotion  the  disappointing  contrasts  in  the 
worid  disappear.    The  unity  of  nature,  happiness,  and  deed 
becomes  effected  in  consciousness.  The  lowest  tribe  in  Ceylon 
indulges  in  wild  nocturnal  dances  in  the  depths  of  the  forest. 
They  dance  around  the  large  arrow  with  rhythmical  shout- 
ings. No  spirit  and  no  god  is  in  the  arrow  for  them,  but  the 
arrow  is  the  centre  of  their  existence,  the  chief  means  of  their 
preservation.  Their  whole  thinking  turns  around  the  arrow. 
In  all  important  events,  in  disease  and  need,  the  arrow  is 
worshipped.   In  these  midnight  dances  the  arrow  irradiates 
a  power  which  transforms  their  whole  world.  The  things  of 
nature  which  oppose  man,  his  longing  for  happiness,  and  all 
his  willing  for  action  are  now  held  together.  The  arrow  helps 
and  will  help;  the  arrow  triumphs  over  the  hostile  nature. 
The  world  now  exists  to  serve  their  will  and  desire;  all  oppo- 
sites  are  overcome.  From  the  ecstasies  of  such  savages  who 
have  not  even  reached  a  real  belief  in  the  spirits  up  to  the 
solemn  worship  of  a  church  community  leads  a  continuous 
way.   The  immediate  opposites  are  overcome  in  purer  and 
purer  form.   The  logical  self-conservation,  the  aesthetic  self- 
agreement,  the  ethical  self-realization,  are  more  and  more 
clearly  embraced  by  the  thought  of  the  metaphysical  self- 
perfection  of  the  world  in  which  everything  which  is  valuable 
is  in  harmony. 

The  intensity  and  vividness  and  depth  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness must  decide  how  far  religion  succeeds  in  reaching 
the  pure  value  of  a  perfect  harmony  of  our  values.  On  the 
other  hand,  independent  of  the  strength  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness, the  value  must  also  be  determined  by  the  question 


i 


I' 


3 


358 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


of  how  far  those  various  values  which  are  to  be  organized 
have  reached  a  development  in  themselves.  A  religion  which 
combines  undeveloped  ideas  of  nature,  barbaric  desires  for 
happiness,  and  undisciplined  demands  for  action  may  be  just 
as  intensely  religious  as  another  which  combines  complex 
science,  refined  feeling  of  agreement,  and  high  moral  con- 
science. Such  a  religion  as  the  former  is  not  less  religious,  but 
it  stands  on  a  lower  level  because  it  refers  the  pure  meta- 
physical value  to  impure  material.  The  highest  religion  must 
arise  where  the  purest  union  of  the  purest  values  is  given. 
Still  further  conditions  for  religious  differences  must  be  given 
by  the  fact  that  the  different  values  may  be  developed  in 
a  very  unequal  way ;  moreover,  they  may  be  emphasized  to  a 
varying  degree.  For  instance,  there  are  religions  in  which  the 
ethical  values  preponderate  so  fully  that  the  logical  and  aes- 
thetic values  are  merely  embedded  in  the  ethical,  and  their 
identification  is  brought  about  by  enclosing  the  one  in  the 
other.  In  the  same  way  there  exist  religions  in  which  the 
aesthetic  or  the  intellectual  factor  preponderates. 

The  decisive  principle,  however,  remains  that  this  act  of 
identification  constitutes  the  meaning  of  religion.  Religion 
is  related  to  the  single  values  as  those  single  values  are  related 
to  the  immediate  life-experiences.  Religion  is  accordingly  also 
a  form  of  apprehension  through  the  over-personal  conscious- 
ness, and  it  is  in  no  other  sense  necessary  than  the  logical, 
aesthetic,  and  ethical  values  themselves.  It  is  the  form  in 
which  this  combined  content  must  be  thought  in  order  to  be- 
come a  common  self-asserting  world  at  all.  But  religion  is  the 
form  of  forms ;  it  is  the  absolutely  valid  form  for  the  connec- 
tion of  that  which  is  itself  found  in  various  forms.  Thus  re- 
ligion does  not  lead  to  firmer  values,  but  to  more  embracing 
ones.  The  certainty  of  truth,  or  the  perfection  of  beauty,  or 
the  dignity  of  morality  must  be  each  in  itself  complete  —  no 
value  has  to  wait  for  sanction  by  a  belief  in  God.  The  power 
of  truth  cannot  arise  from  the  fact  that  it  harmonizes  with 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS  359 

beauty  or  morality.  But  by  this  harmony  only  the  worid 
attains  its  ultimate  completion.  Only  in  this  accord  of  all 
values  the  aim  towards  unity  on  the  part  of  the  over-personal 
consciousness  can  reach  its  last  goal,  at  least  as  far  as  a  naive 
life-work  can  reach  a  last  goal  at  all.  To  reach  the  ultimate 
end,  to  be  sure,  still  more  will  be  needed:  the  systematic, 
conscious  labor  of  civilization  will  become  necessary.  That 
is  the  task  of  philosophy. 

If  the  world  of  possible  experiences  is  to  be  supplemented 
by  a  trans-experience  which  combines  all  the  values,  this  new 
thought  must  again  take  a  threefold  expression.  It  must 
refer,  like  all  the  values  which  we  recognized,  either  to  the 
outer  world,  or  to  the  fellow- world,  or  to  the  inner  world,  how- 
ever much  all  these  three  developments  may  fuse  with  each 
other.  It  is  therefore  certainly  not  a  sharp  separation,  but 
only  an  indication  of  fundamental  tendencies,  if  we  suggest 
such  a  threefold  division.  In  this  sense  we  should  say  that 
the  religious  value  with  reference  to  the  outer  world  manifests 
itself  through  the  belief  in  the  creation,  with  reference  to  the 
fellow-worid  through  the  belief  in  the  revelation,  and  with 
reference  to  the  inner  world  through  the  belief  in  the  salva- 
tion. We  must  follow  that  up  still  further. 

A.  —  CREATION 

The  religious  mind  which  looks  up  to  God,  the  creator  of 
heaven  and  earth,  is  not  concerned  with  an  hypothesis  of  nat- 
ural science.  Belief  in  the  religious  sense  has  only  the  word 
in  common  with  that  other  belief  which  confines  itself  to  be- 
lieving because  it  lacks  sufficient  hold  for  a  full  knowledge. 
The  belief  in  God  is  not  an  uncertain  tentative  opinion  which 
is  satisfied  with  an  unsafe  h3T)othesis  because  no  sufficient 
proof  for  full  certainty  is  at  our  disposal.  On  the  contrary, 
the  religious  belief  carries  in  itself  a  certainty  which  is  supe- 
rior to  all  logical  power  of  demonstration.  Above  all,  God  the 
creator  is  no  naturalistic  hypothesis,  because  that  creator 


360 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


which  would  be  meant  only  as  cause  of  the  natural  process 
in  the  sense  of  natural  science  would  lack  the  essential  qual- 
ities for  a  god. 

It  may  be  doubtful  whether  the  naturalistic  contemplation 
of  things  makes  it  at  all  necessary  to  transcend  the  world  of 
experience  and  to  seek  a  creator  of  the  world.  The  chief  ar- 
gument of  past  days  was  the  adjustment  and  fitness  of  nature, 
which  seemed  explainable  only  if  a  foreseeing  intellect  had 
planned  it  from  the  beginning.  But  in  our  day  such  a  view 
has  lost  its  chief  meaning.  The  rise  of  forms  which  are  adapted 
to  their  surroundings  and  which  maintain  themselves  under 
changing  conditions  through  adjustment  nowadays  no  longer 
appears  to  natural  science  as  an  unsolvable  problem.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  sciences  recognize  to-day  more  sharply  how 
endlessly  much  in  nature  is  not  at  all  adjusted  and  adapted 
to  purposes.  Above  all,  the  hypothesis  of  a  creator  who  stands 
as  against  the  world  with  forethought  and  planning  purpose 
would  solve  the  problem  from  the  standpoint  of  the  natural 
sciences  only  when  the  creator  himself  is  conceived  as  a  bodily- 
mental  structure.  When  we  discussed  the  values  of  develop- 
ment, we  saw  that  the  human  inventor  may  be  considered  as 
a  sufficient  cause  for  the  origin  of  the  machine,  inasmuch  as 
physiology  understands  the  inventor  himself  as  a  series  of 
causal  processes  which  cooperate  to  produce  the  adjusted 
parts  of  the  machine.  The  inventor  conceived  as  cause  is  not 
in  question  in  his  purposive  reality,  but  only  as  a  psycho- 
physical process,  and  his  purposive  thought  is  itself  only 
a  piece  of  the  psycho-physical  natural  process,  a  link  in  the 
causal  chain.  But  in  the  same  way  God,  too,  would  then  be 
nothing  but  a  gigantic  psycho-physical  apparatus.  And  that 
means  that  he  might  be  sufficient  to  explain  the  resulting 
effects,  namely,  the  world-experience,  but  that  his  own  work- 
ing would  then  offer  exactly  the  same  problems.  God  himself 
would  then  have  to  be  causally  explained.  In  short,  in  this 
way  natural  science  would  always  only  come  back  again  to  a 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS  361 

naturalistic  object  which  as  such  would  never  give  an  ulti- 
mate conclusion  to  the  inquiry. 

It  is  different  when  at  the  beginning  of  the  series  a  creator 
is  posited  who  is  not  psycho-physical  mechanism,  but  is  a  sub- 
ject in  the  way  in  which  we  ourselves  are  real  subjects.  We 
always  postulated  that  our  own  deed  of  will  as  part  of  the 
historical  reality  must  be  understood  in  its  freedom  and  with- 
out reference  to  causes.  Our  deed  is  free  because  it  would  be 
meaningless  to  ask  for  its  causes.  Its  whole  reality  lies  in  its 
purpose.   It  does  not  seek  to  be  explained,  but  to  be  inter- 
preted in  its  intentions.  A  creator  who  wills  the  world  in  such 
a  way  is  indeed  beginning  and  end,  and  the  world  which  he 
plans  is  included  in  the  totality  of  his  deed.  The  causal  chain 
of  the  world  would  then  be  constituted  by  the  creator's  free 
will,  and  the  freedom  of  his  will,  which  we  can  understand  by 
feeling  our  own  will,  would  bring  to  rest  every  further  inquiry. 
Yet  we  should  have  to  admit  again  that  this  whole  creating 
super- will  has  reference  only  to  that  which  demands  explana- 
tion, the  causal  process  of  nature.    Such  a  world  creator, 
therefore,  cannot  will  anything  but  that  blind  swarming  of 
the  unchanging  elements  of  things.  The  creator's  only  pur- 
pose would  then  be  the  purposeless  movement  of  the  atoms. 
Such  a  creator  certainly  would  no  longer  be  a  mere  natural 
thing  which  itself  demands  explanation;  he  would  be  the 
creator  and  the  lawgiver.    He  has  posited  the  immutable 
masses  and  the  unchanging  energies;  and  yet:  can  such  a 
creator  who  would  be  confined  to  this  explanatory  task  ever 
mean  a  God  for  us  ?  A  will  which  wills  nothing  but  the  exist- 
ence of  the  world-substance  and  the  validity  of  the  natural 
causes  would  be  an  omnipotent  spectre,  which  would  not 
awaken  awe  or  confidence,  hope  or  fear,  thanks  or  love.  No 
religious  feeling  could  respond  to  him,  and  the  most  essential 
elements  for  a  God  would  be  lacking.  Yes,  we  hardly  even 
have  a  right  to  speak  of  omnipotence  if  such  a  creating  spirit 
does  not  will  anything  but  nature  as  nature ;  he  cannot  will 


362  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

anything  but  the  law,  and  is  thus  without  power  in  the  face 
of  a  process  according  to  law.  For  the  thought  of  action  de- 
termined by  goodness  there  would  be  no  point  of  contact  at 

If  such  a  creating  will  is  to  become  a  God,  something 
fundamentally  new  must  be  added :  the  will  must  enter  into 
relation  with  the  aesthetic  world  of  happiness,  of  unity,  of 
beauty,  and  with  the  ethical  world  of  development,  of  achieve- 
ment, of  morality.   Only  this  combination  of  the  separated 
worlds  of  values  gives  to  the  thought  of  God  the  power  of  life. 
Whether  the  world  over  which  God  dominates  is  the  infinite 
universe  of  the  modem  natural  science,  or  is  a  little  section 
of  experience  which  the  imagination  of  the  savages  has  cut 
off,  in  every  case  the  true  test  of  the  god-character  remains 
the  unification  of  a  manifoldness  of  values.   Whether  God 
stands  above  the  things  or  lives  in  the  things  themselves, 
whether  there  is  one  god  or  many,  remains  a  separation  of 
secondary  importance.   Only  one  question  is  always  funda- 
mental, whether  the  same  god  who  orders  the  things  in  their 
natural  connection  at  the  same  time  forms  our  experiences 
to  beautiful  inner  agreement  and  realizes  our  ideals  in  the 
development  of  the  world.  The  religious  feeling  must  be  cer- 
tain that  the  world  in  which  the  things  move  in  accordance 
with  God's  will  is  a  world  in  which  the  connections  are  con- 
trolled by  natural  law,  in  which  everything  unites  itself  in 
inner  harmony,  and  in  which  the  good  deed  brings  with  it  the 
victory.  The  connection  of  knowledge  may  be  still  the  most 
superficial  combination  of  experiences,  the  inner  harmony  may 
be  no  more  than  the  happiness  of  mere  enjoyment,  and  the 
victorious  good  may  not  represent  more  than  the  selfish  wish 
of  the  tribe.  Thus  the  values  may  stand  on  the  lowest  level, 
but  the  worid  which  is  dominated  by  God  must  serve  all  these 
groups  of  values  in  common.  To  believe  in  God  the  creator 
means  to  be  convinced  in  the  inmost  mind  that  through  the 
agency  of  an  over-experienceable  power  the  opposition  be- 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


363 


'tween  natural  order,  happiness,  and  morality  is  removed 
from  the  world.  No  explanation  of  the  scientific  kind  has  to 
make  this  unification  conceivable.  Only  he  who  is  immedi- 
ately and  personally  certain  and  convinced  of  this  unity 
through  God  has  religion. 

Such  a  creator  stands  at  the  central  point  of  every  great 
historical  religion.  Sometimes  the  logical,  sometimes  the 
aesthetic,  sometimes  the  ethical  postulate  may  have  the  over- 
weight in  accordance  with  the  emotional  dispositions  of  the 
different  peoples  and  ages.  These  emotional  factors  also 
decide  which  personal  attitude  in  the  relation  to  God  may 
prevail.  It  may  be  gratitude  and  love,  or  the  feeling  of  de- 
pendence, humbleness,  and  even  fear,  or  perhaps  confidence 
and  courage,  or  finally  self-sacrificing  renunciation.  But  in 
the  unerring  belief  which  gains  its  deepest  life-feeling  from 
a  beyond  in  which  all  values  become  a  unity  lies  the  religion 
which  lives  in  all  changing  religions.  If  we  look  to  the  fur- 
thest Orient,  we  find  in  the  Chinese  a  people  which  certainly 
clings  to  the  earthly  life.  Its  cult  of  the  dead  cannot  hide 
the  fact  that  it  was  fundamentally  poor  in  religion  until  the 
Buddhistic  religion  intruded  from  without.  But  from  the  be- 
ginning the  great  teachers  were  certain  that  the  supreme 
master,  who  is  at  first  the  sky  itself,  regulates  the  natural 
order  of  the  things  and  at  the  same  time  the  moral  order  of 
man  in  perfect  unity.  The  original  Chinese  consciousness 
found  its  deepest  emotional  expression  in  Laotse,  who  pro- 
claimed :  "  Man  comes  from  the  earth,  and  the  earth  from  the 
sky,  and  the  sky  from  the  Tao,  and  the  Tao  comes  from  itself. 
The  whole  created  nature  with  its  products  is  only  a  mani- 
festation of  the  Tao.  While  Tao  is  a  spiritual  and  immaterial 
being,  it  embraces  every  visible  thing  and  in  it  are  all  beings. 
A  supreme  spirit  lives  in  it  in  an  incomprehensible  way.  This 
spirit  is  the  highest  and  most  perfect  being,  because  in  it 
there  is  truth  and  belief  and  confidence.  From  eternity  to 
eternity  his  glory  will  not  cease,  because  he  combines  in  him- 


I 


364  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

self  the  true  and  the  good  and  the  beautiful  in  the  highest 
degree  of  perfection."  That  is  the  fundamental  tone  which 
sounds  through  the  religions  of  all  nations  and  all  ages.  The 
order  of  nature,  the  pure  happiness,  and  the  moral  striving 
must  somehow  be  combined  in  something  which  is  beyond 
experience,  which  we  cannot  understand,  but  in  which  we 

must  believe. 

From  China  the  way  leads  westward  to  India.  The  wonder- 
ful  people  of  India  with  their  early  flagging  energy  have 
unfolded  their  best  powers  in  their  religion ;  pondering  and 
dreaming,  through  four  thousand  years  they  have  trans- 
formed  those  fundamental  thoughts  always  anew.  From  the 
undeveloped  symbols  of  the  earliest  times  to  the  philosoph- 
ical  systems  of  religion  of  the  later  priests  there  remains  a 
certain  mysterious  feeling,  while  the  content  of  the  religion 
hardly  allows  a  unified  formula.  Nevertheless  it  might  be 
said  that  from  earliest  times  a  certain  belief  was  slowly  pre- 
pared which  later  found  incomparable  expression.  It  was  the 
belief  that  the  things  are  only  an  illusion,  the  suffering  only 
an  appearance,  the  evil  only  a  misinterpretation.  All  the  true 
being  is  spirit,  and  in  devotion  to  the  pure  spirit  all  truth, 
all  happiness,  and  all  morality  necessarily  flow  together.  The 
elimination  of  the  opposition  of  values  is  here  gained  by  an 
entirely  new  turn  of  thought.  The  opposition  is  overcome 
by  recognizing  the  worid  of  opposition  as  an  illusory  worid, 
but  the  ultimate  meaning  is,  after  all,  in  the  turn  of  the 
Indian  thought  the  same  as  in  all  other  religions  of  worid- 
influence.   Here,  too,  the  belief  has  overcome  the  struggle 
between  natural  knowledge  and  the  desire  for  happiness  and 
the  postulates  of  morality.    It  is  evident  that  the  desire 
for  happiness  is  in  this  case  the  moving  power  in  the  whole 
system.  In  spite  of  all  apparently  moral  energy  of  renuncia- 
tion,  it  remains  after  all  the  aesthetic  desire  for  the  removal 
of  suffering  which  controls  the  totality  of  this  worid-view  and 
which  subordinates  nature  and  morality. 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


365 


The  true  world  of  India  is  eternal  and  immutable.  Every 
becoming  is  only  an  illusion.  In  sharpest  contrast  to  it  we 
find  the  belief  of  the  Persians  and  the  religion  of  Zoroaster. 
The  history  of  the  world  is  a  world-struggle  which  will  end 
with  the  triumph  of  the  good  and  the  defeat  of  the  evil.  After 
a  world-period  of  twelve  thousand  years  the  savior  will  come 
and  awaken  the  dead.  The  religious  drama  thus  plays  in  this 
temporal  world  of  the  senses,  but  the  effective  religious 
power  here,  too,  combines  morality,  happiness,  and  causality. 
Those  Persian  peasants,  surrounded  by  enemies,  recognized 
that  the  good  and  the  beautiful  and  the  causally  necessary 
were  entirely  separated  in  their  suffering  existence,  and  that 
the  powers  which  controlled  their  world  allowed  the  victory 
of  the  immoral.  There  began  the  mission  of  Zoroaster.  The 
true  god,  he  proclaims,  has  nothing  in  common  with  those 
gods  of  evil.  In  the  true  god  are  combined  power  and  mor- 
ality and  the  kindness  which  brings  happiness.  The  true 
god  is  the  creator  and  conservator  of  the  world,  and  especial 
thanks  are  due  to  him  for  ordering  nature  in  accordance  with 
laws ;  but  at  the  same  time  he  is  the  holy  power  which  in 
absolute  purity  effuses  continuous  godly  energy  and  helps 
the  moral  men  powerfully  to  protect  the  world  against  the 
impure  and  bad.  This  god,  finally,  is  just,  and  guarantees  for 
the  good  word  and  the  good  deed  wonderful  reward  at  the 
last  day  of  judgment.  The  great  accord  of  the  triad  of  values 
is  thus  completely  fulfilled  here  too. 

Marduc  was  considered  the  king  of  the  gods  from  the 
foundation  of  the  Babylonian  Empire  under  Hammurabi.  At 
the  dawn  of  creation  Marduc  begins  his  control  of  the  worid. 
He  secures  the  victory  of  the  light  and  overwhelms  the  dark 
powers  of  evil.  He  guides  the  blessing  streams,  he  gives  the 
harvest  and  all  food  for  men,  he  heals  sickness  and  liberates 
the  sufferer  from  pain,  he  awakens  the  dead.  However  much 
there  may  be  which  is  crude  and  entirely  under  dominance 
of  the  naturalistic  myths,  this  connection  between  the  power 


m 


!il 


.^ 


366 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


367 


over  nature  and  the  happiness  of  men  and  the  pure  helpful 
deed  repeats  itself  in  the  whole  Babylonian-Assyrian  m3rth- 
ology.  The  anger  of  the  gods  sends  the  great  flood  to  punish 
the  evil  deeds  of  men.  They  send  pestilence  and  defeat  in 
war  to  those  who  do  wrong,  who  break  their  pledges,  who 
destroy  the  harmony  of  the  family. 

We  come  to  the  Mediterranean.  It  would  be  in  vain  to  try 
to  transform  the  Egyptian  religions,  with  their  numberless 
gods,  with  their  cult  of  animals  and  dead,  and  their  long 
changing  history,  into  a  closed  system.  But  as  soon  as  the 
thought  of  a  highest  power  has  been  formed,  it  again  serves 
at  the  same  time  the  domination  over  nature,  the  help  towards 
happiness  and  success,  and  the  enforcement  of  moral  obliga- 
tions. It  is  Amon-Ra,  the  supreme  sun-god.  "  He  gave  order 
and  the  gods  arose ;  he  made  the  men  and  created  the  animals. 
The  men  came  out  of  his  eyes  and  the  gods  out  of  his  mouth." 
—  "The  oppressed  put  their  confidence  in  him, as  he  is  the 
helper  of  the  poor  who  cannot  be  corrupted.'*  The  last  hap- 
piness in  the  paradise  of  Osiris  is  found  only  by  him  who  in 
the  court  of  the  dead  can  confess  "  that  he  has  not  done  any 
sin  against  men,  and  that  he  has  not  done  an5rthing  which 
the  gods  detest."  In  the  domain  of  Ra  there  cannot  be  any 
opposition  between  the  process  of  nature  and  happiness  and 
moral  realization. 

If  we  see  the  Greek  gods  in  the  mirror  of  the  Homeric 
songs,  we  may  be  doubtful  whether  the  Hellenic  soul,  too, 
unified  the  values  of  the  world  by  its  religion.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  we  see  them  in  the  image  of  the  Platonic  myths,  we 
know  that  the  accord  of  the  true  and  the  good  and  the  beau- 
tiful was  never  purer  and  deeper.  Yet  even  in  the  unphilo- 
sophical  heaven  of  gods  in  which  so  much  low  immoral  long- 
ing and  so  much  unjust  caprice  were  mingled,  after  all  it  was 
Zeus  who  dominated,  and,  as  the  king  of  the  gods  and  men, 
was  the  protector  of  justice  and  the  helper  of  the  weak  and 
defenceless.  And  if  the  poet  in  his  longing  for  beauty  makes 


the  gay  life  of  the  gods  appear  devoid  of  morality,  Athene 
and  Apollo  manifest  by  their  national  influence  that  a  deep 
moral  power  emanated  from  these  children  of  Zeus.  The 
incomparable  beauty  and  power  were  thus  after  all  joined 
with  a  moral  efiiciency. 

Jahwe,  the  god  of  the  Israelites,  was  at  first  practically  only 
a  naturalistic  power,  the  god  of  the  mountain  and  the  thunder- 
storm, but  the  spiritual,  moral  deepening  of  the  Jahwe 
thought  is  the  history  of  the  Jewish  nation.  If,  at  the  break- 
down of  the  Israelite  state,  the  Jahwe  religion  did  not  disap- 
pear, it  was  because  through  the  words  of  the  prophets  the 
god  had  been  developed  into  a  god  of  moral  order  superior 
to  the  chance  of  natural  experience.  From  the  deepest  moral 
soul  Elias  had  demanded  that  the  people  must  choose  by 
principle  between  the  true,  holy,  moral  god  and  the  unholy 
natural  gods.  The  god  of  Israel  was  a  powerful  god  who 
could  divide  the  sea,  and  yet  he  was  a  benevolent  god  who 
brought  welfare  and  happiness  to  his  people,  and  above  all 
he  was  a  just  god  who  would  give  up  even  his  people  if  moral 
justice  demanded  it.  In  this  unity  lie  the  meaning  and  the 
strength  of  the  belief. 

For  the  Christian  religion  it  holds  true,  more  than  for  any 
other,  that  the  mere  apprehension  of  the  outer  world  and  its 
beyond  is  not  suflScient  to  express  the  deepest  meaning  of  the 
religion.  Only  the  apprehension  of  the  self  and  the  beyond  of 
the  self,  the  confidence  in  salvation,  express  the  life  of  those 
who  believe  in  the  crucified  one.  Certainly  the  outer  world, 
too,  must  find  its  place  in  the  totality  of  the  Christian  doctrine, 
but  the  kingdom  of  God  is  in  ourselves.  Yet  at  first  we  only 
have  to  ask  as  to  the  view  of  the  outer  world.  But  it  is  clear 
already  from  the  gospels  and  from  the  convictions  of  early 
Christianity  that  this  world  of  things  is  created  in  freedom 
and  set  in  order  by  the  same  god  who  has  prepared  it  as  the 
realm  of  morality  and  who  has  blessed  it  with  happiness. 
Universal  power,  morality,  and  love  are  combined  in  the 


:») 


368 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


369 


creator.  The  world,  his  creation,  is  from  the  beginning  ar- 
ranged so  that  the  ordered  process  of  nature,  the  happy  life, 
and  the  victory  of  the  good  must  lose  their  apparent  contra- 
diction for  the  soul  of  the  believer.  From  the  beginning 
Christianity  is  the  doctrine  of  the  unification  of  nature, 
happiness,  and  morality  by  the  holy  transcending  power  of 
the  spiritual  creator. 

Since  the  days  of  the  first  Christian  communities  all  the 
particular  views  have  passed  through  incessant  changes. 
The  order  of  nature  is  very  unequally  conceived  if  sometimes 
every  change  in  the  world  is  understood  as  always  a  new 
action  of  the  creator  and  at  other  times  there  is  a  sure  belief 
that  God  has  given  to  nature  the  laws  for  all  time.  Still  more, 
morality  is  very  unequally  conceived.  Sometimes  it  is  a  pre- 
supposition that  every  human  soul  has  the  free  power  to  de- 
cide between  good  and  bad,  at  other  times  it  has  been  a  fixed 
belief  that  God  had  decided  beforehand  who  is  to  have  the 
power  for  good  and  who  may  victoriously  carry  through  the 
struggle.  And  not  less  different  is  the  way  in  which  happiness 
has  been  conceived  if  it  is  sometimes  promised  for  the  resur- 
rection at  the  last  day  and  sometimes  sought  in  the  trustful 
belief  itself  in  the  heart  of  the  fighter  in  the  hour  of  the  fight. 
But  in  the  fundamental  demand  these  contradictions  do  not 
change  anything.    In  every  variety  of  religious  doctrines, 
whenever  they  were  really  supported  by  a  living  belief,  the 
chief  fact  has  remained  the  same :  the  world  of  the  creator 
was  destined  for  the  unity  of  the  different  values.  The  moral 
may  lie  in  the  decision  of  the  individual,  or  may  have  been 
performed  by  the  predestination  of  God ;  the  happiness  may 
come  after  aeons,  or  may  illumine  our  soul  to-day.  The  rest- 
less wavering  between  the  true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful 
in  the  world,  for  the  true  Christian  of  all  periods,  is  brought  to 
rest  by  the  belief  in  God  the  father.  It  is  as  Augustine  said : 
"  Thou  hast  created  us  with  an  impulse  towards  thee ;  there- 
fore our  heart  is  restless  until  it  finds  rest  in  thee," 


The  Islam  religion  would  not  have  found  such  power  over 
the  people  if  the  Koran,  in  spite  of  its  fantastic  exaggerations, 
had  not  clearly  taught  that  the  world-totality  which  Allah 
created  serves  at  the  same  time  the  natural  order,  morality, 
and  human  happiness.  The  seven  fundamental  qualities 
officially  accredited  to  God,  it  is  true,  do  not  include  his  mer- 
ciful benevolence,  but  the  Koran  speaks  of  it  at  many  places. 
It  contributes  much  towards  the  belief  which  seeks  the  living 
unity  of  values  in  Allah  and  Mahomet.  But  it  is  still  more 
important  that  the  Koran  also  leaves  no  doubt  that  in  spite 
of  the  predestination  which  results  from  God's  omnipotence, 
after  all  the  individual  man  determines  the  moral  value  of 
his  action.  After  his  death  he  will  be  examined,  and  at  the 
day  of  judgment  he  will  find  reward  or  punishment.  If  the 
good  overweighs  the  evil,  he  will  pass  the  bridge  of  hell  with- 
out damage  and  will  reach  the  paradise  which  prophets  and 
martjTs  enter  immediately  after  their  death. 

What  expresses  itself  so  clearly  in  the  great  historical  re- 
ligions is  less  clear  and  less  perfectly  suggested  by  the  natural 
religions  and  half-religions  of  the  lower  races.  Indians  and 
Persians,  Egyptians  and  Greeks,  Israelites  and  Arabs,  started 
alike  from  crude  symbols  of  nature  and  life.  But,  after  all, 
those  gods  of  nature  and  of  dead  leaders  and  ancestors,  even 
in  the  clumsy  form  of  earliest  myths,  contain  from  the  begin- 
ning the  tendency  to  combine  separated  groups  of  values. 
Just  through  this  original  disposition  the  low  symbol  of  God 
continuously  grew  with  the  development  of  the  various  values 
which  entered  into  it,  and  slowly  and  steadily,  without  a 
sudden  change,  it  absorbed  in  itself  the  power  of  highest  belief. 
What  Jahweism  became  in  Israel  is  hardly  suggested  in  the 
preceding  Jahwe  adoration  among  the  Kenites.  But  that 
local  god  of  the  mountain,  who  was  in  a  higher  sense  morally 
indifferent,  after  all  combines  the  power  over  a  natural  region 
with  the  will  to  strengthen  the  life-hopes  of  the  tribe  and  to 
bring  to  victory  the  over-personal  will  of  that  group.  Even 


.+) 


370 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


371 


in  the  crudest  form,  the  symbol  must  be  more  than  mere 
over-personal  cause  of  nature  in  order  to  find  religious  sub- 
mission at  all.  That  all  holds  true  for  the  thousandfold  forms 
in  which  animistic  gods  to-day  still  control  the  hopes  and 
fears  of  the  uncivilized  peoples.  Whether  the  natural  powers 
become  humanized  there,  or  whether  human  leaders  become 
transformed  into  natural  powers,  whether  conceptional  words 
become  personal  names  —  in  every  fetish  there  is  already 
given  a  creating  energy  which  somehow  controls  the  natural 
connection  of  the  things  and  at  the  same  time  enters  into 
relation  with  the  common  will  and  wishes  of  the  tribe.  The 
most  different  volitions  may  stand  in  the  foreground  and 
the  forms  may  still  be  changing  and  fugitive,  but  even  in  the 
most  primitive  shape  the  absolutely  valid  value  of  the  unity 
of  values  can  be  recognized.    It  is  as  the  Buddhists  say: 
"  Many  ways  lead  from  the  most  different  starting-points  up 
to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  but  the  same  moon  shines  down 
on  all  of  them.''   And  after  all  the  same  moon  also  shines 
over  those  many  paths  which  only  lead  a  short  way  up  and 
do  not  reach  the  top  of  the  mountain. 

B.  —  REVELATION 

The  power  of  God  was  to  us  the  beyond  of  the  outer  world ; 
the  revelation  is  the  beyond  of  the  fellow-world.  The  revela- 
tion supplements  the  historical  connection  of  willing  beings 
just  as  the  creation  supplements  the  causal  connection  of 
things.  Through  revelation  the  holy  spirit  pervades  the  whole 
fabric  of  human  society  as  religious  doctrine,  as  cult,  as  church 
and  clergy,  and  gives  to  the  life  of  the  community  its  over- 
personal  value.  If  our  valuations  are  to  be  without  contra- 
diction in  themselves,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  believe  that  the 
world  of  things  is  more  than  mere  nature.  We  must  also  feel 
certain  that  the  claims  of  men  which  approach  us  as  historical 
reality  are  more  than  merely  demands  of  historical  men.  Our 
social  life  is  not  only  filled  with  social  strifes,  but  is  the  battle- 


ground of  opposing  valuations.  The  consciousness  of  our 
duties  and  of  our  rights,  the  dignity  and  power  of  the  histor- 
ical traditions,  the  over-personal  hopes  and  appreciations, 
may  oppose  one  another.  All  these  contrasts  can  and  must 
disappear  only  when  we  are  certain  that  the  historical  con- 
nection ultimately  points  back  to  God.  We  must  feel  that  the 
demand  of  men  is  ultimately  sanctioned  by  God  himself,  in 
whom  all  order  and  all  morality  and  all  bliss  become  a  unity. 
Only  in  so  far  as  the  historical  willing  flows  immediately  from 
God's  own  will  is  the  highest  value  of  completion  reached ; 
only  then  can  it  combine  in  itself  in  a  scientifically  inconceiv- 
able way  the  values  of  historical  order,  of  moral  deed,  and  of 
endless  life-harmony. 

The  over-personal  demand  for  complete  unity  of  values 
must  trace  the  life  of  the  community  to  a  religious  revelation. 
God  then  becomes  for  the  historical  life  too  the  spiritual 
background  in  which  the  contradictions  become  reconciled. 
God's  influence  means  not  at  all  merely  a  direct  continuation 
of  the  historical  tradition  in  retracing  history  beyond  its 
origin.  We  saw  that  a  god  who  does  not  will  to  be  an3rthing 
but  a  cause  of  nature  would  not  be  a  god,  but  merely 
a  psycho-physical  mechanism  which  itself  would  belong  in 
natural  science.  In  the  same  way  a  god  whose  revelation  was 
nothing  but  the  beginning  of  the  historical  continuity  would 
not  be  a  god,  but  merely  a  vague  chapter  of  pre-history.  The 
over-human  influence  becomes  a  religious  revelation  only  if  it 
includes,  beside  the  historical  value  of  connection,  also  the 
sesthetic  value  of  fulfilment  and  the  ethical  value  of  the  ideal 
goal.  Revelation  can  therefore  come  in  at  any  time  anew, 
inasmuch  as  the  will  of  God  may  enter  into  the  historical 
process  at  any  point  to  unite  the  valuations  and  to  give  to  the 
human  community  confidence  and  direction. 

Every  miracle  is  such  a  new  revelation,  and  it  is  clear  that 
in  this  sense  the  miracle  belongs  to  the  most  necessary  mani- 
festations of  the  evaluating  consciousness.  The  miracle  is  no 


)ii' 


*) 


372 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


^t 


suspension  or  annulling  of  the  natural  laws,  inasmuch  as 
the  connection  in  which  the  miracle  has  a  meaning  is  not  the 
order  of  nature,  but  is  the  connection  of  wills.  That  which 
goes  on  in  the  miracle  is  without  any  relation  to  the  question 
whether  those  experiences  can  be  apperceived  also  as  physical 
facts.   As  soon  as  they  are  brought  under  such  a  point  of 
view,  of  course  they  must  be  obedient  to  the  natural  laws, 
and  the  apparent  exception  would  simply  constitute  a  pro- 
blem which  science  was  so  far  unable  to  solve.    But  such  a 
point  of  view  of  science  is  artificial  and  foreign  to  the  real 
life-experience  of  the  miracle,  in  which  everything  depends 
upon  the  manifestation  of  a  will.  We  saw  that  it  is  always 
artificial  to  bring  the  real  historical  life  under  the  thought- 
forms  of  the  causal  natural  science.   The  world  of  freedom 
demands  rather  its  own  forms  of  connection.  Only  in  a  world 
of  freedom  the  miracle  takes  place.   A  will  manifests  itself 
there  which  we  understand  as  the  will  of  God.  There  is  no 
breaking  of  the  chain  of  natural  processes  in  question,  be- 
cause in  that  realm  of  freedom  no  natiu^l  order  is  involved. 
The  power  of  the  miracle  does  not  lie  in  its  negative  relation 
to  suspended  causes,  but  in  its  positive  relation  to  a  superior 
will,  in  the  significance  and  uniqueness  of  its  revelation. 

The  revelation,  therefore,  must  always  give  to  man  much 
more  than  merely  the  recognition  that  God  exists.  The  whole 
historical  life  finds  its  impulses  and  its  uniting  meaning  there. 
The  orders  of  the  state  and  the  crowns  of  the  monarchs  are 
divine.  The  law  and  the  power  of  punishment  are  divine, 
marriage  and  oaths  are  divine,  every  moral  deed  and  every 
ideal  striving  in  the  community  are  divine.  The  whole  his- 
torical life  in  its  reference  to  the  revelation  becomes  in  this 
way  embedded  in  religion.  It  is  therefore  entirely  wrong  to 
believe  that  there  can  exist  a  fundamental  opposition  between 
religion  and  state,  or  between  religion  and  science,  or  between 
religion  and  art.  Wherever  such  an  opposition  historically 
arises,  one  of  the  two  sides,  or  both,  must  have  become  dis- 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


373 


loyal  to  their  highest  ideal  task.  The  special  values,  as  for 
instance  science  or  art  or  law  or  industry  or  love,  may  enter 
into  conflict  with  each  other,  but  religion  cannot  be  in  dis- 
agreement with  any  one  of  them  by  principle,  as  religion's 
fundamental  task  is  to  unite  the  valuations  by  reference  to 
a  beyond.  A  narrow-minded  church,  a  selfish  state,  a  petty 
school-knowledge,  a  reckless  art,  a  frozen  morality,  may  not 
come  into  harmony  with  one  another.  That  is  easily  under- 
stood. 

Where  there  is  community-life,  there  revelation  is  also 
needed.  The  religion  alone  always  brings  that  which  diverges 
again  to  convergence,  inasmuch  as  the  consciousness  of  his- 
torical tradition  and  order,  of  moral  duty,  and  of  fullest  hap- 
piness can  be  combined  only  through  such  a  transhistorical 
relation.  The  mere  progress  of  civilization  would  be  unable 
to  conciliate  all  opposition  of  valuation.  Certainly  on  the 
lowest  levels  there  is  usually  no  definite  tradition  for  such  an 
over-historical  communication.  The  priests  know  that  the 
fetish  and  the  idol  have  their  magical  powers,  that  the  holy 
animal  must  be  adored  by  the  whole  clan,  that  the  prescrip- 
tions of  the  taboo  must  be  observed,  but  there  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  definite  act  of  revelation  by  which  this  over-natural 
information  was  gained.  But  everywhere,  among  the  prim- 
itive peoples  of  Africa  and  America  and  the  South  Seas  and 
among  the  Mongols,  everywhere  the  beginnings  of  state  order, 
of  moral  duty,  of  legal  obligation,  of  social  harmony,  and  of 
explanatory  knowledge,  have  found  their  last  connection  and 
their  unity  with  hopes  and  wishes  for  the  common  happiness 
through  the  revealed  proclamation  of  the  priests. 

This  belief  finds  its  fullest  elaboration  in  the  great  devel- 
oped religions.  When  Zoroaster  on  the  height  of  the  moun- 
tain experiences  the  contact  with  God  and  is  lifted  to  the 
heavenly  throne  and  hears  from  God  himself  the  divine  truth, 
the  Persian  belief  finds  in  this  over-historical  starting-point 
the  essentials  of  religion.  From  there  flows  the  energy  with 


i 


374 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


which  the  historical  order,  the  hoped-for  happiness,  and  the 
moral  conviction  in  the  life  of  the  Persians  reenforced  one 
another.  There  before  his  throne  God  himself  had  made 
Zoroaster  his  prophet.  Every  historical  development  had  in 
this  over-fact  its  absolutely  safe  starting-point. 

Buddha  did  not  receive  the  revelation :  his  earthly  life 
itself  was  revelation.  To  become  a  savior  for  mankind  he 
decided  to  descend  from  heaven  to  earth.  As  his  mother  he 
chose  a  pious  queen,  and  as  soon  as  he  was  bom,  he  cried 
with  a  loud  voice :  "  I  am  the  supreme  and  best  in  the  world, 
and  shall  make  an  end  of  all  suffering.''  In  the  later  belief 
of  the  church,  the  historical  Buddha  even  becomes  only  one 
manifestation  of  the  real  Buddha.  He  remains  the  most  im- 
portant appearance,  but  before  and  after  him  Buddha  mani- 
fested himself  also  in  other  forms. 

The  always  new  revelation  of  divine  will  has  perhaps  no- 
where more  deeply  entered  into  the  national  life  than  through 
the  Delphic  oracles  of  the  Greeks.  Political  alliances  and 
fimdamental  laws  were  made  dependent  upon  the  voices  of 
the  Delphic  Apollo,  and  through  Apollo  Zeus  himself  was 
speaking.  The  question  is  not  how  far  the  calculation  of 
priests  and  how  far  the  sincere  belief  in  prophets  influenced 
the  people.  The  decisive  fact  is  that  through  the  belief  in  the 
words  of  the  virginal  Pythia  a  deep  civilizing  harmony  of 
political  state  movements,  of  social  peace  movements,  and 
of  moral  law  movements  was  secured.  The  logically  valuable 
historical  order,  the  aesthetically  valuable  harmony  of  love, 
and  the  ethically  valuable  realization  of  the  deepest  will 
through  action  could  be  melted  together  in  the  life  of  Greece 
into  a  unity  only  by  the  power  of  the  cult  with  its  manifesta- 
tions. The  same  holds  true  for  the  Assyrians  and  Babylonians 
with  their  abundant  talent  for  religion.  Here  even  art  and 
science  are  apprehended  as  immediate  divine  revelations, 
just  as  the  throne  of  the  kings  is  established  by  the  gods.  The 
laws  of  Hammurabi's  old  Babylonian  statutes  are  all  to  be 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS  375 

referred  to  divine  revelation.  The  relief  in  the  famous  diorite 
block  shows  how  the  sun  god  installs  the  king  as  judge. 

The  religious  significance  of  Moses,  too,  lies  in  the  fact  that 
God  manifests  himself  to  him  as  a  living  god  who  restores  to 
the  people  oppressed  under  the  Egyptian  might  their  belief 
in  their  destiny.  It  was  the  divine  revelation  which  through 
Moses  spoke  to  the  discouraged  people  and  started  a  new 
development,  in  which  all  the  ideals  again  became  a  unity. 
But  just  as  God  manifested  himself  before  to  Abraham  and 
Isaac  and  Jacob,  so  the  Jahwe  of  Moses  has  revealed  himself 
to  many  successors  and  has  given  to  the  historic  development 
of  the  believers  the  over-historical  unity.    In  the  belief  in 
revelation  also  lies  the  decisive  power  for  the  world-task  of 
historical  Christianity.  Certainly  the  meaning  of  the  Christian 
conviction  is  grasped  most  deeply  when  the  revelation  is 
posited  into  the  own  heart  and  is  sought  in  the  change  which 
a  true  belief  brings  to  the  inner  life.  But  the  church,  both  the 
Protestant  and  the  Catholic,  at  first  had  good  reason  to  main- 
tain the  revealed  doctrine  as  revelation.  The  inspired  sacred 
writings  as  such  were  inexhaustible  sources  of  the  historical 
influence.  The  life  of  Jesus  with  its  miracles  was  a  manifesta- 
tion of  the  God  of  love.  The  Christian  community  found  in 
this  manifestation,  from  the  manger  to  the  cross,  the  point  of 
transcending  reference  from  which  every  valuable  hope  and 
will  and  work  attained  inner  unity.   The  miracle  had  this 
world-moving  influence  not  because  it  was  supra-natural, 
but  because  it  was  supra-historical.  It  had  no  relation  what- 
ever to  nature  as  such,  but  it  stood  in  decisive  relation  to 
history.   For  the  historical  volition  it  was  the  inspiration 
and  transformation.  For  Islam,  too,  there  can  hardly  be  a 
doubt  that  Mahomet  himself  really  believed  that  he  was 
called  to  his  mission  by  Allah,  and  that  his  prophetic  mani- 
festation would  realize  itself.  Islam  does  not  deny  that  God 
has  revealed  himself  to  the  world  by  angels  and  prophets  and 
saintly  men  from  Adam  and  Noah  to  Jesus,  but  the  Koran 


J 


376 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


I 


which  contains  the  manifestation  through  Mahomet  is  alone 
destined  for  all  mankind.  It  is  the  true  word  of  God,  which 
was  decreed  by  God  from  eternal  times,  and  which  was  sent 
down  by  the  angel  in  order  that  Mahomet  might  manifest  it. 
Again  the  believers  had  thus  gained  an  historical  beyond  which 
gave  to  the  political,  the  aesthetic,  and  the  ethical  energies  a 
common  unified  direction. 

Thus  the  community-life  has  secured  at  all  times  the  unity 
of  its  diverging  valuations  by  the  belief  in  an  over-historical 
starting-point  in  ever  new  forms  and  symbols.  In  the  belief 
itself  this  identification  of  the  values  became  realized;  no 
perception  and  no  science  were  needed  for  it.  The  mystic,  to 
be  sure,  at  all  times  and  at  all  places  has  found  this  relation 
to  a  revealing  god  immediately  in  himself.  When  the  re- 
velation which  he  experienced  irradiated  to  the  fellow-world, 
he  became  an  historical  religious  power ;  when  that  which  his 
vision  saw  determined  only  his  own  religious  life,  the  histor- 
ical life-connection  was  cut  off.  On  the  other  hand,  the  belief 
of  the  community  must  be  deepened  when  the  manifestation 
which  the  individual  experiences  in  his  own  believing  heart 
harmonizes  with  the  revelation  of  the  church,  and  if  the  inner 
world  in  this  way  testifies  to  that  which  the  fellow-world 
must  demand  in  order  to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  values. 

C.  —  SALVATION 

The  inner  world  is  filled  with  contradictions.  Through  our 
own  power  this  opposition  and  strife  of  our  inner  volitions 
cannot  be  subdued.  The  soul  seeks  a  beyond  of  the  inner 
experience  in  which  this  counterplay  comes  to  silence.  It  may 
be  a  heavenly  predestination  which  takes  care  that  just  our 
own  self  after  all  finally  comes  to  a  complete  unity.  Or  it  may 
be  the  pious  worship  and  a  heavenly  vision  which  raise  our 
self  above  all  inner  struggles.  Or  a  life  after  death  may  unroll 
itself  before  the  believing  eye,  and  may  offer  everything  which 
life  has  denied.  Or  an  atonement  may  purify  us  from  our  sins. 


THE  VALUES  OP  HOLINESS 


377 


Infinite,  indeed,  are  the  forms  in  which  the  misery  of  mankind 
externally  and  internally  is  overcome  by  belief,  and  a  last 
unity  gained  not  for  the  natural  process  of  the  outer  world, 
not  for  the  historical  movement  of  the  fellow-world,  but  for 
the  experience  of  the  inner  world.  The  longing  for  this  abso- 
lute value  of  unity  in  our  inner  world  is  the  demand  for  salva- 
tion. It  arises  wherever  in  the  world  mankind  exists,  because 
the  necessary,  the  moral,  and  the  happy  never  have  com- 
pletely unified  themselves  in  the  life-experience  of  any  one. 
The  thought  of  a  life  after  death  in  a  better  place  is  not  at 
all  necessarily  in  the  foreground ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  just 
this  thought  has  been  often  developed  without  reference  to 
the  idea  of  salvation.  The  idea  of  the  soul  which  is  suggested 
by  the  facts  of  death  or  by  dreams  may  lead  to  a  belief  in 
another  world  which  is  not  at  all  a  better  one.  Even  among 
the  lowest  savages,  who  show  no  traces  of  religious  impulses, 
the  idea  of  a  life  after  death  is  often  developed.  The  dead  are 
furnished  with  shoes  for  the  long  journey,  but  that  they  will 
find  a  better  life  in  the  strange  land  is  at  first  not  involved  in 
the  consideration.  Yet  the  way  from  such  ideas  to  the  para- 
dise is  only  a  short  one.  Even  to  the  lowest  Indian  the  be- 
yond is  a  place  for  enjoyment  and  pleasure,  and  for  the  hunter 
it  is  a  hunting-ground  rich  with  buffaloes.  But  while  the 
better  life  is  at  first  often  independent  of  the  desire  for  salva- 
tion, still  more  often  the  salvation  is  independent  of  a  heav- 
enly life.  Here  on  earth  the  suffering  of  the  soul  will  disappear, 
and  all  will  come  to  complete  unity  by  divine  influence,  by 
benevolent  providence,  by  prayers,  and  good  deeds.  Yes, 
even  the  life  after  death  does  not  necessarily  have  to  be  re- 
moved from  earth.  The  doctrine  of  transmigration  of  souls, 
for  instance,  in  the  ethically  shaded  form  of  Brahmanism,  is 
surely  a  doctrine  of  salvation.  The  man  whose  existence  is 
filled  with  good  deeds  is  raised  by  divine  influence  to  a  higher 
stage  of  life,  which  is  freed  from  the  pains  and  struggles  of  the 
lower  stage.  The  partial  liberation  from  the  present  suffering 


378  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

will  thus  come  when  the  present  life-struggle  is  fought  to  an 
end,  but  it  will  come  in  the  form  of  an  earthly  life. 

Yet  the  fullest  liberation  is  found  for  the  Indian  thought 
only  in  the  complete  emancipation  from  the  treasures  of  life. 
Life  is  suffering  because  it  is  desire.  When  the  desire  in  us  is 
annihilated,  the  torture  of  existence  is  ended.  An  unselfish, 
mild,  pure  state  of  mind  and  the  discipline  of  abstinence  is 
Buddha's  sermon  for  the  masses;  but  those  who  want  to 
reach  the  beatitude  of  complete  deliverance  must  go  beyond 
it  and  come  to  a  state  in  which  all  sensuous  excitements  are 
extinguished  and  a  dreaming  ecstasy  is  brought  about.  The 
centre  of  gravity  seems  to  lie  only  in  the  liberation  from  pain, 
but  Buddha  says  that  everybody  is  himself  the  cause  of  his 
suffering,  and  by  himself  he  will  be  liberated.  That  which  is 
to  be  aimed  at  is  then  ultimately  not  deliverance  from  the 
world,  but  liberation  from  the  selfish  attitude  towards  the 
world.  Only  when  we  relate  the  things  to  ourselves  as  indi- 
vidual persons  do  they  become  evils.   If  we  sink  into  that 
absolutely  valid  reality,  there  is  no  longer  anything  ugly  or 
anything  painful.    This  salvation  from  the  conflicts  of  the 
world  is  therefore  ultimately  the  own  rising  to  the  standpoint 

of  pure  valuation. 

It  seems  as  if  the  highest  conflict,  the  conflict  of  the  pure 
values  themselves,  is  not  touched  by  all  that.  But  it  is  clear 
that  we  become  conscious  of  that  conflict  of  values  only  by 
the  selfish  reference  of  the  world  to  our  own  personality.  The 
necessity  of  the  world-process  and  the  beautiful  harmony  of 
things  and  the  purity  of  moral  ideals  are  not  in  themselves  in 
conflict.  The  opposition  comes  only  by  their  mutual  crossing 
in  our  personal  will-experience  because  the  unity  of  our  per- 
sonality then  demands  also  a  unitedness  of  those  demands 
for  values.  The  necessary  natural  process  which  as  such  is 
valuable  becomes  perhaps  an  anti-value  when  it  contradicts 
the  demand  for  harmony  and  brings  us  misery.  In  the  same 
way  the  harmony  of  joy  which  is  valuable  may  become  a  sin 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


379 


when  it  contradicts  the  value  of  morality.  And  again  every- 
thing which  is  valuable  in  the  world  of  moral  purity  and 
beautiful  harmony  may  become  untrue  for  us  when  it  con- 
tradicts our  demand  for  a  reliable  order  of  things.  The  mis- 
ery, the  sin,  and  the  untrue  are  thus  rebellions  against  aes- 
thetic, ethical,  and  logical  values  as  soon  as  they  are  referred 
to  the  individual  person.  As  long  as  they  are  only  related  to 
the  world  itself,  they  are  merely  mutually  independent  values. 
If  the  relation  of  the  values  to  a  personal  will  is  extinguished, 
then  there  ceases  the  mutual  disturbance  of  the  values,  be- 
cause then  they  no  longer  have  any  mutual  relations.  He 
who  sinks  into  the  world  without  reference  to  his  own  self 
has  therefore  overcome  the  opposition  of  the  true  values. 
But  he  has  not  overcome  the  opposition  by  reconciling  and 
uniting  them,  but  by  eliminating  the  demand  for  such  unity 
through  renouncing  his  own  self.  The  world  in  itself  is  not 
sinful,  not  unhappy,  not  untrue.  Each  of  its  values  is  a  be- 
coming of  a  special  kind,  an  elaboration  of  special  ideals 
which  do  not  disturb  each  other,  but  which  do  not  come  in 
contact  with  each  other.  Indian  philosophy  thus  opens  a  way  to 
a  new  kind  of  unity,  the  unity  not  in  the  world  but  in  the  soul 
which  strives  for  ideals.  Not  the  god  who  dominates  the  all 
but  the  soul  which  starts  the  valuations  of  the  world  must 
now  be  conceived  as  the  ultimate  unity.  But  if  that  is  the 
meaning,  then  religion  has  been  transformed  into  philosophy. 
He  who  seeks  the  unity  by  sinking  impersonally  and  there- 
fore over-personally  into  the  world,  and  therefore  finds  it  not 
in  God  but  in  the  seeking  self,  is  on  the  way  to  a  philosophical 
view  of  the  world,  even  when  he  continues  to  speak  the  lan- 
guage of  religion.  Buddhism  is  therefore  in  its  ultimate  mean- 
ing philosophy.  In  the  same  direction  moves  the  religion  of 
salvation  in  all  times  as  soon  as  the  impersonal  sinking  into 
the  world  becomes  the  predominant  element.  Neoplatonism 
expresses  it  clearly. 
The  Jewish  religion  began  with  a  strong  personal  claim  on 


I 


m 


380  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

the  world ;  the  conflict  was  therefore  intensely  felt,  and  was 
referred  entirely  to  the  given  world  itself.  Only  a  god  beyond 
this  world  could  remove  this  inner  friction  of  the  experience. 
The  fulfilment  of  the  prescriptions  which  God  likes  can  secure 
the  earthly  welfare  in  which  all  conflicts  of  the  inner  world 
are  harmoniously  solved.   The  promised  kingdom  for  which 
they  hope  is  at  first  still  to  come  on  earth.  The  beyond  of  the 
experience  is  simply  experience  of  the  future.  Only  late  the 
Jewish  nation  developed  the  belief  in  the  life  after  death,  a 
belief  which  was  living  in  the  Greek  mysteries  as  well  as  in  the 
Persian  and  Egyptian  national  consciousness.  In  Christianity 
this  belief  enters  into  the  centre  of  the  ideas.  Not  a  kingdom 
on  earth  but  a  kingdom  in  heaven  will  come,  in  which  bodily 
human  existence  and  happiness  and  justice  and  peace  will  be 
united.  The  unity  of  the  logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical  values 
in  the  inner  world  is  completely  realized  in  the  Christian 
belief  in  a  beyond.    The  earthly  life  with  its  conflicts  is  now 
embedded  in  a  larger  whole  as  an  harmonious  part.    In  this 
infinite  totality  all  limitations  of  experience  and  all  struggles 
of  the  world  are  annihilated,  and  this  supreme  value  which 
harmoniously  unites  all  values  is  more  certain  than  the  ex- 
perience itself  because  the  conviction  of  belief  maintains  it. 
In  the  religion  of  Islam  all  that  reappears. 

It  corresponds  exactly  to  the  meaning  of  values  that  in  the 
church  of  Christ  and  in  the  church  of  Mahomet,  there  is  a 
hell  with  its  tortures  as  well  as  a  heaven.  Values  can  never 
be  affirmed  without  making  the  denial  thinkable,  too.  The 
absolutely  ultimate  value  can  be  reached  by  the  soul  only  if 
it  wills  values  at  all.  The  moral  value  is  the  only  one  which 
must  be  created  by  own  activity.  Whoever  denies  it  by  sinful 
deed  does  not  will  any  unity  in  his  deepest  willing,  and  there- 
fore destroys  for  himself  the  heavenly  certainty.  The  imag- 
ination may  give  to  the  tortures  infinite  content,  but  the 
deepest  torture  after  all  remains  that  the  unity  of  will  cannot 
be  reached,  that  the  heaven  is  closed.  The  decisive  fact  is 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


381 


that  a  heavenly  kingdom  in  full  unity  of  valuation  exists. 
"Thy  kingdom  come"  is  the  prayer  of  the  soul  which  desires 
salvation.  In  this  highest  completion  of  the  inner  world 
nothing  is  fundamentally  changed  when  in  the  sense  of 
Paulinism  the  future  resurrection  is  not  referred  to  the  body 
but  to  the  spirit,  and  if  the  death  of  the  crucified  one  is 
thought  as  atonement.  Christ  now  intermediates  the  salva- 
tion, but  the  state  of  being  saved  maintains  the  same  features. 

The  Christian  thought  of  salvation,  too,  leads  beyond  it- 
self, or  rather  leads  from  the  purely  religious  to  the  philosoph- 
ical attitude.  The  moral  consciousness  has  often  objected  to 
the  idea  of  atonement,  the  aesthetic  consciousness  has  re- 
volted against  the  idea  of  a  final  condemnation,  the  logical 
consciousness  has  resisted  the  consequences  which  seemed 
to  belong  to  resurrection.  But  the  philosophizing  change  in 
the  idea  of  immortality  arises  after  all  from  quite  different 
considerations.  In  the  unphilosophical  form  this  belief  stands 
and  falls  with  the  presupposition  that  our  inner  world  is  a 
process  in  time,  a  process  which  by  an  unlimited  temporal 
prolongation  becomes  the  possible  bearer  of  infinite  values. 
But  just  this  presupposition  does  not  hold.  When  we  dis- 
cussed the  sciences  and  separated  the  historical  aspect  from 
the  naturalistic  one,  we  recognized  that  all  historical  reality 
is  given  by  deeds  of  will  which  are  not  describable  and  ex- 
plainable things,  but  attitudes  which  must  be  interpreted, 
understood,  and  appreciated.  As  such  living  realities  the 
human  experiences,  we  saw,  are  not  in  a  causal  connection, 
and  not  in  the  time  of  the  physical  things.  Their  reality  lies 
in  the  connection  of  their  meaning,  and  this  connection  be- 
longs to  the  realm  of  freedom.  The  question  of  causes  and  of 
temporal  duration  is  for  these  immediate  will-experiences  as 
little  admissible  as  the  question  of  their  space-form,  or  weight, 
or  color. 

Of  course  we  saw  that  everything  in  the  world  can  be 
treated  as  object;  the  self  then  becomes  a  passive  spectator, 


I: 


iVd 


382 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  HOLINESS 


383 


and  the  experience  becomes  a  causal  content  of  consciousness. 
We  recognized  that  as  the  task  of  psychology.  But  then  the 
immediate  life-reality  is  sacrificed ;  it  is  an  abstract  aspect 
which  becomes  necessary  for  the  special  purposes  of  explana- 
tion. If  we  do  not  have  to  explain  the  inner  world,  but  to 
understand  it  in  its  meaning  and  in  its  values,  we  must  try  not 
to  analyze  it  psychologically,  but  to  grasp  it  in  its  immediate 
will-character.  In  this  purposive  life-reality  our  inner  life  is 
not  in  the  time-form  of  the  physical  things.  Our  self  is  directed 
towards  things  which  are  considered  as  present,  or  as  past,  or 
as  future,  but  the  self  itself  does  not  become  a  thing  by  that, 
and  is  not  simultaneous  with  its  present  things.  The  self 
itself  remains  outside  of  the  physical  time  because  it  posits 
and  embraces  that  time  in  all  its  directions.  In  the  over- 
temporal  act  of  the  will,  the  total  infinite  time  of  the  things 
is  enclosed.  An  immortality  which  is  merely  a  prolongation 
of  a  temporal  process  can  therefore  refer  only  to  that  psycho- 
logized mental  thing.  The  free  over-temporal  self,  the  acts  of 
which  constitute  our  immediate  life,  cannot  go  on  through  an 
infinite  time  because  it  cannot  enter  into  time  at  all. 

In  any  case,  no  real  value  could  arise  if  our  self-reality 
were  to  live  its  life  in  the  physical  time.  All  that  is  banished 
into  time  is  absolutely  not  existing  if  it  does  not  lie  in  the 
present  instant.  The  past  and  the  future  are  equally  beyond 
reach.  Reality  then  transforms  itself  into  an  unending  pro- 
cession of  single  instants,  and  everything  which  is  merely 
instantaneous  is  in  itself  absolutely  without  value.  We  saw 
that  every  value  depends  upon  the  identifying  realization 
between  separate  contents.  Schiller's  Don  Carios  exclaimed : 
"  One  instant  lived  in  paradise  is  not  too  deariy  bought  by 
death.*'   But  such  an  instant  would  be  entirely  worthless. 
The  value  could  set  in  only  if  at  least  two  instants  were  given, 
and  the  second  were  recognized  as  the  identical  realization  of 
the  first.  But  that  is  possible  only  when  the  two  separated 
contents  are  taken  into  one  imified  act.  The  first  must  there- 


fore not  have  become  imreal  when  the  second  enters.  The 
anticipation  and  the  realization  must  not  be  two  temporal 
processes,  as  in  temporal  form  the  first  would  no  longer  exist 
when  the  second  arises.  They  must  rather  be  separated  parts 
of  one  atemporal  will-act.  But  if  one  single  temporally  con- 
ceived and  therefore  psychologized  experience  is  worthless 
in  itself  and  unfit  to  enter  into  a  value,  the  mere  multiplica- 
tion cannot  change  anything.  A  mere  chain  of  temporal  con- 
tents of  consciousness  therefore  remains  indifferent  from  the 
standpoint  of  value,  even  if  it  goes  through  uncounted  mil- 
lions of  centuries.  The  mere  extension  of  our  psychological 
phenomena  in  time  would  be,  for  the  meaning  of  the  person- 
ality, just  as  accidental,  external,  and  ultimately  worthless  as 
the  expansion  of  our  body  in  space.  Our  life  would  not  be- 
come more  valuable  if  our  arm  should  reach  to  the  furthest 
star.  In  the  purposive  atemporal  experience  lies  our  personal 
reality.  Therefore  the  unified  identification  of  values  can  be 
found  for  our  inner  world  not  by  a  temporal  prolongation 
but  only  outside  of  time. 

The  spiritual  beyond,  accordingly,  begins  not  after  aeons, 
or  after  the  bodily  temporal  occurrence  of  our  death,  but 
must  be  included  in  our  over-temporal  will-connections.  It 
is  a  beyond  because  it  transcends  all  the  real  acts  of  our  will, 
and  can  never  be  completely  grasped  in  a  concrete  life- 
experience.  It  is  therefore  an  ideal,  but  this  ideal  can  be  be- 
lieved as  real  because  our  conviction  maintains  it.  The  true 
salvation  in  the  spirit  of  Christianity  is  the  victorious  arising 
of  that  will-attitude  in  us  by  which  every  opposition  of  values 
is  overcome  and  the  full  unity  of  the  true,  the  harmonious, 
and  the  good  is  reached  in  our  soul.  It  is  the  salvation  of  the 
over-personal  blessedness.  All  understanding  of  this  ultimate 
unity  then  leads  into  the  depth  of  the  own  soul.  Now  the 
salvation  no  longer  results  as  the  effect  of  a  divine  action, 
but  by  our  own  aiming  toward  a  higher  purer  life.  The  be- 
yond of  our  inner  world  lies  at  the  bottom  of  our  self,  and  by 


I 


1 


384  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

that  insight  the  religious  thought  takes  a  turn  towards  phil- 
^ophy.    Nevertheless,  the  Christian  thought  remains  also 
Tthis  form  still  true  religion.  It  remains  religion  because  m 
the  centre  stands  the  certainty  that  this  own  coj~^ 
of  the  unity  of  values  is  upheld  by  the  belief  m  God   The  be- 
Hef  i^  the  Line  power  of  uniting  the  values  is  now  itself  the 
Lving  fact.  That  again  is  certainly  not  to  be  undei^tood 
S  any  psychological  sense.  The  decisive  reality  remains  un- 
expre^d  if  this  belief  comes  to  be  described  as  a  psychi^ 
Suse  and  this  expansion  of  our  soul  as  a  psychical  effect. 
Xt  "really  in  quest-  is  the  connection  of  meanings  m 
free  volitions.  To  love  God  means  to  the  inner  world  the 
a^lutely  valid  conciliation  of  all  mutually  opposing  evalua- 
?ons   The  torn  and  broken  experience  of  the  self  ha.  become 
n  the  belief  a  meaningful  unity,  the  inner  struggle  has  come 
to  rest,  the  helpless  bondage  has  been  transformed  into  free- 
dom  by  salvation. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 

The  pious  soul  finds  God  in  a  vague  longing  toward  the  unity 
of  values ;  to  find  this  unity  of  values  by  a  conscious,  con- 
ceptionally  clear,  purposive  labor  is  the  ultimate  task  of  all 
philosophy.  Thus  the  goal  remains  a  common  one,  but  the 
way  towards  it  is  entirely  different.   This  difference  is  too 
easily  misunderstood,  and  yet  the  God  to  whom  prayer  rises 
has  lost  his  deepest  religious  meaning  if  he  transforms  him- 
self into  the  absolute  of  the  idealist.  The  ultimate  principle 
which  philosophy  is  seeking  is  not  meant  to  come  to  us  in 
creation,  revelation,  and  salvation.   Certainly  religion,  too, 
has  reached  an  absolutely  ultimate.    There  cannot  exist  a 
being  who  stands  behind  the  Godhead.  As  soon  as  the  pur- 
pose is  to  apprehend  the  given  worlds  of  truth  and  of  har- 
mony and  of  goodness  as  identical  with  one  another,  the 
belief  in  God  alone  can  bring  us  certainty.  No  philosophical 
remodelling  of  this  belief  can  supplement  this  completing 
thought  or  still  less  replace  it.  Only  by  the  relation  to  God 
can  these  conflicting  worlds  be  united  in  such  a  way  that  one 
fulfils  itself  in  another  and  that  their  totality  itself  becomes 
a  pure  value.  Yet  the  presupposition  for  this  deed  of  belief 
remains  that  these  at  first  conflicting  worlds  are  given  as 
experienced  realities.  From  the  things  of  life  which  we  find, 
from  the  real  nature  and  history,  from  the  love  and  happiness 
that  men  really  experience,  from  the  moral  order  which 
is  really  given  to  us,  our  longing  arises  to  the  holy,  which  is 
supra-real  and  which  unites  all  that  is  given.   From  such 
starting-points  the  unity  cannot  be  reached  in  any  other  way ; 
no  philosophical  thought  can  explode  this  belief.  The  valu- 


^t 


.ill 


386 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


able  experiences  themselves  do  not  become  changed  by  this 
superstructure  of  a  divine  reality. 

All  this  must  be  entirely  different  as  soon  as  philosophy 
tries  to  seek  the  unity  of  the  values.  Then  the  first  step 
must  be  to  examine  the  presuppositions  of  the  values  them- 
selves. That  which  we  call  the  given  and  that  which  we  call 
the  experience  must  themselves  become  problems  of  thought. 
By  such  a  turn  the  direction  of  the  search  becomes  entirely 
changed.  If  we  examine  the  given  experience  itself  we  must 
turn  from  the  experience  to  the  experiencing  subject,  from 
the  values  to  the  evaluating  consciousness,  from  the  world 
to  the  I  and  its  reason.  But  if  those  realms  of  value  are  de- 
pendent upon  the  actions  of  the  self,  their  unification  can  no 
longer  be  brought  about  by  merely  uniting  the  separated  ex- 
periences, but  rather  must  be  brought  about  by  uniting  the 
evaluating  actions  of  our  L  Instead  of  outward  movement 
to  an  inexperienceable  reality  beyond  the  world  which  re- 
ligion seeks,  we  then  necessarily  have  an  inward  movement 
to  the  absolute  in  ourselves,  in  which  the  different  evaluating 
acts  have  started.  This  new  direction  towards  the  absolute 
by  an  examination  of  the  inner  conditions  of  valuation  can 
indeed  be  in  question  only  when  the  longing  for  an  ultimate 
unity  has  led  to  a  methodical  and  systematic  labor  of  thought. 
Such  intentional  elaboration  of  values  was  what  we  recognized 
as  civilization  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word.  Philosophy 
is  therefore  an  achievement  of  civilization  like  science  and  art 
and  law.  Religion  creates  its  value  by  its  naive  immediate 
feeling  of  life  which  is  at  the  bottom  of  our  certainty  of 
existence,  of  our  joy  in  life  and  happiness,  of  our  belief  in 
development  and  progress.  Of  course  at  the  higher  stage  re- 
ligion absorbs  numberless  values  of  civilization.  The  nature 
which  God  created  may  be  conceived  by  the  believers  in 
accordance  with  the  scientific  work  of  physics  and  chemistry. 
The  belief  may  make  use  of  all  cultural  means  of  poetry  and 
music,  painting  and  architecture.  The  church  may  be  secured 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  387 

and  propagated  by  legal  and  moral  achievements  of  civiliza- 
tion. But  the  original  religious  deed  of  belief  remains  always 
an  immediate  apprehension  of  the  value.  Religion  is  there- 
fore a  life-value  to  us,  philosophy  a  cultural  value.  A  mutual 
suppression  and  interference  are  no  more  in  question  than 
any  confiict  between  the  naive  unity-value  of  love  and  the 
systematic  unity- value  of  art. 

For  us  there  is  no  special  proof  necessary  that  the  sys- 
tematic examination  of  the  possible  fields  of  value  really  leads 
back  to  the  evaluating  soul.  Our  total  undertaking  was  evi- 
dently one  long  example  of  such  a  method.  In  studying  the 
various  groups  of  values  we  had  to  understand  them  as  func- 
tions of  the  subject.  We  had  no  free  choice  there.  If  we  were 
really  to  examine  the  true  and  the  beautiful  and  the  good 
and  the  holy  with  reference  to  that  which  is  similar  and  which 
is  dissimilar  in  them,  we  had  to  turn  from  what  is  apparently 
given  as  completed  structures  to  those  inner  energies  in  us 
which  posit  the  separated  values  in  the  swarming  experi- 
ences. If  the  question  is  now  how  far  these  values  themselves 
can  be  brought  to  a  unity,  it  is  evidently  for  us  the  most 
natural  continuation  of  our  analysis  to  turn  again  to  this 
inner  positing  of  values  in  ourselves  and  to  seek  its  ultimate 

conditions. 

The  true  goal  of  philosophy,  we  said,  is  the  unification  of 
the  values.  The  examination  of  the  special  values  gives  the 
special  part  of  the  philosophical  task :  the  logic,  the  aesthetics, 
the  philosophy  of  religion,  the  philosophy  of  nature,  the  phil- 
osophy of  history,  and  so  on.  But  the  totality  of  philosophy 
is  more  than  the  sum  of  these  parts.  They  all  find  their  ulti- 
mate foundation  in  the  closing  examination  concerning  the 
inner  unity  of  the  evaluations  themselves.  Only  by  bindmg 
together  and  uniting  all  the  valuations  does  the  worid-totality 
itself  become  valuable,  and  that  alone  gives  us  a  philosophical 
view  of  the  worid.  The  philosophical  view  of  the  worid,  on 
the  other  hand,  can  alone  give  meaning  to  our  life.  If  we 


^1 


388  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

interpret  the  task  of  philosophy  in  this  way,  we  do  not  take 
sides  for  one  philosophical  school  against  other  philosophical 
tendencies.  When  we  defined  the  task  of  religion  as  unity 
of  values,  by  such  a  definition  we  drew  boundaries  inside 
which  there  was  room  for  Buddhism  and  the  cult  of  the  Greeks 
and  Christianity  and  Islam.  If  we  define  as  the  goal  of  phil- 
osophy the  unity  of  the  evaluating  acts,  again  we  have  not 
excluded  any  special  kind  of  philosophy  by  it.  The  ultimate 
problem  of  the  philosophers  has  found  very  different  formula- 
tions in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Yet  without  any  d^p 
intruding  changes  of  the  historical  systems,  it  might  be  de- 
monstrated that  the  solutions  of  the  ultimate  philosophical 
problem  have  always  meant  a  fundamental  reconciliation  of 
all  contradictions  in  the  evaluating  deeds. 

Such  a  view  does  not  involve  the  demand  for  a  fundamental 
metaphysical  principle.  On  the  contrary,  the  reconciliation 
of  the  conflicts  of  valuation  may  be  secured  far  from  all  meta- 
physics.   The  opposition  between  the  valuation  of  know- 
ledge with  its  demand  for  causal  laws,  and  the  valuation  of 
morality,  with  its  demand  for  freedom,  is,  for  instance  com- 
pletely abolished  as  soon  as  it  becomes  clear  that  both  do  not 
refer  to  the  same  world  at  all.  Moreover,  in  the  sphere  of  ex- 
perience itself  a  kind  of  unity  is  established  as  soon  as  one 
particular  valuation  becomes  in  principle  super-ordinated 
above  all  others.  For  instance,  if  the  connections  of  the  outer 
worid  are  posited  as  the  only  values  which  are  absolutely 
valid  we  must  come  to  a  naturalistic,  materialistic  view  of 
the  worid  in  which  there  can  be  no  conflict  of  valuation.  Cer- 
tainly such  quari;er-philosophy  will  very  quickly  prove  itself 
insufficient,  inasmuch  as  such  a  valuation  of  nature  cannot 
itself  be  deduced  from  a  worid  which  is  nothing  but  nature. 
But  in  that  case  all  the  other  valuations  would  simply  be 
accompaniments  of  the  moving  matter,  and  therefore  unda- 
mentally  subordinated  to  the  causal  process,  and  final  y  em- 
bedded without  conflict  in  the  unified  view  of  the  worid.  In 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  389 

the  same  way  any  other  group  of  values  can  be  raised  over 
all  the  remaining  ones  and  can  thus  secure  unity  by  the 
domination  of  one  factor. 

If  instead  of  the  connections  of  the  outer  worid  the  con- 
nections of  the  fellow-worid  are  emphasized,  the  result  is  a 
not  less  one-sided  philosophy  in  which  the  historical  develop- 
ment alone  is  evaluated,  and  all  the  other  valuations  are  then 
historical  deeds  which  result  from  it.  If,  instead,  the  connec- 
tion of  the  inner  worid  as  psychical  content  is  over-evaluated, 
the  result  must  be  a  positivistic  philosophy  of  the  inner 
experiences,  which  again  easily  forces  all  other  values  into 
its  service.   Hence  systems  which  are  apparently  the  most 
extreme  opposites  in  philosophy  agree  in  their  effort  to  give 
preference  to  the  valuation  of  connection,  and  to  make  these 
logical  values  supporters  of  all  the  other  possible  valuations. 
Only  contents  of  knowledge,  not  agreements  or  developments 
or  realizations,  can  then  claim  fundamental  value.   In  con- 
trast to  such  systems,  aesthetic  or  ethical  philosophy  may  go 
the  opposite  way  with  the  same  one-sidedness,  perhaps 
merely  to  oppose  the  naked  philosophy  of  the  intellect.  The 
romantic  philosophy,  for  instance,  subordinates  everything  to 
the  valuation  of  unity,  and  again  it  may  be  either  the  unity  of 
the  inner  worid  which  controls  everything,  or  the  harmony 
of  the  fellow-worid,  or  the  loving  devotion  to  the  accord  of 
the  universe.  A  philosophy  of  duty,  on  the  other  hand,  in- 
terprets all  knowledge,  that  is,  all  the  evaluating  true  judg- 
ments, as  a  special  case  of  moral  obligation.  In  this  way  we 
see  before  us  numberiess  possibilities  to  secure  the  unity  of 
the  valuations  in  experience  by  super-ordinating  one  special 
kind  of  value  over  all  others.  Our  definition  of  philosophy, 
which  seeks  the  philosophical  task  in  the  unification  of  the 
valuation,  leaves  us  ample  room  for  all  the  varieties  of  phil- 
osophy which  history  has  matured. 

For  us  such  a  solution  of  the  problem  has  become  impossi- 
ble. We  have  examined  the  valuations,  and  have  become  cer- 


* 


«#S£^i-ir:,i'^ 


390  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

tain  that  the  values  are  coordinated  to  each  other.  We  have 
lost  the  right  to  conceive  one  group  of  values  as  dependent 
upon  another.  Each  valuation  arises  with  equally  valid  claim 
from  the  immediate  life-experience.  To  apprehend  the  world 
in  its  self-realization,  in  its  progress,  in  its  achievement,  is 
not  a  more  and  not  a  less  ultimate  value  than  to  understand 
it  in  its  harmony  and  beauty,  or  to  recognize  it  m  the  security 
of  its  existence  and  of  its  lawfulness.  Our  study  of  the  values 
therefore  excludes  for  us  every  philosophy  which  ignores  the 
equality  of  right  between  the  logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical 
valuations.  Existence  as  such  is  not  prior  to  and  not  more 
fundamental  than  goodness  or  harmony. 

If  the  various  values  are  entitled  to  equal  nghts,  no  one  of 
them  can  serve  as  the  one  fundamental  value  from  which  the 
others  are  to  be  deduced.  Hence  we  must  either  forego  their 
unification,  or  we  must  conceive  them  all  together  ^  deduci- 
ble  from  a  fundamental  act  which  lies  further  back.  To  forego 
the  unity  cannot  mean  anything  else  than  to  conceive  the 
world  in  its  totality  as  contradictory  and  therefore  worthless. 
Each  value  may  remain  valid  in  its  particular  sphere,  but  only 
in  reference  to  the  special  field.   Referred  to  the  world-to- 
tality, ever/thing  would  lose  its  pure  value  when  the  contra- 
diction between  moral,  true,  and  beautiful  reality  cannot  be 
overcome  in  the  totality.  To  have  value  meant  for  any  ex- 
perience to  show  itself  identically  realized  in  a  new  expen- 
ence    The  world  as  a  whole  therefore  has  a  value  only  when 
the  separated  realities  show  themselves  ultimately  as  van- 
ous  realizations  of  an  absolute  reaUty  which  remains  m  them 

identical  with  itself. 

To  be  sure,  we  can  go  through  our  life  without  concern  for 
the  value  of  the  totality.  It  is  the  habitual  method  of  man- 
kind to  act,  to  enjoy,  and  to  estimate  the  world  m  pieces. 
But  whoever  has  found  in  himself  the  deeper  question  as  to 
the  unity  cannot  find  rest  in  the  negative  reply.  The  answer 
that  the  world  does  not  have  any  unity,  that  the  valuations 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


391 


fall  asunder,  and  that  a  self-asserting  totality  does  not  exist  at 
all  is  ultimately  no  possible  answer.  It  is  no  answer  because 
when  we  ask  for  the  values  of  unity  we  do  not  mean  to  ask 
about  something  ready-made  for  which  it  would  be  possible 
to  state  whether  it  exists  or  does  not  exist.   The  question 
means  rather  how  is  the  unity  to  be  created.  Values  are  tasks 
which  are  to  be  fulfilled.  We  saw  that  the  values  of  the  true 
and  beautiful  and  good  were  also  not  simply  hidden  some- 
where ready-made,  and  now  to  be  discovered.  He  alone  foimd 
them  who  created  them.  To  find  a  valuable  world-totality 
is  in  the  same  way  nothing  but  a  task :  the  task  of  apprehend- 
ing the  world  in  such  a  way  that  everything  which  we  ac- 
knowledge as  valuable  is  a  necessary  content  in  it,  and  that 
nevertheless  the  world  remains  in  unity  with  itself.  Before 
such  a  task  the  question  can  be  only  whether  we  are  success- 
ful in  the  fulfilment  or  not.  The  purpose  of  apperceiving  the 
world  of  harmony,  of  truth,  and  of  morality  as  a  valuable 
self-completing  whole  demands  our  effort  just  as  science  and 
art  and  law  demanded  it.  To  deny  to  the  seeker  the  valuable 
totality  of  the  world  is  as  meaningless  as  it  would  be  to  tell 
the  naturalist  that  the  parts  of  nature  are  not  really  in  causal 
connection.   He  would  answer  that  the  experience  can  be- 
come a  causal  nature  only  by  his  logical  work  as  the  value  of 
connection  in  the  world  depends  upon  his  thinking  the  iden- 
tification. In  this  way  the  philosophical  world-totaUty  is  also 
certainly  not  something  ready-made,  not  something  which 
the  philosopher  has  to  unveil  from  its  masking  drapery.  It  is 
the  goal  of  apprehension  towards  which  he  aims.  His  ques- 
tion regarding  such  a  valuable  world-whole  is  therefore,  if 
he  understands  himself  correctly,  not  whether  there  is  an 
ultimate  reality  or  not.  His  question  is  only  what  the  char- 
acter of  such  unity  is,  or  rather  how  the  world  must  be  con- 
ceived to  gain  that  unity.  That  such  unity  really  is  valid  is 
thus  presupposed  in  the  question  itself.  Those  who  do  not 
ask  for  it  cannot  know  it.  But  those  who  do  ask,  and  are 


,392  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

thus  already  seeking,  possess  the  certainty  of  its  reality,  and 
their  search  refers  only  to  the  elaboration. 

At  the  very  threshold  another  objection  must  also  be  re- 
moved. If  philosophy  declares  the  ultimate  meaning  of  the 
world  to  be  a  self-asserting  unity  of  values,  this  result  of 
thought  must  be  fixated  through  conceptions  and  must  be 
expressed  in  judgments.  But  through  this  fixation  and  expres- 
sion the  coordination  of  the  values  again  seems  sacrificed,  in- 
asmuch as  the  whole  now  becomes  object  of  knowledge  and 
therefore  becomes  subordinated  to  the  logical  valuation.  But 
that  is  misleading.  The  fundamental  difference  is  neglected 
here,  the  difference  between  the  sciences  of  experience  and 
metaphysics.  In  all  the  sciences,  in  the  natural  sciences,  in 
mathematics,  in  the  historical  sciences,  and  in  the  philosoph- 
ical special  sciences,  we  always  had  to  do  with  the  connection 
of  the  given,  with  the  relation  of  things  or  beings  or  norms 
with  each  other.  As  soon  as  we  are  to  grasp  the  deepest 
fundamental  reality,  we  have  an  entirely  different  task.  The 
unification  of  the  separated  groups  of  values,  as  we  saw,  was 
not  to  be  reached  simply  by  combining  the  given  realities, 
but  by  embedding  them  in  a  beyond  of  experience.   The 
great  evaluating  deeds  must  be  recognized  as  parts  of  a  self- 
asserting  absolute  act,  which  as  such  is  postulated  but  not 
experienced.   If  we  call  the  unification  of  our  experiences 
our  knowledge,  the  unification  of  our  experiences  with  a  post- 
ulated absolute  fact  cannot  again  be  treated  as  knowledge. 
An  entirely  different  deed  of  the  I  has  to  come  in.  It  is  an  act 
of  conviction.  From  the  bottommost  depths  of  the  person- 
ality this  postulate  breaks  out.  Only  if  such  a  self-asserting 
absolute  fact  is  posited  from  which  all  special  valuations 
emanate  is  the  world-totality  itself  really  valuable. 

This  valuation  of  the  totality  is  therefore  a  value  of  special 
kind,  a  metaphysical  value  of  conviction,  which  is  funda- 
mentally to  be  separated  from  the  logical  values  of  connec- 
tion.   Without  the  deepest  decision,  without  staking  and 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


393 


pledging  the  whole  personality,  in  short  without  conviction, 
there  is  and  can  be  no  ultimate  philosophy.   This  ultimate 
deed  of  conviction  is  indeed  never  a  merely  describable  pro- 
cess which  could  be  expressed  in  its  real  meaning  through  the 
terms  of  science.  Those  who  would  like  to  narrow  down  the 
account  of  reality  to  a  mere  description  of  objects  may  there- 
fore feel  satisfied  in  ruling  out  such  philosophy  as  "ineffable.'' 
If  there  were  expression  only  where  there  is  description,  phil- 
osophy would  indeed  have  to  choose  between  ineffability  and 
despair.   The  pseudo-philosophies  of  materialism  or  positiv- 
ism would  have  to  take  the  place  of  real  philosophy,  and  yet 
they  could  remain  enthroned  only  so  long  as  no  one  dared  to 
ask  what  they  mean  by  their  claim  to  be  true.  But  being 
ineffable  in  this  sense  is  a  fate  which  the  absolute  deed  of 
philosophy  shares  with  every  single  historical  will-act  if  it  is 
taken  in  its  immediate  reality.  Even  the  most  modern  forms 
of  *' realism''  put  themselves  in  the  wrong  from  the  start 
when  they  give  an  account  of  the  will  in  the  same  way  in 
which  they  describe  the  trees.  Wherever  there  is  will  the 
immediate  life-reality  is  lost  if  the  psychological  abstractions 
make  it  a  describable  object.  To  be  ineffable  means,  then, 
not  to  have  been  pressed  into  the  thought-forms  of  natural 
science,  but  to  have  been  left  in  the  life-form  of  immediate 
reality.  There  is  a  richer  form  of  expression  than  mere  ob- 
jective description.  Every  yes  and  no,  every  affirmation  and 
every  denial,  even  the  affirmation  of  easily  effable  realistic 
half-philosophy,  proves  in  every  statement  the  possibility  of 
expressing  that  which  is  not  describable. 

This  ultimate  value  of  conviction  is  now  indeed  super- 
ordinated  over  the  logical  and  aesthetic  and  ethical  groups  of 
values.  A  philosophy  maintained  by  such  a  conviction  does 
not  raise  the  logical  valuation  over  the  other  valuations 
because  the  certainty  of  conviction  is  not  based  on  logical 
knowledge.  All  the  values,  the  logical,  aesthetic,  ethical,  and 
religious  ones,  thus  remain  coordinated  with  reference  to  the 


■;     i'S 


« 


394  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

ultimate  principle  to  which  the  conviction  relat^  them.  The 
fact  that  this  conviction  must  be  commumcat^d  by  concep- 
tions judgments,  and  sentences  does  not  at  all  transform  it 
Xa  Sific  knowledge.  The  poet,  the  priest,  the  stat^ 
man,  the  judge,  makes  use  of  the  same  linguistic  means  with 
which  the  investigator  communicates  his  descriptions,  yet 
they  certainly  do  not  communicate  to  us  knowledge,  but 
attitudes,  decisions,  and  inspirations.  „u,„,„t« 

We  now  stand  before  a  new  ultimate  value  the  absolute 
of  philosophy,  the  fundamentally  ultimate  which  beai^  a 
reality  in  itself.   It  is  the  over-expenenceable  in  which  aU 
experience  comes  to  completion.   No  knowl^ge  can  reach 
it  only  conviction  can  make  it  certain.  And  yet  this  con- 
viction  again  is  only  a  special  kind  of  evaluation  that  is,  a 
TecTal  kind  of  pure  identification.  It  is  the  identification  of 
auThe  other  values.  This  identity  of  all  the  mutually  opposing 
values  is  reached  by  understanding  all  the  va  ues  as  expres- 
Ifons  or  realizations  of  a  last  self-asserting  reality.  The  wor  ds 
of  those  values  which  enter  into  our  expenence  represent  the 
self-asserting  self-realization  of  the  "^^^  "^^^f  P'?^,  f  ,^, 
Nothing  can  have  validity  which  is  not  mainteined  by  this 
mlie  act,  a.  soon  as  the  task  of  raising  the  to^^ty  o 
values  itself  towards  the  level  of  a  value  is  completed.  But 
from  the  worid  of  evaluated  experiences,  how  can  we  reach 

S  postulated,  primary  r^lity?  On  the  ground  o^sy- 
tematicphilosophyofcourseitcannotbeaquestionoffantastc 

sLculations  and  dreams.   We  have  just  as  much  nght  to 
E^e  thLlution  of  a  cubic  equation  to  the  play  of  imagina- 
tion. Entirely  definite,  extremely  complex  facte  are  ^ven 
and  from  them  the  self-asserting  underiying  fact  is  to  be 
dlmined.  To  be  sure,  it  must  remain  the  deed  of  conv.ct.n 
that  can  give  to  this  ultimate  principle  vahdity  and  m  this 
se^^X.  but  the  determination  of  its  characteristics 
J^ndTafiirst  strictly  logical  labor  before  the  conviction 
can  evaluate  the  last  result. 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


395 


What  we  are  seeking  must  be  sharply  determinable  in  its 
content,  and  must  bear  in  itself  the  total  richness  of  our  expe- 
rience, and  yet  must  not  itself  be  experienceable.  My  experi- 
ence is  the  life-content  of  my  personal  self,  and  what  is  to  be 
conceived  as  experienceable  at  all  must  belong  to  a  self.  The 
conditions  for  the  possibility  of  being  experienced  are  there- 
fore annulled  as  soon  as  the  selfhood,  that  is,  the  relation  to 
the  individual  personality  as  such,  is  eliminated.  My  contents 
of  experience,  the  whole  worid  of  my  values,  must  thus  be- 
come over-experienceable  as  soon  as  I  give  up  my  self,  that 
is,  as  soon  as  the  I  annuls  itself.  With  the  I  falls  the  thou,  and 
with  the  total  reference  to  individuals  falls  the  opposition  be- 
tween the  self  and  the  things.  Thus,  if  we  give  up  the  bound- 
aries of  the  inner  worid,  then  we  also  annul  the  fellow-worid 
and  the  outer  worid  as  such.  The  content  of  experience  has  by 
that  ceased  to  be  experience.  It  has  become  over-experience- 
able  manif oldness :  the  self  has  been  expanded  to  the  all. 
Over-experienceable  thus  means  not  something  which  we  do 
not  know  at  all.  An  inexperienceable  manifold  of  such  a  kind 
would  lie  outside  every  possible  interest.   The  over-experi- 
enceable which  enters  into  our  conviction  is  the  real  experi- 
ence for  which,  by  annulling  every  relation  to  a  self,  the  char- 
acter of  being  experienceable  to  a  self  is  eliminated.  When 
inner  worid,  fellow-worid,  and  outer  worid  become  trans- 
formed in  this  way  into  an  over-experience,  we  know  from 
the  start  at  least  this  about  it.  As  soon  as  this  over-experi- 
enceable reality  posits  in  itself  an  I,  it  constitutes  by  that 
positing  at  the  same  time  a  thou,  and  in  positing  subjects  in 
this  way  it  also  posits  the  opposition  to  objects.   In  short, 
as  soon  as  there  arises  an  I  in  the  over-experienceable,  the 
whole  system  of  inner  worid,  fellow-worid,  and  outer  worid 

becomes  necessary. 

It  may  be  pointed  out  at  once  that  such  over-expenenceable 
reality  is  of  course  over-personal  or  impersonal  in  an  entirely 
different  sense  from  that  in  which  the  special  values  were  o ver- 


^tl 


396  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

personal.  It  was  indeed  essential  for  the  truth  and  the  beauty 
and  the  good  that  they  are  not  related  to  the  states  of  the 
own  personality  like  the  agreeable  or  the  useful.  Their  valua- 
tion was  independent  of  the  self,  inasmuch  as  they  represent 
pure  values  only  if  they  are  equally  valid  for  every  possible  self. 
The  pure  value  is  necessary  and  general.  However,  the  de- 
taching of  the  values  from  our  accidental  self  meant  there 
no  elimination  of  the  relation  to  individual  subjects.  On  the 
contrary,  the  value  was  value  for  personalities,  it  was  over- 
personal  only  in  so  far  as  it  was  valid,  not  for  this  or  that 
personality,  but  necessarily  for  every  thinkable  personality. 
But  now  our  over-experience  demands  that  we  think  away 
the  relation  to  individual  personalities. 

By  such  a  decision  all  the  further  steps  appear  necessary. 
What  remains  from  our  total  experience  as  soon  as  our  self 
has  been  enlarged  to  an  over-personality?  Of  course,  at  first 
everything  must  fall  away  which  has  as  content  our  own  self 
in  its  accidental  states,  in  its  pleasures  and  pains.  As  soon  as 
the  particular  standpoint  of  the  self  is  made  void,  pleasure 
and  pain  have  lost  their  meaning.  They  were  only  the  indi- 
cations for  the  way  in  which  the  self  grasps  the  world  from 
the  standpoint  of  its  particular  interests.  But  evidently  not 
enough  is  done  by  eliminating  these  feeling-acts  of  personal 
attitude.  In  the  same  way  everything  in  our  experience  which 
lies  outside  of  the  pure  values  belonged  to  the  particular  per- 
sonality.  We  recognized  that  the  value  was  everywhere  based 
on  the  demand  that  its  content  must  be  acknowledged  by 
every  thinkable  subject.  The  anti-value,  for  instance  the 
error  or  the  wrong  or  the  regress  or  the  discord,  is  accordingly 
that  which  cannot  be  postulated  as  belonging  to  every  think- 
able subject.   It  can  be  maintained  only  by  particular  per- 
sons, and  therefore  it  stands  and  falls  with  the  individual  self. 
As  soon  as  the  self  in  its  individuality  is  extinguished,  there 
can  remain  from  the  total  experience  of  the  self  only  that 
which  can  be  conceived  as  common  to  every  thinkable  self, 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


397 


the  realm  of  values.  But  we  cannot  rest  even  here.  In  the 
values,  too,  a  personal  factor  meets  a  general  factor.  The 
maintaining  of  the  identical,  that  striving  for  the  unity  in 
the  otherness  and  for  the  realization  of  the  given  in  new  form, 
is  general  and  independent  of  the  particular  self.  Whether  we 
had  to  do  with  logical  or  aesthetic  or  ethical  or  religious  values, 
we  always  found  the  valuation  determined  by  this  longing  for 
identification,  and  this  was  fundamentally  independent  of 
a  particular  self.  This  act  therefore  can  enter  completely  into 
the  impersonal  over-experience.  But  the  identified  contents 
—  they  may  be  parts  of  the  outer  world,  or  of  the  fellow- 
world,  or  of  the  inner  world  —  are  after  all  in  every  valuation 
again  in  the  particular  form  of  their  relation  to  the  self.  Their 
space-position  and  their  temporal  form,  their  grouping  and 
their  vividness,  are  dependent  upon  the  particular  standpoint 
of  the  single  self. 

If  everything  is  really  to  be  eliminated  which  is  posited  by 
the  particular  self,  the  separation  between  inner  world,  fel- 
low-world, and  outer  world  disappears,  and  nothing  can  re- 
main in  the  space-time  relation  which  is  posited  by  the  par- 
ticular standpoint.  That  which  is  maintained  as  identical  is 
therefore  now  no  longer  an  outer  world  which  stands  in  op- 
position to  the  maintaining  will ;  hence  the  will  which  main- 
tains the  over-experience  finds  no  content  outside  of  itself. 
Its  content  therefore  must  be  contained  in  its  own  activity, 
that  is,  in  the  over-experience  the  will  has  become  its  own  con- 
tent. Then  only  have  we  an  over-experience  which  is  liberated 
from  the  selfhood.  It  is  a  striving  which  has  become  its  own 
content,  and  which  aims  to  maintain  this  content.  A  per- 
sonal self,  then,  does  not  belong  to  this  ultimate  striving.  Yet 
it  is  not  incomparable  with  the  self,  as  in  the  self,  too,  this 
will  towards  identical  maintaining  binds  all  valuable  expe- 
rience. The  fundamental  act  of  the  self  thus  remains  even 
after  eliminating  all  the  characteristics  of  the  individual  per- 
sonality as  such.   That  fundamental  act  shares  its  essential 


I 


398  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

principle  with  the  self,  but  it  is  no  longer  an  individual  self. 
It  is  conceived  as  the  selfhood  without  individuality.  We 
might  suggest  it  by  the  word  *' over-self."  The  over-self  is 
therefore  reached  as  soon  as  the  reference  to  the  personal 
conditions  in  our  experience  is  eliminated.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  soon  as  the  over-self  posits  in  itself  a  limited  per- 
sonal  self,  its  undifferentiated  content  must  at  once  separate 
itself  into  a  self,  a  co-self,  and  a  not-self,  that  is,  into  inner 
world,  fellow-world,  and  outer  world. 

We  look  back  once  more  over  the  last  part  of  our  road. 
Our  evaluated  experience  is  full  of  contradictions  and  with- 
out inner  unity.   The  logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical  values, 
all  of  which  were  found  in  each,  the  outer  world,  fellow-world, 
and  inner  world,  appear  as  separated  realms  of  value  inde- 
pendent of  each  other.  But  we  demand  that  we  be  able  to 
apprehend  the  world-totality  as  a  value,  and  that  means  we 
postulate  that  the  world-totality  remain  in  unity  with  itself. 
The  separated  worlds  of  our  experience  must  therefore  be 
understood  as  various  part  contents  and  expressions  of  one 
fundamental  world  which  lies  beyond  every  possible  indi- 
vidual experience,  and  which  remains  identical  with  itself  in 
every  becoming  and  change.  We  had  to  examine,  therefore, 
how  far  experience  involves  an  over-experience  from  which 
it  can  be  deduced.   We  asked  what  remains  of  experience 
when  the  conditions  of  individual  experience,  namely,  the 
relation  to  a  personal  self,  are  annulled.  We  have  found  that 
then  there  remains  that  fundamental  striving  which  we 
recognized  as  the  underlying  act  of  every  valuation,  namely, 
the  striving  for  a  new  which  is  identical  with  the  old.  Inas- 
much as  this  over-personal  act  shares  this  striving  with  the 
self,  we  called  it  an  over-self.   Such  a  will  to  the  identical 
maintaining  has  in  that  over-experience  no  external  mate- 
rial, no  outside  object,  as  the  ultimate  reality  cannot  still 
have  something  beside  itself.    Its  object  must  therefore  lie 
in  itself.  The  over-will  is  its  own  content.   But  as  soon  as 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


399 


in  its  imfolding  a  self  arises,  the  manifold  of  inner  world, 
fellow- world,  and  outer  world  would  be  posited  by  it,  and  with 
them  the  logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical  series  of  values.  From 
the  fundamental  will  towards  identical  maintaining  the  over- 
will  would  bring  forward  the  total  of  valuable  experiences 
with  their  separated  and  contradictory  realms  of  values.  The 
over-self,  which  is  united  in  itself  and  which  we  postulated  by 
conviction,  would  thus  become  the  source  of  all  those  inde- 
pendent and  contradicting  experiences  to  which  our  know- 
ledge, our  enjoyment,  and  our  estimation  are  related. 

The  character  of  this  over-experience  can  now  be  followed 
up.  We  know  at  first  that  it  is  a  striving.  The  over-self  which 
encloses  in  itself  the  conditions  for  every  possible  experience 
is  thus  certainly  not  a  thing  which  has  existence :  the  funda- 
mental reality  is  life-activity,  deed.   We  know  further  that 
it  is  a  striving  towards  identical  maintaining.  The  over-self, 
therefore,  can  never  lead  beyDnd  that  originally  given,  as  its 
own  meaning  lies  in  the  maintaining.  We  know  further  that 
the  over-self  does  not  find  any  material  outside  of  itself,  as 
every  outside  content  of  experience  is  dependent  upon  that 
individuality  which  is  eliminated  in  the  over-self.    Finally, 
we  know  that  the  evaluating  identification  never  refers  to  a 
merely  unchanged.  On  the  contrary,  wherever  we  had  to  do 
with  logical,  or  esthetic,  or  ethical,  or  religious  values  in  the 
outer  world,  the  fellow-world,  or  the  inner  world,  the  identical 
was  always  somehow  changed  and  enhanced.  Either  it  be- 
came more  vivid,  or  it  realized  itself  externally,  or  it  entered 
into  new  space-time  forms,  but  in  every  case  it  changed  its 
character  in  such  a  way  that  it  could  become  the  starting- 
point  for  new  action  and  deed.  We  saw  that  to  be  realized 
means  to  remain  identical  and  yet  to  become  the  foothold  for 
a  new  action.  If  this  energy  is  to  be  effective  in  the  over-self, 
the  striving  which  is  directed  towards  self-assertion  miist 
not  only  maintain  itself,  but  must  realize  itself,  enhance  it- 
self, move  on  to  new  and  ever  new  footholds  of  new  actions. 


400 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


If  a  striving  is  to  realize  itself  and  thus  to  fulfil  itself,  and  yet 
to  maintain  itself,  it  becomes  necessary  indeed  that  the  real- 
ization shall  be  of  such  a  kind  that  it  leads  to  new  striving. 
If  the  fulfilment  were  not  to  lead  to  new  striving,  it  would 
be  extinguished  by  the  fulfilment  and  would  therefore  cease 
to  be  striving.  The  over-self  is  a  striving  which  aims  to 
maintain  itself  identical,  that  means  to  maintain  itself  in 
its  striving.  Every  goal  which  is  reached  must  therefore 
be  starting-point  to  a  new  activity  and  must  enhance  itself 

incessantly. 

From  here  we  can  already  take  a  wide  outlook.    If  this 
over-self  were  to  create  in  itself  the  limited  standpoint  of  a 
self,  the  whole  inner  world,  fellow-world,  and  outer  world, 
we  saw,  must  arise,  and  with  them  the  whole  manifoldness 
of  the  values  of  experience.  The  over-self  would  then  realize 
itself  by  its  own  deed  in  the  pure  values  of  logical,  aesthetic, 
ethical,  and  religious  life.  The  over-self  would  bear  the  worlds 
of  experience  and  realize  itself  in  them.  It  is  clear  that  that 
would  indeed  fulfil  the  conditions  by  which  the  totality  would 
become  a  value,  inasmuch  as  the  striving  of  the  over-experi- 
ence and  the  values  of  the  world-experience  are  now  related 
to  each  other  like  purpose  and  realization.  The  over-self  re- 
mains loyal  to  itself  when  it  expresses  itself  in  the  world  of 
the  experienceable  values.  The  manifoldness  of  values  would 
then  be  no  longer  a  conflict  in  which  the  values  interfere  with 
each  other,  because  in  those  values  works  that  one  aim  of 
the  over-self  towards  self-assertion.  The  total  world  is  abso- 
lutely valuable,  as  all  which  we  know  of  it  —  on  the  one  side 
the  aiming  over-self  which  is  posited  by  the  conviction,  on  the 
other  side  the  true,  beautiful,  and  good  which  is  posited  by 
experience  —  blend  in  a  perfect  unity.  One  realizes  itself  in  the 
other,  and  our  will  towards  identification  becomes  satisfied 
in  a  general,  necessary  way.    It  cannot  have  any  possible 
meaning  to  go  beyond  that  and  to  ask  still  further  as  to  the 
value  of  the  world.  The  all  is  now  completely  in  unity  with 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


401 


itself,  and  therefore  leaves  no  demand  for  identification  un- 
satisfied. This  value  of  unity  is  necessarily  the  last.  If  we 
were  to  ask  further  on  whether  it  has  any  value  that  such  a 
valuable  all  exists,  we  should  contradict  ourselves.  To  seek 
the  value  of  the  existence  of  the  world-whole  would  mean 
that  we  seek  something  else  which  can  be  posited  as  identical 
with  the  world-whole  and  which  realizes  itself  in  it.  But  if 
this  other  were  still  real,  the  world-whole  would  not  be  the 
whole :  the  presupposition  would  be  given  up.  The  value  of 
the  world,  like  every  thinkable  value,  can  only  lie  in  the  mu- 
tual relation  of  its  parts.  An  absolutely  single  can  never  have 
a  value  in  itself,  even  if  it  is  a  world-totality.  In  the  identi- 
fication of  its  own  deeds,  the  infinite  value  of  the  world- 
totality  is  completed. 

The  counterplay  manifests  itself  when  we  look  towards 
the  over-self  from  the  standpoint  of  our  self.  Our  whole 
experience,  with  all  its  contradictions,  by  the  relation  to  the 
over-experience  now  gains  its  unity,  its  rest,  its  final  meaning. 
The  experiences  which  were  independent  of  each  other  and 
therefore  accidental  now  become  harmonious  parts  of  the 
deeds  of  an  over-self  which  realizes  itself  from  inner  neces- 
sity. The  values  of  the  world  of  experience  by  that  relation 
are  anchored  to  the  deepest  bottom  of  ultimate  reality.  An 
entirely  new  meaning  of  the  values  now  becomes  clear.  We 
called  valuable  that  realization  of  the  parts  of  experience 
which  in  a  general  and  necessary  way  had  to  satisfy  every 
possible  subject.  But  now  the  meaning  of  the  value  tran- 
scends the  desire  and  satisfaction  of  all  thinkable  selves  and 
enters  into  connection  with  the  over-experience  of  the  over- 
self.  The  experience  accordingly  takes  its  ideals  from  an 
over-experience  which,  to  be  sure,  is  not  to  be  found  beyond 
the  things  like  a  god,  but  which  is  effective  and  valid  imper- 
sonally in  ourselves.  The  valuable  is  therefore  that  which  is 
in  harmony  with  the  will  of  the  over-self. 
Apparently  by  this  last  meditation  we  have  argued  in  a 


402 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


* 


circle.  We  acknowledged  the  over-self  because  by  it  the  world 
becomes  a  value  for  us,  and  now  we  find  that  a  value  is  that 
which  is  in  harmony  with  the  over-self.  The  over-self  is  de- 
manded by  the  valuation,  and  the  valuation  is  conditioned 
by  the  over-self.  One  of  the  two  evidently  must  be  the 
original  starting-point,  but  the  critical  examination  of  such 
a  last  hold  can  be  given  to  us  only  in  the  real  experience  of 
the  self.  Hence  the  relation  is  simply  this :  the  self  posits  the 
over-self  by  an  act  of  conviction,  because  it  is  an  absolutely 
necessary  value  for  every  thinkable  self.  In  the  metaphys- 
ical view  of  the  world  which  arises  by  this  positing,  the  over- 
self  is  the  only  fundamental  will  and  everything  which  cor- 
responds to  its  will  is  valuable.  Accordingly  the  deed  of  our 
self  posits  the  over-self  from  which  every  self  arises.  The  self 
must  expand  itself  towards  an  over-self  to  find  in  it  the  rest, 
the  certainty,  and  the  identity  with  the  absolute  whole. 

The  character  and  the  working  of  the  over-experience  must 
come  to  sharper  relief  when  we  refer  the  world  of  experience 
to  it.  We  must  therefore  examine  how  the  experience  changes 
when  it  is  conceived  as  melted  into  this  over-experienceable 
striving.  Here  for  the  last  time  we  might  separate  outer 
world,  fellow-world,  and  inner  world,  and  examine  for  each 
realm  how  it  enlarges  its  meaning  in  the  relation  to  the  over- 
reality  until  all  manifest  themselves  in  common  as  the  life 
of  the  over-self  which  continually  enhances  its  aiming,  which 
remains  loyal  to  itself,  and  which  has  as  its  only  goal  the  eter- 
nal value. 


A.  —  WORLD 

From  the  swarming  of  our  impressions  the  valuable  outer 
world  of  our  knowledge  arose.  Such  a  world  was  no  longer 
made  up  of  the  chance  impressions  of  this  or  that  one,  but  it 
was  constituted  by  the  existing  and  connected  things  which 
are  valid  in  their  reality  for  every  possible  subject.  From  the 
same  material  of  the  swarming  impressions  of  life  also  arose 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


403 


the  valuable  outer  world  of  our  pure  joyful  devotion.  That 
world  was  no  longer  made  up  of  the  chance  pleasures  of  this 
or  that  one,  but  was  constituted  by  the  harmonious  beautiful 
surrounding  which  in  its  unity  was  valid  for  every  possible 
subject.  Finally,  from  those  swarming  impressions  arose  the 
valuable  outer  world  of  development  and  achievement  as  ob- 
ject of  our  estimation.  That  world  was  no  longer  made  up  by 
the  chance  aims  of  this  or  that  one,  but  it  was  constituted 
by  the  energies  which  unfolded  themselves  and  enhanced  them- 
selves to  higher  and  higher  values  which  were  valid  for  every 
one.  Yet  the  one  world  did  not  know  about  the  other  :  one 
moved  on  in  necessity,  the  other  in  freedom;  one  was  always 
perfect,  the  other  always  uncompleted.  That  which  was  true 
was  perhaps  not  beautiful  or  did  not  show  progress;  that 
which  developed  itself  perhaps  disturbed  the  harmony ;  that 
which  was  beautiful  perhaps  could  not  be  brought  into  con- 
nection. And  yet  the  world  as  a  whole  must  ultimately  be 
united  in  itself,  must  be  self -asserting  and  thus  identical  with 
itself,  if  it  is  not  to  be  without  value  as  a  whole.  And  if  it  is 
worthless  as  a  whole,  the  values  of  the  parts  would  be  lowered 
to  the  level  of  illusory  values. 

But  we  recognized  that  this  ultimate  unity  could  become 
conceivable  for  us  as  soon  as  we  understand  that  those  sepa- 
rated worlds  of  experience  are  only  different  expressions  and 
realizations  of  one  and  the  same  fundamental  world.  Such 
an  apprehension  offered  itself  as  natural  as  soon  as  we  had 
found  that  those  valuable  worlds  of  the  pure  experience  arise 
only  by  particular  attitudes  in  our  apprehension,  and  that 
these  various  attitudes  can  all  be  resolved  into  one  common 
behavior  of  our  will.  Hence  in  the  ultimate  reality  we  have 
not  separated  worlds,  but  separated  deeds  of  one  will.  This 
fundamental  will  in  us,  however,  necessarily  lies  beyond  ex- 
perience. We  know  it  only  by  its  achievements,  we  know  it 
as  a  necessary  presupposition  without  which  the  performances 
in  us  cannot  be  understood.  We  know  it  becau^  we  experience 


4: 


404 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


405 


its  results,  but  we  cannot  find  it  in  its  own  reality  in  the  midst 
of  our  individual  self.  The  individuality  of  the  self  must  be 
given  up  if  we  think  ourselves  into  the  standpoint  of  that 
fundamental  self,  and  in  giving  up  the  individuality  of  the 
self  of  course  we  eliminate  also  the  outer  world,  in  so  far  as 
it  presents  itself  from  the  strictly  individual  standpoint.  The 
beyond  of  this  self-experience  is  accordingly  a  fundamental 
will  which  creates  in  itself  the  individual  selves  as  well  as  the 
various  logical,  aesthetic,  and  ethical  forms  of  apprehension. 
And  this  over-self,  this  fundamental  will,  no  longer  finds  the 
outer  world  which  the  individuals  find,  but  can  find  only 
itself  as  material  of  apprehension. 

That  lies  far  away  from  such  playing  philosophy  of  will  as 
that  of  Schopenhauer,  which  is  based  on  the  external  simi- 
larity between  the  things  and  ourselves.  Such  a  philosophy 
argues  that  the  things  move  like  ourselves,  that  we  do  not 
know  their  inside,  but  that  we  know  our  own  inside  as  will, 
and  that  we  therefore  have  the  right  to  draw  the  conclusion 
that  in  a  corresponding  way  the  things  also  are  will  in  their 
inside.  Our  result  has  nothing  in  common  with  such  meta- 
physics. The  things  which  natural  science  knows  have  no 
inside.  They  are  and  remain  always  exactly  that  which  they 
present  themselves  as  being  in  the  thought-forms  of  natural- 
istic apprehension.  As  parts  of  the  chain  of  causes  and  effects, 
they  can  never  be  will.  In  the  over-experience  of  the  over- 
self,  they  are  will  to  us  because  the  outer  world  as  such  has 
been  entirely  annihilated  in  it.  The  outer  world  as  such  arises 
in  contrast  to  and  together  with  the  inner  world  of  the  indi- 
vidual self.  If  the  individual  self  is  annulled,  the  outerness 
of  the  world  is  annulled  too.  The  over-self  therefore  cannot 
find  anything  without ;  and  as  we  found  that  the  only  thing 
we  know  about  the  over-self  is  that  it  shares  with  our  indi- 
vidual self  the  will  to  activity,  we  must  conclude  that  the  will 
of  the  over-self  finds  as  material  only  its  own  willing.  To 
introduce  any  additional  element  would  be  fantastic  specula- 


tion. Real  philosophy  is  bound  to  calculate  with  those  ele- 
ments which  are  objectively  found  either  in  the  experience 
or  in  the  presuppositions  which  are  necessary  to  make  ex- 
perience possible.  On  this  basis  the  fundamental  postulate, 
that  the  ultimate  reality  is  one,  can  be  fulfilled  only  if  we 
demand  that  the  content  of  the  world  is  a  world-will. 

On  the  surface  it  looks  as  if  there  still  remains  the  torturing 
question :  What  then,  after  all,  is  this  material  of  the  world? 
Even  if  the  evaluating  over-self  and  the  evaluated  world  are 
one  and  the  same  fundamental  will  in  the  infinity  of  its  aim- 
ing, we  are  anxious  to  test  its  substance  as  a  chemist  analyzes 
his  material.  But  all  such  questions  arise  from  misunder- 
standings. From  the  start  we  have  emphasized  that  the  will  is 
no  being,  but  an  activity.  Only  when  the  over-self  apprehends 
itself  and  makes  itself  in  this  way  an  object,  can  it  become 
content  to  which  the  evaluating  I  finally  attaches  the  value 
of  existence.  Yet  even  when  everything  is  deed  of  the  will, 
the  imagination  may  be  unwilling  to  stand  still  before  such 
a  boundary-line.  This  world-will,  it  seems,  must  have  some 
quality  which  we  must  be  able  to  describe  or  to  characterize. 
But  here  all  questioning  becomes  meaningless,  not  because 
we  do  not  have  enough  knowledge,  but  because  such  a  ques- 
tion negates  the  presuppositions.  An  inquiry  into  the  "stuff" 
of  the  world  can  have  a  meaning  only  when  there  are  different 
stuffs  which  can  be  discriminated.  But  when  everything  is 
equally  will,  it  cannot  have  any  meaning  to  find  out  what  this 
will  really  is,  as  there  cannot  be  anything  to  which  it  might 
be  referred  or  with  which  it  might  be  compared.  If  there  is 
nothing  possible  which  is  different  material,  a  description 
of  the  material  could  not  even  satisfy  any  justified  logical 
interest. 

We  know,  then,  only  the  one  character  of  the  absolute :  it  is 
will.  In  the  beginning  there  was  a  deed,  but  the  beginning 
does  not  lie  in  time,  as  time  is  only  the  form-thought  of  that 
object  world  which  is  created  by  the  primary  deed.  The  deed 


406 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


is  always  something  entirely  united  and  undifferentiated, 
something  which  has  lost  its  immediate  life- value  when  it  is 
decomposed.   The  analyzing  psychologist  must  separate  the 
will-action  into  its  different  successive  parts  because  he  con- 
ceives the  mental  states  as  accompaniments  of  physical  things. 
The  historical  life  does  not  know  this  breaking  in  pieces,  and 
if  we  want  to  understand  the  primary  deed  of  the  over-self, 
we  must  start  from  this  real  immediate  life-experience  of  the 
historical  personality,  not  from  the  products  of  psychological 
abstractions.  In  that  over-experience,  too,  the  deed  is  there- 
fore a  realization  of  purpose,  a  fulfilment  of  the  desire,  a  will 
which  is  victorious.  Now  this  over-will  is  to  be  the  totality 
of  the  real.  Then  it  cannot  find,  or  grasp,  or  aim  at  an5rthing 
which  lies  outside  itself.   The  only  goal  which  the  will  aims 
to  reach  through  its  deed  must  be  the  willing  of  itself.  But 
we  know  that  to  reach  a  goal  means  that  the  will  maintains 
its  object  in  a  new  form,  which  is  a  starting-point  for  new 
intentions.  We  saw  in  every  case  that  the  realization  through 
the  will  meant  a  transformation  into  something  new  which 
is  identical  with  the  old  in  its  content,  but  which  by  its 
new  vividness  or  by  its  new  form  allows  a  new  purpose  and 
a  new  action.   The  will  always  reaches  out  for  a  goal  which 
represents  the  foothold  for  a  new  will.  Hence  the  funda- 
mental will  also  can  have  no  other  aim  than  to  reach  start- 
ing-points for  new  will.  The  will  must  therefore  incessantly 
enhance  itself  in  its  willing,  and  yet  must  remain  in  every 
enhancement  identical  with  itself  and  must  fulfil  itself.  The 
meaning  of  the  world  is  accordingly  an  aiming  towards  a 
greater  abundance  of  aiming  which  yet  remains  identical 
with  itself.  It  is  a  self -unfolding  of  the  will,  which  must  lead 
to  new  and  ever  new  volitions  which  represent  the  real  world, 
and  yet  which  cannot  have  any  other  aim  than  that  of  striv- 
ing. There  can  be  no  other  world  and  no  other  world-piu*pose. 
We  now  have  to  ask  at  first  how  things  may  be  conceived  as 
arising  from  this  fundamental  will. 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


407 


In  every  will-act  of  ours  the  resolving  analysis  may  find 
the  starting-point  of  the  striving,  the  striving  itself,  and 
finally  the  goal  of  the  striving  which  becomes  realized.  They 
are  melted  into  a  perfect  unity,  and  only  in  this  unity  and 
totality  have  they  the  meaning  of  a  will-act.  The  resolution 
into  those  three  parts  belongs  to  a  consideration  which  does 
not  belong  to  the  experience  of  the  deed  as  such.  The  same 
must  hold  true  for  the  fundamental  will  of  the  over-self.  The 
world  as  absolute  reality  is  the  unresolved  unity  of  this  eter- 
nal deed.  But  for  this  fundamental  deed  it  must  also  hold 
true  that  as  soon  as  the  striving  is  resolved  from  the  totality, 
it  stands  opposite  the  starting-point  of  the  striving  and  the 
goal  of  the  striving.  The  starting-point  is  that  which  the  will 
no  longer  wills  when  it  seeks  the  goal :  the  goal  is  that  which 
the  striving  has  not  yet  reached.  The  striving  is  the  move- 
ment from  the  will,  which  is  given  up  as  will  and  is  no  longer 
willed,  to  the  new  will  which  has  not  yet  unfolded  itself.  In  the 
deed  itself  the  not-yetand  the  no-longer  are  one.  Their  atem- 
poral,  mutual  relation  gives  unity  and  meaning  to  the  deed. 
But  from  the  standpoint  of  the  detached  striving  factor  of  the 
deed,  the  no-longer  and  the  not-yet  stand  separated  against 
each  other.  Such  striving  thus  becomes  itself  the  relation- 
point  for  an  opposite  pair  of  directions.  This  relation-point 
we  call  the  now.  From  the  standpoint  of  such  now  the  no- 
longer  becomes  the  past  and  the  not-yet  becomes  the  future. 
With  the  resolution  of  the  striving  from  the  atemporal  will- 
totality  the  time  is  posited  as  a  relation  between  starting- 
point  and  goal.  The  striving  distributes  itself  in  this  way 
over  separated  time-elements,  and  by  that  ceases  to  be  the 
one  eternal  striving.  It  resolves  itself  into  an  infinite  series 
of  striving  units. 

When  the  striving  separates  itself  from  its  content,  still  a 
further  antithesis  is  posited.  Just  because  the  striving  main- 
tains the  content  in  the  transition  from  the  past  to  the  future, 
this  content  is  acknowledged  as  something  independent.  It 


408  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

is  now  not  a  part  of  the  striving  itself,  is  therefore  outside  of 
the  striving  effort,  and  in  this  way  the  not-here  arises  as 
against  the  here.   The  time  had  the  double  face;  from  the 
now  it  looks  forward  and  backward.  The  space  at  first  knows 
only  one  opposition,  here  and  without.  But  that  without  re- 
fers to  the  whole  manifoldness  of  the  simultaneous  contents. 
With  every  single  content  the  character  of  the  without  shades 
itself  and  becomes  a  particular  space-direction.  In  this  way 
arises  the  endless  manifoldness  of  space-directions  as  soon  as 
the  striving  as  such  detaches  itself  from  the  totality  of  the 
deed     It  has  no  metaphysical  significance  that  for  certain 
determinations  three  space-directions  are  selected  from  the 
endlessly  many.   For  the  space,  too,  it  holds  true  that  the 
here  for  one  act  may  be  the  without  for  the  other.  The  here 
character  of  the  striving  then  resolves  itself  again  into  an 
unlimited  number  of  separated  centres  of  striving  with  an 
unlimited  number  of  here-points.    As  soon  as  the  striving 
separates  itself  from  its  content  in  the  deed  of  the  over-self, 
the  time-relation  and  the  space-relation  of  the  content  are 
accordingly  posited,  and  with  them  the  unlimited  resolution 
of  the  striving  in  independent  units.  But  that  leads  us  to  our 
individual  selves.  The  acts  of  our  I  are  such  detached  and 
endlessly  resolved  resolutions  of  the  one  absolute  striving  of 
the  over-self.   How  groups  of  such  self-acts  combine  them- 
selves to  united  personalities  we  followed  up  when  we  dis- 
cussed the  existence  of  beings.  We  have  to  return  to  that 
when  we  speak  about  mankind,  but  at  first  we  are  mterested 
in  the  other  side  of  the  process.  With  the  same  act  by  which 
the  striving  in  the  primary  deed  resolved  itself  into  striving 
individual  beings,  the  content  of  the  will  has  transformed 
itself  into  spatial  and  temporal  relations.  From  the  sum  of 
these  relations  the  striving  finally  elaborates  the  one  space 
and  the  one  time  which  embrace  all  thinkable  contents  of 

striving.  ,.^       ,    , 

The  world  in  space  and  time  therefore  has  reality  only  for 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


409 


the  apprehension  of  the  numberless  individual  selves  who 
have  been  resolved  as  striving  activities  from  the  over-self. 
Of  course  at  first  it  is  not  a  world,  but  only  a  manifoldness. 
But  as  every  single  I  is  part  of  the  striving  of  the  over-self  and 
accordingly  manifests  its  character,  this  spatial  temporal 
manifold  must  group  itself  in  accordance  with  the  funda- 
mental tendency  of  the  over-self.  We  recognized  as  its  funda- 
mental aim  that  everything  which  is  grasped  must  be  trans- 
formed by  striving  into  something  new,  that  in  the  new  the 
old  is  to  be  maintained,  and  that  the  old  in  the  new  becomes 
the  starting-point  for  a  new  striving.  This  identifying  trans- 
formation can  go  on  in  three  directions,  and  we  have  studied 
those  three  directions  most  carefully.  The  individual  self 
manifesting  the  striving  of  the  over-self  must  apprehend  its 
space-time  world,  therefore,  as  a  world  of  logical  knowledge, 
of  aesthetic  enjoyment,  of  ethical  estimation.  It  is  the  same 
over-striving  that  through  the  Individual  self  performs  this 
threefold  upbuilding  and  which  binds  these  different  deeds 
of  the  self  together  in  the  unity  of  an  individual  self. 

We  saw  how  the  striving  of  that  type  which  we  call  know- 
ledge aims  to  grasp  those  contents  which  can  be  maintained 
in  the  transition  from  one  self  to  another  self.  That  gave  us 
the  existence  of  the  things.  This  striving  aims  further  to 
maintain  the  content  in  the  transition  from  the  no-longer  to 
the  not-yet,  and  that  gives  us  the  value  of  the  connection  of 
things.  The  transition  from  one  content  to  the  other  which 
is  sought  in  the  fields  of  existence  and  connection  demands 
accordingly  that  the  self  pass  from  one  I  to  another  I,  or 
from  one  time  to  another  time,  but  that  the  content  itself  re- 
main unchanged.  The  content  as  part  of  the  fundamental 
deed  of  the  over-self  was  will,  but  if  the  self  in  its  knowledge 
of  the  world  entirely  abstracts  from  every  change  of  the  con- 
tent, this  will-content  does  not  come  in  question  at  all  in  its 
will-character.  It  is  extinct  will,  which  no  longer  wills  any- 
thing else.   It  is  a  completed  will,  which  in  its  completion 


(• 


^i 


410 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


goes  unchanged  into  other  selves  and  into  other  times.  The 
nature  which  is  object  of  our  knowledge  of  existence  and  con- 
nection is  therefore  a  deed  of  will  which  does  not  will  beyond 
itself,  and  which  cannot  unfold  itself  in  its  will.  It  is  the 
world,  the  parts  of  which  have  and  maintain  only  spatial 
temporal  existence.  Their  will  is  extinct  because  the  self  in 
its  search  for  knowledge  aims  only  towards  maintaining  the 
same  content  in  its  transition  to  other  selves  and  to  other 
times,  and  therefore  only  elaborates  that  which  is  essential 
for  the  maintaining  of  the  content  in  this  particular  transi- 
tion. Nature  as  such  therefore  has  no  will. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  world  of  aesthetic  enjoyment  this 
transition  to  other  selves  and  to  other  times  is  not  in  ques- 
tion. The  essential  factor  now  is  the  relation  among  the  va- 
rious contents.  Their  will  is  therefore  not  at  all  extinct.  Every 
particular  content  now  must  come  into  the  world  in  its  will- 
character,  and  the  transition  from  one  content  to  the  other 
can  maintain  the  old  in  the  new  only  if  they  will  the  same 
and  thus  resound  harmoniously.  The  beauty  and  harmony 
of  nature  and  of  art  now  become  living.  Finally,  in  the  world 
of  development  and  realization  the  will  of  the  things  trans- 
forms itself  into  reality.  Thus,  here  too,  the  will  of  the  con- 
tent stands  in  the  foreground.  The  self  now  seeks  the  transi- 
tion not  from  one  will  to  another  will,  as  in  the  case  of  aesthet- 
ics, but  from  the  will  to  fulfilment.  But  that  means  it  is  a 
transition  from  a  will  which  aims  beyond  itself  to  a  will  which 
is  completed  in  itself,  and  which  can  therefore  enter  with  a 
value  of  existence  into  new  situations  and  actions. 

The  three  worlds  are  consequently  the  necessary  products 
of  the  one  striving  achievement  of  the  self.  But  these  three 
directions  of  the  striving  necessarily  belong  together  because 
together  they  form  the  primary  deed.  We  recognized  that  the 
primary  deed  of  the  over-self  demanded  first  that  the  will 
strive  towards  an  enhanced  will,  further  that  in  this  transi- 
tion to  the  new  the  will  maintain  itself,  and  third  that  in  this 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  411 

way  it  unfold  itself.  If  in  this  united  deed  the  will  as  striving 
separates  itself  from  the  will  as  content,  the  content  became 
a  manifoldness  in  space-time,  and  the  striving  resolved  itself 
into  an  unlimited  number  of  selves.  That  which  in  the  orig- 
inal deed  was  a  unity  must  therefore  resolve  itself  into  several 
parts  in  every  individual  self.   In  the  original  deed  of  the 
over-self  that  which  maintains  itself  as  the  content  was  the 
will  itself.  In  the  deed  of  the  individual  self  the  maintained 
content  has  become  an  object  without,  and  therefore  a  three- 
fold possibility  arises.   The  content  is  followed  up  without 
reference  to  its  will  in  reference  to  the  other  selves  or  to  other 
space  and  time  parts ;  or  secondly,  the  content  is  followed  up 
with  reference  to  its  will  in  other  wills ;  or  thirdly,  the  content 
is  followed  up  in  its  own  will  until  it  fulfils  itself.  All  these 
three  transitions  are  necessary  parts  of  the  united  deed  in 
which  the  will  maintains  itself  because  it  is  will,  in  which  the 
will  agrees  with  itself  because  it  is  one,  in  which  the  will  ful- 
fils itself  because  it  is  a  deed.  These  are  the  three  essential 
features  of  every  deed.  In  the  over-self  they  are  the  one  un- 
broken deed,  but  as  soon  as  in  the  over-self  the  striving  as 
an  I  detaches  itself  from  the  whole  and  thus  creates  the  num- 
berless selves  and  the  space-time  world,  this  one  deed  must 
resolve  itself  into  those  three  factors.  The  self,  therefore,  must 
have  the  logical,  the  aesthetic,  and  the  ethical  worlds  as  three 
separated  worlds  which  become  one  only  if  the  selfhood  is 
annulled  again  and  the  individual  steps  back  into  the  over- 
self.   Nature  as  connection,  nature  as  harmony,  and  nature 
as  development  are  therefore  only  three  sides  of  the  one  orig- 
inal deed  of  the  over-self.  In  the  world  of  reality  the  neces- 
sity of  the  connection,  the  unity  of  the  harmony,  and  the 
progress  of  the  development  are  reconciled,  as  all  three  belong 
to  the  free  deed  of  the  fundamental  will.  The  individual  self 
alone  knows  their  conflict,  which  disappears  as  soon  as  the 
conviction  eliminates  the  boundaries  of  the  self  and  with  the 
self  the  space-time  limitations  of  the  content. 


^1 


412 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


B.  —  MANKIND 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


413 


The  manifoldness  of  the  selves  also  appeared  different  in 
the  logical,  in  the  aesthetic,  and  in  the  ethical  view  of  the 
fellow-world.  At  one  time  we  saw  it  in  its  historical  connect- 
edness, the  second  time  in  the  love  and  unity  of  its  members, 
the  last  time  in  its  self-loyalty  and  in  its  progress.  But  here, 
too,  all  the  inner  contradictions  must  disappear  as  soon  as  the 
fellow-world  is  related  to  the  ultimate  will  of  reality.  Then 
only  the  meaning  of  mankind  becomes  significant. 

Our  experience  began  with  the  fact  that  we  find  the  inner 
world  of  our  self  as  against  a  fellow-world  of  other  selves. 
They  were  not  perceived  things  in  the  outer  world,  but  will- 
ing beings  whom  our  will  immediately  acknowledges.   The 
over-experience  which  becomes  opened  to  us  by  our  convic- 
tion now  embeds  self  and  fellow-world  together  into  the 
eternal  will  of  the  over-self.   The  free  deed  of  the  over-self 
makes  the  separated  selves  in  their  manifoldness  arise  out  of 
itself.  And  the  will  which  the  selves  receive  from  that  over- 
self  posits  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  experiences  of 
the  separated  personalities.  The  ultimate  over-will  in  its  free- 
dom is  therefore  not  only  bearer  of  the  selves,  but  also  bearer 
of  the  necessary  forms  of  their  worlds,  and  that  means  of  their 
worlds  of  knowledge,  of  enjoyment,  and  of  estimation.  In  the 
elaboration  of  these  experiences  which  express  the  will  of 
the  over-self  the  individual  selves  therefore  realize  the  over- 
personal  goal.  The  values  which  the  selves  acknowledge  as 
common  for  their  worlds  of  experiences  are  accordingly 
manifestations  of  the  one  fundamental  will,  and  its  self-loyal 
unfolding  becomes  the  content  of  the  process  of  mankind. 
We  must  avoid,  however,  the  misleading  idea  that  the 
selves  are  in  a  way  secretions  or  products  of  the  over-self  as  if 
they  had  their  reality  without  the  eternal  deed  of  the  over- 
self.   The  over-self  would  then  be  complete  and  effective  in 
itself  without  reference  to  the  fact  that  it  produces  many  sin- 


gle  selves.  No ;  the  selves  are  in  the  over-self  as  the  drops  in 
the  stream,  and  the  total  development  of  mankind  is  part  of 
the  primary  over-will  itself.  In  religion  the  belief  finds  a  crea- 
tor who  stands  as  against  the  self  in  a  beyond  into  which  the 
personality  may  enter  without  being  annihilated ;  in  philo- 
sophy the  conviction  seeks  an  over-self  of  which  the  self  is 
a  necessary  part  in  an  over-experience  into  which  it  cannot 
enter  without  enlarging  itself  to  the  over-self.  Religion  is 
philosophy  for  the  I  who  maintains  its  selfhood  also  in  the 
face  of  the  all ;  philosophy  is  religion  for  the  I  which  in  its 
own  deed  finally  grasps  the  all  and  through  the  all  gives  up 
the  selfhood. 

As  the  drops  in  the  stream !  And  yet  such  a  metaphor,  too, 
is  entirely  misleading  if  it  is  to  say  more  than  that  the  selves 
do  not  live  outside  the  deed  of  the  over-self.  It  misleads 
as  soon  as  it  suggests  that  the  sum  of  the  drops  makes  up  the 
stream  itself.  The  sum  of  the  selves  and  of  the  experiences  of 
the  selves  is  not  at  all  the  totality  of  the  over-self.  For  the 
over-self  the  content  of  the  striving  has  not  entered  into  the 
form  of  the  self-experience,  as  we  saw  that  this  latter  form  is 
dependent  upon  the  standpoint  of  the  I.  The  mere  accumu- 
lation of  self-experiences,  therefore,  could  never  reach  the 
content  of  the  over-self.  In  the  same  way  the  mere  sum  of 
an  unlimited  series  of  selves  would  only  bring  a  repetition 
of  wills  which  are  directed  towards  self-experience  and  never 
that  over-will  which  is  directed  towards  a  world-totality.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  the  self  and  in  the  over-self  the  kind  of  the 
will  must  necessarily  be  the  same.  Both  can  manifest  only 
the  will  striving  to  enhance  the  content  in  order  to  make  it  a 
new  foothold  for  volition  and  yet  to  maintain  the  old  content. 
As  striving,  the  self  is  thus  equal  to  the  over-self.  The  over- 
self  which  makes  up  the  total  ultimate  reality  was  the  striving 
which  aims  towards  its  own  enhancement  and  yet  maintains 
itself.  Every  point  reached  is  accordingly  a  starting-point 
for  a  new  will  to  new  goals,  and  the  new  goal  is  again  striving. 


414 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


415 


At  every  thinkable  stage  of  this  timeless  eternal  deed  every- 
thing must  be  possible  content  of  striving  and  yet  striving 
itself  as  well.  As  far  as  it  is  considered  as  content,  it  takes 
the  temporal  spatial  form  of  experience.  As  far  as  it  is  con- 
sidered as  striving,  it  multiplies  itself  into  the  unlimited 
number  of  selves,  and  only  in  so  far  as  striving  and  content 
are  experienced  as  the  same,  is  it  the  one  over-personal  world- 
deed  of  the  absolute. 

The  question  arises  why  the  absolute  moves  towards  the 
separation  of  striving  and  content  at  all.  What  is  the  purpose 
towards  which  the  will  strives  when  it  splits  its  deed  into  the 
will  as  striving  and  the  will  as  content?  But  such  a  question 
distorts  the  process.  We  have  not  a  temporal  succession.  It 
is  not  as  if  the  deed  was  at  first  united  action  and  then  at  a 
certain  stage  of  development  a  bifurcation  began  by  which  it 
divided  itself  into  the  aiming  of  selves  and  the  experienced 
content.  On  the  contrary,  the  unity  of  the  world-positing 
absolute  deed  continues  to  be  maintained  in  eternity,  and  on 
the  other  hand,  even  in  the  lowest  stage  of  the  deed  in  the 
midst  of  the  one  deed  the  separation  is  incessantly  performed. 
While  the  deed  is  closed  in  itself  and  fulfils  itself  as  the  whole 
in  perfect  completion,  yet  in  the  midst  of  this  whole  the  will 
as  it  wills  to  grasp  itself  stands  out  in  opposition  to  that  which 
it  grasps  in  itself.  That  is,  the  striving  stands  in  the  midst  of 
the  deed  in  contrast  to  the  goal.  We  oiu'selves  as  selves  are 
that  striving  in  the  midst  of  the  absolute  deed,  and  therefore 
we  find  the  world-experience  as  in  contrast  to  ourselves.  If 
we  could  stand  outside  of  the  selves,  the  absolute  deed  would 
be  closed  in  itself  and  the  whole  would  appear  to  our  view  as 
a  whole.  But  as  we  are  the  striving  in  the  midst  of  that  whole 
deed,  the  will  as  a  content  remains  something  foreign  to  us. 
And  by  this  separation  that  movement  sets  in  which  makes  us 
individual  selves  and  the  not-self  an  outer  world.  For  the 
deed  of  the  over-self  accordingly  nothing  new  is  added  when 
in  the  midst  of  its  own  definite  acts  the  relation  between  the 


will  as  subject  and  as  object  resolves  itself.  We  grasp  it  then 
only  from  one  side,  from  the  side  of  the  will  as  striving.  We 
are  the  striving  and  yet  at  the  same  time  the  whole  deed. 

But  finally  we  are  also  parts  of  the  content.  If  the  world- 
deed  is  the  will  which  maintains  itself,  every  particle  of  this 
world-will  must  also  belong  to  that  which  is  maintained, 
that  is,  to  the  content  of  experience.  As  such,  we  are  bodies, 
and  only  through  them  the  personality  which  enters  into 
the  historical  mankind  becomes  completed.  We  saw  how  the 
world-deed  narrows  itself  into  the  I.  As  soon  as  the  content 
of  the  striving  is  shaped  in  the  space-time  form,  the  striving 
itself  as  starting-point  for  the  directions  of  time  and  space 
must  represent  a  here  and  now.  From  this  here-now  stand- 
point each  self  must  stand  as  against  the  world-experience. 
This  standpoint  selects  the  particular  content  of  experience 
which  can  exist  for  the  striving  of  the  individual  self.  On 
the  other  hand,  changes  in  the  midst  of  the  space-time  world 
can  result  only  through  other  space-time  changes.  The  striving 
of  the  will  can  enter  into  processes  of  the  outer  world,  there- 
fore, only  when  some  physical  causal  action  coincides  with 
the  will.  The  world  of  the  self  thus  depends  upon  the  pre- 
supposition that  a  particular  will  with  a  particular  here  and 
now  finds  just  here  and  now  an  organism  in  which  correspond- 
ing movements  proceed.  The  striving  in  the  over-self,  which 
by  its  resolution  transforms  itself  into  an  unlimited  number  of 
possible  selves  and  posits  by  them  the  space-time  world,  can 
therefore  realize  from  this  unlimited  series  only  certain  selves 
as  personalities.  The  conditions  for  a  real  self  are  fulfilled 
only  when  the  particular  will  as  will  and  as  content  possess 
the  same  space-time  value.  But  evidently  this  is  not  a  chance 
coincidence.  The  space-time  position  of  the  particular  I 
resulted  from  the  particular  selection  of  the  things  towards 
which  the  will  took  attitude.  The  will  of  the  I  was  here  and 
now  only  in  the  sense  that  certain  things  were  past  and  future, 
before  and  behind.  But  the  selection  of  these  things  depends 


;'!• 


416 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


417 


upon  the  relation  to  an  acting  organism.  The  here  and  now 
of  the  particular  will  must  therefore  be  given  with  the  body. 
From  the  unlimited  series  of  possible  selves,  accordingly, 
a  self  must  be  realized  wherever  an  acting  organism  posits 
by  its  movements  particular  relations  to  its  surround- 
ings. The  width  of  this  experienced  world  is  accordingly 
determined  by  the  manifoldness  of  these  organic  reactions. 
The  being  may  be  an  earthworm  or  a  man  of  civilization. 
But  by  this  selecting  dependence  upon  the  body  the  self  never 
becomes  an  object  like  the  body,  but  remains  a  free  will  which 
is  limited  only  with  regard  to  its  objects.  As  such  a  free  will 
it  cannot  be  perceived,  but  must  be  acknowledged,  and  esti- 
mated, and  all  mankind  builds  itself  up  by  this  relation  from 
will  to  will. 

Only  when  we  view  mankind  in  this  metaphysical  con- 
nection do  we  recognize  the  ultimate  meaning  of  its  inex- 
haustible activity.  We  understand  that  by  mankind's  striv- 
ing for  the  securing  and  realization  of  values  the  will  of  the 
eternal  over-self  maintains  and  enhances  itself.  From  the 
standpoint  of  the  individual  self  we  have  separated  logical 
and  aesthetic  and  ethical  apprehension.  Those  various  values 
of  mankind  are  now  recognized  as  different  sides  of  the  one, 
united,  absolute  deed.  Every  particular  aspect  emphasizes 
only  particular  elements.  The  knowledge  of  the  fellow-world 
demanded  that  we  maintain  and  identify  the  volitions  which 
started  from  the  same  subject ;  we  gained  by  it  the  value  of 
existence  of  the  beings.  In  the  historical  connection  know- 
ledge maintained  the  will  which  was  directed  to  the  same  ends 
in  the  transition  from  man  to  man.  It  was  a  definite  identical 
will  which  was  followed  up  by  such  logical  consideration.  On 
the  other  hand,  when  the  aesthetic  value  was  sought,  the 
mutual  relation  of  the  various  beings  was  grasped ;  it  was  the 
identification  through  the  harmony  of  souls,  through  friend- 
ship and  love.  Finally,  when  the  ethical  standpoint  was 
taken,  the  will  in  its  striving  towards  the  realization,  and  that 


means  towards  enhancement,  was  maintained  in  order  to  be 
identified  with  a  new  stage  and  volition  and  deed.  In  this 
way  every  one  of  the  values  gives  valid  expression  to  the 
self-enhancing  self-assertion  of  the  will,  but  no  one  value 
represents  the  totality  of  this  deed.  The  deed  is  split  as  soon 
as  the  striving  has  separated  itself  from  its  content,  and  the 
all-striving  has  thus  been  divided  into  the  unlimited  number 
of  single  beings.  The  deed  becomes  a  totality  again  only  when 
the  single  beings  annul  the  limitation  and  grasp  their  own 
ultimate  reality  in  the  over-personal  will  of  the  absolute  self. 

From  this  deepest  source  flows  the  right  understanding  of 
the  human  task  and  of  the  position  of  the  individual  in  man- 
kind. Only  in  the  certainty  of  this  connection  with  the  over- 
self  do  we  know  on  principle  that  every  one  of  us  is  unique  and 
cannot  be  replaced  and  is  necessary  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
world-plan.  If  we  know  life  merely  from  the  swarming  of 
the  day,  the  one  may  appear  hardly  distinguishable  from  his 
neighbor.  Only  a  few  have  anything  new  to  say,  and  many  a 
man  may  appear  superfluous  and  accidental.  From  the  stand- 
point of  the  whole  we  understand  that  this  all  is  a  unique 
drama,  in  which  every  volition  has  its  necessary  place.  Only 
from  the  unity  of  this  whole  do  we  know  that  no  self  can  be 
repeated  in  any  other  world.  The  world  is  a  living  willing 
activity  and  not  a  dead  accidental  process.  Our  own  deed 
becomes  in  that  way  alone  a  responsible  irreplaceable  parti- 
cipation. While  our  self  by  its  relation  to  the  whole  goes  over 
into  the  eternal,  at  the  same  time  our  self  gains  eternal  and 
inexhaustible  significance.  In  our  own  small  life-purpose,  we 
now  will  the  great  infinite  whole.  Nobody  else  can  satisfy  our 
will,  and  nobody  else  can  disburden  us  from  our  duty. 

This  deepest  connection  also  brings  man  nearer  to  man. 
We  are  unique  as  selves,  but  ultimately  we  are  all  in  the  one 
embracing  over-self.  Yes,  we  all  are  the  same  over-self  and 
separate  ourselves  only  by  our  relation  to  the  space-time 
world  which  itself  arose  by  the  splitting  of  the  primary  deed 


li 


418 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


into  striving  and  content.  That  is  not  to  be,  as  it  sometimes 
has  been,  the  way  to  an  ethical  doctrine.  The  sympathy  with 
another,  in  whose  pain  we  participate  because  he  is  ultimately 
one  and  the  same  with  us,  has  no  moral  significance  for  our 
philosophy.  Pleasure  and  pain  and  accordingly  participation 
in  pleasure  and  sympathy  were  lying  outside  of  morality  for 
us.  But  this  ultimate  unity  unites  us  in  our  common  duty. 
Even  when  we  examined  the  spheres  of  experience  we  found 
that  the  true  values  must  be  common  to  all  human  beings. 
We  recognized  that  the  evaluating  will  was  the  fundamental 
condition,  the  "a-priori,'*  of  the  common  world  of  experience. 
If  we  will  to  build  up  a  world  which  is  not  merely  a  personal 
dream  and  accidental  chaos,  it  must  be  the  world  of  values. 
Yet  only  from  this  relation  to  the  over-self  comes  the  higher 
sanction  of  this  common  will.  The  ^im  towards  building  up 
the  world  of  values  is  now  no  longer  merely  the  necessary  will 
of  every  being  who  wills  to  be  acknowledged  as  a  self,  but  it 
is  a  task  which  precedes  the  arising  of  the  selves  themselves. 
It  is  the  task  which  gives  any  meaning  whatever  to  the  self- 
hood and  to  the  content  of  experience. 

Certainly  from  the  standpoint  of  experience,  we  recognized 
the  development  and  achievement  of  men,  their  happiness 
and  their  peace,  their  science  and  their  art,  as  something 
absolutely  valuable.  Yet  that  meant  for  us  then  only  that  it 
must  be  valuable  for  every  possible  I.  But  what  new  width 
and  significance  and  dignity  come  to  the  history  of  mankind 
now  that  it  unveils  itself  as  the  unfolding  of  an  eternal  will ! 
Every  truth  and  every  work  of  art,  every  act  of  justice  and 
every  moral  victory,  every  economic  progress  and  every  re- 
ligious inspu^tion,  now  becomes  a  new  enhancement  of  an 
eternal  will.  In  every  cooperation  of  men  who  build  up  values 
in  the  family  and  in  the  tribe,  in  the  community  and  in  the 
state,  in  the  widest  circle  of  civilization  a  continuous  growth 
of  the  living  world-positing  energy  is  manifested.  In  every 
fighter  for  new  values,  in  every  leader  of  mankind,  the  deepest 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  419 

world-will  strives  upward.  But  when  the  meaning  of  the  social 
work  towards  values  becomes  metaphysically  deepened,  at 
the  same  time  the  counter-will  which  selfishly  destroys  values 
must  be  sharpened  in  its  contrast.  To  hold  the  untrue  and 
the  ugly,  to  create  the  unjust  and  the  immoral,  to  interfere 
with  the  development  and  to  destroy  the  harmony  now  means 
more  than  a  mere  opposition  to  the  labor  of  others.  It 
means  metaphysical  solitary  confinement.  The  life  which 
raises  up  pleasure  as  its  purpose  now  views  below  and  about 
it  an  infinite  abyss.  Such  a  life  has  lost  the  connection  with 
a  world-totality.  The  world-will  which  bears  all  existence 
and  gives  meaning  to  reality  is  on  principle  annulled  by  the 
conscious  denial  of  values.  Suddenly  everything  has  become 
meaningless,  purposeless,  empty.  The  I  which  seeks  only  its 
pleasure  is  banished  into  eternal  solitude. 

That  must  not  be  misunderstood  as  if  a  soul  becomes  an- 
tagonistic to  values  if  it  seeks  in  its  action  its  own  self.  Only 
if  the  pleasure  is  brought  into  opposition  to  the  value  and  if 
accordingly  that  which  is  desired  for  the  self  is  preferred  to 
that  which  is  absolutely  valid  is  the  metaphysical  ground 
destroyed.  The  strong  personality,  on  the  other  hand,  which, 
moved  by  passions,  seems  to  seek  itself,  seeks  the  values  and 
only  tries  to  give  to  the  values  the  stamp  of  the  own  particu- 
lar deed.  Just  that  creates  in  the  world  of  will  ever  new  evalu- 
ation and  always  enhances  anew  the  deepest  energy.  Such 
a  powerful  will  of  the  self  and  such  self-feeling  in  the  fight 
against  the  colorless  society  pattern,  such  creation  in  accord- 
ance with  the  own  will  is  surely  not  opposed  to  the  world- 
will.  It  is  a  transvaluation.  That  is  meant  not  in  the  sense 
that  it  demonstrates  transitoriness  and  change  in  the  pure 
values.  No,  the  values  remain  unchangeable,  but  the  fulfil- 
ment of  the  evaluation,  the  content  of  the  evaluated  relations, 
must  change  in  order  that  the  world-will  may  enhance  itself 
from  stage  to  stage.   We  saw  that  value  never  belonged  to 
anything  isolated,  but  always  to  a  relation,  always  to  an 


420 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


identification  of  the  separated.  The  will  must  progress  to  new 
and  ever  new  identifications  of  the  world,  inasmuch  as  the 
world  itself  must  continually  progress  and  the  world  must 
progress  because  it  is  will ;  in  every  act  its  reality  seeks  a  new 
starting-point  for  a  new  will.  He  who  destroys  in  order  that 
he  may  put  the  energies  of  his  self  into  the  world-process,  he 
who  banishes  traditional  valuations  in  order  that  from  his 
deepest  soul  he  may  wrest  new  values  from  the  world-will 
and  throw  them  into  the  becoming  of  mankind,  is  eternally 
right,  and  the  crowd  which  only  wants  to  enjoy  is  wrong  in 
contrast  to  such  a  great  self-asserting  individuality.  All  the 
energy  and  all  the  value  of  our  self  thus  ultimately  originates 
from  the  infinite  all-will.  And  yet  the  reality  and  the  validity 
of  this  over-self  will  originates  for  eternity  from  the  convic- 
tion of  our  own  self. 

C.  —  OVER-SELF 

We  stand  before  the  last  question :  What  does  the  inner 
world  in  itself  become  when  it  is  referred  to  the  over-reality? 
In  a  certain  sense  we  have  answered  that  question  before. 
When  the  fellow-world  of  our  experience  by  its  relation  to  the 
absolute  enlarged  itself  to  mankind  as  a  whole,  it  necessarily 
included  also  our  own  self.  Each  of  us  is  a  member  of  man- 
kind, and  the  meaning  of  our  single  self  then  lies  in  the  part 
which  we  take  in  the  upbuilding  of  the  values.  Only  in  so  far 
as  we  help  mankind  to  create  values  do  we  fulfil  the  task 
which  the  absolute  bears  in  itself  and  which  becomes  realized 
by  the  history  of  mankind.  We  are  a  single  small  fraction  of 
the  totality  which  appears  to  logical  knowledge  as  the  neces- 
sary historical  connection,  to  aesthetic  appreciation  as  com- 
munity of  souls,  to  ethical  estimation  as  free  purposive  pro- 
gress. 

But  our  self  was  for  us  not  only  a  chance,  single  member 
in  the  masses;  it  remains  always  at  the  same  time  the 
one,  closed,  inner  world.  This  inner  world  of  the  self  was  torn 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


421 


by  contradictions,  too.  The  logical  self-apprehension  recog- 
nized as  the  real  I  the  reason  with  its  necessary  connection  of 
valuations.  The  aesthetic  self-intuition  sought  an  I  which 
offers  the  completed  unity  of  happiness.  The  ethical  self- 
certainty  acknowledged  an  I  which  realizes  itself.  Only  when 
the  inner  world  too  is  recognized  as  emanation  of  a  deeper 
will  can  this  apparent  contradiction  disappear.  Then  the  dif- 
ferent values  represent  merely  various  aspects  of  that  funda- 
mental reality.  The  I  can  find  this  deeper  will  only  as  content 
of  its  conviction.  In  its  own  acting,  it  must  posit  itself  as 
identical  with  the  embracing  will  which  is  absolute.  In  itself 
it  must  therefore  annul  its  selfhood  to  posit  itself  in  unity 
with  the  absolute  which  gives  infiniteness.  The  self  enlarges 
itself  into  the  over-self  by  its  own  deed.  The  limitations  of 
the  one-sided  aspect  then  fade  away.  In  the  will  of  the  over- 
self  necessary  connection,  harmonious  unity,  and  self-loyal 
realization  are  posited  in  one  and  the  same  deed.  The  will  of 
the  over-self  had  to  maintain  itself.  By  that  it  had  to  enhance 
itself,  to  realize  itself,  to  progress  from  stage  to  stage,  and 
thus  harmoniously  to  fulfil  all  its  willing.  In  the  narrowed 
apprehension  of  the  I,  this  will-process  resolves  itself  into  the 
separated  values.  In  the  over-self  the  one  fundamental  deed 
embraces  necessity  and  freedom,  unity  and  progress. 

Accordingly  we  find  in  ourselves  the  over-self  in  the  blend- 
ing allness  of  values,  as  soon  as  the  boundaries  of  the  self 
begin  to  disappear.  We  must  now  look  from  the  self  towards 
the  over-self,  and  we  shall  ultimately  glance  for  the  last  time 
from  the  over-self  back  to  the  self.  In  other  words,  we  will 
indicate  once  more  the  purest  meaning  of  our  view  of  the 
world  in  order  ultimately  to  trace  once  more  the  life-purposes 
of  the  personality.  Indeed,  the  view  of  the  world  has  become 
completed  for  us  only  now  since  we  have  come  to  understand 
how  the  world  and  mankind  and  the  self  are  embedded  in  the 
deed  of  the  over-self  for  eternity. 

For  eternity!   We  have  reached  that  highest  point  from 


422 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


which  the  meaning  of  eternity  unveils  itself.  And  through 
it  we  recognize  the  deepest  aiming  of  the  absolute.  The  three- 
fold valuation  of  connection,  unity,  and  realization  has  shown 
itself  now  as  a  mere  resolving  of  one  united  deed  which  in 
the  over-reality  is  really  a  single  one.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
three  contents  of  the  world,  outer  world,  fellow-world,  and 
inner  world,  presented  themselves  also  as  mere  separated 
aspects  of  this  same  absolute  deed.  The  resolution  into  those 
three  different  values  resulted  as  soon  as  in  a  way  we  took 
a  cross-section  of  the  world-deed,  and  the  resolution  into  the 
three  world-contents  when  we  took  a  longitudinal  section,  if 
such  metaphors  may  be  allowed.  In  the  absolute  over-deed 
all  those  separations  are  again  annulled.  The  I,  the  fellow-I, 
and  the  not-I  are  in  the  over-I  one  and  the  same ;  and  the 
logical,  the  sesthetic,  and  the  ethical  valuation  form  in  the 
over-I  one  single  unfolding  will,  and  accordingly  one  single 
deed :  the  world-deed. 

The  world  is  a  deed.  From  here  everything  becomes  illu- 
minated. A  deed  is  the  realization  of  that  which  is  willed.  A 
deed  is  not  only  a  final  action  as  if  it  were  simply  a  process. 
The  action  is  part  of  the  deed  only  if  it  corresponds  to  the  will. 
In  every  deed  that  which  is  willed  and  that  which  is  achieved 
are  posited  as  one.  As  purpose  of  the  will  the  goal  is  a  not- 
yet,  a  future.  In  view  of  the  achievement  the  mere  willing  of 
the  goal  has  become  a  no-longer,  a  past.  Only  when  both 
are  perfectly  one  do  we  have  a  deed.  In  the  deed,  therefore, 
past  and  future  are  one,  and  that  alone  is  the  meaning  of 
eternity.  The  world-deed  is  eternal  in  time  just  as  the  circle 
is  eternal  in  space.  Nowhere  a  beginning  and  nowhere  an 
end  in  the  circle.  In  the  eternity  of  the  fulfilment  of  the 
world-deed  the  over-self  does  not  know  a  past  which  is  not 
also  future  nor  a  future  which  is  not  also  past.  The  world 
is  eternal  because  in  every  fibre  of  its  ultimate  reality  it  is 
nothing  but  deed,  and  because  every  deed  posits  future  and 
past  as  a  unity. 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS 


423 


The  world  is  a  deed.  A  deed  is  an  identification.  Now  we 
understand  why  every  will  which  arose  from  the  depths  of 
the  world-will  remained  fundamentally  a  striving  for  identi- 
fication. Here  lies  the  last  ground  for  form  and  content  of 
our  values.  We  recognized  all  our  values  as  such  relations  of 
identities,  and  all  striving  of  the  personalities  for  values  was 
an  expression  of  this  demand  for  finding  that  which  remains 
identical  with  itself  in  the  experience.  This  demand  for  iden- 
tification meant  at  the  same  time  the  demand  for  the  self- 
assertion  of  the  world.  This  demand  is  not  itself  an  object  of 
experience.  It  manifests  itself  in  its  deed,  and  only  from  the 
result,  from  the  evaluated  world  can  we  recognize  this  ab- 
solute deed.  The  personality  must  be  impelled  by  such  a 
deed  inasmuch  as  all  our  willing  and  realizing  in  experience 
must  participate  in  the  deed  and  will  of  the  eternal  absolute. 
The  deed  demands  that  everything  remain  worthless  which 
does  not  identify  the  grasped  content  in  a  new  experience 
and  which  does  not  in  this  way  remain  loyal  to  its  will. 

The  world  is  a  deed.  A  deed  is  a  realization,  and  as  realiza- 
tion we  recognized  the  fulfilment  of  will  in  a  form  which  de- 
mands new  will.  Realization  is  therefore  enhancement  of 
will.  Hence  at  no  stage  can  the  deed  of  the  over-self  come  to 
a  standstill.  And  it  can  never  go  backward,  as  every  realiza- 
tion must  lead  to  a  new  will  which  has  all  the  earlier  stages 
as  presuppositions.  Every  new  stage  therefore  realizes  the 
ultimate  meaning  of  the  preceding  stages.  But  just  that 
meant  to  us  progress.  In  every  valuable  process  the  will  of 
the  world  is  enhanced.  Yet  that  does  not  mean  that  that 
which  is  reached  is  in  itself  more  valuable  than  the  stage 
which  is  left  behind.  The  value  always  lay  only  in  the  rela- 
tion, in  the  realization,  in  the  positing  as  identical.  Every 
single  enhancement  of  the  will  is  therefore  absolutely  valu- 
able, and  nothing  can  be  still  more  valuable  than  that  which 
is  absolutely  valuable.  Even  the  highest  stage  which  the  will 
may  reach  is  always  valuable  only  with  reference  to  the  ear- 


424 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


lier  stage.  Only  the  relation  is  valuable,  because  it  is  the  ful- 
filment of  the  will.  The  ultimate  goal  of  the  world  lies  at  an 
endless  distance.  And  yet  even  that  furthest  final  point  can- 
not be  more  valuable  in  itself  than  that  which  is  left  behind. 
Only  the  movement  towards  a  goal,  the  maintaining  and  en- 
hancement, is  endlessly  valuable. 

The  world  is  a  deed.   Deed  means  fulfilment  and  comple- 
tion. If  the  world  is  to  be  a  deed,  it  must  always  be  complete 
in  itself,  and  yet  its  goal  was  to  lie  at  an  infinite  distance. 
There  is  no  contradiction.   It  is  a  necessary,  inner  counter- 
play  of  the  eternal  will.   In  the  infinite  lies  the  last  stage  of 
the  world,  but  no  stage  can  belong  to  this  world  which  does 
not  belong  to  its  will  and  therefore  to  its  moving  from  the 
start.    Whatever  the  world-will  may  desire,  it  must  be  a 
self-unfolding  of  the  original  will.  The  over-self  can  never  be- 
come disloyal  to  itself.   Its  unlimited  development  is  given 
in  the  law  of  its  own  free  deed  as  the  curve  of  geometry  is 
given  in  the  formula  of  its  smallest  part.    If  the  over-self 
would  know  itself  entirely,  it  would  from  the  beginning  be 
obliged  to  will  the  world  in  its  infinity.  All  becoming  is  the 
self-unfolding  of  this  one  will.    The  world  is  therefore  an 
infinite  enhancement  of  will,  and  yet  a  completed  deed, 
as  nothing  which  is  not  willed  can  ever  be  added  to  this  will 
which  maintains  itself.  With  the  first  positing  this  endless, 
infinite,  eternal  world  is  perfectly  closed,  and  it  is  meaningless 
to  ask  for  a  world  which  lies  outside  of  it. 

The  world  is  a  deed.  The  deed  in  its  totality  embraces  con- 
nection and  unity  and  achievement.  Only  by  annulling  its 
totality  in  separating  the  not-I  from  the  I  the  three  aspects 
of  the  world  became  resolved,  and  each  became  the  starting- 
point  of  a  special  world-valuation.  Each  became  the  ''a- 
priori''  of  a  particular  evaluated  world.  But  just  for  this 
reason  those  separated  evaluations  can  be  valid  only  for  the 
world  of  experience  which  resulted  from  that  opposition  of  I 
and  not-I.  For  the  over-experience,  for  the  ultimate  reality 


« 

0 


THE  VALUES  OP  ABSOLUTENESS  425 

of  will,  accordingly,  the  logical,  or  aesthetic,  or  ethical  stand- 
ards of  valuation  must  be  insuflScient.  Thus  the  deed  of  the 
over-self  can  be  measured  only  by  the  metaphysical  value 
which  is  the  inner  imity  of  those  three  values  of  experience. 
The  ultimate  reality,  therefore,  can  never  be  grasped  by  mere 
logical  knowledge,  and  every  philosophy  which  is  based 
merely  on  logical  thinking  must  be  impotent  on  principle. 
But  in  the  same  way  such  a  philosophy  cannot  be  supported 
merely  by  aesthetic  feeling  which  seeks  the  value  of  unity,  or 
by  ethical  consciousness  which  evaluates  the  realization. 
Every  single  effort  of  such  evaluating  one-sidedness  must 
bring  the  absolute  which  is  to  bear  all  experience  down  into 
the  realm  of  experience  itself.  The  deed  of  the  over-self  would 
then  glide  back  into  individual  life.  Conviction  alone  in  which 
the  world  manifoldness  is  posited  as  a  unity  can  grasp  the  ul- 
timate reality.  Only  through  conviction  the  over-deed  annuls 
the  metaphysical  solitude  of  the  self  and  binds  together  the  I 
and  the  not-I  in  their  truth  and  unity  and  freedom.   The 
world-will  is  will  towards  values.  But  the  created  value  ap- 
pears only  in  the  experience  of  the  I  as  truth,  harmony,  and 
goodness.  In  the  ultimate  over-personal  reality  the  world  is 
grasped  through  the  metaphysical  over-value  which  creates 
all  those  values  of  experience.  Through  the  conviction  of 
belief  in  this  metaphysical  value  the  I  enlarges  itself  to 
the  over-I  which  contains  in  itself  the  I  with  the  fellow-I 
and  the  not-I. 

The  world  is  a  deed.  It  is  no  thing,  no  content,  no  mere 
existence  with  which  the  world  begins  and  the  parts  of  which 
now  simply  last  in  indifference.  It  is  no  deed-material  which 
hangs  together  in  accidental  parts  externally  and  the  elements 
of  which  continue.  The  world  is  a  living  deed,  and  the  work 
of  this  deed  is  to  be  performed.  From  here  we  imderstand 
the  task  and  the  meaning  of  our  individual  selfhood. 

Whoever  has  proceeded  from  fluctuating  chance  volitions 
to  real  convictions  finds  this  unswervingly  before  his  soul : 


k.    >• 


426 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


our  life  has  meaning  and  purpose.  We  are  not  embedded 
helplessly  into  a  blind  accidental  game  which  destroys  the 
values  of  experience,  but  with  our  whole  life-reality  we  belong 
to  a  world  which  strives  upward.  The  rigid  necessity  which 
forces  us  has  shown  itself  as  a  value,  too,  as  a  value  which 
our  own  will  is  positing  in  its  pure  willing  towards  the  goal 
of  the  world.  Banished  is  the  anxiety  that  the  over-reality 
may  be  meaningless,  and  that  our  world  of  experience  with 
all  its  truth  and  beauty  and  goodness  may  be  a  useless  pur- 
poseless upbuilding.  In  the  beyond  of  the  self  there  works  a 
will  towards  values  which  bears  our  own  valuation,  and  which 
cannot  be  sacrificed  itself  in  any  infinity. 

This  life  in  the  world  of  values  is  a  great  affirmation.  Pre- 
judiced pessimists  think  that  if  all  existence  is  will,  life  must 
be  intolerable.  They  say  that  each  will  is  dissatisfaction  with 
that  which  is  given,  and  when  the  will  is  satisfied  all  interest 
is  annulled.  The  world  would  thus  be  a  pendulum  movement 
between  pain  and  apathy.  We  now  know  the  opposite.  Just 
because  the  world  and  life  are  unending  will,  the  true  life  is 
filled  with  the  greatest  possible  measure  of  pure  satisfaction. 
We  recognized  that  the  will  is  not  at  all  displeasure.  Only 
the  realization  of  that  which  is  not  willed  brings  dissatis- 
faction. The  continuous  willing  as  such  is  not  at  all  a  suffering. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  joy  which 
floods  from  the  fulfilment.  The  fulfilment  itself,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  not  annul  the  will,  and  therefore  does  not  deprive 
us  of  the  possibility  of  new  satisfaction.  We  recognized  that 
fulfilment  and  realization  cannot  mean  anything  else  than 
transition  to  new  starting-points  for  a  new  will.  As  the  world 
is  nothing  but  will,  the  will  always  wills  only  new  willing,  and 
every  realization  is  fulfilment  just  because  it  secures  new  voli- 
tion. He  who  p)Osits  the  value  bears  in  himself  a  joy  which 
necessarily  realizes  itself  in  every  pulse-beat  of  life.  Will  itself 
becomes  an  inexhaustible  source  of  satisfaction.  No  suffering 
and  no  disappointment  can  dry  up  this  eternal  source.   It 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  427 

ceases  only  when  the  value  is  destroyed  on  principle,  when 
the  umty  with  the  over-self  is  accordingly  denied,  when  the 
world-affirming  meaning  of  life  is  lost  by  the  own  will.  He  who 
does  not  will  the  value  does  not  fundamentally  will  his  own 
wi  1,  and  life  itself  is  therefore  sacrificed.  What  remains  is 
only  the  phantom  of  life.  "The  true  life,"  says  Fichte,  "lives 
in  the  eternal.  It  is  a  whole  in  every  instant,  the  highest  life 
which  IS  possible  at  all.  The  phantom  life  lives  in  the  chang- 
ing. The  phantom  life  therefore  becomes  an  incessant  dyin;?  • 
It  lives  in  dying." 

It  would  be  meaningless  to  hope  for  more  from  life  than 
such  a  fulfilment  of  the  own  will.  Nothing  but  fulfilment  of 
the  own  demand  could  ever  bring  any  satisfaction  at  all  to 
us.  And  this  fulfilment  does  not  lie  in  a  far  distant  life,  is  not 
a  seeking  for  an  ultimate,  perhaps  unattainable,  goal.  Every 
act  offers  a  totality  of  value,  and  in  every  will  through  truth 
and  harmony  and  morality  something  perfect  can  be  created. 
That  all  this  is  possible  makes  our  life  the  best  and  most 
blessed.   Such  optimism  is  now  no  longer  threatened  for  us 
by  the  inner  opposition  of  the  values.  Those  contradictions 
have  been  annulled  in  the  over-self.   We  know  that  those 
contradictory  valuations  are  ultimately  only  different  aspects 
of  the  fundamental  deed  which  is  a  unity  in  itself,  and  that 
the  conflict  is  irreconcilable  only  in  the  limited  experience  of 
the  self,  not  in  the  ultimate  reality.  As  soon  as  we  grasp  the 
self  in  the  over-self,  the  parts  unite  themselves  harmoniously 
in  a  totality.  On  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  the  over-self  has 
become  the  limited  self  and  the  original  deed  therefore  re- 
solved into  a  will  towards  the  separated  values,  their  conflict 
is  necessary.   And  in  this  conflict  was  ultimately  lying  also 
the  contrast  between  the  will  towards  the  value  and  the  striv- 
ing against  the  value,  between  happiness  and  suffering,  be- 
tween progress  and  death,  between  morality  and  sin.  That 
our  individual  life  is  overshadowed  by  suffering  and  disap- 
pointment, that  error  and  temptation  and  non-fulfilment 


428 


THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 


penetrate  into  our  days,  in  short  that  human  fate  is  after  all 
only  a  human  life  is  therefore  posited  with  the  will  to  be  a 

self. 

The  mere  desire  for  pleasure  and  the  mere  avoiding  of  pain 
cannot  possibly  be  the  goal  of  our  life  if  it  is  to  maintain 
meaning  and  value  at  all  and  is  not  in  its  lonely  selfishness 
to  detach  itself  from  the  world-will.  We  recognized  that  fully 
at  every  stage  of  our  philosophical  inquiry.  We  saw  that  the 
pleasure,  too,  has  its  aesthetic  place  in  the  inexhaustible  value 
of  happiness,  but  it  was  the  unity  of  the  inner  experience 
which  was  demanded  in  such  a  valuation,  not  the  content  of 
pleasure  as  such.  It  is  aesthetically  valuable  to  be  happy,  but 
it  is  without  ethical  value  to  strive  for  pleasure,  and  it  is 
ethically  worthless  to  prefer  pleasure  to  the  values  of  will. 
The  moral  task  of  our  life  is  to  realize  the  absolutely  valid 
pure  values  by  our  own  deed.  In  this  life-work,  we  know  our- 
selves as  free  creators.  We  are  free  because  our  will  in  the 
reality  of  life  is  not  posited  as  a  link  in  the  chain  of  causal 
connections.  It  is  meaningless  to  ask  there  for  its  causes.  Our 
will  is  completely  determined  by  its  inner  relations  and  inten- 
tions. We  do  not  perceive  our  will  like  a  thing,  but  experience 
it  in  an  incomparable  way  as  an  own  self-certain  striving,  as 
a  free  realization.  And  every  realization  meant  to  us  an  en- 
hancement of  the  free  will.   On  the  other  hand,  the  values 
which  we  seek  in  freedom  are  not  given  to  us,  but  are  de- 
manded from  us.  They  are  not  experiences,  but  new  crea- 
tions from  the  material  of  experience.  This  free  work  of  our 
life  is  unique ;  we  recognized  it  as  irreplaceable  in  the  only 
world  of  the  deed  of  the  over-self.  And  this  life-work  from 
birth  to  death  is  in  every  valuable  deed  a  whole,  in  every 
realization  of  values  eternal,  an  eternally  valuable  part  in  the 
infinite  atemporal  all. 

It  is  eternally  valuable  because  a  will  maintains  itself  in  its 
seeking  of  values  and  therefore  remains  loyal  to  itself.  We 
recognized  as  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  pure  value  that 


THE  VALUES  OF  ABSOLUTENESS  429 

that  which  is  grasped  remains  the  same  in  the  new  form. 
Outside  of  us  and  beside  us  and  in  us  value  belongs  only  to 
that  which  the  will  grasps  as  realization  of  the  willed.  If  we 
are  not  loyal  to  ourselves,  we  ourselves  become  worthless  and 
sacrifice  ourselves.  To  remain  faithful  is  therefore  the  ulti- 
mate demand,  and  to  be  faithful  to  ourselves  means  to  realize 
our  will.  And  to  realize  means  to  maintain  the  old  in  the  new 
and  yet  to  take  the  new  as  starting-point  for  new  volitions. 
A  mere  skipping  and  mere  sudden  transition  from  one  state 
into  another  would  never  have  meaning.  To  fall  asleep  wish- 
less  as  the  beggar's  child  and  to  awake  as  the  child  of  the 
fairy  king,  without  memory,  without  identification  of  present 
and  past,  is  neither  progress  nor  connection  nor  happiness. 
The  new  must  have  been  willed  in  the  old  and  the  old  must  be 
grasped  in  the  new,  to  be  valuable.  In  self-loyalty  to  enhance 
our  own  will  by  creating  that  which  we  willed  with  our  deepest 
intention,  and  to  help  in  this  way  to  build  up  a  world  of  values 
in  which  the  absolutely  valid  becomes  expression  of  our 
personal  will —that  is  the  one  all-embracing  task  of  our  per- 
Jppality.  '-« 

To  upbuild  a  world  of  values !  That  is  not  attainable  for 
our  isolated  energies.  We  can  only  take  part  in  the  common 
task  of  mankind.  This  mankind  we  recognized  as  united  by 
its  belief  in  the  values,  and  this  unity,  too,  was  no  accidental 
occurrence.  We  saw  that  only  those  whose  deepest  will  posits 
the  forms  of  the  values  as  necessary  can  be  acknowledged  as 
members  of  mankind.  To  unfold  his  own  will  in  self-faith-\ 
/fulness  means  therefore  for  every  one  to  help  the  upbuilding  of  ) 
[^  the  same  common  world.  In  this  common  work  the  power 
became  enhanced.  The  history  of  mankind  thus  became  an 
endless  unfolding  of  the  own  will.  For  mankind,  too,  it  re- 
mained true  that  the  pleasure  cannot  be  the  goal  of  the  deed. 
To  bring  the  greatest  possible  pleasure  to  the  greatest  possible 
masses  the  wide  circuit  through  the  history  of  civilization 
would  not  have  been  necessary.  The  realization  of  pleasure 


430  THE  ETERNAL  VALUES 

has  hardly  been  changed  and  remains  indifferent  at  every 
stage.  To  progress  in  the  sense  of  the  self-assertion  of  the 
will  in  will-enhancement  remains  for  mankind,  too,  the  ulti- 
mate meaning  of  duty.  In  science  and  art,  in  love  and  peace, 
in  industry  and  state,  in  morality  and  law,  in  religion  and 
philosophy :  mankind  is  to  unfold  in  freedom  what  is  intended 
as  necessary  goal  of  its  own  will. 

Even  nature  serves  this  upbuilding  of  a  world  of  values 
through  history.  Nature  is  willing  to  become  material  and 
tool  of  the  evaluating  will.  In  the  progress  of  economy  nature 
climbs  from  step  to  step  through  richer  and  richer  forms  of 
serviceableness.  In  its  beauty  and  in  its  development  nature 
shows  its  will ;  in  its  causal  lawfulness,  nature  guarantees  its 
loyalty.  The  total  outer  world  resounds  with  the  will  of  the 
beings.  But  this  eternal  unity  of  outer  world  and  fellow-world 
and  inner  world  in  the  whole  richness  of  their  connections 
and  unities  and  realizations  would  never  have  been  possible 
if  they  were  not  all  flowing  from  the  same  eternal  absolute 

deed  of  the  over-self. 

That  this  over-self  is  real,  and  that  its  will  really  and  un- 
changeably  binds  our  world  of  values,  and  that  our  loyal  life 
is  therefore  endlessly  valuable,  no  knowledge  can  teach  us. 
No  knowledge  could  be  sufficient.  This  certainty  is  founded 
on  the  rock  of  conviction,  and  on  conviction,  therefore,  is 
based  every  value  of  truth,  of  unitj^of.  realization,  of  com- 
pletion. But  Ito  conviction  itself  is  ultimately  our  own 
deed?  We  cannot  leave  this  deed  undone  unless  we  are  to 
sacrifice  ourselves,  as  only  through  this  deed  our  total  world 
of  willing  is  formed  into  a  unity.  But  it  remains  our  own 
deed.  In  the  will  towards  the  unity  of  our  own  willing  the 
world-deed  is  closed,  in  which  every  demand  is  satisfied, 
every  question  answered,  every  striving  fulfilled.  To  be  faoth- 

r"fd  to^ourselves  in^eternity  —  in  such  a  deed  all  values  of  the 

I  world  are  safely  harbored. 


INDEX 


#»l 


INDEX 


Absolute,  2,  47,  77,  113,  318,  328, 

348,  394,  405,  414. 
Absoluteness,  385. 
Achievement,  258,  301,  330. 
Acknowledgment,  24,  38,  88,  110. 
Action,  61,  74,  335,  399. 
Activity,  23. 
Adjustment,  187,  360. 
.a:sthetic,  163,  177,  180,  204. 
.^thetics,  59,  156,  167,  387. 
Aflirmation,  159. 
Agreement,  78,  197. 
Animals,  110. 
Anticipation,  72. 
Anti-naturalism,  44. 
Applied  Art,  205. 
Appreciation,  17. 
A-priori,  79,  166,  354,  418,  424. 
Art,  168,  187,  204,  307. 
Artist,  171,  212. 
Atemporal,  383,  407. 
Atoms,  11,  126. 
Atonement,  376. 
Attitude,  24,  91, 104, 144. 
Authority,  52. 

Bar,  244. 

Beauty,  40,  165,  204,  249. 

Being,  88. 

Belief,  386. 

Biology,  35, 110. 

Body,  106,  415. 

Books,  227. 

Bust,  212. 

Causal,  10,  128,  140, 144. 

Causality,  126. 

Chaos,  75. 

Choice,  62. 

Chord,  246. 

China,  363. 

Christian,  367,  375,  380. 


Civilization,  80,  165,  257,  279,  317, 

373,  386. 
Classification,  132. 
Climax-value,  31. 
Coercion,  321. 
Color,  178,  225,  245. 
Comedy,  236. 
Community,  285,  310,  331. 
Completion,  78,  258. 
Conception,  111,  124. 
Conclusion,  159. 
Conditional,  28. 
Connection,  87, 116,  146. 
Conscience,  196,  331,  341. 
Consciousness,  13,  18,  43,  110. 
Conservation,  78,  128. 
Consistency,  64. 
Content,  221. 
Contradictory,  352. 
Conviction,  392,  425. 
Creation,  359. 
Criminal,  62. 

Dance,  206. 

Darwinism,  264,  283. 

Death,  271,  376. 

Decision,  58,  258. 

Deduction,  161. 

Description,  17,  130. 

Desirability,  31. 

Desires,  29. 

Details,  221. 

Development,  36,  257, 264, 301, 340. 

Devotion,  182,  192. 

Discord,  215. 

Displeasure,  65. 

Dogmatic,  88. 

Drama,  210,  230,  234. 

Economist,  27. 
Economy,  304,  308. 


434 

Education,  298,  317. 
Egotism,  332. 
Egypt,  366. 
Emotion,  363. 
Empirio-criticism,  34. 
Enjoyment,  183,  347. 
Estimation,  267,  303. 
Eternity,  421. 
Ethical,  156,  255,  330. 
Existence,  81,  87,  95,  208,  350. 
Expectation,  127,  209. 
Explanation,  17,  130,  169,  266. 

Fairy-tale,  231. 
Faithfulness,  343. 
Fate,  199. 

Feeling,  66,  172,  250. 
Fellow-will,  105. 
Fellow-world,  92. 
Fetish,  270. 
Fine  Arts,  218. 
Force,  131. 
Form,  223,  237. 
Freedom,  145,  283,  372. 
Friendship,  191. 
Fulfilment,  71,  400,  424. 
Future,  407. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


435 


General,  124. 

Generalization,  127. 

God,  266,  356,  359,  371,  379,  385. 

Gratification,  1. 

Growth,  263. 

Greece,  366,  374. 

Happiness,  195,  279,  332,  353,  368. 

Harmony,  183,  345. 

Heaven,  380. 

Hero,  234. 

Historian,  139. 

Historical,  230. 

History,  118, 122, 138, 277, 301, 371. 

Holiness,  347. 

Humanists,  35. 

Idea,  135, 186,  301. 
Idealism,  3,  41,  44,  49,  196,  304, 
312,  318. 


Identity,  72.  75,  95,  117,  134,  158, 

261,  338,  394,  406,  423. 
Illusions,  2,  364. 
Imagination,  97,  100. 
Immediacy,  23,  42. 
Immoral,  340. 
Immortality,  381. 
Impression,  94. 
Inclination,  320. 
Independence,  76. 
India,  364,  378. 
Individual,  322,  415. 
Individuality,  14,  190,  286,  396. 
Induction,  161. 
Industry,  304. 
Inefifable,  393. 
Influence,  152. 
Intention,  262. 
Introjection,  170. 
Invention,  229,  360. 
Islam,  369,  375. 
Isolation,  181. 
Israel,  367. 


Judgment,  54,  88.  119,  159,  392. 

Knowledge,  38,  87. 

Labor,  311,  314. 

Landscape,  178,  185,  205.  215. 

Language,  111. 

Law  (Natural),  122,  132. 

Law  (State),  317.  321.  330. 

Lawlessness,  326. 

Life,  11,  42,  229. 

Light,  177,  225. 

Lines,  224. 

Literature,  227. 

Logic,  387. 

Logical,  85,  156,  180,  393,  425. 

Love.  188. 

Loyalty,  63,  192.  429. 

Man,  12,  188. 
Manifoldness,  178,  195. 
Mankind,  412. 
Material,  10. 
I  Materialistic,  312. 


Meaning,  220,  238. 

Mechanism,  10. 

Melodrama,  236. 

Melody,  246. 

Memory,  96. 

Metaphysics,  48, 156,  167,  345,  356, 

388,  416. 
Miracle.  371. 
Money,  30,  315. 
Moral,  38,  60,  190,  196,  320,  340, 

428. 
Morality,  54,  297,  329,  351. 
Music.  241. 

Nation,  292. 

Naturalism,  41. 

Naturalist,  13,  126. 

Nature,  117.  121.  274.  410,  430. 

Necessity,  50. 

Norms,  52. 

Novel,  215. 

Object.  140. 
Objective,  29. 
Obligation,  46,  341. 
Opposite,  92. 
Organism,  136. 
Ought,  51. 

Over-experience,  395,  399. 
Over-individual,  39. 
Over-personal,  70,  156,  395. 
Over-reality,  318. 
Over-self,  398,  412,  420,  430. 
Over-will,  398. 

Pain,  19,  66. 

Painting,  207,  209,  219. 

Parallelism,  136. 

Past,  142,  407. 

Penalties,  327. 

Perseverance,  129. 

Persia,  365,  373. 

Personality,  27,  69,  92,   122,  297, 

337,  378,  408,  419. 
Persons,  102,  118,  138. 
Philosophy,  5,  227,  318,  352,  386. 

413.  425. 
Phylogenetic,  272. 


Physical,  90. 

Physics,  313. 

Plastic  209. 

Pleasure.  19,  51,  65,  193,  196,  332, 

428. 
Poem.  212,  230. 
Poet,  227. 

Positivism,  18,  289,  393. 
Postulate,  96,  392. 
Pragmatism,  2,  34,  41,  44. 
Predestination,  368. 
Priests,  373. 
Progress,  262,  270,  277,  281,  293, 

325. 
Pseudo-values,  28. 
Psychical,  15,  90,  135,  168. 
Psychologism,  90. 
Psychology,  4, 16,  89, 101, 134,  147, 

167,  248. 
Psychophysical,  241. 
Psychophysicist,  15. 
Purposes,  27,  265,  426. 
Purposiveness,  269. 


Race,  284. 

Reaction,  67. 

Real,  175. 

Realism,  393. 

Realization,  69,  325,  399,  423. 

Reason,  118,  155. 

Reconstruction,  23. 

Regress,  271. 

Regularities,  128. 

Relations,  99. 

Relative,  30. 

Relativism,  2,  36,  58.  < 

Religion,  354,  358,  369,  413. 

Religious,  222. 

Renunciation,  364. 

Responsibility,  62. 

Revelation,  370. 

Rhyme,  209,  238. 

Rhythm,  209,  239,  243. 

Salvation,  376,  381,  383. 
Satisfaction,  13,  65,  311,  347,  426. 
Science,  10,  87,  116,  119,  122,  130, 
133,  220. 


436 


INDEX* 


Sculptor,  209. 

Self,  90, 104,  296,  334,  337,  382,  395, 

412. 
Self-agreement,  165,  204. 
Self-assertion,  78,  349. 
Self-deception,  211. 
Self-loyalty,  342. 
Self-perfection,  211,  357. 
Self-realization,  63,  262,  303,  338. 
Sensations,  43. 
Sensuous,  183,  199. 
Skepticism,  2,  38. 
Social,  52,  304,  323. 
Society,  317,  419. 
Sociologists,  34,  123. 
Sophists,  3,  41. 
Soul.  112. 
Sound,  243. 

Space,  97,  130,  207,  408. 
Spectator,  20. 
Statutes,  320. 
Stimulus,  69. 
Style,  239. 

Subject,  103,  109,  138. 
Suggestion,  93,  106,  108. 
Sympathy,  190. 
System,  78,  80. 

Technical,  313. 
Teleological,  264. 


Theatre,  210,  214. 
Thing,  94,  98,  118. 
Thou-experience,  211. 
Time,  97,  130,  142,  382. 
Tone,  177,  242. 
Totality,  390,  401. 
Transformation,  24. 
Transition,  73. 
Transmigration,  377. 
Transvaluation,  5. 
Truth,  35,  54,  88,  166. 

Understanding,  149. 
Un-equation,  266. 
Unity,  165,  172,  187,  204,  352,  403. 
Unreal,  208,  222.  229,  232,  252,  254- 
Utilitarianism,  53. 

Validity,  56. 
Vitalism,  265. 
Volitions,  150. 
Voluntarism,  17. 

Will,  13,  59,  64,  105,  123,  141,  143, 
156,  169,  200,  288,  337,  403,  409, 
424. 

Words,  238. 

World,  9,  75.  271,  402. 

World-will.  405. 


••I 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U    .   S    .   A 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  UBRARIES 

This  book  U  due  on  the  date  Indicated  below,  or  at  the 
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provided  by  the  rules  of  the  Library  or  by  special  arrange- 
ment  with  the  Ubrarian  in  charge. 


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